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“At the moment, one of the most problematic areas of private international 
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1. Significance of the topic 
 
As a matter of fact, intellectual property (“IP”) rights constitute for many companies and 
individuals the core assets they own, and on which they ground their business activity. As a 
consequence, protection of IP rights is for such entities a decisive issue, which also means that 
litigation is crucial, even if it involves costs and uncertainties.1 Besides, the more 
globalisation proceeds, the more companies being involved in cross-border business activities 
apply for patents in, respectively for multiple States. Due to the principle of territoriality 
(which shall be subject to a deepened analysis at a later point) patents are however only valid 
in the State(s) in, respectively for which they have been granted, even if such patents may 
have the same content. In case that such parallel patents are infringed by another company, 
there is not only one infringement, but the infringement of each national patent constitutes a 
separate infringement. In such a situation, the patent holder will usually be interested in suing 
the infringer for all infringements at one place, while the infringer might be interested in the 
contrary. The situation becomes even more complicated where not only several patents are 
affected, but where there are also several infringers which potentially have acted in a 
coordinated way. Then the patent holder might be strongly interested to proceed against all 
infringers in a consolidated way, in that he sues all of them at one place, which, again, might 
be in opposition to the infringers' in interests. With regard to patents, a special problem 
consists in the fact that such intellectual property rights only come into existence when being 
granted by a State (for instance in contrast to copyright). In light of this, the question arises in 
which way infringement proceedings are affected when the alleged infringer raises the 
defence of invalidity of the concerned patent. For, not only the grant of patents, but also a 
decision on the validity of a patent might be considered so closely connected with sovereignty 
of the granting State that only the courts of this State might be competent to decide on this 
matter. Apart from such procedural questions, one should not lose out of sight that interim 
relief plays a considerable role especially in cross-border disputes.      
 
It has been underlined that there is a growing conflict between the increasing 
internationalisation of economic activity on the one hand and the nation-State-based 
organisation of the patent system on the other hand.2 For, in a globalised world, the economic 
considerations more and more go beyond the scope of patent legislation and jurisdiction.3 On 
a global scale, the solution might therefore even lie in granting international patents being 
valid all around the world, and in harmonising and integrating judicial systems to address 
existing problems with regard to international patent infringement and patent validity 
litigation.4 However, as one may doubt that this approach is realistic,5 it seems preferable to 
                                                 
1
 Fumagalli 2010, p. 16. 
2
 Artelsmair 2005, p. 14. 
3
 Artelsmair 2005, p. 14. 
4
 Pavana Kumar (2009)97(7) Current Science 1009, at p. 1012. In this context, the project of a Global Judgments 
Convention may be mentioned, which shall in parts be subject to a closer discussion at a later point in this thesis. 
However, the conception that a world patent (respectively major supranational rights) would best serve the 
protection of inventions has been refused by other parts of legal doctrine. For instance, it has been put forth that 
patent protection is rather to be found “in international, multilateral and bilateral collaboration and 
implementation, of which the EPO based on the European Patent Convention is a good example”, cf. Schade 
(2010)41(7) IIC 806, at p. 811. 
5
 Concerning this proposal, Pavana Kumar admits that “this is easier said than done, given the complex political 
systems of the nations of the world”, cf.  Pavana Kumar (2009)97(7) Current Science 1009, at p. 1012. It may be 
added that such a “global solution” will presumably fail due to existing significant differences with regard to 
legal cultures, attitudes and mentalities, and also due to the absence of a general trust among the States which 
would form the indispensable basis for such a universal, i.e. global, project.  
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strive for alternatives to “global patents”6. With regard to the European Union, this would 
mean to focus on the goal to strengthen patent protection within Europe, avoiding that patent 
protection within Europe becomes not only less effective and more expensive than patent 
protection in comparable markets, such as the USA or Japan, but to avoid as well that 
Europe’s ability to act in international arenas is likewise limited. Against this background, 
there seems to be a growing pressure to centralise the patent system.7  
 
From the European perspective, we today face a co-existence of national patents and 
European patents, and this landscape will be enriched by so-called European patents with 
unitary effect. The main difference between these types of patents consists in their varying 
territorial scope of protection. Apart from the existence of different types of patents, which 
may already cause the problem to decide which type of patent to choose (which will depend 
on primarily economic aspects), multiple further problems exist at diverse levels: international 
procedural law (in particular international jurisdiction), choice of law and substantive law. 
The title of this thesis – “Cross-border patent infringement litigation within the European 
Union” – may already generate several connotations. First, the thesis will deal with patent 
infringement litigation, and will therefore primarily deal with procedural law, in particular 
the field of international jurisdiction. Aspects of choice of law and substantive law will only 
be mentioned when essential to discuss and fully comprehend a specific procedural aspect. 
For instance, one might wonder whether respectively in which way the principle of 
territoriality which will be treated in more detail in the framework of this thesis has also 
relevance for procedural law. Noteworthily, a patent holder may become involved into 
proceedings in numerous constellations. For instance, he may find out that someone else is 
infringing his patent, and he will consequently intend to stop this infringing activity. On the 
other hand, it may also occur that someone else sues the patent holder by way of an action for 
a declaration of non-infringement in order to attain a judicial decision that there is actually no 
patent infringement. Apart from these constellations, pure validity actions may be initiated or 
defences of invalidity may be raised. While invalidity defences will be treated in this thesis 
due to the strong connection with and influence on infringement actions, this thesis will not 
deal with pure validity actions. Second, this thesis will concentrate on patent infringement 
litigation, thereby excluding, on the one hand, contractual actions (such as actions arising 
from a conflict in the framework of a license agreement), but also pure validity actions as 
already mentioned. Third, I will, in principle, leave aside purely national disputes (unless 
necessary to illustrate a specific issue), but focus on cross-border proceedings.    
 
During the recent years, cross-border patent disputes have gained more and more significance. 
This may also be based on the insight that an effective patent enforcement is an indispensable 
element of a functioning patent system besides choice of law and substantive law rules. Or 
one might even go so far to express it in the following way: In reality, the “best” patent will 
lose much of its significance and economic value if there is no effective judicial way to stop 
others from infringing it. This thesis pursues the objective to deliver a contribution for 
elaborating how effective patent infringement litigation should be formed. Being focused on 
the legal situation within the European Union, this thesis will primarily focus on the legal 
provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which has been developed from the previous 
Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. Since law is no static phenomenon, but 
rather constantly develops, the main objective of this thesis is to analyse different ways to 
amend existing deficiencies in cross-border patent litigation and to draft solutions: within the 
                                                 
6
 Cf. the provocative title of a work by Trimble “Global Patents – Limits of Transnational Enforcement” whereas 
Trimble clarifies in the first sentence of the introduction that such a global patent does not exist, cf. Trimble 
2012, p. 1. 
7
 Artelsmair 2005, p. 14. 
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existing system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation – being amended – on the one hand, or 
through alternative instruments and means on the other hand. In this respect, the European 
patent with unitary effect, and the Unified Patent Court, as alternative solutions to the present 
system of patent protection within Europe shall be treated.  
 
 
2. The approach pursued in this thesis 
 
For a clear orientation, I shall briefly outline in which way this thesis is constructed. 
Subsequent to these introductory remarks, I will proceed with discussing certain basic terms 
and principles in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, I will then treat in detail rules of international 
jurisdiction with regard to patent infringement actions according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. The focus in Chapter 2 will lie on illustrating which essential problems with 
regard to cross-border patent infringement proceedings are (still) existing under the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation which should be taken into consideration when eventually recasting the 
Regulation. The findings of Chapter 2 will form the basis for a deepened analysis undertaken 
in Chapter 3 concerning the question in which way these rules of international jurisdiction 
according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation could (respectively should) be reformulated. 
Besides analysing existing reform proposals I will also deliver own formulation proposals. In 
Chapter 4, I will deal with the creation of a European patent with unitary effect and a Unified 
Patent Court as an eventual alternative to classical European patents in order to avoid existing 
jurisdictional problems. Finally, I shall finish this thesis with a conclusion of my findings and 
proposals, and a summary.    
 
I would like to finish this introduction with a formal remark. Only for reasons of convenience, 
I chose the masculine form when referring to a plaintiff, defendant etc. This certainly does not 
imply any evaluation.   
 















































1. Basic terms and principles 
 
 
1.1 What is a patent? 
 
While the existence of a patent system is generally recognised in both common law and civil 
law countries, there are significant differences between those kinds of legal systems, which do 
not only concern details, but also affect fundamental questions and decisions such as the 
following: What is a patent? What is its nature? Which reasons may exist to justify a patent 
system? A closer look reveals that different answers may be received from the common law 
and the civil law perspective. Before analysing cross-border patent infringement proceedings 
and evaluating in which way such proceedings can be led most effectively in Europe, I shall 
give a short overview which are the concepts of a patent according to common law and civil 
law, and treat the different ways of justification for the existence of patent systems.  
 
 
1.1.1 The concepts of a patent – historical embedding 
 
 
1.1.1.1 The common law perspective 
 
In the following paragraphs, I shall briefly outline how a patent is considered and 
characterised in common law. For reasons of simplification, I shall primarily refer to English 
law, while it shall not be concealed that the described principles equally, respectively 
similarly, apply to other common law systems, such as the U.S. American law. 
 
The idea of a patent as it exists in England today is strongly determined by the Patents Act 
1977. However, in order to ensure a comprehensive understanding of its conceptional basis, I 
shall start with a short overview of the development of the concept of a patent existing before 
1977. Historically, patents were considered monopolies offered by the State, i.e. by the 
Crown. Such special privileges were granted to trade guilds and corporations as well as to 
individuals. Thus between the years 1331 and 1452, various letters of protection were issued 
to foreign weavers and other craftsmen.8 Originally, such monopolies offered by the State 
were designed to encourage the setting up of new industries,9 but also as rewards.10 To give a 
prominent example dating from the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century in Britain, the Crown 
granted privileges to subjects in return for the subject carrying out some corresponding duty. 
In the beginning, these privileges were granted in so-called “letters patent”, derived from the 
Latin expression “literae patentes”, meaning “open letters” from the Crown to the subject. 
They were named in this way “because they are not sealed up, but exposed to view, with the 
Great Seal pendant at the bottom, and are usually addressed by the Sovereign to all the 
subjects of the Realm”.11  
 
In contrast to the current system, which includes a sort of system of checks and balances, such 
a mechanism did not exist at that time, which resulted in the situation that privileges were 
conferred quite freely by the Crown. This situation had two negative consequences: on the 
one hand, patents were even granted for activities that were already being performed by 
individuals. An “inventor” was understood to cover not only the deviser of the invention but 
                                                 
8
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-07. 
9
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-08.  
10
 Bently & Sherman 2001, p. 310; Cornish & Llewelyn 2003, para. 3–04.  
11
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-02. 
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also one who imported it from abroad.12 For instance, to illustrate that practice, the Crown 
granted a monopoly over the selling of playing cards (Darcy's Patent for the monopoly of 
importing, manufacturing and selling playing cards, which was the subject of the famous Case 
of Monopolies).13 On the other hand, towards the end of the Elizabeth's reign, abuses crept in. 
Monopolies were granted to court favourites and the like in respect of the right to sell staple 
commodities, which led to vociferous complaints.14  
 
As this practice provoked more and more criticism, the abuses of the monopoly system 
becoming so scandalous that the agents most concerned in enforcing certain patents were 
impeached and some twenty patents were thereupon revoked by proclamation,15 the Crown's 
right to grant such privileges was both challenged in the courts16 and became subject to 
parliamentary intervention with the passage of the 1624 Statute of Monopolies. The latter 
effected a limitation of the circumstances in which a patent could be granted and also 
restrained the duration of the patents for new manufacture to a period of fourteen years 
(covering two terms of apprenticeship).17 
 
From 1624 to 1835 the actual procedure for the grant and enforcement of patents remained 
completely a matter for the common law.18 Regarding the nature of the patent itself, the 
nineteenth century brought the most significant changes; patents changed from primarily 
being a creature of Crown prerogative to become a creature of bureaucracy.19 This process 
was accompanied by the development of patent law, both in an academic way and by judicial 
decisions. Important changes in the procedure for obtaining the grant (including provisional 
protection) were introduced by the Act of 1852 which provided also for the establishment of 
the Patent Office,20 and by the Acts of 1883 to 1888 there came into being the system that 
existed until 1 June 1978 when substantially the whole of the Patents Act 1977 came into 
operation.21 Until the Patents and Designs Act 1932 the grounds upon which a patent could be 
revoked, meaning the grounds of invalidity, had remained the grounds available at common 
law, but that Act, while retaining the grounds at common law, additionally introduced several 
specific statutory grounds.22 By the Patents Act 1949, the last of the “old statutes”23, i.e. those 
statutes before the Patents Act 1977, the legislator abolished the grounds available at common 
law leaving the statutory grounds specified in that Act as constituting the complete code of 
grounds upon which a patent could be revoked.24 The Patents Act 1949 provided, for the first 
time, for the appointment of specialist patent judges to hear patent matters.25 The Patents Act 
1977 has effected far-reaching changes in the English patent system and law. Despite the 
enactment of the Patents Act 1977, a number of provisions of the Act of 1949 (as amended) 
continued to apply to existing patents and patent applications,26 i.e. patents granted and 
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 Cornish & Llewelyn 2003, para. 3–05. 
13
 Darcy v. All(e)in (1602) Co Rep 84b, 1 W.P.C. 1; cf. Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 
1-09. 
14
 Reid 1999, para. 1.16. 
15
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-10. 
16
 Clothworkers of Ipswich Case (1614) Godbolt 252. 
17
 Bently & Sherman 2001, p. 311. 
18
 Reid 1999, para. 1.19. 
19
 Bently & Sherman 2001, p. 311. 
20
 Reid 1999, para. 1.19. 
21
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-23. 
22
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-23; Reid 1999, para. 1.19. 
23
 Reid 1999, para. 1.19. 
24
 House of Lords 27 October 1970, American Cyanamid Company (Dann’s) Patent, [1970] F.S.R. 443 – 
American Cyanamid Company (Dann’s) Patent; Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-23. 
25
 Cf. s.84(1) of the Patents Act 1949 
26
 Cf. s.127 and Scheds. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Patents Act 1977. 
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applications for patents in being before 1 June 1978 (when substantially the whole of the 
Patents Act 1977 entered into force), the last of which did not expire until 1998.27 I shall come 
back to the Patents Act 1977 when treating specific aspects of English patent law at a later 
point in this Chapter. Here it may suffice to highlight that the Patents Act 1977, in particular, 
introduced provisions as to novelty and inventive steps which follow corresponding 
provisions in the European Patent Convention (EPC).28 With regard to subsequent sets of 
rules established to amend the Patents Act 1977, I shall, owed to the objective pursued here to 
merely deliver a brief overview of the concepts of a patent, restrict myself to mention the 
Patents Act 2004. One of the main purposes of this Act was to bring UK domestic law into 
line with the revisions to the EPC agreed in November 2000.29 
 
 
1.1.1.2 The civil law perspective 
 
Similarly to the common law perspective, civil law legal systems also assume that IP rights 
such as patents shall promote industry and economic progress by protecting the inventor's 
intellectual and commercial achievement and connected interests, assigning him the economic 
value of the intellectual goods created by him.30 However, as will become clear in the 
following paragraphs, while this general idea is equal in both legal systems, the concept of a 
patent as well as the justifications given for the existence of patents vary to a notable extent 
between common and civil law. As there are also differences between civil law States, both 
France and Germany shall be treated. 
 
 
1.1.1.2.1 France  
 
Similarly to the development in common law, the civil law patent can be deduced from the 
medieval privilege. In contrast to patents, the function of a privilege was not in the first place 
to exclude others from the invention and its exploitation, but to entitle the inventor to make 
use of his invention.31 This led to the situation that the Sovereign more and more used the 
grant of privileges to gain money and to promote his favourites. The climax of this privilege 
system on the European continent, governed by civil law32, came under the regime of 
absolutism in France. In this period, money flowing from the grant of privileges had become a 
main revenue of the State, particularly for the running of royal manufactures.33 In contrast to 
England, where the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 limited the misuse of the allocation of 
patents and restricted it to the first inventor, the privilege system in France stayed in force 
regardless of a legal restriction of the privilege as to the duration and the inheritableness in 
1762. It was not before 1789 that, in the course of the French Revolution, the privilege system 
was formally abolished.34 One important consequence of the French Revolution was its image 
of the human being having genuine human rights and fundamental liberties. Consequently, 
inventions were now considered human achievements worthy to be protected because an 
                                                 
27
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-23. 
28
 These provisions are s. 2(1),(2) and (3) of the Patents Act 1977, corresponding to Articles 54-56 of the EPC; 
cf. Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-25. 
29
 Miller, Burkill, Birss & Campbell 2011 (Terrell), para. 1-36. 
30
 Jestaedt 2008, para. 2. 
31
 Osterrieth 2010, para. 25. 
32
 It is admitted that one might differentiate, beyond the differentiation between civil law and common law legal 
families, between those systems and the Nordic legal family. However, for reasons of simplification, the latter 
group shall not be separately taken into consideration in this thesis.  
33
 Osterrieth 2010, para. 25. 
34
 Osterrieth 2010, para. 26. 
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individual had created them. According to this idea, the French Patent Act of 1791 made the 
inventor the owner of his invention. Also in accordance with the latter concept, but in 
opposition to English law at that time, the French Patent Act of 1791 did not require an 
official examination of novelty or even utility.35 Furthermore, patents for imported things and 
methods were granted as well.36 As the act of invention itself conferred ownership of the thing 
or the invented process to the inventor, the official examination of novelty and utility would 
only have a declaratory rather than a constitutive effect.37 Today it is in particular the Code de 





In Germany – which initially consisted of multiple territorial States – the idea of industrial 
property did not play an important role at the beginning of the nineteenth century, due to the 
fact that the lack of one unified German State led to burdens for commerce, which was still 
captured in a guild system, and industry.38 However, step by step, the liberal ideas of the 
French Revolution also found their way into the German territories. In contrast to France, but 
similarly to England, the general opinion in most German territories now consisted in a dislike 
of any monopolies, because monopolies were considered as an institution being contrary to 
the given liberties.39 Only the bigger German States, if any, introduced acts to protect 
inventions, while smaller States merely granted privileges if the inventions were already 
protected in another State. Prussia was very reluctant to grant patents, because authorities 
believed that commerce was best promoted by granting merely few patents.40 Similarly, the 
German Customs Society (Deutscher Zollverein), founded in 1833, promoted a further 
restriction of the patent system, because patents were considered as tax monopolies which 
should be prevented. After the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, the first German 
Patent Act was passed in 1877, and updated in 1891. The latter brought along a refined patent 
protection, protecting not necessarily the actual inventor but the one who was registered first 
after an examination by the patent office. Consequently, the grant of a patent had constitutive 
and not only declaratory effect.41 Today, the Patentgesetz which contains both substantive and 
procedural provisions is the most relevant national legal source of patent law in Germany. 
 
 
1.1.2 Ways of justification for the existence of patents 
 
 
1.1.2.1 The common law perspective 
 
Noteworthily, both “individual” and “public” justifications have been referred to in the 
arguments in favour of patents for invention, as for other kinds of intellectual property law.42 
On the one hand, it has been emphasised that an inventor has a natural or moral right to the 
products of his mental labour (deontological or natural rights justification). According to this 
theory, social or competitive consequences are not taken into consideration. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that justice demands that an inventor's contribution should be 
                                                 
35
 Kraßer 2009, p. 60. 
36
 Kraßer 2009, p. 60. 
37
 Kraßer 2009, p. 60-61. 
38
 Jestaedt 2008, para. 29. 
39
 Jestaedt 2008, para. 29. 
40
 Jestaedt 2008, para. 29. 
41
 Osterrieth 2010, paras. 31-32. 
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 Cornish & Llewelyn 2003, para. 3–36. 
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recognised by the grant of a reward.43 However, the most prominent rationale being 
developed under (English) common law in order to justify a strong, effective patent system is 
the thesis that the grant of patent monopolies effects public benefits, in that a system more 
similar to copyright – with its “property”-like duration and its protection of all original 
creations, but only against copying – would seem more appropriate, if the major reason for a 
patent system were to give the inventor his just reward.44 This argumentation is called the 
consequentialist or utilitarian justification. While it has been used in different variations, its 
basic idea is that the public should only ever have to endure the harm caused by the grant of a 
patent if the public also receives some corresponding benefit.45 The main objectives of a 
patent system are thus said to be the encouragement of industry, employment and growth, 
rather than justice to the “inventor” for his effort.46 The latter aspect is thus seen as a mere by-
product of granting a patent, as an incidental consequence of modern patent systems, which 
do not protect each inventor who conceives an invention but only entitle the first-comer – i.e 
the first to apply for a patent, not necessarily being the first to invent – by giving him 
priority.47 In detail, it has been argued that the public interest in the patent system flows from 
the fact that the patentee introduced a form of technology that had not previously been 
available. Initially, this often simply involved the patentee importing information about a 
trade or a craft from another State. Later, this rationale was replaced by the argument that the 
public benefit lay in the disclosure of the invention occurring on publication of the patent 
application. This role of the patent has been referred to as the “information function” of the 
patent system.48 According to this point of view, patents are considered to act as incentives to 
individuals or organizations to disclose information that may have otherwise remained 
secret.49 Furthermore, it has been emphasised that patents provide an incentive for the 
production of new inventions.50 Following this approach, the underlying purpose of a patent 
system might actually be seen in the “encouragement of improvements and innovation”51, the 
inventor receiving, in return for making known his improvement to the public, the benefit of a 
period of monopoly during which he becomes entitled to prevent others from performing his 
invention except by his licence. As they benefit economically from such a system, investors 
are considered more willing to fund research and development. Consequently, patents link 
scientific and technical research with commercial interests.52 
 
It has been argued that the whole patent transaction can thus be thought of as a bargain or 
contract between the inventor and the State, both parties bringing consideration to that 
contract. The consideration of the State consists in giving the patent to the inventor, and the 
inventor, applying for the patent, brings consideration in terms of fees and by adding his 
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1.1.2.2 The civil law perspective 
 
In contrast to common law, which strongly emphasises the idea of public benefit when 
arguing in favour of an effective patent system (while there are different attempts concerning 
the exact argumentation), the civil law approach rather tends to stress the protection of private 
interests and so emphasises the character of patents as a type of intellectual property. As to 
those private interests, it can be differentiated between economic interests, following directly 
from the fact that the inventor invested money in the development of a product or a process54 
and thus shall benefit from the fruits of his invention, and personal interests based on the 
personality right of the inventor as an individual and thus linked indirectly with an 
invention.55 Although the latter aspect might be more relevant in the field of copyright law, it 
is generally recognised that the personality right is to be protected as to patent rights, too.56 
On the other hand, public interests are generally regarded as simple motives of the legislator 
without having (much) independent importance. However, in some respect also civil law legal 
systems take into consideration those public interests, for instance in respect of attributing IP 
rights, determining the object respectively extent of protection, and ensuring legal 
protection.57    
 
 
1.2 National patents, European patents and European patents with unitary effect 
 
 
1.2.1 Status quo: National patents and European patents 
 
At present, patent protection in Europe is characterised by the coexistence of two available 
types of patents: national patents granted by competent national authorities, and European 
patents granted by the European Patent Office, a body of the European Patent Organisation 
(EPO) which is an international organisation being situated in Munich and The Hague, 
comprising 38 members (among which 28 are EU Member States, besides 10 other European 
countries).  
 
Both national patents and European patents, the latter being bundles of national patents,58 are 
granted and protected according to national law. As to European patents, their scope of 
protection is thus more limited than eventually to be expected according to their designation 
at first glance. On the one hand, the European Patent Convention (hereinafter EPC) provides a 
single procedure for granting European patents. One single patent application being filed in 
any language and prosecuted in English, French or German, must be made. The full text of the 
patent is to be published in the chosen official language of the EPO. A translation into the 
other two official languages of the EPO, of the part of the patent defining the scope of 
protection, i.e. the claims, must be produced. Eventually, the designated States of the EPC 
may require further translation into their own languages after grant, typically within a period 
of three months.59 On the other hand, it is to be noted that a European patent is not per se 
effective for all Contracting States to the EPC. Rather, the applicant must choose for which 
countries protection shall be gained, and validate the European patent in these States 
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 33 
according to the respective validation requirements which may vary among each other. 
Furthermore, the fate of a European patent, once having been granted and validated, may vary 
among the States for which protection has been gained. The present European patent thus 
actually represents a bundle of national patents. In procedural respect, this causes the need to 
potentially litigate a European patent in multiple jurisdictions, and to enforce it separately in 
each State. As a consequence, contradictory decisions may appear in a State and between 
States in first, second or third instance, due to different evidence put before judges, different 
experts used in different jurisdictions, different advocates dealing with the case and 
inconsistent implementation of European Directives.60 Although there has been harmonisation 
in the approaches taken by different countries, the remaining differences can still result in 
forum shopping, with the different particularities of different countries’ judicial systems being 
exploited variously by patentees and defendants.61 Also, some countries may have more 
infringers than others, and in some of the smaller countries, the cost of litigation may be out 
of proportion to the level of infringement, leading to the result that patent enforcement may 
not be a viable undertaking in smaller countries.  
 
With regard to actions concerning national patents, national courts have jurisdiction. In case 
of references for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ will come into play. The same currently applies 
with regard to European patents. Once the Unified Patent Court (UPC) will have been 
installed, that court will have jurisdiction for European patents (beside national courts for a 
transitional period of seven years). The ECJ will remain competent to answer references for a 
preliminary ruling.  
 
 
1.2.2 To be established: European patents with unitary effect  
   
By way of Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012, the so-called European patent 
with unitary effect is being developed as a third option beside national patents and classical 
European patents as illustrated above.62 While the question of whether simultaneous 
protection via a unitary patent and a national patent is possible will have to be clarified in 
national provisions,63 Article 4(2) of Regulation 1257/2012 makes clear that it will be 
impossible to have the same patent granted as a unitary patent and a classical European patent 
without unitary effect. A European patent with unitary effect will be effective in all 
participating Member States and thus will ensure uniform protection for an invention in these 
States.  
 
With regard to European patents with unitary effect, the future Unified Patent Court (UPC) 
shall have jurisdiction (beside national courts for a transitional period of seven years). The 
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1.3 Patent categories: product patents and process patents 
 
Noteworthily, both common law and civil law systems provide for the possibility to grant a 
patent on a product (product patent) or on a process (process patent). As the differentiation 
between product patents and process patents will be relevant in this thesis, I shall continue 
with a short illustration of the most important rules in this respect, addressing the common 
law, civil law and European perspective. 
 
 
1.3.1 The common law perspective 
 
Again, I shall refer to English law when discussing the common law perspective. According 
to the above cited Statute of Monopolies from 1624, all grants of monopoly rights were 
declared to be void at common law, except from letters patent and grants of privilege in 
respect of any “manner of new manufactures”. Under the Patents Act 1949, the predecessor of 
the Patents Act 1977, the definition of a patent was extended: an invention, to be patentable, 
must either be a “manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of 
privilege within section six of the Statute of Monopolies”, or be a new method or process of 
testing applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture.64  
 
Under the Patents Act 1977 – its passage being necessary for bringing into harmony English 
law with the provisions of the European Patent Convention of 1973, to which the United 
Kingdom adhered65 – the former definition of an invention as a “manner of new manufacture” 
as well as the body of case-law which interpreted that definition has become obsolete. It has 
been replaced by a statutory codification of the requirements of patentability, in section 1(1) 
to 1(4) of the Patents Act 1977, based upon and intended to have the same effects as the 
corresponding provisions of Articles 52 to 57 of the European Patent Convention, with certain 
amendments to section 1(3) and (4) giving effect to Article 27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement.66 
The text of section 1 of the Patents Act 1977 provides as follows: 
 
 
 Section 1 
 
 (1) A patent may be granted only for an invention in respect of which the following conditions are 
 satisfied, that is to say– 
 
  (a) the invention is new; 
 
  (b) it involves an inventive step; 
 
  (c) it is capable of industrial application; 
 
  (d) the grant of a patent for it is not excluded by subsections (2) and (3) below; 
 
 and references in this Act to a patentable invention shall be construed accordingly. 
 
 (2) It is hereby declared that the following (among other things) are not inventions for the purposes of 
 this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of– 
 
  (a) discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method; 
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  (b) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever; 
 
  (c) a scheme, rule or method for performing a mental act, playing a game or doing business, or 
  a program for a computer; 
 
  (d) the presentation of information; 
 
 but the foregoing provision shall prevent anything from being treated as an invention for the purposes of 
 this Act only to the extent that a patent or application for a patent relates to that thing as such.  
 
 (3) A patent shall not be granted– 
 
  (...); 
 
  (b) for any variety of animal or plant or any essentially biological process for the production of 
  animals or plants, not being a micro-biological process or the product of such a process. 
 
 (...)  
  
 
According to the definition in section 1(1) of the Patents Act 1977, the term “patentable 
invention” is defined as an invention that satisfies the four conditions laid down in that 
section. Besides, protection concerning a process is not excluded by the negative enumeration 
within section 1(2) of the Patents Act 1977 clearly reflecting Article 52(2) of the EPC. The 
wording of section 1 of the Patents Act 1977 is thus formulated in a way that comprises both 
product patents and process patents. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that patent protection principally equally applies to a process can also be 
derived from the fact that section 1(3)(b) of the Patents Act 1977 which reflects Article 53(b) 
of the EPC, while excluding certain essentially biological processes from patentability, 
explicitly states that a patent can be granted in case of a micro-biological process.  
 
Additionally, the definition of the term “invention” in section 125(1) of the Patents Act 1977 
affects product patents as well as process patents: 
 
 
 Section 125 
 
 (1) For the purposes of this Act an invention for a patent for which an application has been made or for 
 which a patent has been granted shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be taken to be that 
 specified in a claim of the specification of the application or patent, as the case may be, as interpreted 
 by the description and any drawing contained in that specification, and the extent of the protection 
 conferred by a patent or application for a patent shall be determined accordingly. 
 
 
The fact that both product patents and process patents are protected under the Patents Act 
1977 is further confirmed by the fact that provisions as section 60(1) of the Patents Act 1977 
where both categories of patents are explicitly addressed: 
 
 
 Section 60 Infringement 
 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person infringes a patent for an invention if, but only if, 
 while the patent is in force, he does any of the following things in the United Kingdom in relation to the 
 invention without the consent of the proprietor of the patent, that is to say–  
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  (a) where the invention is a product, he makes, disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports 
  the product or keeps it whether for disposal or otherwise; 
 
  (b) where the invention is a process, he uses the process or he offers it for the use in the United 
  Kingdom when he knows, or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the circumstances, that its 
  use there  without the consent of the proprietor would be an infringement of the patent; 
 
  (c) where the invention is a process, he disposes of, offers to dispose of, uses or imports any 
  product obtained directly by means of that process or keeps any such product whether for 
  disposal or otherwise. [underscores added] 
 
 
As a result, it can be concluded that all new technological processes, machines, devices, 
articles, products and compositions are, in principle, of inherently patentable nature.67 
 
 
1.3.2 The civil law perspective 
 
In the following paragraphs, it shall be demonstrated that the differentiation between product 
patents and process patents is also known and ensured in civil law systems within Europe. At 
least in this respect, the situation is therefore comparable to the situation in England. The 





In contrast to French copyright law, which contains a typology of what can be object of a 
copyright, the set of rules concerning patents do not imply such an enumeration of types of 
patentable inventions.68 However, the Code de la propriété intellectuelle contains inter alia, 
in its first title implying several provisions with regard to patents (“brevets d'invention”), in 
the first chapter, third part, provision L. 611-10 which reads: 
 
  
 L. 611-10 
 
 (1) Sont brevetables les inventions nouvelles impliquant une activité inventive et susceptibles 
 d'application industrielle. 
 
 (2) Ne sont pas considérées comme des inventions au sens du premier alinéa du présent article 
 notamment: 
 
  (a) Les découvertes ainsi que les théories scientifiques et les méthodes mathématiques; 
 
  (b) Les créations esthétiques, 
 
  (c) Les plans, principes et méthodes dans l'exercice d'activités intellectuelles, en matière de jeu 
  ou dans le domaine des activités économiques, ainsi que les programmes d'ordinateurs; 
 
  (d) Les présentations d'informations. 
 
 (3) Les dispositions du 2 du présent article n'excluent la brevetabilité des éléments énumérés auxdites 
 dispositions que dans la mesure où la demande de brevet ou le brevet de concerne que l'un de ces 
 éléments considéré en tant que tel. 
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 (L. 611-10 
 
 (1) New inventions are patentable which involve an inventive step and which are susceptible of 
 industrial application. 
 
 (2) The following are not regarded as inventions within the meaning of the first paragraph of this article: 
 
  (a) Discoveries as well as scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
 
  (b Aesthetic creations; 
 
  (c) Schemes, principles and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing 
  business, and programs for computers; 
 
  (d) Presentations of information. 
 
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 of this article exclude patentability of the enumerated items referred 
to in these provisions only to the extent to which the patent application or the patent relates to such 
items as such.)69   
 
 
In the first paragraph of L. 611-10, the French legislator used, in accordance with Article 
52(1) of the EPC, the term “invention” in a quite broad way, neither referring to a product in 
the sense of a physical object, nor to a process. Besides, protection concerning a process is not 
excluded by the negative enumeration within the second paragraph of L. 611-10 which clearly 
reflects Article 52(2) of the EPC. This may already suggest that patents can be gained for both 
products and processes.  
 
Additionally, in provision L. 611-17, the French legislator, while generally excluding certain 
essentially biological processes from the scope of patentable inventions, explicitly admitted 
microbiological processes and the products thereof as patentable:  
 
 
 L. 611-17 
 
 Ne sont pas brevetables: 
 
 (...) 
 c) Les races animales ainsi que les procédés essentiellement biologiques d'obtention de végétaux ou 
 d'animaux, cette disposition ne s'appliquant pas aux procédés microbiologiques et aux produits obtenus 
 par ces procédés.  
 
 
 (L. 611-17  
 
 The following things are not patentable: 
 
 (...) 
 (c) Animal varieties as well as well as essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
 animals, while this provision does not apply to microbiological processes and products gained from 
 such processes. [underscores added])70 
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The fact that this provision which reflects Article 53(b) of the EPC, not only mentions 
processes in the framework of a discussion of patentability, but explicitly states that certain 
types of processes are patentable proves that French law in principle, i.e. in the framework of 
existing restrictions as to specific areas, provides for patent protection both for products and 
processes.71 In case of a product patent, the product, as the object of the invention, is simply a 
physical object that can be described according to its composition, structure, form and 
function.72 A process patent refers to an invention of the application of means according to a 
succession of states or stages to become effective within a determined order and under 





The German Patentgesetz, which contains substantive provisions as to the protection of 
German patents on a national basis, applies both to product patents and to process patents. 
This is already suggested by the open wording of section 1(1) of the Patentgesetz (“Patente”) 
and the fact that section 1(2) of the Patentgesetz explicitly mentions patents for specific 
processes in conjunction with biological material. In this respect, German patent law differs, 
in schematic respect, from the legal situation in France presented above, where, closely 
reflecting Articles 52 and 53 of the EPC, inventions of processes are merely indirectly 
addressed as objects for a patent, by way of a re-exception (cf. L. 611-17 of the French Code 
de la propriété intellectuelle discussed above). Although the provisions of the German 
Patentgesetz also reflect the provisions of the European Patent Convention, the German 
legislator, in deviation from the Convention, explicitly mentioned and declared patentable, in 
section 1(2) of the Patentgesetz, processes to create, work or use biological material, and 
added exceptions in other provisions.74 Besides, section 9 of the Patentgesetz expressly 
differentiates between product patents and process patents.  
 
For a better understanding of the following discussion of the treatment of product patents and 




 § 1   Erfindung, Patentfähigkeit 
 
 (1) Patente werden für Erfindungen erteilt, die neu sind, auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruhen und 
 gewerblich anwendbar sind. 
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 (2) Patente werden für Erfindungen im Sinne von Absatz 1 auch dann erteilt, wenn sie ein Erzeugnis, 
 das aus biologischem Material besteht oder dieses enthält, oder wenn sie ein Verfahren, mit dem 
 biologisches Material hergestellt oder bearbeitet wird oder bei dem es verwendet wird, zum Gegenstand 
 haben. (...) 
 
 
 (§ 1   Invention, Patentability 
 
 (1) Patents are granted for inventions that are new, based on an inventory activity and commercially 
 applicable. 
 
(2) Patents are also granted for inventions in the sense of subsection 1, if they concern a product that 
consists of biological material or contains such material, or if they concern a process through which 
biological material is manufactured or worked or in which it is used. (...))75  
 
 
Section 9 of the Patentgesetz reads: 
 
 
 § 9   Wirkung des Patents 
 
 Das Patent hat die Wirkung, dass allein der Patentinhaber im Rahmen des geltenden Rechts befugt ist, 
 die patentierte Erfindung im Rahmen des geltenden Rechts zu benutzen. Jedem Dritten ist es verboten, 
 ohne seine Zustimmung 
 
 1. ein Erzeugnis, das Gegenstand des Patents ist, herzustellen, anzubieten, in Verkehr zu bringen oder 
 zu gebrauchen oder zu den genannten Zwecken entweder einzuführen oder zu besitzen; 
 
 2. ein Verfahren, das Gegenstand des Patents ist, anzuwenden oder, wenn der Dritte weiß oder es auf 
 Grund der Umstände offensichtlich ist, dass die Anwendung des Verfahrens ohne Zustimmung des 
 Patentinhabers verboten ist, zur Anwendung im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes anzubieten; 
 
 3. das durch ein Verfahren, das Gegenstand des Patents ist, unmittelbar hergestellte Erzeugnis 
 anzubieten, in Verkehr zu bringen oder zu gebrauchen oder zu den genannten Zwecken entweder 
 einzuführen oder zu besitzen.  
 
 
 (§ 9   Effects of the Patent    
 
 The patent has the effect that only the holder of the patent has the right, in the framework of the 
 applicable law, to use, in the framework of the applicable law, the invention for which the patent was 
 granted. Every third party may not, without the consent of the patent holder, 
 
 1. manufacture, offer, put into circulation, use or, for the aforementioned purposes, import or 
 possess a product which is the object of the patent; 
 
 2. apply a process which is the object of the patent or, if the third party knows or if it is obvious in the 
 circumstances that the application of the process is prohibited without consent of the patent holder, 
 offer such a process which is the object of a patent for application within the scope of application of this 
 Act; 
 
3. offer, put into circulation or use or, for the aforementioned purposes, import or possess the 
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Patents can thus be granted with regard to products or processes. Accordingly, inventions are 
classified into patents which, on the one hand, concern the design of products, objects, 
equipment or materials, or, on the other hand, concern processes concerning the manufacture 
of products, the use of objects or the achievement of a result. Product patents and process 
patents have different legal effects, due to the fact that different types of use are protected by 
these patents. Indeed the classification of patents into product patents and process patents is 
based on these differences as to the protection granted by the respective patent category.77  
 
The object of a product patent is not the product as such, but rather the invention that led to 
the product.78 However, the protection of a product patent is effected by prohibiting a third 
party from dealing with the concerned product in a certain way specified by the law (cf. 
Section 9 2nd sentence no. 1 of the Patentgesetz).79 In light of this, the product patent grants 
comprehensive protection, because the patent holder is granted the exclusive right of all 
possibilities to manufacture and use the product concerned.80 As a consequence, the 
infringement of a product patent does not depend on a specific mode or way of manufacture.81   
 
As to process patents (cf. Section 9 2nd sentence no. 2 and no. 3 of the Patentgesetz), it is to be 
differentiated between processes of manufacture (no. 3) – which is interpreted in a broad 
way82 – and other processes (no. 2). Process patents of manufacture show the particularity that 
not only the process is protected but also the product that is immediately manufactured 
through that process. In contrast to product patents according to Section 9 2nd sentence no. 1 
of the Patentgesetz, protection according to no. 3 only exists if there is an immediate 
connection between the protected process and the product. As a consequence, a product is not 
protected according to no. 3 if the manufacture was undertaken on the basis of another 
process than the protected process.83   
 
 
1.3.3 The European perspective 
 
It is noteworthy that the conception of a differentiation between product patents and process 
patents has also been adopted at the European level. When discussing national provisions of 
patent law above, it has become clear that, although these provisions differ to a certain extent, 
they are however similar. As has been mentioned, the reason for this phenomenon is the 
construction of the respective provisions, in the analysed legal systems, reflecting the articles 
of the European Patent Convention. For convenience, the respective rules of the EPC shall be 
coherently presented here as far as being relevant in this context. As the so-called European 
patent constitutes in fact a bundle of national patents, this harmony of conceptions is required 
to ensure an adequate patent protection.  
  
Article 52 of the EPC provides: 
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 Article 52 Patentable inventions 
 
 (1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, 
 which are new and which involve an inventive step. 
 
 (2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1: 
 
  (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
 
  (b) aesthetic creations; 
 
  (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, 
  and programs for computers; 
 
  (d) presentations of information. 
 
 (3) The provisions in paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred 
 to in that provision only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates 
 to such subject-matter or activities as such. 
 
 (...)   
  
 




 Article 53 Exceptions to patentability 
 
 European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
 
 (...) 
 (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; 
 this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof. 
 
 
Additionally, Article 64(2) of the European Patent Convention (EPC) explicitly confirms the 
potential patentability of inventions concerning processes: 
 
 
 Article 64 Rights conferred by a European patent 
 
 (...) 
 (2) If the subject-matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall 
 extend to the products directly obtained by such process. 
 
 
1.4 The principle of territoriality 
 
Both in civil law and common law legal systems, the principle of territoriality has always 
been accepted. However, different conceptions exist about the exact scope and meaning of 
this principle. In the following paragraphs, I shall deliver a brief outline.    
 
 
1.4.1 Different conceptions of the principle of territoriality 
 
To put it in a nutshell, three possible interpretations can be distinguished. 
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1.4.1.1 Private international law interpretation 
 
On the one hand, it has been put forth that the principle of territoriality immediately and 
necessarily effects that the fate of intellectual property rights – i.e. both their creation, 
existence and termination – is fully determined by the legal provisions of the State where 
respectively for which the concerned right has been granted.84 
 
 
1.4.1.2 Substantive law interpretation 
 
Besides, the prevailing legal opinion advocates a conception according to which the principle 
of territoriality has no effect at the level of private international law, but solely at the level of 
substantive law, in that intellectual property rights, due to their territorial limitation, are 
merely protected within the territory of the granting State.85 Accordingly, national patents 
granted by national authorities only confer protection for the States to which these authorities 




1.4.1.3 Combined approach86 
 
However, a decision between the aforementioned conceptions is dispensable,87 because those 
conceptions usually will hardly lead to different results in practice. For those who advocate a 
private international law interpretation admit that the principle of territoriality is also relevant 
for the territorial limitation of the effect of the concerned intellectual property rights,88 and on 
the other hand, those who prefer a substantive law interpretation, acknowledge that the 
territoriality of the concerned intellectual property rights have effects at the level of private 
international law (in terms of the principle of lex loci protectionis, meaning that the law of the 
granting State is decisive for the assessment of private international law with regard to 
patents).89 After all, there is no doubt or dispute about the existence of both the principle of 
territoriality and the principle of lex loci protectionis.90 Therefore, the issue of whether the 
principle of lex loci protectionis is an inevitable consequence of the principle of territoriality, 
or rather constitutes an autonomous principle, does not have to be decided. 
 
 
1.4.2 Is the principle of territoriality relevant for international jurisdiction in cross-
border patent infringement disputes? 
 
Regardless of the exact meaning of the principle of territoriality, the question arises which 
role is to be attributed to this principle with regard to the issue of international jurisdiction. In 
concreto: Shall the courts situated in the granting State, due to the principle of territoriality, be 
conferred exclusive international jurisdiction also (beside validity actions) with regard to 
actions concerning the infringement of patents granted for this State?    
                                                 
84
 Troller 1952, p. 48; Ebner 2004, pp. 21-22; Sack (2000)46(3) WRP 269, at p. 270 with further references. 
85
 Drexl 2015 (Münchener Kommentar zum BGB), Internationales Immaterialgüterrecht, para. 14; Otte 
(2001)21(4) IPRax 315, at p. 316; Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 7, there fn. 8-10; Schack (2003)23(2) IPRax 141, at p. 
141; Fezer & Koos 2010 (Staudinger), para. 883; Keller 2006, p. 449.  
86
 Cf. Sack (2000)46(3) WRP 269, at p. 270; cf. also: Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 7-8. 
87
 Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 7-8; differently: Schauwecker 2009, p. 15.  
88
 Troller 1952, pp. 48-53. 
89
 Fezer 2009, Einleitung H. Internationales Markenprivatrecht, para. 15. 
90
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 14; Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 7-8; Otte (2001)21(4) IPRax 315, at p. 316.  
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Traditionally, national courts of European Member States denied, by reference to the principle 
of territoriality, to have international jurisdiction to decide on infringement actions concerning 
foreign patents respectively other intellectual property rights.91 While German courts 
relatively early adopted a more liberal approach, English, French and Dutch courts upheld a 
restrictive conception for a long time.  
 
To illustrate the (change of) attitude of national courts of selected States within the European 
Union as to the issue in question, I shall give an overview of relevant jurisprudence in the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
 
1.4.2.1 Court decisions in the United Kingdom 
 
Traditionally, English courts have been of the opinion that they do not have jurisdiction with 
regard to infringement proceedings concerning foreign patents respectively proceedings 
concerning foreign intellectual property rights in general.92 Only within the scope of the 
Brussels Convention respectively Brussels I Regulation they have ultimately accepted such 
jurisdiction.93 This strict conception has been primarily based on two principles developed in 
common law: the so-called Moçambique rule and the double-actionability rule. With regard 
to actions which do not affect the Brussels Convention respectively the Brussels I Regulation, 
English courts have kept their strict view of not having jurisdiction where foreign patents are 
concerned.   
 
 
1.4.2.1.1 The Moçambique rule 
 
In its landmark Moçambique decision, the House of Lords held – which has been called the 
Moçambique rule – that English courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain an action to 
recover damages for a trespass to land situate abroad.94 Being initially developed in the 
context of a trespass to lands, this rule was later applied as well to intellectual property rights 
being registered or acquired otherwise95 abroad.96 The following three citations may give an 
idea of this conception. In Tyburn Productions, Justice Vinelott addressed  
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 Stauder & Kur 2001, p. 152; Ebner 2004, pp. 164-166. 
92
 Cf. Bragiel (1999)2 I.P.Q. 135 
93
 Cf. the historical overview delivered in: High Court of Justice 14 and 16 October 1997, and Court of Appeal 
27 October 1997, Fort Dodge Animal Health Limited and Others v AKZO Nobel N.V. and Another, [1998] 
F.S.R. 222, 226-230 – Fort Dodge. 
94 House of Lords 8 September 1893, The British South Africa Company v The Companhia de Moçambique and 
Others, [1893] A.C. 602 (= [1891] All ER Rep 640, 653) – Moçambique; cf. Zigann 2002, pp. 31-33. 
95
 Noteworthily, the Moçambique rule is also applied to intellectual property rights for which registration is not 
required, such as copyright; cf. High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 2 February 1990, Tyburn Productions 
Limited v Doyle, [1990] R.P.C. 185 – Tyburn; cf. also Wadlow 1998, para. 6–48 (Wadlow emphasises that “no 
distinction is made between registered and unregistered rights”); Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 15; Arnold (1990)12(7) 
E.I.P.R. 254; Kieninger (1998)47(4) GRUR Int. 280, at p. 284; Zigann 2002, pp. 38-40. 
96
 High Court of Australia, Decision from 20 January 1905, Potter v. Broken Hill Pty. Co. Ltd., [1905] VLR 612, 
618 – Potter; cf. Zigann 2002, p. 35; constant jurisprudence, cf. High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 2 
February 1990, Tyburn Productions Limited v Doyle, [1990] R.P.C. 185 – Tyburn; cf. also High Court of Justice 
(Chancery Division) 22 April 1986, Def Lepp Music and Others v Stuart-Brown and Others, [1986] R.P.C. 273 – 
Def Lepp Music; Outer House (Scotland) 13 December 1988, James Burrough Distillers plc v Speymalt Whisky 
Distributors Ltd., [1989] S.L.T. 561 – James Burrough Distillers; High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 9 
December 1994, Plastus Kreativ AB v Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co, [1995] R.P.C. 438 – Plastus 
Kreativ; High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 24 May 1991, L.A. Gear Incorporated v Gerald Whelan & 
Sons Limited, [1991] F.S.R. 670 – L.A. Gear; cf. also Peinze 2002, p. 267 et seq. with further references to 
English case-law; cf. also Austin (2009)40(4) IIC 393, at pp. 395-397. 
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 “(...) the central issue in this case (...) whether the distinction between transitory and local actions which 
 was considered by the House of Lords in British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique 
 [1893] A. C. 602 was fundamental to their decision and if it was, whether an action raising questions as 
 to the validity or infringement of patent rights, copyrights, rights of trade mark and other intellectual 
 property rights are properly to be considered actions of a local nature or whether it was, as it were, a 
 historical prologue setting out the basis of the narrower rule that the English courts will not entertain 
 proceedings raising question as to the title to or for damages for trespass to land.”97 
 
After an extended discussion, Justice Vinelott concluded that the Moçambique rule was also 
applicable to proceedings concerning intellectual property rights. As a consequence, English 
courts would not have jurisdiction for validity and infringement proceedings concerning 
foreign intellectual property rights. 
 
To give another example, Justice Mummery held in L.A. Gear in 1991, referring to Tyburn 
that 
 
“(...) it is difficult to see how any such claim could properly be made in the proceedings in Ireland 
 for infringement of the United Kingdom trade mark. A United Kingdom trade mark is territorial in its 
 operation. It only has force and effect in the United Kingdom. It has no effect in the Republic of Ireland. 
 An action for infringement of it is local and not transitory in nature. In other words the acts of 
 infringement relied upon must take place within the United Kingdom: see: Dicey and Morris, The 
 Conflict of Laws, (11th edition), volume 2 pages 1390 and 1391 and also Tyburn Productions Limited 
v. Conan Doyle[1991] Ch. 75 where it was held that actions for infringement of intellectual property 
 rights, such as patents, trade marks and copyrights, are in the nature of local and not transitory actions. 
 (...)”98 
 
In a similar way, Lord Justice Dillon explicated in Mölnlycke that 
 
 “(...) from the nature of a United Kingdom patent, proceedings for infringement of a United Kingdom 
 patent can only be brought in a United Kingdom court, in the present case the English court, and could 
 only be founded on infringement in England. The German court could entertain a claim for 
 infringement of the comparable German patent, but could not entertain a claim for infringement of an 
 English patent. Conversely the English court could not entertain a claim for infringement of a German 
 patent.”99  
 
In 1982, the Moçambique rule was limited to some extent by Section 30 of the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 which provides: 
 
 
 Section 30 Proceedings in England and Wales or Northern Ireland for torts to immovable 
   property. 
 
 (1) The jurisdiction of any court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland to entertain proceedings for 
 trespass to, or any other tort affecting, immovable property shall extend to cases in which the property 
 in question is situated outside that part of the United Kingdom unless the proceedings are principally 
 concerned with a question of the title to, or the right to possession of, that property. 
 
 (2) Subsection (1) has effect to the 1968 Convention and the Lugano Convention and the Regulation 
 and to the provisions set out in Schedule 4. 
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 High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 2 February 1990, Tyburn Productions Limited v Doyle, [1990] 
R.P.C. 185, 189 – Tyburn. 
98
 High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 24 May 1991, L.A. Gear Incorporated v Gerald Whelan & Sons 
Limited, [1991] F.S.R. 670, 674 – L.A. Gear. 
99
 Court of Appeal 27 June 1991, Mölnlycke AB and Another v Procter & Gamble Limited and Others (No. 4), 
[1992] R.P.C. 21, 28 – Mölnlycke AB and Another v Procter & Gamble Limited and Others.  
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However, English courts and legal doctrine have mostly not considered this limitation of the 
Moçambique rule according to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act to apply to 
intellectual property rights, which has been fiercely criticised by legal commentators, because 
the application of the Moçambique rule to patents and other intellectual property rights was 
based exactly on a claimed comparability between such rights and immovable property.100 In 
this respect, Fawcett/Torremans have rightly stated:  
 
 “Further, following the passing of section 30(1), we now have the bizarre situation whereby the 
 limitation in cases involving foreign intellectual property rights is wider than that in cases involving 
 foreign land. An action for trespass to foreign land which does not involve any issue of title to the land 
 can now be heard by the English courts, whereas the result of Tyburn is that an action for infringement 
 of a foreign intellectual property right, which does not involve any issue as to the title to the right but 
 merely, for example, the question of whether there has been an act of infringement, cannot be heard.”101    
 
Although parts of legal doctrine have proposed or at least discussed to abolish the 
Moçambique rule for the area of intellectual property law102, this has been rejected.103 So, the 
Court of Appeal decided in Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth I that there is a subject-matter 
limitation in relation to infringement of a foreign copyright. The court stated:  
 
 “We accordingly conclude that for sound policy reasons the supposed international jurisdiction over 
 copyright infringement claims does not exist. If it is ever to be created it should be by Treaty with all 
 the necessary rules about mutual recognition, lis pendens and so on. It is not for judges to arrogate to 
 themselves such a jurisdiction.”104 
 
However, this decision was later reversed by the decision of the Supreme Court (Lucasfilm 
Ltd v Ainsworth II) where the Supreme Court, on the basis of an extended reasoning also 
referring to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 8 of the Rome II Regulation 
and the conceptions of the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles, finally held: 
 
 “We have come to the firm conclusion that, in the case of a claim for infringement of copyright of the 
 present kind, the claim is one over which the English court has jurisdiction, provided that there is a 
 basis for in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, or, to put it differently, the claim is justiciable 
 (...).”105  
 
 “There are no issues of policy which militate against the enforcement of foreign copyright (...).”106 
 
 
1.4.2.1.2 The double-actionability rule 
 
The second principle which has been referred to in order to justify that English courts lack 
jurisdiction as to proceedings concerning foreign intellectual property rights, is the so-called 
                                                 
100
 Cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 24; Fentiman (1997)56(3) C.L.J. 503, at p. 505; Zigann 2002, p. 44: Zigann has 
impressively characterised this phenomenon as “Paradoxie der gesamten englischen Rechtsprechung zum 
internationalen Zivilprozessrecht des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes” (“paradox of the total English jurisprudence 
with regard to international procedural law concerning intellectual property”). 
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 Fawcett & Torremans 2011, para. 6.167. 
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 Cf. Cornish (1996)45(4) GRUR Int. 285; cf. Wadlow 1998, para. 6–31; Cohen (1997)19(7) E.I.P.R. 379; 
Fawcett & Torremans 2011, paras. 6.170-6.178 with further references to case-law. 
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 Cf. Wadlow 1998, para. 6–32; Schauwecker 2009, p. 24 et seq. 
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 Court of Appeal 16 December 2009, Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2009] EWCA Civ 1328, [2010] F.S.R. 10, 
para. 183 – Lucasfilm v Ainsworth I. 
105
 Supreme Court 27 July 2011, Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, [2011] F.S.R. 41, para. 105 – 
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 Supreme Court 27 July 2011, Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39, [2011] F.S.R. 41, para. 109 – 
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 46 
double-actionability rule developed by the English High Court in its Phillips v Eyre decision 
where Justice Willes explicated clearly: 
 
 “As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have been committed 
 abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of such a character that it would have 
 been actionable if committed in England (...). Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable by the 
 law of the place where it was done.”107  
 
Dicey and Morris108 have described, up to the twelfth edition109 of their celebrated work “The 
Conflict of Laws”, this principle in Rule 203 in a similar way: 
 
 
 Rule 203 
 
 (1) As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country is a tort and actionable as such in England, only if 
 it is both 
 
  (a) actionable as a tort according to English law, or in other words is an act which, if done in 
  England, would be a tort; and 
 
  (b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done. 
 
 (2) (...) 
 
 
On the basis of this principle, English courts would never have jurisdiction for an action 
concerning the infringement of a foreign patent, because acts committed abroad can, due to 
the principle of territoriality, only infringe the respective foreign patent. On the other hand, 
only infringing acts committed in England can constitute a tort according to English law.110 
The latter aspect is expressed clearly in Article 60(1) of the Patents Act 1977 which provides:  
 
 
 Section 60 Infringement 
 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person infringes a patent for an invention if, but only if, 
 while the patent is in force, he does any of the following things in the United Kingdom in relation to the 
 invention without the consent of the proprietor of the patent, that is to say– (...). [underscore added] 
 
 
Besides, English courts have not admitted the supplementary consideration that the infringing 
act, if it had been committed in England affecting a fictitious English patent, would constitute 
a patent infringement according to English law.111  
                                                 
107
 High Court of Justice (Exchequer Chamber) 23 June 1870, Phillips v Eyre, [1870-71] L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28-29 – 
Phillips and Eyre; cf. Bragiel (1999)2 I.P.Q. 135, at p. 144 et seq.; Floyd & Purvis (1995)17(3) E.I.P.R. 110, at 
p. 111; Wadlow 1998, para. 6–07; Kieninger (1998)47(4) GRUR Int. 280, at pp. 285-286. 
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1 May 1996, the double actionability rule persists merely with regard to defamation claims. In the 14th edition of 
“Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws”, this principle has therefore been described as the basis of clause (2) 
of Rule 235 as follows: “As a general rule, an act done in a foreign country which is alleged to give rise to a 
liability such as is mentioned in clause (1) of this Rule is actionable as such in England, only of it is both (a) 
actionable as such according to English law (or in other words is an act which, if done in England, would give 
rise to such a claim) and (b) actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done.” (cf. 
Collins 2006 (Dicey and Morris), para. 35R-123).   
110
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It is noteworthy that the double-actionability rule has been abolished112 – except from the 
determination of issues arising in any defamation claim113 – by Section 10 of the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995114 which provides: 
 
 
 Section 10 
 
 The rules of the common law, in so far as they – 
 
  (a) require actionability under both the law of the forum and the law of another country for the 
  purpose of determining whether a tort or delict is actionable; or 
 
  (b) allow (as an exception from the rules falling within paragraph (a) above) for the law of a 
  single country to be applied for the purpose of determining the issues, or any of the issues, 
  arising in the case in question, 
 
 are hereby abolished so far as they apply to any claim in tort or delict which is not excluded from the 
 operation of this Part by section 13 below. 
 
 
1.4.2.1.3 Jurisdiction of English courts where the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively 
its predecessors) applies (respectively apply) 
 
The negative attitude of English courts towards a decision in proceedings on the infringement 
of a foreign intellectual property right has been given up in relation to proceedings within the 
scope of the Brussels Convention respectively the Brussels I Regulation/Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. This change of view became manifest for the first time in the decisions in the 
Pearce v Ove Arup case. 
  
In this case regarding a foreign copyright, Justice Lloyd decided that English courts do have 
jurisdiction when being conferred jurisdiction upon by the Brussels Convention, because the 
effectiveness of the Brussels Convention would be impaired otherwise. In particular, he held 
that 
 
 “(...) the [Brussels] Convention does require an English court to accept jurisdiction where an action is 
 brought against an English domiciled defendant (with or without other defendants) for breach of a 
 Dutch copyright, and to hear that action on the merits, and thus overrides, so far as is necessary for that 
 purpose, both Rule 203 [in: Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, Volume 2, 12th ed., 1993] and the 
 Moçambique rule, even though neither of them is a rule as to jurisdiction. Each of them, to the extent 
 that they would preclude the English court from hearing such an action, would in my judgment impair 
 the effectiveness of the Convention by frustrating the operation of the basic rule in Article 2, and must 
 therefore give way in order to allow the jurisdictional rules of the Convention to have their proper 
 effect. The position is quite different from other exclusionary rules, such as Acts of State, because the 
 Rule 203 and the  Moçambique rule proceed on the clear premise that the English courts are not a 
 suitable forum for such an action whereas the courts of another country are appropriate. It seems to me 
 that, where that other country is another Contracting State, this is a position which subverts the policy 
 and provisions of the Convention. To borrow a phrase from another area of Community law, although 
                                                 
112 The result of the express abolition of the common law choice of law rules, except in relation to defamation 
claims, is a general choice of law rule requiring reference to the lex loci delicti which may, in an appropriate 
case, be displaced in favour of the law of another State by reference to the rule of displacement, cf. ss.11, 12 of 
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, cf. Collins 2006 (Dicey and Morris), para. 
35-002.      
113
 Cf. Article 13 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995; Collins 2006 (Dicey and 
Morris), para. 35-014.   
114
 Section 10 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 is part of Part III of this Act. 
Part III entered into force on 1 May 1996. 
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 they are not rules as to jurisdiction, they are “measures having an equivalent effect” to rules of 
 jurisdiction, and are inconsistent with the mandatory effect of the Convention and its basic rules as to 
 domicile-based jurisdiction in Article 2 [underscore and content in brackets added].”115   
 
This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. After an extensive review of the 
authorities, Lord Justice Roch concluded for the court: 
 
 “For the reasons which we have set out we are satisfied that the Moçambique rule does not require the 
 English court to refuse to entertain a claim in respect of the alleged infringement of Dutch copyright; 
 and that, in those circumstances, the court is not required by the first limb of the double actionability 
 rule to hold that the claim is bound to fail because the acts done in Holland cannot amount to an 
 infringement of United Kingdom copyright [underscores added].”116   
 
These considerations as to jurisdiction of English courts for proceedings with regard to the 
infringement of a foreign copyright were applied in the Coin Controls case on the 
infringement of a foreign patent. By reference to the Schlosser Report and the statement 
contained therein that the doctrine of forum (non) conveniens developed in common law may 
not be applied with regard to the Brussels Convention (and the same applies to the Brussels I 
Regulation), Justice Laddie held in this decision: 
 
 “One of the purposes of the [Brussels] Convention is to replace the differing domestic rules, at least in 
 relation to forum, by a simple set of rigid provisions forcing litigation into the courts of one country and 
 out of the courts of others. As the Schlosser Report states: 
 
  ... in accordance with the general spirit of the 1968 Convention, the fact that foreign law has 
  to be applied, either generally or in a particular case, should not constitute a sufficient reason 
  for a court to decline jurisdiction. Where the courts of several States have jurisdiction, the 
  plaintiff  has deliberately been given a right of choice, which should not be weakened by 
  application of the doctrine of forum conveniens. 
 
 (...) (I)f the Convention requires the courts here to accept the foreign claims, then the same rules apply 
 to other Contracting States and none of us have the power or right to ignore or override it. If the 
 Convention gives jurisdiction to the courts of one country, they cannot reject the gift. They must accept 
 it and act on it [content in brackets added].”117  
 
Noteworthily, the considerations undertaken in Pearce v Ove Arup and Coin Controls 
explicitly and exclusively referred to the Brussels Convention, underlining the fact that the 
provisions of the Brussels Convention (and the same goes for the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
must be applied in a way that ensures the effectiveness of the Convention (Brussels Ibis 
Regulation). Due to this immediate reference of the employed reasoning to the rules of the 
Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation), it is to be expected that English courts will 
continue to deny jurisdiction in cases of infringement of foreign intellectual property rights 
where the Brussels regime is not applicable,118 although parts of English legal doctrine have 
submitted that, also in such cases, denying jurisdiction to the English courts is not justified.119   
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1.4.2.2 Court decisions in France 
 
Like courts in England, French courts, by reference to the principle of territoriality120, the 
French ordre public121 and the legal notion of service public (to be understood as comprising 
all acts of public authority)122, originally assumed to have exclusive jurisdiction (not only 
regarding validity proceedings but also) with regard to infringement proceedings concerning 
French patents, denying jurisdiction of foreign courts for actions concerning French patents, 
and equally denied jurisdiction of French courts with regard to foreign patents as a matter of 
assumedly exclusive jurisdiction of the respective foreign courts.123 While few progressive 
legal commentators at least advocated, already before World War I, jurisdiction of French 
courts for infringement actions concerning foreign patents – whereas it was not contested that 
French patents would have exclusive jurisdiction as to infringement actions concerning 
French patents124 – the majority of legal commentators shared the strict and clear opinion of 
the courts that French courts may only, and exclusively, decide on French patents.125  
 
The argumentation of the French courts (and the majority of legal commentators) shall be 
illustrated by the decision of the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris in the Yema case from 
1971, where the court, in order to establish exclusive jurisdiction for infringement 
proceedings concerning a foreign patent, expressly referred to the aspects of ordre public 
interne and the fact that the grant of a French patent was to be considered a French act of 
authority. The court stated:     
 
 “Attendu que l'octroi du brevet nécessaire à l'exercice des droits de l'inventeur est un acte de concession 
 émanant des pouvoirs publics dont l'intervention détermine, en droit international privé, la solution des 
 conflits de lois en la matière; qu'un service public ne pouvant fonctionner que selon les lois qui 
 l'instituent, les litiges nés de ce fontionnement à l'occasion de la délivrance d'un brevet français sont 
 nécessairement de la compétence des juridictions françaises assurant le maintien de l'ordre public 
 interne qui prime en l'occurrence toutes autres considérations.”126 
 
(“The grant of the patent which is a prerequisite for the use of the inventor’s rights is an act of public 
authority whose intervention determines, in matters of private international law, the solution of the 
respective conflicts of law. A public service can only operate according to the laws which establish it. 
Disputes arising from this operation on the occasion of issuing a French patent necessarily fall within 
the competence of French jurisdiction ensuring to maintain the internal public order (ordre public 
interne) which predominates in this case all other considerations.”)127 
 
However, this decision has been subject to considerable criticism, in particular concerning the 
court’s reference to the aspect of ordre public.128 Nowadays, French courts assume to have 
international jurisdiction to decide on the infringement of foreign patents according to the 
local rules of jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 42 et seq. of the Nouveau code de procédure 
civile (New Code of Civil Procedure).129 It has been accepted as a general rule that the 
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121
 Cf. Treichel 2001, p. 12; Loussouarn, Bourel & Vareilles-Sommières 2013, para. 695.  
122
 Treichel 2001, p. 12. 
123
 Treichel 2001, p. 12, and there fns. 9 and 10 with comprehensive references to French case-law. 
124
 Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 14; Treichel 2001, p. 13. 
125
 Treichel 2001, pp. 12-13; Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 13-14; Mousseron, Raynard & Véron (1998)29(8) IIC 884, 
at p. 888. 
126
 TGI Paris 4 May 1971, (1974)63 Rev. crit. DIP 110, at p. 111, with case note G. Bonet – Yema. 
127
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
128
 G. Bonet (case note) TGI Paris 4 May 1971, (1974)63 Rev. crit. DIP 112, at p. 117 – Yema. 
129
 Treichel 2001, p. 13 et seq. 
 50 
principle of territoriality has no longer any effect on the issue of international jurisdiction with 
regard to intellectual property rights.130  
 
  
1.4.2.3 Court decisions in Germany 
 
In its Lampen decision in 1890, the German Reichsgericht impressively explicated that 
German courts would not have jurisdiction with regard to infringement proceedings 
concerning English patents. The court made clear that according to its view, the fact that the 
effects of English patents were restricted to the territory of England would lead to the 
consequence that only English courts would have jurisdiction as to (infringement) actions 
concerning English patents. In this respect, the court held: 
 
 “Da das englische Patent nur für England ertheilt ist und nur für England ertheilt werden konnte, so 
 können Kläger einen Anspruch auf Schutz des ihnen für England ertheilten Patents auch nur in England 
 erheben.”131   
 
 (“As the English patent is granted only for England, and could only be granted for England, 
 plaintiffs can only claim protection of their patent granted for England in England.”)132  
 
Thus, the court concluded from the principle of territoriality according to which an English 
patent is protected only in England that this fact is inevitably linked with the issue of 
jurisdiction. The court continued distinctly:  
 
 “Dem deutschen Richter ist auch in dem Falle, wenn zufällig bei ihm ein Gerichtsstand begründet wäre, 
 nicht anzusinnen, etwa auf die Klage eines Engländers gegen einen Engländer, welcher im deutschen 
 Gerichtsbezirk Vermögen hat, einen Anspruch dahin zu thun, daß sich der Beklagte in England der 
 gewerblichen Herstellung und Veräußerung von Werkzeugen oder Maschinen zu enthalten habe, 
 welche dem Kläger durch ein englisches Patent patentirt seien.”133 
 
(“The German court, even in case that incidentally a venue was founded, may not be demanded to 
decide with regard to an action raised by an Englishman against another Englishman who disposes of 
assets in the German court district, by which the plaintiffs seeks to have the defendant convicted to 
refrain from commercial manufacture and distribution of tools or machinery for which the plaintiff has 
an English patent.”)134 
 
Despite the general existence of protection of patent rights both in the English and in the 
German legal system, the Reichsgericht explicated, by underlining the absence of a unitary 
right respectively protection: 
 
 “Man darf nicht aus den verschiedenen Patentgesetzen der einzelnen Kulturstaaten einen allgemeinen 
 Satz ableiten, es werde das Erfinderrecht geschützt. Ein solcher allgemeiner Satz wäre nur eine 
 Abstaction, welche nicht geeignet ist das, was sich in verschiedenen Gesetzgebungen Gleichmäßiges 
 findet, zu einem gemeinsamen Recht zu machen. (...) In diesem Sinne ist, – man mag es beklagen, – das 
 Erfinderrecht zu einem gemeinsamen Rechtsinstitut der Kulturstaaten noch nicht geworden, und der 
 Richter kann es dazu nicht machen. (...) Erst wenn Staatsverträge dahin führen, daß Patente, welche in 
 dem einen Staate ertheilt sind, auch für das Gebiet der anderen Staaten als ertheilt gelten, würde sich 
 das Patentrecht als ein den kontrahirenden Staaten gemeinsames Rechtsinstitut ansprechen lassen, so 
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 daß dann ein dem Staate, welcher das Patent verliehen hat, begangener Eingriff in das Patent in dem 
 anderen Staat verfolgt werden könnte.”135  
 
(“One may not derive from the different patent laws of the individual “cultural States” a general rule 
that the inventor's right would be protected. Such a general rule would merely be an abstraction which is 
not suitable to form similar rights in the different legal systems into one common law. (...) In this sense, 
unfortunately, the inventor's right has not become a common legal institution of the “cultural States”, 
and the court cannot make it one. (...) Only when treaties determine that patents which have been 
granted in and for the one State are considered to be also granted for the territory of the other States, the 
patent law/the right of the patentee [due to the ambiguity of the German term “Patentrecht”, meaning 
both patent law in general and the personal right of the patentee, it is not clear which term the 
Reichsgericht actually referred to] could be addressed as a common legal institution of the Constracting 
States, so that an infringement of the patent, committed to the State which granted the patent, could be 
pursued in the other State.”)136 
 
The Reichsgericht abandoned this strict jurisprudence in 1931 with regard to trademark law in 
its Norsk Vacuum Oil Compani decision and decided that, concerning trademark law, the 
issue of whether a trademark is protected or not according to German law does not coincide 
with the issue of whether German courts have jurisdiction as to infringement proceedings 
regarding this trademark. The Reichsgericht held: 
 
 “Aus der Nichteintragung eines ausländischen Warenzeichens in der deutschen Zeichenrolle folgt nur, 
 daß diesem Zeichen nicht der Schutz des deutschen Warenzeichenrechts zugute kommt. (...) Dagegen 
 besteht kein Grund gegen die Zulässigkeit der Inanspruchnahme eines Inländers, der die 
 Verletzungshandlung gegen ein nur in einem ausländischen Staate geschütztes Warenzeichen dort 
 begangen hat, vor einem deutschen Gericht aus dem ausländischen Warenzeichengesetz.”137 
 
(“It can solely be derived from the non-registration of a foreign trademark in the German trademark 
register that this trademark is not protected according to German trademark law. (...) However, there is 
no reason against the admissibility of an action against a national who has committed in a foreign State 
the infringing act against a trademark that is merely protected in that foreign State, before a German 
court on the basis of that foreign trademark law.”)138 
 
In regard of trademarks, the Bundesgerichtshof continued this jurisprudence of the 
Reichsgericht. So, the Bundesgerichtshof decided in its Flava/Erdgold decision in 1956, 
emphasising, in particular, that the sovereignty of the foreign State would not be impaired by 
the jurisdiction of German courts because the judgment rendered in Germany would only 
have effects in Germany: 
 
 “Es ist seit langem in Rechtsprechung und Schrifttum anerkannt, daß ein Inländer mit inländischem 
 Gerichtsstand, der die Verletzungshandlung gegen ein im ausländischen Staat geschütztes 
 Warenzeichen dort begangen hat, vor einem deutschen Gericht auf Grund des ausländischen 
 Warenzeichens auf Schadensersatz in Anspruch genommen werden kann. (...) Aber auch für Ansprüche 
 auf Unterlassung der Verletzung von im Ausland bestehender Zeichenrechte, begangen im Auslande, 
 muß die Verfolgung im Inland offenstehen. (...) Da das vom deutschen Gericht erwirkte Urteil nur 
 Wirkungen im Inland erzeugt, bleibt die ausländische Souveränität unangetastet.”139 
 
(“It has been recognised for a long time by the courts and by legal commentators that, when there is a 
venue in Germany, a national who committed in a foreign State the infringing act against a trademark 
being protected in that foreign State, may be sued for damages before a German court on the basis of the 
foreign trademark. (...) But also regarding claims for omitting the infringement of foreign trademark 
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rights, committed abroad, it must be possible to sue the infringer in Germany. (...) As the judgment 
rendered by the German court produces effects only in Germany, the foreign sovereignty remains 
untouched.”)140 
 
However, in regard of patents, courts maintained the conception of a strict coherence between 
the principle of territoriality and jurisdiction, i.e. the idea of exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts in the protection State. This is illustrated by the formulation of the Reichsgericht in its 
Geschwindigkeitsmesser decision from 1934 where the court held:  
 
 “Ebenso kommen Patentverletzungsansprüche nach feststehender Rechtsprechung (...) nicht in Betracht, 
 soweit es sich um die Verfolgung von Ansprüchen wegen Verletzung ausländischer Patente im Ausland 
 handelt.”141 
 
(“Likewise, claims arising from patent infringement do not exist according to established case-law (...), 
as far as the assertion of claims arising from the infringement of foreign patents, committed abroad, is 
concerned.”)142 
 
Another example can be found in the jurisprudence of the Oberlandesgericht Hamm which 
held in its Einbruchkerbmaschine decision: 
 
 “Für die Frage, ob die Klägerin als Lizenznehmerin eines allein auf den Namen N. lautenden englischen 
 Patents der Beklagten die Einfuhr und den Vertrieb in England verbieten kann, sind die deutschen 
 Gerichte nicht zuständig. Das gleiche würde gelten für die Frage, ob eine Herstellung von 
 Einbruchkerbmaschinen in England, die die Beklagte bisher aber nicht vorgenommen hat und nach ihrer 
 Angabe auch nicht vornehmen will, die Rechte der Klägerin aus dem englischen Patent Nr. 426966 
 verletzt.”143 
 
(“With regard to the question of whether the plaintiff as a licensee of an English patent that is solely 
 registered under the name N., may enjoin the defendant from importing and distributing (the concerned 
product) in England, German courts do not have jurisdiction. The same would apply to the question of 
whether a manufacture of “Einbruchkerbmaschinen” (specific machines) in England, which the 
defendant has not undertaken so far, and according to her assertion does not intend to undertake either, 
infringes the plaintiff's rights based on the English patent No. 426966.”)144 
 
However, step by step, courts advocated international jurisdiction of German courts also with 
regard to infringement proceedings concerning foreign patents: So, the Landgericht 
Düsseldorf stated in its Hohlkörper decision in 1958, although finally leaving open the 
question in the concrete case because the court did not find it necessary to be decided: 
 
 “Nachdem der BGH im Warenzeichenrecht für die deutschen Gerichte eine universelle Gerichtsbarkeit 
 [annotation by the author of this thesis: the court chose the wrong term; the correct term would be 
 “internationale Zuständigkeit”] in Anspruch nimmt, sind keine zwingenden Gründe mehr zu erkennen, 
 weshalb für das Patentrecht der entgegengesetzte Standpunkt aufrechterhalten werden sollte.”145 
 
(“As the BGH assigns, in trademark law, universal jurisdiction to German courts, no compelling reasons 
remain why the opposite point of view should be maintained for patent law.”)146  
 
Even clearer, and not rendered as an obiter dicum, the Landgericht Düsseldorf expressed its 
liberal view in its Frauenthermometer decision in 1966: 
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“Die deutsche Gerichtsbarkeit [annotation by the author of this thesis: the court obviously chose the 
wrong term; the correct term would be “internationale Zuständigkeit”] ist auch insoweit begründet, wie 
die Klage auf dieVerletzung ausländischer Patent- und Gebrauchsmusterrechte (...) gestützt wird. Das 
frühere Reichsgericht (...) hat zwar insoweit im Hinblick auf die territorial begrenzte Geltung der 
Patent- und Gebrauchsmusterrechte einen abweichenden Standpunkt vertreten. Die Bedenken des 
Reichsgerichts sind jedoch zumindest auf dem verwandten Rechtsgebiet des Warenzeichenrechts (für 
das das  Territorialitätsprinzip in gleicher Weise gilt) von Rechtsprechung und herrschender Lehre als 
nicht durchschlagend erkannt worden (...). Für das Gebiet des Patent- und Gebrauchsmusterrechts kann 
nichts anderes gelten. Jeder Staat erkennt an, daß andere Staaten Warenzeichen und technische 
Schutzrechte mit Wirkung für ihr Staatsgebiet erteilen können. Eine Anerkennung dieser Schutzrechte 
durch die Gerichte eines anderen Staates kann dem Verleihungsstaat nur recht sein, und ein Eingriff in 
die fremde Souveränität liegt schon deshalb nicht vor, weil das vor einem deutschen Gericht erwirkte 
Urteil nur Wirkungen im Inland erzeugt. (...) Es ist daher gerechtfertigt, die deutsche Gerichtsbarkeit 
 [internationale Zuständigkeit; cf. annotation above] auch für Klagen aus ausländischen Patent- oder 
 Gebrauchsmusterrechten zu bejahen, sofern ein inländischer Gerichtsstand besteht [content in brackets 
added]. (…)”147  
 
(“International jurisdiction of German courts also exists insofar as the action is founded on the 
 infringement of foreign patent and utility model rights (...). The former Reichsgericht (...), with regard 
to the territorially restricted validity of patents and model rights, indeed held a deviating point of view. 
However, the concerns of the Reichsgericht have, at least regarding the related legal area of trademark 
law (to which the principle of territoriality equally applies), have been found not convincing by courts 
and prevailing legal doctrine (...). For the field of patent and model right law nothing else can apply. 
Each State recognises that other States can grant trademarks and intellectual property rights being 
effective for the territory of the granting State. A recognition of these intellectual property rights by the 
courts of another State can only lie in the interest of the granting State, and there is no infringement of 
the foreign sovereignty, because the judgment rendered by a German court has only effect in Germany. 
(...) Therefore it is justified to approve international jurisdiction of German courts also with regard to 
 actions concerning foreign patent or utility model rights, as far as there is a venue in Germany. (…)”)148 
 
 
1.4.2.4 Court decisions in the Netherlands 
 
Initially, Dutch courts, similarly to the English, French and German courts, clearly denied to 
have jurisdiction concerning actions as to the infringement of foreign intellectual property 
rights as patents. A famous decision which illustrates this attitude is the decision rendered by 
the Rechtbank Amsterdam in the Fokker case in 1926.149 The decision was based on the 
following facts:150   
 
The Dutch aircraft manufacturer A.H.G. Fokker (F) who had his domicile in Germany during 
World War I was sued for damages, in Germany, by the Luft-Verkehrs-Ges.m.b.H. (L), a 
German company, for the alleged infringement of a German patent belonging to L. However, 
when the deciding court finally rendered a judgment, after several years of proceeding, and 
convicted F to pay damages to L as demanded, F had already moved back to the Netherlands. 
In the absence of a treaty between the Netherlands and Germany on the mutual recognition 
and enforcement of judgments, the German judgment could not be enforced in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, L sued F for damage again, in Amsterdam in the Netherlands, for 
infringing L's German patent by an infringing act in Germany. F, denying any patent 
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infringement, also argued that even if F's acting in Germany was to be considered an 
infringement of L's German patent, such acting would not be unlawful in the Netherlands and 
the holder of a German patent would not be entitled to claim damages for the alleged 
infringement of this German patent before a foreign court. The Rechtbank Amsterdam 
essentially agreed with the defendant's argumentation. On the one hand, the Rechtbank 
explicated that, when a Dutch committed an unlawful act (tort) against a German in Germany, 
a Dutch court principally has jurisdiction for an action brought by the German (victim) 
against the Dutch (infringer). But, on the other hand and essential for this case, the Rechtbank 
expressed its view that the case of a patent infringement was to be treated differently: the 
court concluded from the fact that the patent was protected on a territorial basis without any 
extraterritorial effect, i.e. only in Germany in the concrete case, that Dutch courts lack 
jurisdiction to decide on an action concerning such a foreign patent, because they are situated 
outside the sphere of protection of the German patent. The Rechtbank Amsterdam thus 
assumed that the principle of territoriality and the question of international jurisdiction are 
inevitably linked with each other. 
 
This restrictive jurisprudence was given up in the Interlas case ultimately decided by the 
Hoge Raad in 1989.151 In this case (which is considered to be the first example of a decision 
ordering extraterritorial prohibitory measures, while it actually merely confirmed the earlier 
case-law, but was the decision to which the courts referred to in subsequent decisions,  
including decisions in patent infringement cases)152 an American company, a French company 
and a Dutch company sued another Dutch company established in Middelburg.153  
 
In its decision, the Hoge Raad held decisively:  
 
 “Tenzij uit de wet, uit de aard van de verplichting of uit een rechtshandeling anders volgt, wordt hij die 
 jegens een ander verplicht is iets te geven, te doen of na te laten, daartoe door de rechter, op vordering 
 van de gerechtigde, veroordeeld. In het algemeen is er geen reden om aan te nemen dat er voor zulk een 
 veroordeling geen plaats is wanneer het gaat om een verplichting – eventueel een verplichting naar 
 vreemd recht – die buiten Nederland moet worden nagekomen. 
 
 Een meer beperkte opvatting als door het onderdeel verdedigd vindt geen steun in het recht en zou in 
 een tijd van toenemende internationale contacten tot het voor de praktijk onwenselijke resultaat leiden 
 dat in geval van onrechtmatige daden met een internationaal karakter – zoals aantasting van 
 intellectuele eigendomsrechten en ongeoorloofde mededinging in meer landen of grensoverschrijdende 
 milieuvervuiling – de Nederlandse gelaedeerde genoopt zou kunnen worden zich in alle betrokken 
 landen tot de rechter te wenden.”154 
 
 
(“Unless anything else follows from the law, the nature of the obligation or from a juridical act, a person 
 who is obliged towards somebody to give something, to do or not to do something will be ordered to do 
 so by the judge on demand of the person to whom the obligation is owed. In general there is no reason 
 to assume that such an order cannot be given when the case is about an obligation – possibly an 
 obligation under the law of a foreign country – which has to be fulfilled outside the Netherlands. 
 
 A more restricted vision finds no support in law and would, at a time of increasing international 
 contacts, lead to the undesirable result for the practice, that in the case of torts with an international 
 character – like infringement of intellectual property rights and unfair competition in several countries, 
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 or environmental pollution crossing borders – the Dutch injured party would be compelled to go to 
 court in every country concerned.”)155  
 
On the basis of this jurisprudence, Dutch courts have liberally assumed jurisdiction for actions 
for damages and for prohibitory actions concerning the infringement of foreign intellectual 
property rights.156 However, this practice was often considered as going too far and has 
therefore been subject to fierce criticism.157 In view of and in reaction to this criticism, the 
Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage considerably limited the said practice of assuming jurisdiction too 
generously in its famous Expandable Grafts decision in 1998.158 It is noteworthy that the 
Hoge Raad confirmed and further elaborated the Interlas doctrine in its later Postech decision 
explicitly with regard to intellectual property rights,159 stating:160 
  
“(…) Bij de behandeling van dit onderdeel dient te worden vooropgesteld dat, indien de Nederlandse 
rechter op grond van enige regel van (commuun) internationaal bevoegdheidsrecht bevoegd is kennis te 
nemen van een vordering betreffende de inbreuk op een naar buitenlands recht verkregen intellectueel 
eigendomsrecht, hij desgevorderd in beginsel een verbod kan uitspreken van handelingen in het 
buitenland. Dit geldt ook in kort geding en ongeacht de grond waarop de Nederlandse rechter zijn 
internationale bevoegdheid heeft gebaseerd (…).161 
  
(“(…) When treating this part it is to be premised that, if the Dutch court, on the basis of a rule of 
(Community) law of international jurisdiction, is competent to decide on a claim concerning the 
infringement of an intellectual property right that is acquired according to foreign law, it can, in 
principle, order an injunction concerning actions abroad. This also applies in the case of “kort geding” 






It may thus be concluded that the courts of all selected States (with regard to English courts at 
least where the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable) accept to have international jurisdiction 
for infringement actions also in case that foreign patents are effected. Legal doctrine generally 
acknowledges that courts have international jurisdiction for infringement proceedings for 
damages and claims for prohibition concerning foreign patents and other intellectual property 
rights.163 Due to the fact that exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) merely affects validity actions, it can be 
concluded a contrario that infringement actions do not fall within the scope of exclusive 
jurisdiction. As a consequence, Member States courts may not deny international jurisdiction 
for infringement actions in case of the infringement of a foreign patent as far as the Brussels 
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Ibis Regulation is applicable.164 The principle of territoriality, as a principle of substantive 
law, does not lead to another result, because it merely affects the substantive limitation of the 
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2. International jurisdiction with regard to patent infringement proceedings according 
to the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation applies regardless of which type of patent (national patent, 
European patent or (future) European patent with unitary effect) is concerned. However, it is 
to be mentioned that the case-law and the opinions of legal doctrine referred to in this chapter 
have been rendered with regard to national patents and “classical”166 European patents as 
bundles of national patents.167  
 
Within the system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, jurisdiction for patent infringement 
proceedings may be always based on Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Other heads 
of jurisdiction for cross-border patent infringement proceedings may be (on the assumption 
that the prerequisites discussed in detail in this chapter are fulfilled) Articles 7(2) and 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In case that the defendant raises the defence of invalidity of the 
concerned patent, Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation determines that the courts of 
the protection State have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to a decision on the validity of the 
patent. Finally, concerning cross-border interim relief, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation contains a specific provision.168  
 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation replaced the Brussels I Regulation which had followed the 
Brussels Convention. In parallel to the Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention was 
signed by the EC Member States and the EFTA Member States (without Liechtenstein) in 
1988. The Lugano Convention which largely corresponds to the Brussels Convention169 was 
subsequently replaced by its recast, the 2007 Lugano Convention, which aimed to bring in 
line the Lugano Convention with the Brussels I Regulation.170  
 
In opposition to the Brussels Convention, there is no interpretative body under the Lugano 
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Convention which gives binding judgments on the Lugano Convention. Noteworthily, the 
authors of the Lugano Convention aimed to overcome this problem and the dangers of the 
development of diverging jurisprudence on the Lugano Convention in the Lugano States and 
between substantially similar provisions in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions being 
interpreted differently by the ECJ and the Lugano States by legislating a number of Protocols 
and Declarations constituting an integral part of the Lugano Convention.171 In particular, 
according to Protocol 2, the courts of the Lugano States must pay “due account” to the 
principles laid down by any relevant decision delivered by courts of the other contracting 
States concerning provisions of the Lugano Convention. Moreover, the EFTA Member States 
declared that they consider it appropriate that the courts pay “due account” to the rulings 
contained in the ECJ and courts of the Member States in respect of provisions in the Brussels 
Convention which are substantially reproduced in the Lugano Convention.172 On the other 
hand, the EC Member States declared that they considered it appropriate that the ECJ, when 
interpreting the Brussels Convention, should pay “due account” to the rulings under the 
Lugano Convention.173 In light of this, the jurisprudence of the ECJ and EU Member States 
courts as to the Brussels Convention respectively the Brussels I Regulation is also relevant for 
the interpretation of corresponding provisions of the Lugano Convention, and vice versa. 
Consequently, although this thesis primarily treats the Brussels regime, I shall also refer to 
decisions rendered with regard to provisions of the Lugano Convention which correspond to 
provisions of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I(bis) Regulation, when analysing provisions 
of the latter sets of rules. 
 
 
2.1 Jurisdiction at the domicile of the defendant – Article 4(1) 
 
The fundamental principle174 of actor sequitur forum rei, laid down in Article 4(1) of the  
Brussels Ibis Regulation, states: 
 
 
 Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that Member State.175 
 
 
As the ECJ has expressly ruled in Josi Reinsurance, persons shall principally be sued in their 
State of domicile because this makes it easier, in principle, for them to defend themselves.176 
According to Article 62, the question of whether a party is domiciled in the Member State 
whose courts are seised of a matter is answered on the basis of the lex fori. In contrast to this 
construction, the Regulation chooses a different solution in the case of companies, other legal 
persons or associations of natural or legal persons. For these constellations, Article 63 
contains an autonomous rule to determine the domicile: the domicile is considered to be 
situated at the place of the statutory seat, the central administration, or the principal place of 
                                                 
171
 Cf. Article 65 of the Lugano Convention; cf. Tritton 2008, para. 14–113. 
172
 Tritton 2008, para. 14–113. 
173
 Tritton 2008, para. 14–113. 
174
 Mankowski even speaks of “Grundphilosophie“, cf. Mankowski 2011 (Rauscher), Art 2 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1. 
175
 The wording of Article 4(1) is identical with the wording of Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
176
 ECJ 13 July 2000, C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Company SA v Universal General Insurance Company 
(UGIC), [2000] ECR I-05925, para. 35 – Josi Reinsurance. Cf. also ECJ 17 June 1992, C-26/91, Jakob Handte & 
Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimique des Surfaces SA (TMCS), [1992] ECR I-03967, para. 14 – Handte.  
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business. It must be noticed that Article 4(1) merely regulates the international jurisdiction 
and does not guarantee that a specific local court in the State of domicile is competent.  
 
It shall not be concealed that it has been doubted in the past that Article 4(1) (respectively its 
predecessors) is applicable to patent infringement proceedings, because the link between 
patent infringement litigation and the question of validity of the patent was considered to be 
so close that the specific provision of Article 24(4) (respectively its predecessors) containing a 
special rule for proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents would also 
be applicable to infringement proceedings.177 However, that opinion is not convincing. The 
wording of Article 24(4) reveals clearly its limitation to the aspects of registration and validity 
of patents. Therefore, the prevailing opinion correctly draws the a contrario-conclusion that 
infringement proceedings should not be covered by Article 24(4).178     
 
Another issue which has been raised is whether Article 4(1) (respectively its predecessors) 
only confers jurisdiction in the case of national patents of EU Member States and European 
patents – with regard to those patents there is no dispute nowadays179 – or also applies to 
infringement actions concerning patents which are granted by and for non-Member States. So, 
it has been put forth that the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) would 
not be applicable to proceedings dealing with such patents, because there was no sufficient 
connection to justify the application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its 
predecessors). In analogy to Article 6(1) (respectively its predecessors), national law should 
therefore be decisive for the question of international jurisdiction because the Regulation 
would not be applicable.180 However, this interpretation fails because it is based on a 
misinterpretation of the system of competences in the Regulation: the domicile of the 
defendant being the decisive factor in that system of competences, the Regulation even does 
not contain or claim another criterion than the missing domicile of the defendant. Moreover, 
actions concerning patents granted in non-Member States do not leave the scope of civil and 
commercial matters (cf. Article 1(1)) either.181  Courts of the State where the domicile of the 
defendant is situated thus having international jurisdiction for patent infringement 
proceedings according to Article 4(1), it is to be underlined that this competence is 
comprehensive, meaning that the issue may be decided under consideration of all relevant 
aspects and concerning all actions.182    
 
 
                                                 
177
 Cf. the comments of the French and United Kingdom Governments in the GAT case, referred to in the 
Opinion of the Advocate General, cf. Advocate General 16 September 2004, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für 
Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, paras. 
18-19 – GAT: “(...) The applicability of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention to infringement actions can 
prevent conflicting judgments and is therefore in the interests of legal certainty (...).”; Reichardt 2006, pp. 54-57; 
Adolphsen (2007)27(1) IPRax 15, at p. 17.  
178
 With regard to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention: Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> 
(lastly accessed on 1 June 2015), p. 36: “Other actions, including those for infringement of patents, are governed 
by the general rules of the Convention.”; Neuhaus (1996)87(9) Mitt. 257, at p. 261; Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 17; 
Nagel & Gottwald 2013, § 3, para. 85. 
179
 Contrary to previous times, cf. among others – tellingly – Véron (2001)128(3) J.D.I. 805, at p. 809: “(I)l a 
fallu près de 15 ans avant que des tribunaux européens acceptent de sanctionner la violation de droits de 
propriété industrielle étrangers. Mais, cette innovation a été ensuite reçue dans la pratique judiciaire 
européenne.”   
180
 Cf. Tritton & Tritton (1987)9(12) E.I.P.R. 349, at p. 351; cf. also: Pertegás Sender 2002, paras. 4.23-4.24.  
181
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 76. 
182 Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 2 EuGVVO, para. 161; Geimer 
2015, para. 1146. 
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2.2 Jurisdiction regarding torts – Article 7(2) 
 
 
2.2.1 General remarks and introduction to Article 7(2) 
 
In Article 7(2)183, the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides for a head of special jurisdiction with 
respect of torts: 
 
 
 Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State: 
(…) 
  
 (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
 occurred or may occur. 
 
 
In its Kalfelis decision on the interpretation of Articles 5(3) and 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (corresponding to Articles 7(2) and 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the ECJ 
postulated that the notion of tort must be interpreted in a European-autonomous way,184 which 
is particularly relevant concerning the relationship between contracts and torts. The ECJ held: 
 
“It must therefore be stated (…) that the term “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” within the 
meaning of Article 5(3) of the Convention must be regarded as an independent concept covering all 
actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” 
within the meaning of Article 5(1) [underscore added].”185 
 
This fundamental principle of independent interpretation has subsequently been confirmed, 
regarding the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, in constant case-law, 
for instance in Reichert II186, Réunion Européenne187, Gabriel188, Tacconi189, Henkel190 and 
Engler191. Beyond that, the ECJ made clear that the same applies to Article 5(3) of the 
                                                 
183
 Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation provided in an almost identical way (merely the order of the words in 
the first sentence has been modified in Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation): 
“A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 
(…) 
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred 
or may occur.” 
Besides these minor modifications, Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation did not bring along any 
substantive change vis-à-vis Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (cf. Von Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at p. 
102). 
184
 Ten Wolde/Knot & Weller 2012 (unalex Kommentar), Art. 5 Nr. 3 Brüssel I-VO, para. 9. 
185
 ECJ 27 September 1988, C-189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst und Co. 
and Others, [1988] ECR 05565, para. 18 – Kalfelis.  
186
 ECJ 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert and Others v Dresdner Bank AG, [1992] ECR I-02149, para. 
16 – Reichert II.  
187
 ECJ 27 October 1998, C-51/97, Réunion Européenne SA and Others v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV, 
and the Master of the vessel Alblasgracht V002, [1998] ECR I-06511, para. 22 – Réunion Européenne.  
188 ECJ 11 July 2002, C-96/00, Rudolf Gabriel, [2002] ECR I-06367, para. 33 – Gabriel. 
189 ECJ 17 September 2002, C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), [2002] ECR I-07357, para. 21 – Tacconi. 
190 ECJ 1 October 2002, C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Karl Heinz Henkel, [2002] ECR I-
08111, para. 36 – Henkel. 
191
 ECJ 20 January 2005, C-27/02, Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH, [2005] ECR I-00481, para. 29 – Engler. 
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Brussels I Regulation.192 In its Reisch Montage decision on the interpretation of Article 6(1) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, the ECJ explicitly referred to its case-law with regard to the 
Brussels Convention, holding:  
 
“It is settled case-law that the provisions of the regulation must be interpreted independently, by 
reference to its scheme and purpose (see, in relation to the Brussels Convention, Case C-433/01 
Blijdenstein [2004] ECR I-981, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).”193 
 
This jurisprudence as to the relationship between the interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation – which also applies to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation – was referred to and confirmed in Hassett194 and Zuid-Chemie195, where the court 
explicitly underlined the necessity of continuity in the interpretation of those two instruments, 
in accordance with Recital 19 in the preamble to the Brussels I Regulation which reads: 
 
 
Recital 19 in the preamble to the Brussels I Regulation 
 
Continuity between the Brussels Convention and this Regulation should be ensured, and transitional 
provisions should be laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the 
interpretation of the Brussels Convention by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the 




Similarly, Recital 34 in the preamble to the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: 
 
 
 Recital 34 in the preamble to the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
 
 Continuity between the 1968 Brussels Convention, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and this Regulation 
 should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same need for 
 continuity applies as regards the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the 
 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Regulations replacing it.  
 
 
It is generally accepted that the infringement of a patent constitutes a tort according to Article 
7(2).196 However, due to the territorial nature of IP rights, IP infringements are substantially 
different from other kinds of torts.197   
                                                 
192
 The same interpretation developed under the Brussels Convention (and the Brussels I Regulation) also applies 
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
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 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-103/05, Reisch Montage AG v Kiesel Baumaschinen Handels GmbH, [2006] ECR I-
06827, para. 29 – Reisch Montage. 
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 ECJ 2 October 2008, C-372/07, Nicole Hassett v South Eastern Health Board and Cheryl Doherty v North 
Western Health Board, [2008] ECR I-07403, para. 17 – Hassett. 
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 ECJ 16 July 2009, C-189/08, Zuid-Chemie BV v Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA, [2009] ECR I-06917, 
paras. 17-19 – Zuid-Chemie. 
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 In place of others: OLG Düsseldorf 22 July 1999, 2 U 127/98, (2001)21(4) IPRax 336 – Schussfadengreifer 
II; LG Düsseldorf 25 August 1998, 4 O 165/97, (1999)48(5) GRUR Int. 455, at p. 457 – Schussfadengreifer I; 
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2.2.2 Types of actions covered by Article 7(2) 
 
While the applicability of Article 7(2) to patent infringement actions does not represent a 
problem, the situation is less clear with regard to the constellation of an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement (action for a negative declaration) and the constellation of a 
preventive action for an injunction. In fact, it has been discussed controversially whether such 
actions fall within the scope of Article 7(2).  
 
 
2.2.2.1 Applicability of Article 7(2) to an action for a declaration of non-infringement 
 
The issue whether an action for a negative declaration (negative declaratory action) falls 
within the scope of Article 7(2) does not arise in case that the plaintiff institutes such an 
action before a court on the basis of Article 7(2), and the defendant (i.e. the patent owner) 
does not challenge jurisdiction. For instance, the defendant may eventually have an interest in 
filing a counterclaim for infringement before the court of the State where the possible 
infringer manufactures or sells products possibly infringing the concerned patent.198 In such a 
case, the invoked court can gain jurisdiction according to Article 26(1) given its preconditions 
are fulfilled, in particular if no other court has exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24. 
 
In principle, it is not contested, apart from the case of infringers who initiate actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement, in countries which are considered to decide slowly, for the 
sole reason to delay proceedings (torpedo tactic)199, that competitors may principally have a 
justified interest in having judicially confirmed that they do not infringe a patent.200 
 
Accordingly, Advocate General Tesauro explicated in his Opinion in the Tatry case that  
 
“(…) the bringing of proceedings to obtain a negative finding, which is generally allowed under the 
various national procedural laws and is entirely legitimate in every respect, is an appropriate way of 
dealing with genuine needs on the part of the person who brings them. For example, he may have an 
interest, where the other party is temporizing, in securing a prompt judicial determination – if doubts 
                                                                                                                                                        
EuGVVO, para. 22; Auer 2014 (Geimer & Schütze, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr), Art. 5 VO (EG) No. 
44/2001, para. 126. 
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 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 49. 
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 This is suggested by Véron, cf. P. Véron (case note) TGI Paris 5 November 2003 (unreported), (2004)26(9) 
E.I.P.R. N151, at N151-152, while it is unclear if Véron also has in mind the possibility of jurisdiction on the 
basis of Article 24.  
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exist or objections are raised – of the rights, obligations or responsibilities deriving from a given 
contractual relationship [underscore added]. (…)”201  
 
As to the crucial question of whether actions for a declaration of non-infringement fall within 
the scope of Article 7(2), the ECJ finally rendered a landmark decision in the Folien Fischer 
case on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
In order to illustrate the problem in a comprehensible way, I shall pursue the approach of 
presenting the differing opinions with regard to this issue which have been developed both in 
the case-law of the Member States and in legal doctrine before the ECJ was given the 
opportunity to make a decision on this matter in the Folien Fischer case in 2012.  
 
 
2.2.2.1.1 The legal situation before the Folien Fischer decision of the ECJ 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1 Exemplary case-law of EU Member States 
 
While the following compilation of decisions of EU Member States courts on the question of 
whether an action for a negative declaration falls within the scope of Article 7(2) does not 
claim to be exhaustive, it may in any event demonstrate that the majority of Member States 
courts which had to deal with this question decided against the applicability of Article 5(3) in 
that constellation.202 Only few courts adopted a more liberal approach. 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1 National case-law against the applicability of Article 7(2)203     
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1.1 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage, Decision from 22 January 1998, Evans 
Medical Ltd v Chiron Corporation – Evans Medical 
 
In Evans Medical, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage decided in second instance that Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable to 
an action of a negative declaration, because such an action does not affect a claim concerning 
an obligation resulting from a tort. 
 
The following facts formed the basis of the decision: The appellant (Evans Medical Ltd., 
hereinafter Evans) had lodged an appeal from the judgment given by the Rechtbank 's-
Gravenhage on 14 May 1997 concerning jurisdiction of the court.204 In the proceedings being 
the subject of this preliminary dispute as to jurisdiction, the respondents (Chiron Corporation, 
hereinafter Chiron) had claimed, in essence, the invalidation of the Dutch part of the 
European patent of which Evans was the registered proprietor and a declaration that their 
products do not infringe Evans’ European patent in the designated countries, save the United 
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 Advocate General 13 July 1994, C-406/92, The owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship ‘Tatry’ v 
The owners of the ship ‘Maciej Rataj’, [1994] ECR I-05439, para. 23 – Tatry. 
202
 This evaluation is shared by Sujecki, cf. Sujecki (2012)61(1) GRUR Int. 18, at p. 19.  
203
 The cited national case-law concerns both Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention, the Brussels Convention 
and the Brussels I Regulation. However, as all these provisions are to be interpreted equally, I shall present them 
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204
 Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 22 January 1998, Evans Medical Ltd v Chiron Corporation, [2001] E.N.P.R. 9, 
248, 250 – Evans Medical. 
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Kingdom.205 In its appeal, Evans asked both for reversal of the judgment of the Rechtbank ‘s-
Gravenhage and that the Dutch court be declared to have had no jurisdiction to decide on the 
action of a declaration of non-infringement initiated by Chiron.206 Chiron contested the 
grounds of appeal and asked for confirmation of the judgment of the Rechtbank ‘s-
Gravenhage.  
 
By reference to the Jenard Report, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage first emphasised the 
fundamental importance of the basic principle of actor sequitur forum rei incorporated in 
Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and held 
that, with accordance to this provision, a company must be sued in the court of the State 
where the company is domiciled, meaning that Evans would have to be summoned before the 
English court.207 In view of Chiron’s argumentation, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage then 
analysed whether Chiron could bring an action for a negative declaration against Evans before 
a Dutch court on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). By reference to the Jenard Report and the Mines de Potasse and 
Marinari decisions of the ECJ, the court underlined that jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is justified because 
there is a close connecting factor between the dispute and the court which has jurisdiction to 
hear it,208 and that, as Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) constitutes an exception from the main rule of Article 2 of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be interpreted restrictively, 
according to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Kalfelis.209 In light of the latter decision, where 
the ECJ held that the notion of “matters relating to tort, delict and quasi-delict” covers all 
actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a 
‘contract’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage concluded, as the action for a 
negative declaration brought by Chiron did not concern a claim of such content, but aimed, on 
the contrary, to establish that the claimant is not liable for patent infringement, that Chiron’s 
claim did not fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation).210 Additionally, the court decided that the exceptional nature of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) does not 
leave any room for the interpretation that it should also include a claim for a declaration that 
an act which has not yet taken place does not infringe patent rights, because where no tort has 
as yet taken place no court can be assigned “where the harmful event occurred”, and such an 
extension would even further restrict the scope of the main rule of Article 2 of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). As a consequence, the court held that 
the Dutch court had no jurisdiction to hear Chiron's claim.211 The Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 
denied – in any case as far as regarding the examination of the intended acts of Chiron 
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abroad – the existence of a “particularly close connecting factor between the claim and a court 
other than the one of the State of the abode of the defendant” (in the present case the Dutch 
court).212 Moreover, the court stressed that the Protocol on the Settlement of Litigation 
concerning the Infringement and Validity of Community Patents ([1989] O.J. L401/34, 30 
December 1989) (which has not entered into force) makes a distinction in Article 14 in 
respect of the jurisdiction between applications for a declaration of non-infringement and 
actions concerning infringement.213 Besides, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage clearly rejected 
Chiron’s argumentation that an application for a declaration of non-infringement forms the 
mirror image of an application for an injunction to prevent infringement and that the rule 
concerning jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) which applies to infringement cases applies, “in mirror image”, 
to cases concerning a declaration of non-infringement. In this respect, the court stressed again 
that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) only 
relates to torts according to a restricted interpretation as illustrated above, not allowing any 
“mirror image” analogous application in the case of an action for a negative declaration.214 
Otherwise, the general rule of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention (Article 4 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) would be narrowed to a larger extent than Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) allows, without the presence of the 
justification on which Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) is founded (“the particularly close connecting factor”).215 Last but not least, 
as to Chiron’s argument in favour of the applicability of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) to an action for a declaration of non-
infringement, that there is in fact no difference between an action for infringement and an 
application for a declaration of non-infringement, because the action for infringement also has 
a declaratory aspect, the court laconically held that this statement may be true, but without 
any relevance for the issue of jurisdiction, because it does not make the action for a negative 
declaration an action which seeks to establish the non-contractual liability of a defendant.216 
 
This decision was subsequently confirmed by the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage in its Freelift 
decision from 19 June 2002.217  
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1.2 Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen), Decision from 14 June 2000, 
Case No. Ö 2095-99 – Flootek 
 
In its Flootek decision, the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta Domstolen) held that an action 
for a negative declaration does not fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Lugano 
Convention because it does not concern a claim for damages in the course of a tort 
committed.218 
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The decision was based on the following facts:219 The defendant, Kaldnes Miljøteknologi, a 
company which had its domicile in Norway, was the holder of two Swedish patents for a 
technique for purifying water – a national patent and a European patent designating Sweden. 
The European patent had been revoked, the decision being under appeal. The defendant and 
its Swedish licensee had written warning letters to the plaintiff, Flootek AB, a Swedish 
company selling devices for purifying water, on the alleged ground that this constituted an 
infringement of the Swedish patent. In reaction to this, the plaintiff filed a claim with the City 
Court in Stockholm, asking for a declaration of non-infringement pursuant to Sec. 63 of the 
Swedish Patent Act. The City Court declined jurisdiction; it was held that it was not possible 
in this case to found the competence of the court on Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention. 
The Court of Appeal (Svea Hovrätt) upheld this decision, and also the Supreme Court (Högsta 
Domstolen) confirmed that Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention was not applicable to an 
action for a negative declaration.  
 
Essentially, the Supreme Court founded its decision on the idea that a deviation from the basic 
rule of Article 2(1) of the Lugano Convention, according to which claims have to be filed 
with the courts in the defendant’s State of domicile, may only be admitted in exceptional 
constellations. As Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention constitutes such a deviation from the 
fundamental rule, it must consequently be interpreted narrowly as a matter of principle.220 
According to the court, such a restrictive interpretation which is very close to the exact 
wording of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention is also necessary due to the interest in 
achieving a uniform interpretation among all Contracting States (of the Lugano 
Convention).221 The latter argument reveals that the court doubted that the wording of Article 
5(3) of the Lugano Convention leaves enough room for an interpretation such as to also 
comprise an action according to which the roles of the parties are reversed in the sense that an 
action is not initiated in order to have the opponent held liable to pay damages, but, in 
contrast, is launched in order to gain a declaration by the concerned court that no such liability 
exists. This attitude of the Supreme Court is in particular illustrated by the following 
formulation: 
 
“Flootek's move for declaration by the court that the application of its techniques does not infringe 
certain patent rights is not founded on the ground that any damage has occurred, nor does it provide 
scope for a full determination of the question whether Flootek by utilizing its technique will be liable 
for damages vis-à-vis Kaldnes Miljøteknologi. Therefore, the case does not concern a claim for 
damages, which is raised in a Contracting State where the harmful event occurred. This means that 
Flootek's action does not fall within the scope of application of Article 5(3) of the Convention.”222 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1.3 Brussels Court of First Instance (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te Brussel), 
Decision from 12 May 2000, Case No. 2000/857/A – Röhm Enzyme 
 
In Röhm Enzyme, the Brussels Court of First Instance (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg te 
Brussel) held that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) does not cover an action for a declaration of non-infringement which has been 
initiated as a torpedo action. 
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Essentially, the following facts formed the basis for the decision of the court: The defendant, 
the company DSM N.V., is holder of a European patent which designates the countries of 
Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The plaintiff, the company 
Röhm Enzyme GmbH, sought to declare that the European patent is null and void as far as the 
Belgian territory is concerned, and to declare that the plaintiff himself does not infringe the 
European patent. Additionally, the plaintiff asked the court to declare that he is free to 
manufacture, market and sell his products in the mentioned countries.223 Before handling the 
case on the merits, the parties explicitly restricted the proceeding to the question of whether 
the invoked court has jurisdiction.224 The defendant claimed that the Belgian court had no 
jurisdiction to decide on claims which are extraterritorial vis-à-vis the Belgian territory.225 
Besides, the defendant filed a counterclaim for frivolous litigation. He put forth that the 
plaintiff had introduced the extraterritorial declaratory claim in order to benefit from the 
priority rule of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (which structurally corresponds to 
Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, whereas the content of the provision has been 
modified), intending to delay proceedings and block the possibility for handling the case by 
the courts in the other jurisdictions.226 According to the defendant, mala fide parties could 
thus be inspired to introduce cross-border declaratory claims in Belgium, with the purpose of 
blocking all other claims for five to ten years. The defendant put forth that such a conduct 
constitutes an abuse of procedure and must therefore be ended immediately.227  
 
With regard to the question of whether the plaintiff could sue the defendant who had no 
domicile in Belgium, on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation), by way of an action for a declaration of non-infringement, the 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argumentation that, if a tort had been committed in Belgium by 
the defendant, the plaintiff would have the possibility to sue the defendant, domiciled in 
another contracting State, before the Belgian courts, and that the same should apply to the 
constellation of an action for a negative declaration as the mirror claim. The court resolutely 
stated their attitude that 
 
“(s)uch an interpretation is not in conformity with the jurisdictional rules.”228 
 
The court enumerated three grounds for jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), but stated that none of these 
grounds are existent in the case of an action for a negative declaration where damages have 
not been caused yet:  
 
“Jurisdiction is granted to the courts of the State where the harmful event has occurred because the 
judge of the place where the facts have taken place is better placed to analyse the constitutive elements 
of the tort. This judge is also best placed from a society point of view to rule upon the damages that 
should be awarded. Most of the time, the victims of the tort will be domiciled in that State and it is 
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better that they get damages according to the uniform legislation of the State where the harmful event 
occurred.”229 
 
In light of this, the court did not leave any doubt that   
 
“(a) decision concerning the non-existence of a harmful event does not make sense. The civil judge has 
only jurisdiction to judge a dispute. The plaintiff(s) need(s) standing and interest to introduce a case: the 
declaratory claim of non-infringement of the plaintiff(s) does not present any interest.”230 
 
As the Rechtbank held that the plaintiff could have pursued no other goal than abusing the 
rule of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 29 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, whereas the content of the provision has been modified), when 
introducing the cross-border action for a declaration of non-infringement, it sentenced the 
plaintiff to pay damages to the defendant.231  
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1.4 Corte di Cassazione, Decision from 19 December 2003, Case No. 19550, 
B.L. Macchine automatiche s.p.a. v Windmöller & Hölscher KG 
 
The Italian Corte di Cassazione held that jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) does not cover the constellation of 
an action for a negative declaration being initiated as a torpedo action.232  
 
In the first instance, the case was brought before the Tribunale di Bologna which decided 
against the applicability of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) to this constellation.233 In essence, the decision was based on the 
following facts: The plaintiff, domiciled in Italy, manufactured packing machines. In 
February 1993, the defendant who manufactured packing machines in Germany requested the 
plaintiff to stop the sale of packing machines of a certain type immediately, founding this 
request on the fact that the defendant was holder of a specific European patent for Belgium, 
Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands. In 1994, the plaintiff filed an 
action, before the Tribunale di Bologna, for a negative declaration in order to receive the 
judicial declaration that neither the manufacture nor the marketing of the concerned machine 
of the plaintiff infringed the said European patent of the defendant. The defendant argued that 
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Italian courts did not have jurisdiction to decide the case. In particular, the defendant put forth 
that Article 5(3) was not applicable to the plaintiff’s action.234 Explicitly referring to the 
Kalfelis decision of the ECJ and previous case-law of the Corte di Cassazione (Unified 
Senates, Decision from 8 August 1989, Case No. 3657, and Decision from 13 February 1993, 
Case No. 1821), the Tribunale di Bologna underlined that Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) constitutes an exception from the 
basic rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) which is justified because of the particular close connection between the dispute 
and the court(s) of the place where the tort has been committed.235 The Tribunale di Bologna 
then stated that this connecting factor lacks in the case of actions for a negative declaration, 
because the plaintiff of such an action claims himself that no tort has been committed.236 
Consequently, the court held that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention does not cover an 
action for a negative declaration. 
 
The plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed against this judgment before the Corte di Appello di 
Bologna.237 The latter court referred to the jurisprudence of the ECJ according to which the 
notion of “tort” is to be interpreted in an autonomous way. By reference to the ECJ, the Corte 
di Appello di Bologna underlined that all actions fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) which seek to establish the 
liability of a defendant for non-contractual grounds. According to the conception of the Corte 
di Appello di Bologna, the applicability of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) presupposes that a tortious conduct – which is qualified 
as tortious – has actually been committed. In this light, the court stated that Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable where an 
action seeks to establish the lawfulness of a conduct.238 
 
Against the latter decision, the plaintiff appealed on points of law before the Corte di 
Cassazione. The Corte di Cassazione confirmed the decisions of the previous instances, based 
on two main arguments: First, the court held that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) presupposes the occurrence of an event which 
has effected a damage. In contrast, an action for a negative declaration is not functionally 
linked with the declaration of a damage. In light of this, the court concluded that an action for 
a declaration of non-infringement and an action seeking to establish the liability of the 
infringer are not identical actions which only differ concerning the identity of the plaintiff, but 
constitute structurally different actions.239 Second, the court underlined that, if the alleged 
infringer was enabled to institute an action for a negative declaration before a court of the 
place where he claims that no damage has occurred, this would imply to deprive the 
potentially aggrieved party of his right to institute proceedings before the court(s) of the place 
where he claims that the harmful event occurred.240    
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The Tribunale di Milano followed this jurisprudence of the Corte di Cassazione in its 
decision No. 3773 (interim injunction) from 26 March 2007.241  
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.1.5 Oberlandesgericht München, Decision from 25 October 2001, Case No. 6 U 
5508/00 – Leit- und Informationssystem II 
 
In Leit- und Informationssysteme II, the German Oberlandesgericht München decided in 
second instance that an action for a declaration of non-infringement does not fall within the 
scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), because this form of action does not seek to establish tortious liability of the 
defendant. 
 
The case started in first instance before the German Landgericht München I. The following 
facts formed the basis of the case: The plaintiff, domiciled in Munich, had developed and 
afterwards manufactured and sold a navigation system for road vehicles. This system was 
inter alia integrated in the vehicles of the German company P. The French affiliate of the 
plaintiff, company S, delivered navigation systems to company P for integration in vehicles. 
The defendant, domiciled in France, is holder of a European patent concerning an electronic 
guidance and information system for road traffic. The European patent designated the 
countries of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. The defendant sued the plaintiff for 
patent infringement before the French Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris. Company S 
joined that proceeding.  
 
The plaintiff initiated an action for a declaration of non-infringement as to the German and the 
French part of the said European patent of the defendant. The plaintiff expressly put forth that 
the Landgericht München I was competent for decision on the basis of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), because he argued that 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) also 
covers actions for a negative declaration.242    
 
As to the question of jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the Landgericht München I differentiated between the 
German and the French part of the concerned European patent. The court held that actions for 
a negative declaration principally fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). With regard to the German part of 
the European patent, the court therefore held that it was competent to decide. Concerning the 
French part of the European patent of the defendant, the Landgericht München I denied its 
jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation), explicating that, due to the principle of territoriality applicable to patent law, 
a French patent (respectively the French part of a European patent) could only be infringed in 
France. The place where the damage occurred could thus only be situated in France.243  
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Remarkably, both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed against this decision of the 
Landgericht München I before the Oberlandesgericht München. While the plaintiff appealed 
against the dismissal of the action for inadmissibility regarding the French part of the 
European patent, the defendant appealed against the statement of the Landgericht München I 
of having jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) with regard to the German part of the European patent.244    
 
In second instance, the Oberlandesgericht München dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, denying 
international jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) for the initiated action for a negative declaration concerning 
non-infringement of the French part of the European patent in France, because the court held 
that there was no room for an exception from the principle rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). Concerning the defendant’s appeal, 
the Oberlandesgericht München held that international jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) for the initiated 
action for a negative declaration concerning non-infringement of the German part of the 
European patent in Germany does not exist either, because, according to the court, Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is generally not 
applicable to actions for a negative declaration.245  The Oberlandesgericht München grounded 
its finding on several arguments. First, referring to the Kalfelis decision of the ECJ, the court 
underlined that the term “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” within the meaning of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be 
considered as an independent concept covering all actions which seek to establish the liability 
of a defendant and which are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of 
the Brussels Convention (Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). While a patent 
infringement constitutes a tort, the plaintiff put forth that no such infringement has occurred 
or may occur. His action did not imply a claim for damages, but was rather based on the non-
existence of such a claim.246 Indirectly, it becomes clear that the court was of the opinion that 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) intends 
to protect the aggrieved party, when the court explicated that the plaintiff of an action for a 
negative declaration may not choose the forum delicti commissi, because he did not act as the 
aggrieved holder of a (patent) right. Again by reference to Kalfelis, the Oberlandesgericht 
München emphasised that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), as it constitutes an exception from the basic rule of Article 2(1) of 
the Brussels Convention (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), must be interpreted 
restrictively. Additionally, underlining that the (potentially) aggrieved holder of a patent may 
choose between the courts competent according to Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) at the place where the defendant is domiciled, 
and the courts competent according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) at the places where the harmful event occurred, the court held 
that there is no need to grant such a right to the alleged infringer of a patent. It is noteworthy 
that the Oberlandesgericht München did not deliver any further reasoning for this 
differentiation. Moreover, the Oberlandesgericht München stressed that interpreting Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) such as to also 
cover an action for a declaration of non-infringement would result in depriving the patent 
holder of his right to choose the place of jurisdiction, because a choice of jurisdiction by the 
alleged infringer in favour of the courts of the place where the alleged harmful event has 
                                                 
244
 LG München I 20 September 2000, 21 O 5046/99, InstGE 1, 236, referred to in: OLG München 25 October 
2001, 6 U 5508/00, InstGE 2, 61, at p. 67. 
245
 OLG München 25 October 2001, 6 U 5508/00, InstGE 2, 61, at p. 68. 
246
 OLG München 25 October 2001, 6 U 5508/00, InstGE 2, 61, at p. 69. 
 73 
occurred would block an infringement action in both this State and the State where the 
potential infringer is domiciled, due to the fact that the ECJ clarified in Tatry that both actions 
have the same object. Besides, a broad interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) would imply the risk that the alleged 
infringer invokes a court of a State where proceedings are known to relatively take a long 
period of time, in order to delay the whole proceeding, which would impede the effective 
enforcement of the rights of the patent holder. Furthermore, the Oberlandesgericht München 
held that the consequence of a race between the parties of suing each other does not 
correspond to the idea of a sound administration of justice. Last but not least, the court 
referred to Articles 93(5) and 94(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 
1993 on the Community trade mark and to Article 14(5), 17(2) of the Protocol on the 
settlement of litigation concerning the infringement and validity of Community Patents 
(Protocol on litigation) (which has never entered into force). According to the cited 
provisions, international jurisdiction in the forum delicti commissi is expressly excluded in the 
case of actions of a declaration of non-infringement of a Community trade mark respectively 
a Community patent. The court in the forum delicti commissi has only jurisdiction concerning 
the torts which have been committed in the territory of the State where the courts is sitting. 
These rules applying in the case of infringement of Community trade marks and Community 
patents, the Oberlandesgericht München draws the conclusion that the same applies a fortiori 
to parallel rights, in particular to the European patent which has a uniform scope of protection, 
but consists of a bundle of national patents.247    
 
This decision of the Oberlandesgericht München, according to which Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable to actions 
for a negative declaration, has been confirmed in a later case by the Landgericht Leipzig248 in 
first instance and the Oberlandesgericht Dresden249 in second instance. The Landgericht 
Leipzig, also by reference to the decisions cited above by the Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta 
Domstolen) and the Italian Corte di Cassazione, underlined that in the case of an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement, the legal relationship between the parties per se lacks a 
tortious or similar character. According to the Landgericht Leipzig, this excludes the 
applicability of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation).250 Besides, the court stressed that the GAT decision of the ECJ, according to 
which Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
is to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein 
concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of 
whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection, does not require another 
interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) which does not concern exclusive jurisdiction.251 As the plaintiff of the brought 
action for a negative declaration did not question the validity of the concerned patent, rules of 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) were not applicable.252   
 
The Oberlandesgericht Dresden, deciding in second instance, agreed with the decision of the 
Landgericht Leipzig. Similarly to the Oberlandesgericht München, the Oberlandesgericht 
Dresden emphasised that the text of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of 
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the Brussels Ibis Regulation) strikes against the applicability of this provision to an action for 
a negative declaration, because Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) presupposes a tortious legal relationship between the parties while 
the plaintiff of an action for a declaration of non-infringement conversely claims that no 
harmful event occurred.253 On the other hand, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden underlined that 
Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not 
applicable in case of an action for a negative declaration either because the plaintiff of such an 
action does not question the validity of the concerned patent, but presupposes that validity.254 
 
As the Oberlandesgericht München, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden also emphasised that the 
alleged infringer is not to be granted the right to choose between jurisdiction of the courts of 
the place where the defendant is domiciled and another jurisdiction.255 Even more clearly than 
the Oberlandesgericht München, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden held that the purpose of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to 
facilitate the proceeding for the aggrieved party, but not in favour of the one who searches 
legal certainty.256 The court also picked up the arguments of the Oberlandesgericht München 
that interpreting Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) in a way that an action for a declaration of non-infringement would be covered 
could effect a blockade for the infringement action, meaning that the aggrieved party would 
be deprived of his right to choose the place of jurisdiction. As a consequence, there would be 
the danger of impeding the effective enforcement of the rights of the patent holder.257 As the 
Oberlandesgericht München, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden stated that a race between the 
parties of suing each other must be avoided in light of a sound administration of justice.258 
Ultimately, as the Oberlandesgericht München, the Oberlandesgericht Dresden also referred 
to the provisions of Articles 93(5) and 94(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 
December 1993 on the Community trade mark by way of an argumentation a fortiori in order 
to underline that courts in the forum delicti commissi have only jurisdiction concerning torts 
which have been committed in the territory of the State where the courts are situated.259 The 
Oberlandesgericht Dresden thus decided that an action for a negative declaration does not fall 
within the scope of application of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), neither by way of a direct application, nor (as the court did not 
recognise any legal gap in this respect) by way of an analogous application.260 
 
The decision of the Oberlandesgericht München cited above was also confirmed by the 
Landgericht München I in a subsequent decision261, in which the Landgericht München I, 
after broadly and thoroughly referring to previous case-law and legal doctrine, followed the 
conception of the Oberlandesgericht München, underlining in particular the wording of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and the 
fact that this provision constitutes an exception to the basic rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
I Regulation (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) which requires a restricted 
interpretation.   
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2.2.2.1.1.1.1.6 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Decision from 5 November 2003 – 
Dijkstra Plastics 
 
The Dijkstra Plastics decision constitutes the first French decision on jurisdiction in an action 
for a cross-border declaration of non-infringement of a patent.262 The Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris held that French courts have international jurisdiction to hear the action for 
a declaration of non-infringement based on the French part of a European patent under Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), whereas this 
provision does not allow a court to issue a cross-border declaration of non-infringement. As a 
consequence, the Tribunal de Grande Instance declined jurisdiction to decide on the non-
French parts of a European patent.263 
 
The decision was based on the following facts: The plaintiff, the Dutch company Dijkstra 
Plastics, manufactured and marketed buckets used for liquid products such as sauces in 
various European countries, including France. The defendant, the German company Saier 
Verpackungstechnik, owns a European patent covering pot-shaped containers, in particular a 
bucket. Faced with the threat of a patent infringement action, the plaintiff initiated an action 
for a declaration of non-infringement against the defendant before the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris. The case was based both on the French part of the defendant’s European 
patent, and on its Austrian, Belgian, German, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Swiss 
counterparts. The defendant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris to rule on the French part of the European patent. However, the disputed 
issue was whether the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris had also jurisdiction in an action 
for a cross-border declaration of non-infringement under Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) with regard to the non-French parts 
of the European patent.264 
 
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris accepted jurisdiction to hear the action for a 
declaration of non-infringement based on the French part of the European patent according to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), but 
stated that Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) does not allow a court to issue a cross-border declaration of non-infringement and 
therefore declined jurisdiction to decide on the non-French parts of the European patent. In 
dicta, the court mentioned that, according to the basic rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), only the courts of the Member State 
where the defendant is domiciled have jurisdiction to make a cross-border decision.265 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.2 National case-law in favour of the applicability of Article 7(2) 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.1 Swiss Supreme Court (Bundesgericht), Decision from 13 March 2007, 
Case No. 4C.318/2006  
 
In a decision from 13 March 2007, the Swiss Supreme Court (Bundesgericht) decided that an 
action for a declaration of non-infringement principally falls within the scope of Article 5(3) 
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of the Lugano Convention266 unless the plaintiff exerts his right of choice according to Article 
5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) in an inappropriate way in order to establish jurisdiction of a court which lacks 
the required proximity to evidence and facts.267 
 
Presented in a simplified way, the decision of the Bundesgericht was based on the following 
facts: The plaintiff, having its seat in Basel/Switzerland, was a company doing business in the 
field of reinsurance. In 1998, the plaintiff had arranged a reinsurance contract between C. 
B.V., a Dutch company, and the reinsurance company K which had its seat in Bermuda. That 
reinsurance contract contained K’s obligation to assure so-called cashback operations 
according to which consumers were promised partial repayment of the purchase price of 
products purchased from retailers. C. B.V. and K also concluded a so-called “Hold-Harmless-
Agreement” according to which K should be held harmless by C. B.V. in case of any 
insurance payments based on a specific insurance policy. In summer 2001, C B.V. became 
insolvent. The defendant was appointed as insolvency administrator. In default of insurance 
protection, numerous claims of consumers could not be satisfied. In 2002, the plaintiff 
brought an action for a negative declaration against the defendant before the Court of First 
Instance of Basel/Switzerland, in order to gain the judicial declaration that the plaintiff is not 
liable for damages. The defendant put forth that the plaintiff must be held liable for damages 
because of the “Hold-Harmless-Agreement” between C B.V. and K, being concluded in the 
framework of the reinsurance contract between C. B.V. and K which had been arranged by 
the plaintiff. In 2005, the Court of First Instance of Basel (Zivilgericht Basel-Stadt) held that it 
lacked jurisdiction to decide on the merits. This decision was confirmed, in second instance, 
by the Court of Appeal of Basel (Appellationsgericht des Kantons Basel-Stadt), in 2006. The 
plaintiff then brought the case before the Bundesgericht.268      
 
As the Bundesgericht essentially referred to the argumentation of the Court of Appeal of 
Basel, I shall present this decision first. Regarding the question of applicability of Article 5(3) 
of the Lugano Convention to the plaintiff’s action for a negative declaration, the Court of 
Appeal of Basel decided that, in principle, not only the aggrieved party but also the alleged 
infringer may choose to initiate an action at the place where the harmful event occurred 
pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). However, the court excluded this right of choice in the case that it 
would result in an “inappropriate” (“unsachgemäß”) result, meaning that it would run 
contrary to the objective of expedience intended by Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention 
(which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).269 The plaintiff claimed 
that he had not undertaken any acts in the Netherlands, but had only acted in Basel.270 
Although the Court of Appeal of Basel accepted that Basel formed a place of the event giving 
rise to the damage, it held that courts in Basel lacked the required factual proximity because 
the acts which had been undertaken in Basel formed only a minor part of the total events, 
emphasising that the claims in question were based on the interaction between the plaintiff 
and K in conjunction with the “Hold Harmless Agreement” with its focus situated in the 
Netherlands, where C. B.V. had its seat and the damage had also occurred. In view of these 
conditions, the Court of Appeal stated that, with regard to the aspects of proximity to evidence 
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and facts, Basel as a place of the event giving rise to the damage would take a back seat vis-à-
vis the place where the damage occurred.271 Consequently, the Court of Appeal of Basel 
decided that Swiss courts had no jurisdiction as to the plaintiff’s action for a negative 
declaration on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).272  
 
The Bundesgericht confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal of Basel. First of all, the 
Bundesgericht clarified that, for jurisdiction concerning the constellation of an action for a 
negative declaration, it cannot be decisive on which legal basis potential claims are based, 
because the plaintiff of such an action does not bring forward any claim at all.273 The court 
underlined that at the time when the action for a declaration of non-infringement is instituted, 
it does not need to be certain on which legal basis the defendant intends to ground his 
claims.274 The Bundesgericht emphasised that an action for a negative declaration, seeking for 
a declaration that the plaintiff is not liable for damages, has the same cause of action as the 
action of the opponent seeking for a declaration of the existence of liability, because it 
constitutes the mirror image of the latter action.275 In light of this, the Bundesgericht drew the 
conclusion that the action for a negative declaration is to be brought before the courts of the 
place where an infringement action would have to be judged.276 Explicitly referring to the 
Kronhofer decision of the ECJ, the Bundesgericht underlined that “the rule laid down in 
Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention is based on the existence of a particularly close 
connecting factor between a dispute and courts other than those for the place where the 
defendant is domiciled, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to those courts for 
reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of 
proceedings”277, and reasoned that the right of choice between the places of jurisdiction, 
according to Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), is also granted to the alleged infringer.278 Nonetheless, the 
Bundesgericht restricted this right of choice in favour of the alleged infringer in the way that 
it must be certain that there is actually a particularly close connecting factor between the 
invoked court and the dispute. Otherwise, the (alleged) infringer could, in the case of actings 
which can be undertaken at any place, choose – for tactical reasons – a place for his infringing 
acting where he assumes courts to decide in his favour – i.e. to the disadvantage of the 
aggrieved party – when subsequently initiating an action for a declaration of non-
infringement. The court held that this result would diametrically run contrary to the objective 
of ensuring the efficacious taking of evidence and conduct of proceedings.279 The court 
underlined that its finding was neither meant to introduce the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, nor to generally balance the interests of the parties in favour of the aggrieved 
party, but merely pursued the goal to avoid that the alleged infringer exerts his right of choice 
according to Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) in an inappropriate way.280 The Bundesgericht underlined that 
factual proximity of the courts at Basel to the dispute would exist if it was to be clarified 
whether the plaintiff committed certain acts in Basel. However, this was not the case, because 
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the plaintiff did not show which claims were controversial between the parties concerning 
which the taking of evidence would be easier before courts in Basel than before Dutch 
courts.281 In accordance with the Court of Appeal of Basel, the Bundesgericht underlined that 
the cashback operations were not sufficiently connected to Basel and were not performed in 
Switzerland, but in the Netherlands.282  
 
The Bundesgericht decided that the plaintiff exerted his right of choice according to Article 
5(3) of the Lugano Convention (which corresponds to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), which principally exists also in the case of an action for a negative declaration, in 
an inappropriate way in order to establish jurisdiction of a court which lacks the required 
proximity to evidence and facts, and that Swiss courts actually had no jurisdiction to decide 
on the merits of this case.283   
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.1.2.2 Regional Court of Frankfurt (Landgericht Frankfurt), Decision from 25 
March 2010, Case No. 2-03 O 580/08 
 
The reasoning of the Bundesgericht discussed in the previous paragraph was referred to and 
confirmed by the German Landgericht Frankfurt in a decision from 25 March 2010.284 By 
express reference to the Bundesgericht, the Landgericht Frankfurt underlined that actions for 
a negative declaration principally fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). The parties’ roles being reversed 
vis-à-vis the constellation in infringement proceedings, it cannot be decisive for jurisdiction 
on which legal basis the plaintiff grounds his claims, because he does not bring forward any 
claims at all, but only the inexistence of (potential) claims brought forward against him by the 
defendant.285 Therefore, an action for a negative declaration is generally to be instituted 
before the courts of the place where infringement proceedings would have to be brought.286  
 
While underlining that the right of choice between the places of jurisdiction according to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is 
generally granted to the aggrieved party, the Landgericht Frankfurt, as the Bundesgericht, 
further explicated that it is the plaintiff of an action for a declaration of non-infringement, i.e. 
the alleged infringer, who has this right of choice, if there is a particular proximity to evidence 
and facts between the invoked court and the (infringing) act to be judged.287 
 
 
2.2.2.1.1.2 Legal doctrine 
 
In contrast to the situation as to the jurisprudence of EU Member States courts, the clear 
majority of legal commentators have argued for the applicability of Article 7(2) concerning an 
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action for a negative declaration, 288 while others have advocated the opposite opinion.289 In 
the following paragraphs, I shall briefly present the main lines of reasoning of both 
conceptions. For reasons of clearness, I shall not treat the opinions separately, but show in 
which way the arguments of both advocates and opponents of the applicability of Article 7(2) 
to an action for a negative declaration are interrelated with each other.                    
 
First of all, it could be underlined that the wording of Article 7(2) does not contain any 
differentiation between specific types of actions.290 Despite the wording of the provision, 
legal commentators militating against the application of Article 7(2) to actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement have put forth that, due to the fact that Article 7(2) is an 
exception to the basic provision of Article 4(1), Article 7(2) must be interpreted in a 
restrictive way.291 According to the latter opinion, that result could be derived from the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Kalfelis decision where the court held that 
 
“(…) the ‘special jurisdictions’ enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the [Brussels] Convention constitute 
derogations from the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant is 
domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively. It must therefore be recognized that a court 
which has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention] over an action in so far as it is 
based on tort or delict does not have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not so based 
[underscores and content in brackets added].”292 
 
Further, one might put forth that the ECJ explicated, in its Kalfelis decision, when defining 
the term “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” as to non-contractual liability:  
 
“It must therefore be stated (…) that the term “matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict” within the 
meaning of Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention must be regarded as an independent concept 
covering all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a 
“contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1) [of the Brussels Convention] [underscore and content in 
brackets added].”293 
 
In light of this, it has been highlighted that an action for a declaration of non-infringement 
does in no way seek to establish such liability of the defendant, and that, by initiating an 
action for a declaration of non-infringement, the plaintiff himself alleges that no harmful 
event occurred, while Article 7(2) exactly requires that such a harmful event occur or may 
occur.294 In this context, it has also been underlined that the ECJ ruled in its Reichert II 
decision, taking reference to the instrument of action paulienne according to French law, that 
actions which are not initiated to have the debtor convicted to pay damages due to a 
committed fraudulent conduct are not covered by Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation): 
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“It may be seen, moreover, from the Commission' s observations, which are not challenged on this 
point, that in French law the action paulienne may be instituted both against dispositions made for 
consideration by the debtor when the beneficiary acts in bad faith and against transactions entered into 
without consideration by the debtor even if the beneficiary acts in good faith.  
 
The purpose of such an action is not to have the debtor ordered to make good the damage he has caused 
his creditor by his fraudulent conduct, but to render ineffective, as against his creditor, the disposition 
which the debtor has made. It is directed not only against the debtor but also against the person who 
benefits from the act, who is not a party to the obligation binding the creditor to his debtor, even, in 
cases where there is no consideration for the transaction, where that third party has not committed any 
wrongful act.  
 
In these circumstances an action such as the action paulienne in French law cannot be regarded as a 
claim seeking to establish the liability of a defendant in the sense in which it is understood in Article 
5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention and therefore does not come within the scope of that provision. 
[underscores and content in brackets added]”295  
 
In view of this jurisprudence of the ECJ in Reichert II, it could be derived that actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement do not fall within the scope of Article 7(2), because such 
actions as well do not seek to establish the liability of the defendant.296 
 
However, such reasoning has not remained undisputed. Proponents of the applicability of 
Article 7(2) to an action for a negative declaration have stressed that the concept of liability 
does not require actual damage to be sustained. As a consequence, future (imminent) torts are 
also covered.297 This has ultimately been made clear by adding the last clause “or may occur” 
into Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (which is also included in Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), modifying the text of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
without actually changing the meaning of the provision.298 In view of this, the opposing 
opinion would not be compatible with the system of the Brussels I(bis) Regulation, also 
because actions for a declaration of non-infringement are covered by Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) as well.299  
 
Furthermore, arguing in favour of the conception that Article 7(2) is applicable to the 
constellation of actions for a declaration of non-infringement, it is to be underlined that the 
opposing view is not in line with the jurisprudence of the ECJ either. While admitting that the 
ECJ actually held in its Kalfelis decision that special jurisdictions within the system of the 
Brussels Convention – and the same applies to the Brussels Ibis Regulation – are to be 
interpreted restrictively, it has been underlined that a closer look on the passage of the above 
cited Kalfelis decision which takes into consideration the whole respective paragraph, reveals 
that the ECJ, by emphasising the necessity of a restrictive interpretation of the special 
jurisdictions, merely intended to stress that the competence of a court to decide on contractual 
matters does not automatically confer the competence to decide on non-contractual issues.300 
This idea is expressly stated in the second sentence of the respective paragraph, which is 
directly linked to its first sentence (“therefore”):    
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“(…) the ‘special jurisdictions’ enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the [Brussels] Convention constitute 
derogations from the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant is 
domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively. It must therefore be recognized that a court 
which has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention] over an action in so far as it is 
based on tort or delict does not have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not so based 
[underscore and content in brackets added].”301 
 
Additionally, it has been put forward that the ECJ has, in its Kalfelis decision, in no way 
addressed the question of the type of action.302 However, the correctness of this general 
statement is doubtful, given the explications of the ECJ in paragraph 18 of this decision where 
the ECJ referred to “all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant (…)”.303   
 
With regard to an action of the patent holder, it is uncontested that Article 7(2) confers 
jurisdiction both concerning an action for performance and an action for a declaration of 
infringement.304 In view of this, it could be argued that not applying Article 7(2) to an action 
for a negative declaration would lead to an unexplainable split between jurisdiction for 
positive and negative declaratory relief,305 there being no reason respectively justification why 
the connection between the dispute and the courts should be less close in the case of an action 
for a declaration of non-infringement.306 
 
Arguing in favour of the applicability with regard to actions for a negative declaration, it 
could further be put forth that an action for a declaration of non-infringement is governed by 
the same rules of jurisdiction as the claim for damages, because it simply mirrors the positive 
action by the victim of that action.307 The action for a declaration of non-infringement thus 
falls on its merits under the definition of tort.308 Although an action for a declaration of non-
infringement does not constitute an action for damages, both an infringement action and an 
action for a declaration of non-infringement concern, at their core, the question of liability.309 
On the other hand, while admitting that a declaration of non-infringement represents the 
“mirror image” of an infringement action as far as the object of the action is concerned, it has 
been put forth that this idea cannot be applied to the rules of jurisdiction because they pursue 
different purposes. In contrast to an infringement action being initiated in order to sanction a 
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patent infringement, an action for a declaration of non-infringement postulates the lack of 
existence of any infringement.310 
 
Legal commentators arguing against the conception that an action for a negative declaration 
falls within the scope of Article 7(2) have vehemently stressed that Article 7(2), respectively 
the right to choose, with regard to jurisdiction, between the courts of the place where the 
event giving rise to the damage (“Handlungsort”) and the place where the damage occurred 
(“Erfolgsort”) shall protect the aggrieved party,311 referring to the Mines de Potasse decision 
of the ECJ. It has also been underlined that the German principle of favourability of private 
international law (“kollisionsrechtliches Günstigkeitsprinzip”) protects the aggrieved party 
and that it was the aggrieved party that was given the right to choose between the above 
indicated jurisdictions in the Mines de Potasse decision. In light of this, it has been concluded 
that the ECJ probably indeed had in mind the principle of favourability of private 
international law when deciding in this way, and that the principle of favourability of private 
international law is therefore also applicable to Article 7(2). According to this conception, it 
would be contradictory if the actor of an action for a declaration of non-infringement, i.e. the 
alleged infringer, was also given the choice of jurisdiction according to Article 7(2), which 
would ultimately disable the choice of jurisdiction of the aggrieved party.312 In order to argue 
for this opinion, reference has been made to the Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti given 
in the Mines de Potasse case, who explicated: 
 
“(…) The injured party, who must establish the unlawful act, is automatically deemed the weaker party 
and as such worthy of protection in the choice of the court having jurisdiction. (…)”313 
 
However, it is noteworthy that the ECJ, in contrast to the Advocate General, who advocated 
to merely refer to the place where the damage occurred, decided that both the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred shall be deemed 
relevant with regard to jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). Beyond that, the ECJ also denied a wide 
interpretation of the “place where the damage occurred” so as to avoid to establish a 
“Klägergerichtsstand” as such in favour of the aggrieved party (cf. below in detail).  
 
With regard to the transfer of the German principle of favourability of private international 
law (“kollisionsrechtliches Günstigkeitsprinzip”) to Article 7(2), it is to be criticised that such 
a conception cannot convince for two reasons: First, it is impossible to conclude that 
principles being applicable according to German private international law are applicable as 
well in the European jurisdictional system. Secondly, another inconsistency lies in the fact 
that the German principle of favourability of private international law does not affect 
jurisdiction but merely concerns the question of which substantive law is applicable. As there 
is a clear distinction between such rules on the applicable substantive law and rules of 
international procedural law within the German legal system, a conclusion from a principle of 
the one set of rules to the other set of rules is not possible. While the favourability principle 
indeed pursues the objective to protect the aggrieved party, rules of procedural law such as 
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Article 7(2) intend to secure a high level of procedural effectivity (“Prozessökonomie”) 
through decisions characterised by factual proximity.314      
 
It could be brought forth that Article 7(2) may also have the objective to grant the plaintiff of 
an infringement action the procedural advantage to choose the competent court. In this 
respect, it has been underlined that protection of the weaker party is a recognised objective of 
certain other provisions315 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) on 
special or exclusive jurisdiction. Such provisions are based on the idea that the protection of 
the weaker party is given preference against the protection of the defendant who normally is 
in a weaker position.316  
 
Against the latter argument, it can be argued that Article 7(2) – unlike Articles 17 and 18 – 
does not pursue the goal to favour the structurally weaker plaintiff, for social considerations, 
by giving jurisdiction to the courts of the State where the plaintiff is domiciled.317 Rather, 
according to the constant jurisprudence of the ECJ, the reason for jurisdiction according to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) is the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute 
and the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of 
jurisdiction to those courts to ensure the sound administration of justice and the efficacious 
conduct of proceedings.318 For instance, the ECJ explicated in Zuid-Chemie, in line with its 
finding in multiple previous decisions:  
 
“(…) (T)he Court has stated that the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and 
the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred, which justifies the attribution of jurisdiction to 
those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of 
proceedings (see to that effect, inter alia, Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, paragraph 11; Case C-220/88 
Dumez France and Tracoba [1990] ECR I-49, paragraph 17; Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others [1995] 
ECR I-415, paragraph 19; and Case C-364/93 Marinari [1995] ECR I-2719, paragraph 10). The courts 
for the place where the harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in 
particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence (see Henkel, paragraph 46) 
[underscores added].”319 
 
Factual proximity between the deciding court and the allegedly infringing act to be assessed 
exists independently of concrete objectives pursued by an action in light of an alleged patent 
infringement, and of which procedural role the alleged infringer and victim play in the 
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proceeding.320 In light of this, the aspect of factual proximity is justified both with regard to 
actions for a performance and actions for a negative declaration.321 In this respect, both types 
of actions constitute two side of the same coin. This objective goal of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) has also been confirmed, 
for instance, by Advocate General Léger in his Opinion delivered on 15 January 2004 in the 
Kronhofer case where he stated: 
 
“The Court’s reasoning is based entirely on the need to ensure that jurisdiction is attributed to the courts 
which are objectively the best placed to assess whether, in the specific case, the factors giving rise to 
liability are present. In other words, it was not prompted by a concern that the victim should be given 
the right to choose which courts should have jurisdiction, by extending the application of Articles 5(2), 
8(2) and 14 of the Brussels Convention [underscore added].”322 
 
Both parties (i.e. the patent holder and the alleged infringer) benefit from this objective goal 
of legal respectively jurisdictional certainty and legal proximity and proximity to evidence.323  
Therefore, it could be argued that the plaintiff of an infringement action would be 
unjustifiedly privileged towards the alleged infringer if an action for a declaration of non-
infringement would not be admissible on the basis of Article 7(2).324 Favouring one of the 
parties as to the determination of jurisdiction would thus be contrary to the objective goal 
pursued.325 Furthermore, Article 7(2), according to its underlying idea, is not restricted to the 
protection of the aggrieved party, but also applicable to an action for a declaration of non-
infringement.326 
 
In light of the general objective of Article 7(2) to ensure the sound administration of justice 
and the efficacious conduct of proceedings, it can be concluded that there is no space for a 
restriction of Article 7(2) pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens either.327 Further, 
in its Dumez decision, the ECJ expressly denied 
 
“(…) any interpretation of the [Brussels] Convention which, otherwise than in the cases expressly 
provided for, might lead to recognition of the jurisdiction of the courts of the plaintiff' s domicile and 
would enable a plaintiff to determine the competent court by his choice of domicile [content in brackets 
added].”328 
 
Arguing against the applicability of Article 7(2) in the case of an action for a declaration of 
non-infringement, it could be pointed out that, if Article 7(2) was applicable in this 
constellation, the (alleged) infringer – and not the aggrieved party – would be favoured, 
because, concerning “Distanzdelikte”, the place of the event giving rise to the damage 
(“Handlungsort”) is often located at the place of domicile of the alleged infringer, meaning 
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that a “Klägergerichtsstand” in favour of the infringer would then be established. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the ECJ has, in its Mines de Potasse decision, broadened the 
meaning of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) to also encompass the place where the damage occurred (“Erfolgsort”), in order 
to strengthen the effectiveness of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), because the place of the event giving rise to the damage will often 
be the place of the domicile of the alleged infringer (with the consequence that the alleged 
infringer is favoured). The ECJ held: 
 
“Thus the meaning of the expression 'place where the harmful event occurred' in Article 5(3) [of the 
Brussels Convention] must be established in such a way as to acknowledge that the plaintiff has an 
option to commence proceedings either at the place where the damage occurred or the place of the event 
giving rise to it. 
 
This conclusion is supported by the consideration, first, that to decide in favour only of the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage would, in an appreciable number of cases, cause confusion between the 
heads of jurisdiction laid down by Articles 2 and 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention, so that the latter 
provision would, to that extent, lose its effectiveness. [underscore and content in brackets added]”329 
 
However, the ECJ also denied a wide interpretation of the “place where the damage occurred” 
such as to avoid to establish a “Klägergerichtsstand” as such in favour of the aggrieved party.  
Several aspects are remarkable in this respect. In Marinari, the ECJ held that the “place where 
the damage occurred” does not encompass the place where the assets of the aggrieved party 
are located. The ECJ held:    
 
“Finally, as regards the argument as to the relevance of the location of the assets when the obligation to 
redress the damage arose, the proposed interpretation might confer jurisdiction on a court which had no 
connection at all with the subject-matter of the dispute, whereas it is that connection which justifies the 
special jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention. Indeed, the expenses and 
losses of profit incurred as a result of the initial harmful event might be incurred elsewhere so that, as 
far as the efficiency of proof is concerned, that court would be entirely inappropriate [underscores and 
content in brackets added].”330 
 
The ECJ confirmed and continued this jurisprudence in Kronhofer:  
 
“(…) In a situation such as that in the main proceedings, such an interpretation would mean that the 
determination of the court having jurisdiction would depend on matters that were uncertain, such as the 
place where the victim’s ‘assets are concentrated’ and would thus run counter to the strengthening of 
the legal protection of persons established in the Community which, by enabling the claimant to identify 
easily the court in which he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he may be 
sued, is one of the objectives of the [Brussels] Convention (see Case C-256/00 Besix [2002] ECR I-
1699, paragraphs 25 and 26, and DFDS Torline, paragraph 36). Furthermore, it would be liable in most 
cases to give jurisdiction to the courts of the place in which the claimant was domiciled. As the Court 
found at paragraph 14 of this judgment, the [Brussels] Convention does not favour that solution except 
in cases where it expressly so provides.  
 
In view of the foregoing considerations, (…) Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention must be 
interpreted as meaning that the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ does not refer to 
the place where the claimant is domiciled or where ‘his assets are concentrated’ by reason only of the 
fact that he has suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of part of his assets which arose 
and was incurred in another Contracting State [underscores and content in brackets added].”331 
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In its Dumez decision, the ECJ pursued this jurisprudence addressing the constellation that the 
plaintiff is an indirect victim. The court ruled: 
 
“(…) (W)hilst the place where the initial damage manifested itself is usually closely related to the other 
components of the liability, in most cases the domicile of the indirect victim is not so related. 
 
It must therefore be stated (…) that the rule on jurisdiction laid down in Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] 
Convention cannot be interpreted as permitting a plaintiff pleading damage which he claims to be the 
consequence of the harm suffered by other persons who were direct victims of the harmful act to bring 
proceedings against the perpetrator of that act in the courts of the place in which he himself ascertained 
the damage to his assets [underscores and content in brackets added].”332  
 
The cases cited in the foregoing paragraphs concerned actions brought by the aggrieved party 
towards the alleged infringer which, in theory, leaves open the possibility that the ECJ would 
exclude the place of the event giving rise to the damage in the case of an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement raised by the alleged infringer.333 However, it is to be borne 
in mind that the ECJ has continuously held that the decisive factor for jurisdiction according 
to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) is the “existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute 
and the deciding court”, indepedently from the domicile of each party, in order to ensure the 
“sound administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings”. 
 
As to the aspect of factual proximity, it could be argued against the applicability of Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation to actions for a negative declaration that favouring the 
aggrieved party contributes to factual proximity, because it is the aggrieved party, and not the 
alleged infringer, who principally bears the burden of proof in matters of tortious claims. 
Given it is this role of the aggrieved party that secures factual proximity, one might conclude 
that the choice of the forum must be reserved for the aggrieved party. Granting this right to 
the alleged infringer, too, could jeopardise the objective and the function of Article 7(2), even 
if this was in accordance with legitimate interests of the alleged infringer.334  
 
However, it is to be borne in mind that the ECJ made clear that there is no link between the 
burden of proof and jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).335 So, the ECJ held in its Shevill decision:  
 
“In the area of non-contractual liability, the context in which the questions referred have arisen, the sole 
object of the Convention is to determine which court or courts have jurisdiction to hear the dispute by 
reference to the place or places where an event considered harmful occurred.  
 
It does not, however, specify the circumstances in which the event giving rise to the harm may be 
considered to be harmful to the victim, or the evidence which the plaintiff must adduce before the court 
seised to enable it to rule on the merits of the case.  
 
Those questions must therefore be settled solely by the national court seised, applying the substantive 
law determined by its national conflict of laws rules, provided that the effectiveness of the [Brussels] 
Convention is not thereby impaired.  
 
The fact that under the national law applicable to the main proceedings damage is presumed in libel 
actions, so that the plaintiff does not have to adduce evidence of the existence and extent of that 
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damage, does not therefore preclude the application of Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention in 
determining which courts have territorial jurisdiction to hear the action for damages for harm caused by 
an international libel through the press [underscores and content in brackets added].”336  
 
Furthermore, it has been underlined that not only the aggrieved party bears the burden of 
proof, but that, according to general principles, each party – i.e. also the alleged infringer – 
has to prove the facts which are favourable to him. Consequently, it depends on the 
circumstances of a concrete case which party will be most interested in a forum where 
evidence can be best manufactured. Apart from this aspect, both parties – bearing the burden 
of proof or not – may be interested in a forum where proceedings can be conducted most cost-
efficiently.337 If it was necessary to determine in each case which party has the greatest 
interest in a forum close to evidence, in order to grant this party the right to choose the forum, 
this would finally result in an examination on an individual basis which is contrary to the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ according to which jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to 
be determined according to abstract criteria.338       
    
Arguing for the applicability of Article 7(2) in the constellation of actions for a declaration of 
non-infringement, it is to be highlighted that, due to the fact that national courts in Europe 
interpret the scope of patent protection in different ways,339 the choice of the forum is of great 
importance for the outcome of the proceedings. If the plaintiff of an action for a declaration of 
non-infringement is denied jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) and if he can only initiate an 
action on the basis of Article 4(1), he is discriminated against the patent holder. In other 
words, the creditor, in particular if suing for damages, would be treated more favourably 
without justification for such privilege, while opening Article 7(2) also for actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement ensures equal procedural chances (“Waffengleichheit”) for 
both parties.340 After all, the fact that it is usually the creditor who sues the debtor and not vice 
versa, cannot serve as an argument why the creditor should per se have the privilege to 
determine jurisdiction. The very fact that this constellation may result in a lack of legal 
protection for the debtor has led to the development of the action for a declaration of non-
infringement, securing equal procedural chances. A discrimination of the plaintiff of an action 
for a declaration of non-infringement could only be justified if the creation of 
“Waffengleichheit” would per se require such discrimination of the debtor.341 While 
exceptions to this principle might be generally justified in the case of (groups of) persons who 
deserve particular protection, this aspect does not apply as to patent infringement proceedings, 
because there is, a priori, no weaker party.342 Another evaluation could only be justified if the 
aggrieved party would otherwise, on the whole, get into a weaker procedural position than the 
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alleged infringer.343 Additionally, suing a patent holder before a court of the State for whose 
territory he has been granted a patent should be considered neither unfair, nor unexpected for 
the patent holder.344      
 
After all, it is far from being sure a priori that the defendant of an infringement action has 
committed a tort and should therefore be denied the advantages of Article 7(2) when 
subsequently filing an action for declaration of non-infringement. Whether he is liable of a 
patent infringement still has to be clarified in the infringement proceedings.345  
 
As another argument against the applicability of Article 7(2) to actions for a negative 
declaration, it could be put forward that the ECJ warned, in its Dumez decision, against a 
multiplication of places of jurisdiction, stating that 
 
“(…) it is necessary to avoid the multiplication of courts of competent jurisdiction which would 
heighten the risk of irreconcilable decisions, this being the reason for which recognition or an order for 
enforcement is withheld by virtue of Article 27(3) of the [Brussels] Convention [underscore and content 
in brackets added].”346 
 
In Marinari, the ECJ confirmed its view with regard to  
 
“(…) the objective of the [Brussels] Convention, which is to provide for a clear and certain attribution 
of jurisdiction (see Case 241/83 Roesler v Rottwinkel [1985] ECR 99, paragraph 23, and Case C-26/91 
Handte v Traitments Mécano-Chimiques des Surfaces [1992] ECR II-3967, paragraph 19) (…) 
[underscore and content in brackets added].”347  
 
However, this being true, it is a matter of fact that the application of Article 7(2) to actions of 
a negative declaration neither runs contrary to the objective of the Brussels Ibis Regulation to 
provide for a clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction (cf. Marinari), nor does it effect a 
multiplication of places of jurisdiction which the ECJ intends to avoid (cf. Dumez), because 
there is no creation of new places of jurisdiction, but the alleged patent infringer is merely 
given the possibility to use the jurisdictions which are open to the patent holder as well.348 
 
Besides, denying the applicability of Article 7(2) to the constellation of actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement could be irreconcilable with the jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
Gubisch and Tatry. In its Gubisch decision, on the interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels 
Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
whereas the content of the provision has been modified), the ECJ explicated, concerning the 
relationship between an action to enforce a contract and an action for its rescission or 
discharge, that    
 
“(…) the question whether the contract is binding (…) lies at the heart of the two actions. If it is the 
action for rescission or discharge of the contract that is brought subsequently, it may even be regarded 
as simply a defence against the first action, brought in the form of independent proceedings before a 
court in another Contracting State.  
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In those procedural circumstances it must be held that the two actions have the same subject-matter, for 
that concept cannot be restricted so as to mean two claims which are entirely identical. 
  
If (…) the questions at issue concerning a single sales contract were not decided solely by the court 
before which the action to enforce the contract is pending and which was seised first, there would be a 
danger for the party seeking enforcement that under Article 27(3) [of the Brussels Convention] a 
judgment given in his favour might not be recognised, even though any defence put forward by the 
defendant alleging that the contract was not binding had not been accepted. There can be no doubt that a 
judgment given in a Contracting State requiring performance of the contract would not be recognised in 
the State in which recognition was sought if a court in that State had given a judgment rescinding or 
discharging the contract. Such a result, restricting the effects of each judgment to the territory of the 
State concerned, would run counter to the objectives of the [Brussels] Convention, which is intended to 
strengthen legal protection throughout the territory of the Community and to facilitate recognition in 
each Contracting State of judgments given in any other Contracting State [underscores and content in 
brackets added].”349 
 
As to the relationship between an action seeking to have the defendant held liable for causing 
loss and ordered to pay damages and an earlier action brought by that defendant for a 
declaration of non-liability, the ECJ ruled subsequently in Tatry: 
 
“(…) (O)n a proper construction of Article 21 of the [Brussels] Convention, an action seeking to have 
the defendant held liable for causing loss and ordered to pay damages has the same cause of action and 
the same object as earlier proceedings brought by that defendant seeking a declaration that he is not 
liable for that loss [underscore and content in brackets added].”350  
 
On the basis of this jurisprudence of the ECJ, it would seem logical to understand Article 7(2) 
as well as to cover both actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and actions 
for a declaration of non-infringement.351 The opposing opinion negates the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ concerning Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (structurally corresponding to 
Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, whereas the content of the provision has been 
modified) which is based on the “Kernpunkttheorie”, despite its similarity in schematic 
respect.352  
 
Against the applicability of Article 7(2) to actions for a negative declaration, one might argue 
that barring Article 7(2) in that constellation has the effect to curtail the danger of 
Italian/Belgian torpedo actions353 via Article 29.354 Such torpedo actions are actions for a 
declaration of non-infringement instituted by the alleged infringer of a patent before the courts 
of a State known for the long duration of its judicial proceedings, especially Belgium and 
Italy.355 Doing so, the plaintiff of such an action pursues the objective to benefit from the 
effect of lis pendens provided for in Article 29(1) which reads:   
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 Article 29(1) 
 
Without prejudice to Article 31(2), where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between 
the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first 
seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised is established. 
 
 
As has been analysed above, the infringement action and the action for a declaration of non-
infringement raised by the alleged infringer are established between the same parties and have 
the same cause of action.356 Due to Article 29(1), a subsequent infringement action by the 
patent holder against the alleged infringer would thus be blocked until the jurisdiction of the 
court seised is established (priority principle).357 In case of a European patent, the existence of 
the same cause of action requires that the infringement action and the action for a declaration 
of non-infringement concern the same national parts of the European patent.358 If different 
national parts of a European patent are affected, infringement proceedings may be stayed on 
the basis of Article 30(1) which provides: 
 
 
 Article 30(1) 
 
 Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
 court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
 
 
It is noteworthy that a stay of proceedings pursuant to Article 30(1) depends, in contrast to the 
legal situation under Article 29(1), on the discretion of the deciding court.359 By instituting an 
action for a declaration of non-infringement at an early stage, the alleged infringer will 
generally effect the stay of infringement proceedings.360 In order to avoid abusive361 torpedo 
actions,362 several solutions are conceivable.363 Besides the idea to admit exceptions from the 
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priority principle of Article 29(1) in such constellations364 and the proposal that the court 
before which an action for a declaration of non-infringement is brought in such 
circumstances, shall separate the merits of the case from the issue of jurisdiction and quickly 
rule about its jurisdiction as such,365 it would also be conceivable to regulate that Article 7(2) 
is not applicable to such actions for a negative declaration. 
 
Although it might be true that the abuse of procedural rules must not be admitted, Article 7(2) 
does not seem to be an appropriate means to solve the problem of (Italian or Belgian) torpedo 
actions.366 As has been illustrated above, the plaintiff of an action for a negative declaration 
may have a justified interest in instituting such an action.367 Rather, the blockading effect of 
torpedo actions should be met by a restrictive application of the term “the same cause of 
action” in Article 29(1) due to the different territorial effects of the patents,368 and by 
efficiently making use of interim relief.369  
 
In comparative respect, one might underline, on the one hand, that Article 97(5) of Regulation 




 Article 97(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 
 
Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 96, with the exception of actions 
for a declaration of non-infringement of a Community trade mark, may also be brought in the courts of 
the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in which an act 
within the meaning of Article 9(3), second sentence, has been committed. 
 
 
As actions for a declaration of non-infringement concerning Community trade marks are 
explicitly excluded from the possibility to be initiated before the courts of the State where the 
infringement has been committed, one might conclude a fortiori that the same must apply in 
case of an action for a declaration of non-infringement concerning a (national or European) 
patent which is no Community right. 
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On the other hand, also referring to the specific legal nature of Community trade marks as 
Community rights, it is to be stressed that Article 97(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 
contains a specific rule and should therefore be restricted to its own ambit and scope of 
application.372  
 
   
2.2.2.1.2 The reference for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof 
 
Due to the fact that the issue whether an action for a negative declaration falls within the 
scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) was decisive in a case which was brought before it, the German 
Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling:  
 
“Is Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as meaning 
that jurisdiction in matters relating to tort or delict also exists in respect of an action for a negative 
declaration in which a potential injuring party asserts that the party potentially injured by a particular 
situation has no claim in tort or delict (in this case, infringement of the provisions of competition 
law)?”373  
 
Although the case brought before the Bundesgerichtshof concerned a matter of competition 
law, the essential problem of whether an action for a negative declaration falls within the 
scope of Article 7(2) is comparable with the problem to be discussed here of whether Article 
7(2) covers an action for a declaration of non-infringement of a patent. That is why this case, 
in particular the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the Opinion of the Advocate General delivered 
before it, shall be subject to closer analysis, after briefly presenting the dispute in the main 
proceedings. Remarkably, this reference for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof put 
the ECJ in the position for the first time to render an explicit decision on the highly 
controversial question of the applicability of Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessors) on 
actions for a negative declaration.374 Previously, as to the problems of “Rechtshängigkeit” 
and the barrier effect (“Sperrwirkung”) of Article 29(1), the ECJ had at least clarified some 
relevant aspects in its case-law, while, with regard to a reference for a preliminary ruling by 
the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf concerning the interpretation of Article 21(1) of the 
Brussels Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, whereas the content of the provision has been modified) where the referring court 
requested a definite interpretation of the terms “Rechtshängigkeit” and “Partei” (“party”),375 
the ECJ did not make a decision because the parties agreed on an extrajudicial solution.376  
 
The reference for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof was based on the following 
facts: Folien Fischer, a company established in Switzerland which developed, manufactured 
and sold laminated paper goods and adhesive film, distributed base material for continuous 
card forms, inter alia in Germany. Fofitec, a company also having its registered office in 
Switzerland and being part of the Folien Fischer group of companies, held several patents in 
the same field of business. Ritrama SpA, a company established in Italy, developed, 
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manufactured and distributed various kinds of laminates and multilayer film. By letter of 
March 2007, Ritrama SpA alleged that the distribution policy of Folien Fisher and its refusal 
to grant patent licences were contrary to competition law. Following that letter, Folien Fischer 
and Fofitec made an application for a negative declaration before the Landgericht Hamburg 
with a view to obtaining a judicial declaration, first, that Folien Fischer was not obliged to 
desist from its sales practice in relation to the granting of discounts and the terms of its 
distribution contracts and, secondly, that Ritrama SpA had no claim either to the elimination 
of or compensation for that sales practice. Folien Fischer and Fofitec also sought a declaration 
that Fofitec was not obliged to grant the defendant a licence for the relevant European patents 
that it holds. After that action for a negative declaration had been brought, Ritrama SpA 
brought an action for performance before the Tribunale di Milano. In support of its 
application for the award of damages and an order requiring Fofitec to issue mandatory 
licences for the patents in question, Ritrama SpA argued that the conduct of Folien Fischer 
and Fofitec was anti-competitive. The action for a negative declaration brought by Folien 
Fischer and Fofitec was dismissed as inadmissible, for lack of international jurisdiction, by 
judgment of the Landgericht Hamburg of 9 May 2008 in first instance.377 In second instance, 
that decision was confirmed on appeal on 14 January 2010 by the Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg, which did not accept the international jurisdiction of the German courts, on the 
ground that the jurisdiction in matters relating to tort or delict provided for in Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) could not apply to an 
action for a negative declaration such as that brought by Folien Fischer and Fofitec since the 
court held that the very purpose of such an action is to establish that no tort or delict has been 
committed in Germany.378 Folien Fischer and Fofitec brought an appeal on a point of law 
before the Bundesgerichtshof, maintaining the forms of order they had sought on appeal.379 In 
its order for reference, the Bundesgerichtshof emphasised that the ECJ had not yet given a 
ruling on whether the jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is also established where the potential injuring 
party brings an action for a negative declaration seeking a declaration that the potential 
injured party has no claim based on an alleged tort or delict.380 Taking into account the 
divergent views expressed by legal commentators381 and various courts of Member States of 
the European Union, as well as the Swiss Confederation,382 the Bundesgerichtshof considered 
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that the correct interpretation of that provision is not obvious in such cases.383 As a 
consequence, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the above 
cited question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.384 In its reasoning, the Bundesgerichtshof 
expressed that it was inclined to apply Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) to an action for a negative declaration.385 In short, the 
Bundesgerichtshof referred to the wording of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), because, also concerning an action for a negative 
declaration, a tort is the subject of the proceeding.386 Further, the court underlined that also 
with regard to an action for a negative declaration, factual proximity – which the court 
identified as the decisive factor for jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), rather than privileging the aggrieved 
party387 – exists between the dispute and the invoked court, the latter aspect being 
independent from which party (i.e. the potential victim or the alleged infringer) is the plaintiff 
of an action.388 Additionally, the Bundesgerichtshof emphasised that an interpretation of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
according to which this provision also comprises actions for a negative declaration does not 
establish a multiplication of places of jurisdiction.389 Besides, the court stressed that Article 
5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) does not 
contain any proviso of abuse (“Missbrauchsvorbehalt”).390 
 
 
2.2.2.1.3 The Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in the Folien Fischer case 
 
As to the question of whether Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) is applicable to actions for a negative declaration in matters relating 
to tort or delict, Advocate General Jääskinen first recognised the argument that such an action 
may be considered a mirror image of   
 
“(…) the action for performance or for damages which, as its symmetrical opposite, is the counterpart 
of the former action [underscore added].”391  
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However, having stated the foregoing, the Advocate General immediately relativised this 
thought – which would actually have strongly argued for an interpretation of Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) such as to cover 
actions for a negative declaration, by explicating: 
 
“However, just as an image can be distorted by a mirror, the symmetry referred to may not be perfect or 
indeed relevant at all. In this instance, I am inclined to think, not without some reservations, that the 
majority view in the present case may be open to question, taking into account not least the wording and 
purpose of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, the fact that it is immaterial in this case that an 
action for a negative declaration and a positive action have the same object, and the practical 
consequences of the broad interpretation suggested.”392  
 
Advocate General Jääskinen then clearly took the view that an action for a negative 
declaration does not fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), founding his opinion on literal, teleological, schematic 
and practical aspects.  
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.1 Literal interpretation 
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.1.1 No action for liability in tort 
 
Beginning with a literal interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the Advocate General referred to the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ in Tacconi according to which  
 
“(…) the expression ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels Convention covers all actions ‘which seek to establish the liability of a defendant’ and 
which ‘are not related to a “contract” within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the [Brussels] Convention’, 
a contract entailing an obligation freely entered into by one party towards another. (…) [underscore and 
content in brackets added]”393   
 
While not doubting that the second condition of a non-contractual legal relationship between 
the parties was fulfilled, the Advocate General expressed his conception that, the normal roles 
in matters relating to tort or delict being reversed in the case of an action for a negative 
declaration,  
 
“(…) an application for a negative declaration does not seek to establish the liability of the defendant, as 
in the case-law cited above, but on the contrary, seeks to rule out the claimant’s liability. (…)”394 
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and even formulated that an action for a negative declaration 
  
“(…) is not, strictly speaking, an action for liability in tort, since it does not seek a finding as to the 
existence of infringements of competition law allegedly committed by the claimants on German 
territory, but has the diametrically opposed objective of exonerating them by seeking a finding that their 
conduct is in conformity with that law [underscore added]. (…)”395 
 
In order to confirm this argumentation, the Advocate General referred to the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ in Reichert II where the court excluded the action paulienne in French law from the 
scope of the Brussels Convention, ruling that 
 
 “(...) a non-contractual action does not fall within the scope of (Article 5(3)) [of the Brussels 
 Convention] where it does not seek compensation for harm within the meaning of that provision, even if 
 the action is based on allegedly wrongful conduct [content in brackets added].”396 
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.1.2 Consequence of a literal interpretation: No connecting factor which would 
be essential for the applicability of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
 
On the basis of his opinion that an action for a negative declaration is no action for liability in 
tort, Advocate General Jääskinen drew – consistently from that starting point – the conclusion 
that, in the case of an action for a negative declaration, there is no such connecting factor 
which would be necessary for Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) to be applicable. He expressed that idea in remarkable clearness as 
follows: 
 
 “(...) An action for a negative declaration (...) presupposes that even the risk of the damage actually 
 occurring is excluded, thus effectively eliminating the connecting factor, and therefore the specific 
 ground of jurisdiction attaching to it, as provided in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001.”397 
 
While conceding that an action for a negative declaration could be founded on the general rule 
of jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant according to Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
I Regulation (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the Advocate General expressed 
his opinion that this does not apply to jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), because  
 
 “(a)n action for a negative declaration seeks a finding in private international law which in my view 
 necessarily implies that the connecting factor in international procedural law does not exist.”398 
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2.2.2.1.3.1.3 Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) merely favours the aggrieved party 
  
By reference to the Mines de Potasse decision of the ECJ, the Advocate General expressed his 
understanding from the case-law of the ECJ that it is the aggrieved party – and not the alleged 
infringer – that shall benefit from the choice between the jurisdiction of the courts of place of 
the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred: 
 
 “(...) Although the Court does not expressly say so, it seems to me that the choice between the two fora 
 was thus made available to the claimant in an action in a matter relating to tort or delict is intended to 
 favour the presumed victim, who is generally the claimant in the proceedings. There is nothing in the 
 case-law to indicate that the same favour should be extended to the perpetrator of a possible harmful 
 act [underscore added].”399 
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.2 Teleological interpretation 
 
In teleological respect, Advocate General Jääskinen underlined that Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) forms an exception from 
the general rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), meaning that  
 
 “(...) preference must always be given to the general ground of jurisdiction based on the defendant's 
 domicile, save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the litigation or the 
 autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor.”400 
 
By reference to the case-law of the ECJ, particularly in Réunion Européenne401 and Zuid-
Chemie402, where the court expressly stated that the rules of jurisdiction which derogate from 
the general principle that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the State in the territory of which 
the defendant is domiciled do not allow an interpretation going beyond the circumstances 
contemplated by the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation), 
the Advocate General concluded that Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
 
 “(...) must be interpreted in a strict, not to say restrictive, fashion.”403 
 
In this respect, the ECJ has continuously held that Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) requires 
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“(...) the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between (the) dispute and the court which 
 may be called upon to hear it, with a view to the efficacious conduct of proceedings [underscore 
added].”404 
 
As to the latter requirement, the Advocate General expressed his serious doubts that  
 
 “(i)n an action for a negative declaration, such enhanced proximity cannot be identified without risk of 
 error.”405    
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.3 Schematic interpretation 
 
According to Advocate General Jääskinen, a proper schematic interpretation of Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), i.e. its position within 
the system of rules of the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation) and its interference 
with such rules, also argues in favour of a restrictive treatment of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) such as to not cover an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement.  
 
With regard to the Tatry decision of the ECJ on the interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels 
Convention (which corresponds to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the Advocate 
General accepted that  
 
“(...) in matters relating to tort or delict, an action for a negative declaration may have the same object 
as the positive action of which it is the counterpart, in so far as one seeks a judicial declaration that a 
 potential perpetrator has not committed a harmful act whereas the other seeks to establish the 
 opposite [underscore added].”406 
 
However, the Advocate General refused to apply the idea of this jurisprudence of the ECJ to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), 
because he was of the opinion that different issues were affected:  
 
 “(...) (I)n Tatry, the Court's ruling was concerned only with provisions relating to lis pendens, which do 
 not as such lay down grounds of jurisdiction but merely determine which of the two courts seised 
 concomitantly must give a ruling first. The issue was therefore very different from that before the Court 
 in this case.”407  
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As a consequence, with regard to the requirement in Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) of a connecting factor between the action and 
the court invoked, Advocate General Jääskinen concluded that   
 
 “(...) although the notion of the object of the action does make it possible to define the scope of the 
 dispute submitted to a court for the purposes of establishing lis pendens and the authority of res judicata 
 arising from such a situation, in accordance with that judgment, this does not mean that that notion 
 makes it possible to determine whether or not a given action exhibits the connecting factor required by 
 Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 [underscore added].”408 
 
Concerning the relationship between the object of the action and the connecting factor within 
the framework of Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), the Advocate General gave clear prevalence to the latter aspect, referring to the 
formulation of this provision. He stated that  
 
 “(...) the form of words used in Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 means that jurisdiction is 
 based not on the object of the action but on the connecting factor stipulated for each ground of 
 jurisdiction, which, as a comparative analysis of the rules of jurisdiction contained in that article shows, 
 are two different things. (...)”409     
 
With regard to the argument put forward by proponents of a broad interpretation of Article 
5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) according to 
which an action for a negative declaration would also be covered by this provision, as, under 
the other grounds of jurisdiction provided for in Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) both a positive action and an action for a negative 
declaration are covered, too,410 the Advocate General undertook a clear differentiation. While 
admitting that in a situation not concerning tort or delict, the positive or negative nature of an 
action does not influence the connecting factor stipulated in the provisions of Article 5 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), he clearly expressed his 
opinion that 
 
 “(...) (i)n matters relating to tort or delict, on the other hand, the nature of the action in an essential 
 criterion in determining jurisdiction, since what matters is the existence or otherwise of the harmful 
 event determining the connecting factor [underscore added].”411  
 
 
2.2.2.1.3.4 Practical consequences of a broad interpretation of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
 
Additionally, Advocate General Jääskinen underlined that practical considerations would 
militate against an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of 
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the Brussels Ibis Regulation) according to which an action for a negative declaration would 
fall within the scope of this provision. While conceding that the ECJ has, in its Tatry412 and 
Gasser413 decisions, generally414 accepted the tactic of one party to “torpedo” or “short-
circuit” the action of the other party by means of a lis pendens objection under Article 21 of 
the Brussels Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, whereas the content of the provision has been modified), the Advocate General 
warned against a (potential) promotion of the torpedo tactic, emphasising that  
 
 “(...) accepting the proposition that an action for a negative declaration in a matter relating to a tort or 
 delict may be based on the special ground of jurisdiction provided for in Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) 
 No 44/2001 could (...) exacerbate the risk of torpedo actions by giving the perpetrators of potentially 
 harmful acts the option of bringing proceedings before a court other than that of the place in which the 
 defendant is domiciled.”415     
 
On the other hand, the Advocate General rejected the argument put forward by the French 
Government that the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) should, while potentially also comprising an action for a negative 
declaration, be restricted in the way that  
 
 “(...) the authority of res judicata of the decision given on the basis of an action for a negative 
 declaration such as that in the main proceedings should be confined in the territory of the Member 
 State in which the competent court has its seat, given that actions of that type are not admissible as such 
 in French law on non-contractual liability.”416  
 
In this respect, Advocate General Jääskinen underlined that a different conception would not 
be in line with the system of the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation) which 
would lose its effectiveness if the effect of the decision of a court being competent on the 
basis of a consented ground of jurisdiction should be confined to the territory of the Member 
State in which that court is situated in the case that the legal or practical consequences of such 
consent turn out unacceptable. As to the latter aspect, the Advocate General emphasised that  
 
 “(...) (t)he purpose and very raison d'être of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 is to lay down rules of 
 jurisdiction which apply to the courts of all the Member States simultaneously and which ensure that for 
 one and the same dispute a single decision is given that has international effects.”417   
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2.2.2.1.4 The Folien Fischer decision of the ECJ 
 
In contrast to the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, the ECJ held that Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be interpreted as 
meaning that an action for a negative declaration seeking to establish the absence of liability 
in tort, delict or quasi-delict, is covered by this legal provision.418 
 
First of all, the ECJ made clear that on the basis of the wording of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – “matters relating to tort, delict or 
quasi-delict” –   
 
“(…) the possibility that an action for a negative declaration might fall within the scope of that 
provision cannot automatically be excluded.”419 
 
The ECJ then confirmed its settled case-law, referring explicitly to its decisions in Zuid-
Chemie420 and eDate Advertising and Martinez421, that special jurisdiction according to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), as an 
exception from the general rule that jurisdiction lies with the courts of the defendant’s place 
of domicile,     
 
“(…) is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the 
courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur, which justifies the attribution of 
jurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration of justice and the efficacious 
conduct of proceedings (…).”422 
 
Grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence being decisive as to the question of 
jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation), the ECJ, by reference to its Wintersteiger423 decision, confirmed its settled 
jurisprudence that the formulation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – “place where the harmful event occurred or may occur” – 
covers  
  
“(…) both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to that damage 
and, in consequence, the defendant may be sued, at the option of the applicant, in the courts of either of 
those places (…).”424 
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Referring to the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, the ECJ underlined the special 
nature of an action for a negative declaration by which the claimant seeks to establish that the 
preconditions for liability are not fulfilled, meaning that  
 
“(…) an action for a negative declaration entails a reversal of the normal roles in matters relating to tort 
or delict, since, in such an action, the claimant is the party against whom a claim based on a tort or 
delict might be made, while the defendant is the party whom that tort or delict may have adversely 
affected [underscore added].”425  
 
However, in contrast to the Advocate General, the ECJ did not conclude from that reversal of 
the parties’ roles that an action for a negative declaration may per se not be covered by Article 
5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), because  
 
“(t)he objectives, pursued by that provision (…) of ensuring that the court with jurisdiction is 
foreseeable and of preserving legal certainty are not connected either to the allocation of the respective 
roles of claimant and defendant or to the protection of either.”426 
 
As a consequence, the ECJ held that   
 
“(…) that reversal of roles is not such as to exclude an action for a negative declaration from the scope 
of point (3) of Article 5 Regulation No 44/2001.”427  
 
Beyond responding to the argumentation put forth by the Advocate General in this respect, the 
ECJ held that during the stage at which the court verifies jurisdiction, it does neither examine 
the admissibility nor the substance of the application for a negative declaration in the light of 
the national law, but restricts itself to identify the points of connection with the Member State 
in which the court seised is sitting. In light of this, the ECJ held: 
 
“In those circumstances, the special nature of the action for a negative declaration (…) has no bearing 
on the examination that the national court must carry out in order to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, since the only matter to be established is 
whether there is a point of connection with the Member State in which the court seised is sitting.”428 
 
In contrast to the Advocate General, the ECJ refused the conception that Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is meant to offer the 
weaker party stronger protection, comparably to the rules on jurisdiction laid down in 
Sections 3 to 5 of the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation). Rather, the ECJ 
underlined that 
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“(…) the application of point (3) of Article 5 [of the Brussels I Regulation] is not contingent upon the 
potential victim initiating proceedings [content in brackets added].”429   
 
With regard to the argument put forth by Advocate General Jääskinen that an action for a 
negative declaration does not fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) because it does not seek to establish the liability 
of the defendant, but on the contrary, seeks to rule out the claimant’s liability, the ECJ 
admitted that the interests of the applicants of the respective actions are different. Despite of 
this, the ECJ found that in both cases 
 
“(…) the examination undertaken by the court seised essentially relates to the same matters of law and 
fact.”430 
 
In contrast to the conception of the Advocate General, who refused to apply the idea of the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in Tatry to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation), because he found that different issues were affected, the ECJ 
extended this jurisprudence to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) as well and, explicitly referring to Tatry, restated:  
 
“(…) (A)n action seeking to have the defendant held liable for causing loss and ordered to pay damages 
has the same cause of action as an action brought by that defendant seeking a declaration that he is not 
liable for that loss [underscore added].”431 
 
The Bundesgerichtshof founded its subsequent judgment on this jurisprudence of the ECJ.432 
 
 
2.2.2.1.5 Comment   
 
In Folien Fischer, the ECJ had – for the first time – the opportunity to comment on the 
controversy whether an action for a declaration of non-infringement falls within the scope of 
Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessor).433 It is to be appreciated that the court did not 
follow the Opinion of the Advocate General who argued in favour of a conception according 
to which such an action would not be covered by Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessor), 
but decided in favour of an interpretation according to which Article 7(2) integrates an action 
for a negative declaration. This result is convincing in several respects: Neither the wording 
nor the purpose of Article 7(2) justify a different treatment of an action for damages against 
the alleged infringer of a patent by the presumed victim and an action for a declaration of non-
infringement against the presumed victim by the alleged infringer. The fact that both actions 
actually concern the same cause of action becomes even more obvious when considering the 
constellation of an action for a positive declaration of infringement against the alleged 
infringer by the presumed victim and an action for a negative declaration against the 
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presumed victim by the alleged infringer. The only fact that should be decisive for the 
question if a court has jurisdiction to decide on a tort on the basis of Article 7(2) is whether 
there is a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the deciding court.434 In 
this respect, it is essential that the ECJ explicitly stated that the purpose of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not to serve the 
plaintiff’s interests exclusively. The Folien Fischer decision of the ECJ is also consistent in 
light of the court’s jurisprudence in Gasser that initiating (counter-)proceedings before a court 
where the duration of proceedings is generally considered to be excessively long does not 
justify to deviate from the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the Brussels I Regulation 
(Brussels Ibis Regulation).435 In this respect, the mere possibility of torpedo actions should 
not be condemned a priori.436 Only the existence of further circumstances may lead to the 
result that there is an abusive conduct. However, the examination of such additional 
circumstances is not possible at the place of jurisdiction according to Article 7(2).437 After all, 
Article 7(2) does not contain any proviso of abuse (“Missbrauchsvorbehalt”). 
 
The Folien Fischer decision of the ECJ may indeed be called a landmark decision for 
international proceedings, because it ultimately confirms that torpedo actions are, in principle, 
an admissible means in European civil procedural law. Nonetheless, it must be stated, in spite 
of the principally positive incentive of the Folien Fischer decision, considerable problems 
with regard to lis pendens have been created by the integration of the action for a negative 
declaration into the framework of Article 7(2), arising from the relation between Article 7(2) 
and Article 29(1), at least on the basis of the current interpretation of these provision 
(respectively their predecessors) by the ECJ. While the court has constantly confirmed a 
narrow scope of authority to decide with regard to Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), excluding 
contractual claims, the ECJ has constantly decided in favour of a broad effect of lis pendens 
according to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention/Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(structurally corresponding to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, whereas the content 
of the provision has been modified). In this respect, the question arises whether the ECJ 
should modify its interpretation of the term “the same cause of action” according to Article 
21(1) of the Brussels Convention/Article 27(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 29(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in order to bring in line Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and Article 21 
of the Brussels Convention/Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 29 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation).438 For the current situation may lead to drastic gaps of legal protection.439 
For instance, the unsolved question already arises with regard to “Platzdelikte” whether an 
action for a negative declaration raised on the basis of Article 7(2) will have the general effect 
of lis pendens with accordance to Article 29(1) regarding a positive action for damages – 
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which is eventually also based on a contract.440 Even more significantly, the same question 
arises with regard to “Streudelikte”, be it concerning actions at several places where the 
damage occurred or will occur in terms of Article 7(2), be it in case of actions at the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage and at the place where the damage occurred, be it in case 
of actions at several places where courts have unrestricted authority to decide like at the place 
of the event giving rise to the damage and the place of domicile of the defendant. In all these 
constellations, an answer needs to be found as to the problem arising where an action for a 
negative declaration against the presumed victim raised before court A bars an action for 
damages against the alleged infringer to be raised before court B.441  
 
Another problem which has been created by the Folien Fischer decision of the ECJ – and 
which is still unsolved – is, in case of several alleged infringers of a patent, whether the raise 
of an action for a declaration of non-infringement by one infringer before any court within the 
European Union having jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) can bar an action for damages 
by the presumed victim on the basis of Article 8(1).442 At this place, it may suffice to state 
that these scenarios illustrate that the ECJ will have to define more clearly respectively 
redefine in which case several actions have the same cause of action rather than – which is 
without doubt a positive first step – merely opening the scope of application of Article 7(2). 
Unfortunately, the recast of the Brussels I Regulations has not brought a significant 
amelioration of this structural problem.     
  
     
2.2.2.2 Applicability of Article 7(2) to a preventive action for an injunction 
 
With regard to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (and Article 5(3) of the Lugano 
Convention), it was controversial whether this provision covered preventive actions for an 
injunction, because the provision read: 
 
 
 Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Lugano Convention 
 
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued: 
 
(…) 




The formulation “occurred”, in opposition to the wording “occurred or may occur” which was 
introduced by Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (and is also contained in Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), could also be interpreted as to require that a damage must 
already have arisen when the action for an injunction is being instituted. While the majority of 
legal commentators favoured a broad interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
such as to also comprise preventive actions for an injunction,443 the case-law of the 
Contracting States of the Brussels Convention tended to deny the applicability of Article 5(3) 
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of the Brussels Convention to such actions.444 In its Henkel decision from 2002, the ECJ made 
clear that, beyond the pure wording of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, actions for an 
injunction could be initiated although no damage had occurred yet; as a consequence, the 
court stated that preventive actions for an injunction were subject to Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention. The court explicated in detail: 
 
“(…) The courts for the place where the harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for 
deciding the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence. Those 
considerations are equally relevant whether the dispute concerns compensation for damage which has 
already occurred or relates to an action seeking to prevent the occurrence of damage. 
 
That interpretation is moreover supported by the Report by Professor Schlosser on the Convention on 
the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland to the Brussels Convention (OJ 1979 C 59, pp. 71, 111), which states that Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention also covers actions whose aim is to prevent the imminent commission of a 
tort (or delict).  
 
It is therefore not possible to accept an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
according to which application of that provision is conditional on the actual occurrence of damage. 
Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to require that an action to prevent behaviour considered to be 
unlawful, such as that brought in the main proceedings, whose principal aim is precisely to prevent 
damage, may be brought only after that damage has occurred [underscores added].”445 
 
In view of the Brussels I Regulation, which had already been established when the ECJ 
decided, the court further left no doubt that preventive actions for an injunction fall within the 
scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention:  
 
“Finally, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), while not 
applicable ratione temporis to the main proceedings, is such as to confirm the interpretation that Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention does not presuppose the existence of damage. That regulation clarified 
the wording of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention that the new version of that provision resulting 
from that regulation refers to the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur'. In the absence 
of any reason for interpreting the two provisions in question differently, consistency requires that 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention be given a scope identical to that of the equivalent provision of 
Regulation No 44/2001. This is all the more necessary given that that regulation is intended to replace 
the Brussels Convention in relations between Member States with the exception of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, with that convention continuing to apply between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Member 
States bound by that regulation [underscore added].”446 
 
The ECJ subsequently confirmed this jurisprudence in DFDS Torline where the court held: 
 
“(…) (T)he Court has already held that it is not possible to accept an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention according to which application of that provision is conditional on the actual 
occurrence of damage. Likewise it has held that the finding that the courts for the place where the 
harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on the 
grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence, is equally relevant whether the dispute concerns 
compensation for damage which has already occurred or relates to an action seeking to prevent the 
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occurrence of damage (Case C-167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, paragraphs 46 and 48) [underscore 
added].”447 
 
The extension of the text of Article 5(3) in the Brussels I Regulation (“… or may occur”) – 
which is also part of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation – ultimately made clear that 
preventive actions for an injunction fall within the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).448 The facts in the Henkel case being 
characterised by the constellation of the danger of repetition (“Wiederholungsgefahr”), the 
ECJ did not have to decide whether a preventive action for an injunction also falls within the 
scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention in case of the danger of first infringement 
(“Erstbegehungsgefahr”). As this dispute already existed before the creation of the Brussels I 
Regulation, it has rightly been concluded that the European legislator, by creating Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, did not intend to differentiate between those two constellations, 
meaning that both constellations are covered by Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).449 Additionally, it is to be emphasised that 
conferring jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) bears particular practical importance in the 
constellation of the danger of first infringement, because, in case that a harmful event has 
occurred before (constellation of the danger of repetition), jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(2) 
already exists for this reason.450 Furthermore, it is to be noticed that the particular close 
connection between the dispute and the deciding court which is decisive for Article 7(2) is 
existent both in the case of the danger of first infringement and in the case of the danger of 
repetition.451 Therefore, both constellations fall within the scope of application of Article 
7(2).452  
 
While determining “the place where the harmful event may occur” can be more complicated 
in the constellation of the danger of first infringement than in the constellation of the danger 
of repetition, because subjective aspects will be decisive,453 that obstacle is manageable in the 
case of potential infringement of intellectual property rights, as the Landgericht Düsseldorf 
proved in its Impfstoff II decision.454 In this decision based on the constellation of the danger 
of first infringement, the court referred, by application of a comparative approach concerning 
the national laws of the Contracting States of the Brussels Convention, both to the place 
where the infringing act is to be expected, and to the place where the protected right is 
situated.455 As it is probable that the patent holder, in case of an imminent patent 
infringement, will usually initiate infringement proceedings before the courts of the State 
where the patent has been granted, the determination of the “place where the harmful event 
will occur” should be feasible.456 At any rate, jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) requires 
that a future harmful event can be based on concrete facts, while the mere vague possibility 
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that such a harmful event could occur sometime does not suffice.457 This requirement will 
definitely be fulfilled in the case of the danger of repetition.458   
 
 
2.2.2.3 Inapplicability of Article 7(2) to competing contractual actions 
 
In its Kalfelis decision, the ECJ clearly decided that jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) does not authorise a 
court to decide also on competing contractual actions. Emphasising the character of Article 5 
of the Brussels Convention (Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – like Article 6 of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 8 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – as exceptions from the 
general jurisdictional rule (forum sitae defensoris) of Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the court held that 
 
“(…) the “special jurisdictions” enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the [Brussels] Convention constitute 
derogations from the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant is 
domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively . It must therefore be recognized that a court 
which has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over an action in so far as it is based on tort or delict does not 
have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not so based [underscore and content in brackets 
added].”459 
 
The fact that Article 8(1) provides for the possibility to initiate a joint proceeding against 
several defendants being domiciled in different Member States – which structurally 
constitutes a violation of the principle of Article 4(1) by the Brussels Ibis Regulation itself – 
does not justify the establishment of an annex competence460 of courts having jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2) for contractual issues,461 because the ECJ explicitly excluded such 
an approach in Réunion Européenne where the court stated: 
 
“(…) (T)wo claims in one action for compensation, directed against different defendants and based in 
one instance on contractual liability and in the other on liability in tort or delict cannot be regarded as 
connected.”462 
 
Moreover, such an annex competence cannot be based on Article 30(1) either, because the 
latter provision presupposes that the invoked court already has jurisdiction, but does not 
establish jurisdiction of a court on the basis of a connection between several actions.463   
 
As a consequence, if the alleged infringer is also a licence holder of the concerned patent, the 
court invoked in patent infringement proceedings on the basis of Article 7(2) cannot decide on 
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eventual contractual claims arising from the contractual relationship between the defendant 
and the plaintiff, but is restricted to decide on the patent infringement as a tort.  
 
 
2.2.3 The applicability of the principle of ubiquity to the constellation of patent 
infringement (determination of the place of the infringing event in terms of Article 7(2)) 
 
It is undisputed that the courts of the State where the patent has been granted have jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2) with regard to patent infringement proceedings. However, it is 
highly controversial whether, beyond this, courts outside this State can have jurisdiction with 
accordance to Article 7(2) in the case of patent infringement, i.e. whether Article 7(2) can 
serve as the basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in patent infringement proceedings. In its 
Mines de Potasse decision, the ECJ, pursuing the approach of an independent interpretation, 
clarified that  
 
“(…) where the place of the happening of the event which may give rise to liability in tort, delict or 
quasidelict and the place where that event results in damage are not identical, the expression ‘place 
where the harmful event occurred’, in Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention, must be understood as 
being intended to cover both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise 
to it. 
 
The result is that the defendant may be sued, at the option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for the 
place where the damage occurred or in the courts for the place of the event giving rise to and is at the 
origin of that damage [underscore and content in brackets added].”464 
 
In light of the extended wording (“or may occur”) in comparison to Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention since the creation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation and being 
also part of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Mines de Potasse decision of the 
ECJ must be understood as also comprising constellations of imminent infringement. Starting 
from Mines de Potasse, I shall analyse whether, respectively in which way that jurisprudence 
is to be applied to patent infringement proceedings. The first question to ask in this respect is 
whether a separation between the place where the event giving rise to the damage 
(“Handlungsort”) and the place where the harmful event occurred (or may occur) 
(“Erfolgsort”) is possible in the case of patent infringement, respectively, in case it is, 
whether such a differentiation makes sense as to the application of Article 7(2) in the case of 
patent infringement proceedings.   
 
It has been discussed controversially, in conjunction with disputes concerning the 
infringement of intellectual property rights, whether these two jurisdictional heads can operate 
independently of each other.465 According to the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine and case-
law of the Member States, the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur is always 
situated in the State where the patent has been granted, having the effect that a choice 
according to the Mines de Potasse decision of the ECJ does not exist concerning patent 
infringement proceedings. Proponents of this opinion derive this result from the principle of 
territoriality according to which a (national or European) patent granted in one State does not 
have any effect in another State, and consequently cannot be infringed by an acting committed 
abroad.466 Nonetheless, other legal scholars advocate the possibility of extraterritorial 
                                                 
464
 ECJ 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., [1976] 
ECR 01735, paras. 24-25 – Mines de Potasse. 
465 Lundstedt & Maunsbach (2003)72(3) NIR 212, at p. 215; Lundstedt (2008)77(2) NIR 122, at p. 130. 
466 Cf. for instance: Rogge & Grabinski 2006 (Benkard – Patentgesetz), § 139 PatG, para. 101b; Bettinger & 
Thum (1999)48(8-9) GRUR Int. 659, at p. 664; Brinkhof (1997)46(6) GRUR Int. 489, at p. 491; Bukow 2003, 
pp. 40-74; Fawcett & Torremans 2011, para. 5.50; Grabinski (2001)50(3) GRUR Int. 199, at p. 204; Heinze 
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jurisdiction on the basis of Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessors) also with regard to 
patent infringement proceedings.467 According to the latter opinion, such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction can potentially be grounded either on the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage or the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur. In the following 
paragraphs, I shall first deal with the question of whether, concerning patent infringement, a 
place of the event giving rise to the damage can exist outside the State where the patent has 
been granted. Subsequently, I shall treat the parallel issue whether a place where the harmful 
event occurred or may occur can be situated outside the State for whose territory a patent has 
been granted.  
 
 
2.2.3.1 Extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage 
 
Can, concerning a patent infringement, a place of the event giving rise to the damage exist 
outside the protection State? First of all, it is noteworthy that the question of the existence of a 
place of the event giving rise to the damage in matters of patent infringement becomes 
relevant in two constellations.468 On the one hand, one might think of acts being committed 
abroad and having effect in the State where the patent is protected (“nach innen gerichtete 
Handlungen”). That constellation may be illustrated by the following case: 
 
Patent holder P holds a European patent for a machine for the territories of Germany 
and the Netherlands. Infringer INF manufactures an identical machine in France and 
sells it, inter alia, in Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
On the other hand, it is conceivable that acts are committed within the State where the patent 
is protected, but are exclusively aimed at another State in which no patent protection exists 
(“nach außen gerichtete Handlungen”). In this respect, the following case may serve for 
illustration:  
 
Patent holder P holds a European patent for a machine for the territories of Germany 
and the Netherlands. Infringer INF manufactures an identical machine in Germany for 
exclusive sale in France.   
 
While, as has been illustrated above, the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine and case-law of 
the Member States advocates a conception according to which, due to the principle of 
territoriality, the existence of an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage is 
                                                                                                                                                        
2007, p. 221 et seq., 231; Kieninger (1998)47(4) GRUR Int. 280, at p. 282; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 5 
Brüssel I-VO, para. 85a; Sack (2000)46(3) WRP 269, at p. 271; Treichel 2001, p. 24; BGH 17 March 1994, I ZR 
304/91, (1994)96(7) GRUR 530, at p. 531 – Beta; OLG Düsseldorf 22 July 1999, 2 U 127/98, (2001)21(4) 
IPRax 336, at p. 338 – Schussfadengreifer II; LG Düsseldorf 25 August 1998, 4 O 165/97, (1999)48(5) GRUR 
Int. 455, at p. 457 – Schussfadengreifer I; LG Düsseldorf 25 March 1999, 4 O 198/97, (1999)48(8-9) GRUR Int. 
775, at p. 777 – Impfstoff II; BGer 23 October 2006, 4C.210/2006, (2007)56(6) GRUR Int. 534, at p. 535.  
467 Cf. for instance: Nuyts 2008, p. 105 et seq.; Pansch (2000/01)1(5) EuLF 353, at pp. 354-356; Pansch 2003, p. 
274 et seq.; Reichardt 2006, p. 44 et seq.; Adolphsen 2009, paras. 479 et seq.; sceptically: Keukenschrijver 2013 
(Busse – Patentgesetz), § 143 PatG, para. 16; Franzosi (1997)19(7) E.I.P.R. 382, at p. 383; Hausmann 
(2003)3(5/6) EuLF 277, at pp. 279-280; Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 65 et seq.; Kubis 1999, pp. 227-230; Laubinger 
2005, pp. 44, 52 et seq.; Otte (2001)21(4) IPRax 315, at p. 317; Mankowski 2012 (Magnus & Mankowski), Art 5 
Brussels I Regulation, para. 227; Nagel & Gottwald 2013, § 3, para. 85; Schack 2010, para. 347; Schack 
(2000)3(3) MMR 135, at p. 137; Fezer & Koos 2010 (Staudinger), para. 1138; Uhl 2000, p. 191; Wilderspin 
(2006)95(4) Rev. crit. DIP 777, at p. 794; as to copyright law: Jooris (1996)18(3) E.I.P.R. 127, at p. 140 (Jooris 
underlines that a distinction has to be drawn between the effects and the causes of the infringement). 
468 The following classification has been chosen according to Geller (2000)49(8-9) GRUR Int. 659, at p. 663 and 
Schauwecker 2009, p. 100. 
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excluded a priori, others have argued that that result would be contrary to the idea of Article 
7(2) (respectively its predecessors) which is to ensure that a court decides which is 
particularly close to facts and evidence.  
 
 
2.2.3.1.1 Starting point: The principle of territoriality as a principle of substantive law 
 
According to the principle of territoriality, a principle of substantive law, patent protection 
geographically covers merely the territory of the State where the patent has been granted. 
Patent infringement requires a use without approval of the patent holder on (within) the 
territory of the State where patent protection has been acquired (“Schutzland”). As a 
consequence, a patent infringement by merely acting in another State is a priori impossible. 
However, it is recognised that, in certain circumstances, the principle of territoriality does not 




2.2.3.1.2 Is the principle of territoriality (although being a principle of substantive law) 
also relevant with regard to the determination of the place where the harmful event 
occurred according to Article 7(2)?   
 
Subsequently to its decision in Mines de Potasse, where the ECJ held that the place where the 
harmful event occurred according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to be interpreted indepedently, the court held in Marinari that 
substantive law (the lex causae) is not decisive for the determination of that place469: 
 
“It must (…) be noted that the [Brussels] Convention did not intend to link the rules on territorial 
jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the conditions under which non-contractual civil 
liability is incurred. Those conditions do not necessarily have any bearing on the solutions adopted by 
the Member States regarding the territorial jurisdiction of their courts, such jurisdiction being founded 
on other considerations. 
 
There is no basis for interpreting Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention by reference to the 
applicable rules on non-contractual civil liability, as proposed by the German Government. That 
interpretation is also incompatible with the objective of the Convention, which is to provide for a clear 
and certain attribution of jurisdiction (…). The delimitation of jurisdiction would then depend on 
uncertain factors such as the place where the victim' s assets suffered subsequent damage and the 
applicable rules on civil liability [underscores and content in brackets added].”470 
 
In this respect, it could be put forth that the cited jurisprudence of the ECJ does not preclude 
to take into account the principle of territoriality in conjunction with the determination of the 
place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 7(2), because the principle of 
territoriality does not constitute a particularity of a specific national law but forms a principle 
which is generally (internationally) accepted and applied. Consequently, the requirements of 
legal certainty and predictability would be met and fulfilled if that principle was also applied 
to Article 7(2).471 
 
                                                 
469
 Nuyts 2008, p. 122; Von Hein (2005)25(1) IPRax 17, at p. 22, additionally underlining that the Shevill 
decision of the ECJ does not lead to another view either.  
470
 ECJ 19 September 1995, C-364/93, Antonio Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc and Zubaidi Trading Company, 
[1995] ECR I-02719, paras. 18-19 – Marinari. 
471
 Bukow 2003, pp. 71-73; Heinze 2007, pp. 223-224. 
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However, such an argumentation would unduly mingle the areas of substantive and 
procedural law and is thus to be rejected a priori. The mere fact that any positive effects (as 
legal certainty and predictability) would be reached by applying the principle of territoriality 
to the jurisdictional issue, respectively any negative effects (as the creation of legal 
uncertainty and unpredictability) could be avoided, cannot justify such a schematic 
(structural) break.  
 
While, in light of the foregoing, it is to be stated that the principle of territoriality, as a 
principle of substantive law, does not have an immediate (direct) effect on the issue of 
jurisdiction, an issue of procedural law, it would seem a hasty conclusion to derive from this 
result that the principle of territoriality does not have any effect on the question where the 
place where the harmful event occurred, according to Article 7(2). It could rather be that the 
principle of territoriality has a mediate (indirect) effect on the determination of the relevant 
place pursuant to Article 7(2). This would be the case if Article 7(2) was linked with the 
substantive facts. In other words, it is to be analysed whether the part of the act which is 
referred to for determining the place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 
7(2), must be (at least a part of) the infringing act according to substantive law. If the answer 
to this question was yes, the conclusion would have to be drawn that an extraterritorial place 
where the harmful event occurred according to Article 7(2) would be excluded due to the 
mediate (indirect) effect of the principle of territoriality which excludes that an element of the 
facts is realised outside the protection State. Alternatively, if the addressed analysis revealed 
the result that the act to which Article 7(2) refers is completely independent from the 
substantive facts, i.e. the infringing act according to substantive law, the principle of 
territoriality would not represent any obstacle, i.e. no mediate (indirect) obstacle either, for the 
existence of an extraterritorial place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 
7(2).472 In light of this finding, it is to be underlined that the decisive factor for the addressed 
analysis is not the principle of territoriality – which as such is not controversial – but rather 
the interpretation of Article 7(2). In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Jenard Report 
explicitly does not clarify that issue, but restricts itself to the following formulation:   
 
“Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention] uses the expression 'the place where the harmful event 
occurred'. The Committee did not think it should specify whether that place is the place where the event 
which resulted in damage or injury occurred or whether it is the place where the damage or injury was 
sustained. The Committee preferred to keep to a formula which has already been adopted by number of 
legal systems (Germany, France) [content in brackets added].”473 
 
Consequently, interpretation, i.e. concretion of what is the meaning of the expression “place 
where the harmful event occurred”, is allocated to the courts. In the following paragraphs, I 









                                                 
472
 Similar: Schauwecker 2009, p. 102. 
473 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015), 
p.  26. 
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2.2.3.1.3 The determination of the place where the harmful event occurred according to 
Article 7(2) on the basis of ECJ case-law 
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.1 Aspects which suggest that the ECJ advocates a conception according to 
which the place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 7(2) is 
completely independent from the place of the infringing act according to substantive law 
 
Since its Mines de Potasse decision, the ECJ has constantly used the terms of “place of the 
event giving rise to the damage” and “place where the damage occurred”.474 The expression 
“place of the event giving rise to the damage” is, as such, broad enough to cover all acts 
which in some way have effected the occurrence of the damage without necessarily forming 
part of the facts which constitute the infringing act according to substantive law.475   
 
In its Marinari decision, the ECJ held that substantive law is irrelevant for the determination 
of that place, because otherwise the principle of legal certainty as to the attribution of 
jurisdiction would be impaired476: 
 
“It must (…) be noted that the [Brussels] Convention did not intend to link the rules on territorial 
jurisdiction with national provisions concerning the conditions under which non-contractual civil 
liability is incurred. Those conditions do not necessarily have any bearing on the solutions adopted by 
the Member States regarding the territorial jurisdiction of their courts, such jurisdiction being founded 
on other considerations. 
 
There is no basis for interpreting Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention by reference to the 
applicable rules on non-contractual civil liability, as proposed by the German Government. That 
interpretation is also incompatible with the objective of the Convention, which is to provide for a clear 
and certain attribution of jurisdiction (…). The delimitation of jurisdiction would then depend on 
uncertain factors such as the place where the victim’s assets suffered subsequent damage and the 
applicable rules on civil liability [underscores and content in brackets added].”477 
 
That jurisprudence was rendered in reaction to the written observation of the German 
Government which had submitted that   
 
“(…) in interpreting Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention, the Court should take account of the 
applicable national law on non-contractual civil liability. Thus, where, under that law, an actual adverse 
effect on goods or rights is a precondition for liability (as, for instance, under paragraph 823(1) of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – the German Civil Code), the “place where the harmful event occurred” 
means both the place of that adverse effect and the place of the event giving rise to it. On the other 
hand, it considers that where national law does not make redress conditional upon an actual adverse 
effect upon property or a right (as, for instance, under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code and Article 
2043 of the Italian Civil Code), the victim may choose between the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage and the place where he suffered financial damage [underscore and content in brackets 
added].”478 
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According to settled case-law of the ECJ, the aspect of factual proximity between the case and 
the deciding court are of special importance in the framework of Article 7(2). For instance, 
the ECJ held in Folien Fischer:  
 
“In matters of tort or delict, the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur are 
usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on grounds of proximity and ease of 
taking evidence (see, to that effect, Case C-167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, paragraph 46, and Zuid-
Chemie, paragraph 24) [underscore added].”479 
 
Given that particular importance attributed to factual proximity, one might assume that the 
ECJ would not feel barred from localising a place of the event giving rise to the damage, 
according to Article 7(2), somewhere else than at the place of the substantive facts of a patent 
infringement, in case that it should turn out that evidence can be gained more easily there.480  
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.2 Aspects which suggest that the ECJ advocates a conception according to 
which the place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 7(2) is indirectly 
linked with the place of the infringing act according to substantive law 
 
However, despite the above explanation which derives the conclusion from the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ that the court clearly differentiates between the facts of a tort according to 
substantive law and the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurs pursuant to 
Article 7(2), avoiding to mingle both aspects, doubts remain whether the ECJ indeed in any 
way ignores the substantive facts of a tort when determining the place of jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2).  
 
First of all, it should be borne in mind that the ECJ has constantly emphasised that Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) is an exception to the basic provision of Article 2(1) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and must 
therefore be interpreted restrictively, in order to avoid a multiplication of fora in favour of the 
plaintiff.481 
 
Referring to the above argumentation based on the Marinari decision of the ECJ, it is to be 
noticed that the ECJ primarily intended to exclude places of subsequent damage 
(“Folgeschäden”) from the scope of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation), which is revealed by the following sentence in the ECJ’s 
decision: 
 
“(…) The delimitation of jurisdiction would then depend on uncertain factors such as the place where 
the victim’s assets suffered subsequent damage and the applicable rules on civil liability [underscore 
added].”482 
 
In its Dumez decision, the ECJ explicated: 
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“(…) (W)hilst the place where the initial damage manifested itself is usually closely related to the other 
components of the liability, in most cases the domicile of the indirect victim is not so related.”483 
 
As the ECJ thus construed a relation between the place where the initial damage occurred – 
being relevant for Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) – and the other components of liability, one might conclude a contrario that the 
damage, in order to confer jurisdiction to the courts at the place where it occurs must be part 
of the substantive facts of the patent infringement.484   
 
Further, the ECJ held in Kronhofer: 
 
“(…) (T)here is nothing (…) to justify conferring jurisdiction to the courts of a Contracting State other 
than that on whose territory the event which resulted in the damage occurred and the damage was 
sustained, that is to say all of the elements which give rise to liability. To confer jurisdiction in that way 
would not meet any objective need as regards evidence or the conduct of the proceedings.”485 
 
Formulating in this way, the ECJ construed a relation between the place of jurisdiction 
according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) and the place where all elements giving rise to liability, i.e. the substantive facts, 
have been realised.  
 
In its Tessili decision on the interpretation of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, the ECJ 
generally postulated that the interpretation of terms of the Brussels Convention (and the same 
applies to the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation) can equally be 
undertaken according to the lex fori or the lex causae: 
 
“The [Brussels] Convention frequently uses words and legal concepts drawn from civil, commercial and 
procedural law and capable of different meaning from one Member State to another. The question 
therefore arises whether these words and concepts must be regarded as having their own independent 
meaning and as being thus common to all the Member States or as referring to substantive rules of the 
law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is 
first brought.  
 
Neither of these two options rules out the other since the appropriate choice can only be made in respect 
of each of the provisions of the [Brussels] Convention to ensure that it is fully effective having regard to 
the objectives of Article 220 of the Treaty. In any event it should be stressed that the interpretation of 
the said words and concepts for the purpose of the [Brussels] Convention does not prejudge the question 
of the substantive rule applicable to the particular case [underscore and content in brackets added].”486 
 
Accordingly, the ECJ referred to the lex causae in order to determine the place of 
performance of a contractual obligation. The court explicated: 
 
“(…) It is for the court before which the matter is brought to establish under the [Brussels] Convention 
whether the place of performance is situated within its territorial jurisdiction. For this purpose it must 
determine in accordance with its own conflict of laws what is the law applicable to the legal relationship 
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in question and define in accordance with that law the place of performance of the contractual 
obligation in question [content in brackets added].”487 
 
Evidently, there is a conflict between that jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Tessili decision and 
its Marinari decision where, as has been stressed above, the ECJ held that substantive law 
shall be irrelevant for the determination of the place of the event giving rise to the damage 
according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation).  
 
In light of the foregoing, it must be noted that there is no distinct jurisprudence of the ECJ as 
to the issue whether the place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) 
and the substantive facts of a patent infringement are actually to be treated completely 
independently from each other, or whether the part of the act referred to within the framework 
of Article 7(2) must be (at least a part of) the infringing act according to substantive law. The 
ECJ has not rendered an explicit decision on this question yet. In particular, the ECJ has not 
decided yet if the places where preparatory acts are carried out constitute places of the event 
giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2).488 The ECJ has not decided either on the 
question of whether there is jurisdiction on the basis of an extraterritorial place of the event 
giving rise to the damage in the case of acts being committed abroad and having effect in the 
protection State, respectively acts that are committed within the protection State, but which 
are exclusively aimed at another State in which no patent protection exists.489 
 
The ECJ seems to undertake, in formal respect, an independent determination of the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage, but actually construes a conjunction between the 
applicable substantive law and the place of the event giving rise to the damage (and the place 
where the damage occurred)490 which may even be inevitable in the long run, because it is the 
lex causae which determines the scope of obligations to act and to omit.491 Eventually, the 
ECJ had in mind, when postulating the requirement of an independent interpretation of the 
place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2), a choice of a place 
amongst those places which are relevant for a tort in substantive respect.492 In light of this, it 
has rightly been put forth that assuming an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the 
damage would require a truly independent determination which has not been realised by the 
ECJ so far.493  
 
Last but not least, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Roche Nederland494 and GAT495 
decisions reveals a certain trend towards a “renationalisation” of patent proceedings.496 
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2.2.3.1.3.3 Relevance of the Shevill decision of the ECJ for the question of whether an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage can exist 
 
When analysing whether the principle of territoriality has an (indirect) effect on the 
determination of the place of the event giving rise to the damage in terms of Article 7(2), the 
question arises whether hints to solve this issue can be derived from the Shevill decision of the 
ECJ.497 However, the crucial question to be answered first – being discussed highly 
controversially498 – is whether the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Shevill can be transferred to the 
constellation of patent infringement. 
 
In essence, the Shevill decision of the ECJ was based on the following facts: The plaintiff, 
Miss Fiona Shevill, considered that an article of the newspaper France-Soir published by the 
defendant, the French company Presse Alliance SA domiciled in France, in the territory of 
various Member States, was defamatory in that it suggested that the plaintiff was part of a 
drug-trafficking network for which she had laundered money. Therefore, the plaintiff issued a 
writ in the High Court of England and Wales claiming damages for libel from the defendant 
in respect of the copies of France-Soir distributed in France and the other European countries 
including those sold in England and Wales. The plaintiff subsequently amended her pleading, 
deleting all references to the copies sold outside England and Wales.499  
 
In its Shevill decision, the ECJ held that  
 
“(i)n the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States, the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage, within the meaning of those judgments, can only be the place where the 
publisher of the newspaper in question is established, since that is the place where the harmful event 
originated and from which the libel was issued and put into circulation [underscore added].”500 
 
With regard to the constellation of cross-border patent infringement, it could be argued that 
the place of the event giving rise to the damage can be located at the place where the 
infringing product is offered and/or sent away. However, it has been discussed controversially 
if this is correct. 
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.3.1 Arguments for and against the applicability of the Shevill decision to cases 
of cross-border patent infringement in order to determine the place of the event giving 
rise to the damage 
 
In favour of the applicability of the Shevill decision to the constellation of cross-border patent 
infringement, it could be argued that the Shevill case concerned rights of personality which 
are also intangible rights like patent rights. However, it is to be noticed in this respect that 
rights of personality are valid without any territorial restriction (principle of universality).501 
This feature constitutes a fundamental difference in comparison with intellectual property 
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rights as patent rights which are only valid within a specific territory (principle of 
territoriality). Remarkably, it is exactly this feature that produces difficulties with regard to 
the determination of the place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2). 
Due to the universal validity of rights of personality (in contrast to patent rights), it is 
uncontested that both the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the 
damage occurred can be located abroad.502 In contrast, with regard to the cross-border 
infringement of patents, the place where the infringement is committed in substantive respect 
must be located in the protection State. Therefore, principles developed in Shevill cannot 
simply be transferred to parallel patent infringement cases.503 
 
As another argument in favour of the applicability of the Shevill decision, it has been put forth 
that the ECJ accepted, in Shevill, that the causal event can be located outside the State where 
the right to reputation is judicially protected, when the ECJ ruled that the causal event relating 
to material distributed in England and amounting to defamation in England could be in 
France.504 Against this assertion, it has rightly been emphasised that it is a misconception that 
the ECJ, in its Shevill decision, accepted that the causal event can be located outside the 
protection State; rather, in Shevill, where rights of personality were concerned, the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage was both located, inter alia, in England and in France. 
Consequently, the ECJ did not recognise an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to 
the damage in that case.505  
 
Besides, the Shevill case concerned the constellation of one continuous act of press 
publication. Although publication was undertaken in several countries, the ECJ was of the 
opinion that there was only one coherent infringing act.506 On the assumption that the parallel 
infringement of several patents constitutes acts which are independent from each other 
(“unabhängige Teilakte”, “selbstständige Verletzungshandlungen”), parts of legal doctrine 
have put forth that the constellation is different from Shevill.507 However, that conception is to 
be rejected, because it would wrongly take into consideration the substantive principle of 
territoriality in terms of the jurisdictional issue of the application of Article 7(2). If, regarding 
parallel patent infringement actions, every act of bringing into circulation of products was 
principally considered a separate act of patent infringement in procedural respect, one 
coherent event would be torn apart.508 As the principle of territoriality is not applicable to the 
issue of jurisdiction, an independent interpretation of Article 7(2) must be chosen. In matters 
of jurisdiction, there may be a uniform event, as the parallel infringement actions can have a 
common origin at the place of manufacture. Thus it can be justified to consider the act of 
manufacture and the subsequent act of bringing into circulation as one uniform event.509 
 
It has been pointed out that the definition of the place of the event giving rise to the damage in 
patent infringement cases cannot be given according to the defendant’s domicile as decided in 
Shevill, because, in cases regarding patent infringement, there is generally a closer link with 
the State where the tortious act occurred, independently from the place where the defendant’s 
domicile is located. Further, Article 7(2) would never confer an alternative basis of 
jurisdiction to Article 4(1) if the place of the event giving rise to the damage necessarily 
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coincides with the domicile of the person liable.510 In this respect, it is to be emphasised that 
the wording of Article 7(2) actually reveals that Article 7(2) is only applicable as to courts 
located in another Member State than the State where the defendant is domiciled.511 Applying 
the Shevill decision to cases of cross-border patent infringement would thus not only require 
to transfer the Shevill decision to territorially restricted rights, but also to apply this 
jurisprudence to cases where the place of the event giving rise to the damage is not identical 
with the place of domicile of the alleged infringer (because infringement actions can already 
be based on Article 4(1) at the place of domicile of the alleged infringer). A deviation 
between the place of domicile of the alleged infringer and the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage may occur in cases of patent infringement via internet, in case that the infringing 
material is uploaded at a place other than the place of the infringer’s domicile. Another 
scenario where the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place of the 
defendant’s domicile can fall apart is that of an action for a declaration of non-infringement 
where an alleged infringer initiates proceedings in order to reach a declaration that he does not 
infringe the defendant’s patent.512  
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.3.2 Conclusion as to the applicability of Shevill and its further significance 
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that the Shevill jurisprudence of the ECJ cannot be transfered in 
toto to the constellation of cross-border patent infringement cases. However, this result does 
not mean that certain findings of this jurisprudence – in particular with regard to the issue of 
the scope of cognition of the courts at the place of the event giving rise to the damage and at 
the place where the damage occurred – may not be relevant with regard to cross-border patent 
infringement cases, which shall be subject of a deepened analysis subsequently.  
 
Although Shevill is not applicable to the constellation of cross-border patent infringement, 
some general statements given by the ECJ in this decision are still of interest also in this 
context. Interestingly, the ECJ held, (also) in Shevill, with regard to the place where the 
damage occurred (“Erfolgsort”) that 
 
“(…) the courts of each Contracting State in which the defamatory publication was distributed and in 
which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation have jurisdiction to rule on the injury 
caused in that State to the victim’s reputation.”513 
 
By the latter formulation, the court constructed a conjunction between substantive law and 
jurisdiction of a court potentially situated outside the protection State. This construction may 
match with regard to the rights of personality due to the principle of universality, but 
structurally cannot be applied to rights which are territorially restricted as patents (principle of 
territoriality). 
 
Additionally, the ECJ explicated in Shevill: 
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“In the area of non-contractual liability (…) the sole object of the [Brussels] Convention is to determine 
which court or courts have jurisdiction to hear the dispute by reference to the place or places where an 
event considered harmful occurred. 
 
It does not, however, specify the circumstances in which the event giving rise to the harm may be 
considered to be harmful to the victim, or the evidence which the plaintiff must adduce before the court 
seised to enable it to rule on the merits of the case.  
 
Those questions must therefore be settled solely by the national court seised, applying the substantive 
law determined by its national conflict of laws rules, provided that the effectiveness of the Convention 
is not thereby impaired [underscore and content in brackets added].”514  
 
It can be concluded from this formulation used by the ECJ that the principle of an 
autonomous determination of the place where the harmful event occurred (“Begehungsort”) 
does not apply without any restrictions.515 So, parts of legal doctrine have suggested that 
reference to the lex causae will be required in order to determine the place of the event giving 
rise to the damage.516 
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.4 Inapplicability of the principle of territoriality 
 
In the absence of a clear attitude of the ECJ regarding the question of whether the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage is to be determined independently from the lex causae, 
meaning that the principle of territoriality is in no way applicable, it is necessary to revert to 
general considerations and principles.  
 
Arguing in favour of the consideration of the principle of territoriality in the framework of 
Article 7(2), one might put forth that the European legislator codified the principle of 
territoriality in the Rome II Regulation.517 In that Regulation, the European legislator indeed 
established unified rules of conflict of laws concerning non-contractual obligations, and 
Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation, dealing with the infringement of intellectual property 
rights, embodies the principle of lex loci protectionis which is closely related with the 
substantive principle of territoriality.518 Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation provides: 
 
“The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual 
property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed.” 
 
In spite of the general separation between matters of jurisdiction and the applicable law, it 
might be possible to derive the applicability of the same principles for both the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation and the Rome II Regulation. In this respect, it is remarkable that the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ also reveals a certain coherence regarding the interpretation of the (pre-) 
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predecessors of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Rome I Regulation519 concerning the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, i.e. the Brussels Convention and the Rome 
Convention520.521 In light of this, and considering that the ECJ has also jurisdiction to interpret 
both the provisions of the Rome II Regulation and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a similar 
coherence of interpretation of the provisions of the latter Regulations could be concluded.522 
Consequently, the principle of territoriality could be also relevant with regard to Article 7(2), 
i.e. concerning the determination of the place of jurisdiction according to Article 7(2).  
 
However, the foregoing argumentation is based on the wrong assumption that the principle of 
lex loci protectionis and the principle of territoriality can be equated. But, although the 
principle of lex loci protectionis and the principle of territoriality are closely related with each 
other, it remains a matter of fact that the principle of lex loci protectionis is a principle of 
private international law which should not be mingled with matters of substantive law like the 
principle of territoriality which concerns the territorial limits of IP rights.523 For it is private 
international law that determines which substantive law is applicable.524  
 
Moreover, Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation only provides which law is applicable in 
case of a patent infringement, but does not contain any hint as to the determination of the 
place where a patent has been infringed which is decisive in terms of Article 7(2). Besides, 
when interpreting a provision of European law, the aspect of effet utile must be taken into 
account. According to this principle, the interpretation of a provision must not lead to the 
result that this provision loses its specific meaning and scope of application. In this regard, it 
is to be underlined that, if the principle of territoriality actually was to be applied to Article 
7(2), Article 7(2) would be deprived of its effet utile, because then only the courts of the 
protection State would be competent, meaning that jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) 
would per se be identical with jurisdiction according to Article 24(4).525  
 
 
2.2.3.1.3.5 Conclusion: Principle of territoriality is no obstacle for an extraterritorial 
place of the event giving rise to the damage 
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that the principle of territoriality has neither an immediate 
(direct) nor a mediate (indirect) effect on the determination of the place of the event giving 
rise to the damage according to Article 7(2).526 Consequently, the substantive principle of 
territoriality constitutes no obstacle against the existence of an extraterritorial place of the 
event giving rise to the damage pursuant to Article 7(2).527 
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2.2.3.1.4 Constellations of extraterritorial places of the event giving rise to the damage  
 
Having arrived at the conclusion that the principle of territoriality does not effect that the 
place of the event giving rise to the damage cannot be located outside the protection State, I 
shall analyse in the following paragraphs whether, respectively in which constellations, parts 
of infringing acts (“Teilakte”) which are accomplished (“vollendet”) in the protection State 
can constitute a place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2). In this 
respect, I shall explicitly deal with the manufacture and the transit of products which allegedly 
infringe patents. 
 
Frequently, the place where a product which allegedly infringes a patent and the place of 
domicile of the alleged infringer will be identical, effecting that the courts of that place 
already have jurisdiction according to Article 4(1), without the need to ground jurisdiction on 
Article 7(2).528 However, the following cases may serve to illustrate that such a synchronism 





Patent holder P holds a European patent for a machine for the territories of Germany 
and Poland. Infringer INF, domiciled in Belgium, manufactures an identical machine 
and sells it in Poland via transit through Germany. As P doubts that Belgian courts will 
decide within a reasonable period, P shies away from suing INF before Belgian courts, 
which have jurisdiction according to Article 4(1), but sues INF in Germany for patent 
infringement of the Polish part of the European patent, on the basis of Article 7(2). Do 





Patent holder P holds a European patent for a machine for the territories of Germany 
and the Netherlands. Infringer INF, domiciled in Belgium, manufactures an identical 
machine in Spain and sells it in Germany and the Netherlands. As P doubts that 
Belgian courts will decide within a reasonable period, P shies away from suing INF 
before Belgian courts, which have jurisdiction according to Article 4(1), but sues INF 
in Spain for patent infringement of the Dutch and the German parts of the European 
patent, on the basis of Article 7(2). Do Spanish courts have jurisdiction as to this claim 
according to Article 7(2)? 
 
 
Principally, it is to be restated that the principle of territoriality merely concerns patent rights 
in substantive respect, and therefore does not a priori preclude jurisdiction according to 
Article 7(2) in case that (parts of) infringing acts with regard to a patent infringement are 
accomplished outside the protection State.529  
 
With regard to Case 1, the transit of the allegedly infringing product through Germany and its 
import into Poland could be considered as parts (“Teilakte”) of a uniform cross-border 
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infringing act. As the transit through the territory of Germany constitutes a part (“Teilakt”) of 
that uniform cross-border infringing act, it could be argued that German courts have 
jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) (also) concerning the Polish part of the European patent.  
 
Concerning Case 2, it could be argued that Spanish courts have jurisdiction according to 
Article 7(2) with regard to both the infringement of the Dutch and the German part of the 
European patent, because the manufacture of the allegedly infringing product in Spain 
constitutes a part (“Teilakt”) of a uniform cross-border infringing act which is accomplished 
(“vollendet”) both in the Netherlands and Germany as protection States.  
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1 Relevant aspects 
 
In light of these cases, it is to be questioned in which circumstances an extraterritorial 
localisation of the place of the event giving rise to the damage pursuant to Article 7(2) is 
justified. In the following, I shall take a closer look on the aspects of accountability 
(“Zurechnungszusammenhang”) and the existence of a particularly close connection. These 
factors can be understood as filters to avoid that jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) as an 
exception to the basic jurisdictional rule of Article 4(1) (jurisdiction at the place where the 
defendant is domiciled) is extended excessively. 
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.1 Filter 1: Accountability (“Zurechnungszusammenhang”) 
 
As has been mentioned above, the wording “place of the event giving rise to the damage” that 
is used in Article 7(2) constitutes per se a broad expression which leaves room to comprise 
also such (parts of) acts which are not part of the substantive facts. On this basis, it has been 
argued that the term “place of the event giving rise to the damage” also covers acts outside the 
protection State insofar as they are causal and accountable to the patent infringement 
accomplished in the protection State.530 Due to the latter restriction of accountability, the mere 
manufacture of a product abroad does not suffice to conceive this act as being part of a patent 
infringement in the protection State; although it is actually causal in the broadest sense 
possible,531 the stricter requirement of accountability is not met.532 On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the act of putting into circulation an object, intendedly and with a clear 
purpose, directed towards the protection State – for instance by a specific labelling in the 
language of the protection State or permanent contractual relations to an importer in the 
protection State – may meet the requirement of accountability to a patent infringement in the 
protection State. Consequently, the place where the object is put into circulation in such a way 
could then be considered a place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 
7(2).533 The danger that in case that several parts of the manufacture of allegedly infringing 
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products are carried out in several Member States, meaning that there could be several places 
of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2),534 which could finally result 
in a multiplication of places of jurisdiction535 and forum shopping, can be effectively reduced 
by the discussed requirement of accountability.536  
 
Applying these considerations to the sample cases presented above, I arrive at the following 
intermediate results: 
 
In Case 1, the transit of the machine through Germany is carried out intendedly and with the 
clear purpose to bring it to Poland to sell it there. Consequently, German courts would have 
jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) as to infringement proceedings concerning the Polish 
part of the European patent. 
 
In Case 2, the foregoing considerations would lead to the result that Spanish courts cannot 
found jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) on the mere fact that INF manufactures the 
machine in Spain. However, Spanish courts would be considered competent pursuant to 
Article 7(2) to decide on the alleged infringement of the Dutch and the German part of the 
European patent for the reason that INF intendedly and with a clear purpose, acting from 
Spain, put the machine into circulation in the Netherlands and Germany. 
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.2 Filter 2: Particularly close connection  
 
In light of the fact that the ECJ has constantly emphasised, since its Mines de Potasse 
decision, that the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and 
the deciding court is essential for jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), it is doubtful 
if the requirement of accountability (“Zurechnungszusammenhang”) suffices to secure the 
existence of such a “particularly close connecting factor”. It is noteworthy that the ECJ, by 
demanding such a particularly close connection, explicitly intended to secure the sound 
administration of justice and the efficacious conduct of proceedings.537   
 
Starting from Cases 1 and 2, I shall differentiate in the following analysis between the place 
of transit and the place of manufacture.   
  
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.2.1 Place of transit 
 
While some legal writers have put forth that the mere transit of products for their illegal sale 
abroad already suffices in order to establish a place of the event giving rise to the damage 
according to Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessors),538 the majority of legal commentators 
have refused such a broad interpretation of Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessors). In fact, 
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the latter opinion appears more convincing, because in the case of transporting a product 
through a State without any intention to use the product in this State, i.e. in a constellation of 
mere transit of the product, there is neither factual (nor legal) proximity between the object 
and the concerned State.539 In particular, proceedings before a court in the State of transit 
would not benefit from a specific proximity of evidence; on the contrary, it is even doubtful 
which evidence, if any, could be gained in the State of transit. Therefore, proceedings in the 
State of transit would not secure the sound administration of justice and the efficacious 
conduct of proceedings. To conclude, there is no particularly close connecting factor between 
the place of transit and a potential patent infringement in the protection State, meaning that 
the place of mere transit does not constitute a place of the event giving rise to the damage and 
thus courts of the State of transit lack jurisdiction according to Article 7(2).    
 
Applying this result to Case 1, I arrive at the conclusion that German courts do not have 
jurisdiction as to proceedings concerning the potential infringement of the Polish part of the 
European patent, because – although being transported intendedly via Germany with the clear 
purpose to bring it to Poland to sell it there – the product was never meant to be brought in 
closer relation to Germany than only in form of the transit through German territory which 




2.2.3.1.4.1.2.2 Place of manufacture 
 
On the basis of the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine and case-law of the EU Member States 
pursuant to which the principle of territoriality must also be taken into consideration regarding 
the issue of jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), as well as pursuant to the conception 
that the principle of territoriality has at least an indirect (mediate) effect, it is to be concluded 
that a particularly close connection in the sense of Article 7(2) between a patent infringement 
and an invoked court only exists in the protection State, because only there the patent can be 
infringed, and the law of this State is applied to the patent infringement.540 In this respect, it 
has been put forth that only the last part of an act that finally accomplishes the patent 
infringement is decisive for the determination of the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage according to Article 7(2), which has been named the so-called “last event rule”.541   
 
Others have emphasised that the place of manufacture is the place where the cause for the 
patent infringement that is accomplished in the protection State is set.542 Further, it has been 
pointed out that the relevant evidence required for infringement proceedings will especially be 
located at the place of manufacture. Accordingly, the sound administration of justice and the 
efficacious conduct of proceedings would be promoted by conferring jurisdiction to the place 
of manufacture as a place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2).543 
Additionally, it has been suggested that accepting the place of manufacture as a place of the 
event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) may even effect a concentration of 
several proceedings in case that the manufacture of an object leads to the infringement of 
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parallel patents, where several proceedings would have to be initiated before different courts 
otherwise.544   
 
Besides, it has been proposed in legal doctrine, as to the question of whether an extraterritorial 
place of manufacture is to be considered a place of the event giving rise to the damage in the 
sense of Article 7(2) due to the existence of a particularly close connection, to distinguish 
between product patents and process patents.545 Comparably to the legal situation in national 
patent systems, a European patent cannot only be granted for a product, but also for a process, 
which results from the broad definition of patentable inventions in Article 52(1) of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC)546 which provides: 
 
“European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application.” 
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.2.2.1 Product patents 
 
With regard to product patents, it has rightly been underlined that the infringing acts of 
bringing into circulation, using, offering, importing and possessing such products for those 
purposes constitute acts of patent infringement that are independent from the manufacture of 
the concerned object.547 Consequently, those acts can be considered and evaluated 
independently from the manufacture, which does not even require knowledge of the act of 
manufacture. It is thus logical to conclude that the mere fact of manufacture of a product does 
not establish such a particularly close connection that would be necessary to consider an 
extraterritorial place of manufacture as a place of the event giving rise to the damage in the 
sense of Article 7(2) concerning a patent infringement in the protection State.548     
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.2.2.2 Process patents 
 
In contrast, as to European process patents, there can be a particularly close connection 
between the courts at an extraterritorial place of manufacture and a patent infringement in the 
protection State, with the consequence that that place of manufacture could then be 
considered a place of the event giving rise to the damage concerning the patent 
infringement.549 In this respect, Article 64(2) of the EPC gains special importance, which 
reads as follows:    
 
“If the subject-matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the patent shall 
extend to the products directly obtained by such process.” 
 
Remarkably, this provision, regarding process patents, extends the scope of protection to the 
products which are directly (immediately) manufactured through the protected process which 
gains particular importance in case that the patent on the process is not valid as such in the 
State of manufacture.550 Insofar, manufacture has rightly been characterised as a part of the 
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uniform tort of offering, bringing into circulation, using, importing or possessing a product 
being manufactured according to a protected process.551 Products are thus protected only 
when manufacture is directly based on the protected process – otherwise process patents do 
not have effect on the products as such. In clearer words: The use of exactly the protected 
process is a precondition for the existence of a patent infringement in the protection State 
(unless there is an (additional) patent on the product).552 Therefore, gaining evidence on this 
very issue will be decisive in such patent infringement cases. That can usually be undertaken 
most easily at the place of manufacture.553 Consequently, it has been concluded, with regard 
to European process patents, that an extraterritorial place of manufacture has a particularly 
close connection to the patent infringement in the protection State and can thus be considered 
a place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 7(2).554   
 
The ECJ underlined, in its Marinari decision, that no reference is to be made to substantive 
law for the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), because otherwise the principles of legal certainty and 
predictability as to the attribution of jurisdiction would be impaired555: 
 
“There is no basis for interpreting Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention by reference to the 
applicable rules on non-contractual civil liability, as proposed by the German Government. That 
interpretation is also incompatible with the objective of the [Brussels] Convention, which is to provide 
for a clear and certain attribution of jurisdiction (…). The delimitation of jurisdiction would then 
depend on uncertain factors such as the place where the victim' s assets suffered subsequent damage and 
the applicable rules on civil liability [underscores and content in brackets added].”556 
 
In this respect, it could be doubted if the differentiation between product patents and process 
patents is admissible. However, as has been shown in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the 
differentiation between product patents and process patents is also familiar to national legal 
systems. Also, the provision of Article 64(2) of the EPC which is binding for all Contracting 
States to the European Patent Convention implies the possibility of obtaining a process patent 
besides a product patent. In light of this, pursuing the approach of a differentiation between 
product patents and process patents does not mean a mere reference to national provisions and 
is therefore reconcilable with the Marinari decision of the ECJ.557  
 
 
2.2.3.1.4.1.2.3 Determination of the place of the event giving rise to the damage in case of 
the infringement of IP rights via the internet 
 
It has rightly been highlighted in legal doctrine that, while torts committed via the internet are 
not beyond the scope of Article 7(2), the internet brings an extra dimension to the 
jurisdictional rules laid down therein.558 Apart from developing specific rules on jurisdiction 
with regard to the infringement of personality rights,559 the ECJ developed in its Wintersteiger 
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decision a specific rule regarding the infringement of a national trade mark registered in a 
Member State through online advertisements by an advertiser domiciled in another Member 
State. The court held: 
 
“In the case of an alleged infringement of a national trade mark registered in a Member State because of 
the display, on the search engine website, of an advertisement using a keyword identical to that trade 
mark, it is the activation by the advertiser of the technical process displaying, according to pre-defined 
parameters, the advertisement which it created for its own commercial communications which should be 
considered to be the event giving rise to an alleged infringement, and not the display of the 
advertisement itself [underscores added].”560 
 
On the basis of this interpretation of the term “place of the event giving rise to the damage” in 
the said specific constellation of trade mark infringement via online advertisement, according 
to which the activation of the technical process of displaying the advertisement is decisive, the 
ECJ localised this place at the place of establishment of the advertiser: 
 
“(…) (S)ince it is a definite and identifiable place, both for the applicant and for the defendant, and is 
therefore likely to facilitate the taking of evidence and the conduct of the proceedings, it must be held 
that the place of establishment of the advertiser is the place where the activation of the display process 
is decided [underscore added].”561 
 
By contrast, the ECJ clearly stated that the place of establishment of the server cannot, due to 
its uncertain location, be the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred, 
although the technical process by the advertiser is activated on that server belonging to the 
operator of the search engine used by the advertiser. In this regard, the court expressly 
emphasised “the objective of foreseeability, which the rules on jurisdiction must pursue.”562 
 
Underlining that the principle of ubiqity also applies to the constellation of the infringement 
of trade marks through online advertisements, the ECJ held that Article 7(2) must be 
interpreted as meaning   
 
“(…) that an action relating to infringement of a trade mark registered in a Member State because of the 
use, by an advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trade mark on a search engine website operating 
under a country-specific top-level domain of another Member State may be brought before either the 
courts of the Member State in which the trade mark is registered or the courts of the Member State of 
the place of establishment of the advertiser [underscore added].”563 
 
Although the Wintersteiger decision concerned a case of trade mark infringement, it is 
probable that the ECJ would apply this jurisprudence as to the determination of the place of 
the event giving rise to the damage also with regard to cases of patent infringements,564 
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because trade marks and patents as territorially restricted IP rights are similar to each other. 
However, it is to be pointed out that this approach pursued by the ECJ, concerning the 
determination of the place of the event giving rise to the damage at the place of establishment 
of the advertiser, respectively infringer, ultimately has the effect that the choice, according to 
Article 7(2), between the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the 
damage occurred, loses much of its importance, because the place of establishment of the 
advertiser will generally be identical with his place of domicile where courts already have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4(1).565 In fact, the interpretation of Article 7(2) pursued by 
the ECJ in Wintersteiger concerning the determination of the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage entails the danger to partly deprive Article 7(2) of its effet utile. For this reason, it 
seems advisable not to follow this approach in the framework of an eventual future recast of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Therefore, this approach will not be subject to further discussion 





On the basis of the foregoing paragraphs, it is to be concluded that the existence of an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation requires that the conditions of accountability and a particularly close 
connection between the infringing acting and the invoked court are fulfilled.  
 
As to the possibility of an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage at the 
place of manufacture with regard to European patents, a differentiation between product 
patents and process patents seems reasonable and justified. For, concerning product patents, 
the infringing acts of bringing into circulation, using, offering, importing and possessing such 
products for the enumerated purposes constitute acts of patent infringement which are 
independent from the manufacture of the concerned object. The mere fact of manufacture of a 
product as such does not establish a particularly close connection that would be necessary for 
establishing jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(2). In opposition, regarding European process 
patents, an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage can exist at the place of 
manufacture if the concerned product is directly (immediately) manufactured through the 
protected process (cf. Article 64(2) of the EPC). This conception also takes into account the 
importance of the basic rule of Article 4(1) which implies that Article 7(2) as an exception of 
this rule must be interpreted restrictively. 
 
On the basis of this differentiating conception, the solution of Case 2 would be that Spanish 
courts lack jurisdiction as to the Dutch and the German part of the European patent, because 
the manufacture of the product in Spain does not suffice to accomplish an infringement of the 
Dutch and the German part of the European product patent. If, by derogation from Case 2, the 
subject-matter of P’s European patent was a process, and INF manufactured identical products 
in Spain, a further differentiation would be necessary: If the manufacture of these products 
was directly based on the protected process, Spain would be considered a place of the event 
giving rise to the damage pursuant to Article 7(2) with regard to an infringement of P’s patent. 
As a consequence, Spanish courts would then have jurisdiction according to Article 7(2). If, 
however, INF used another method for manufacture than the one protected by P’s process 
patent, that protection would not extend to the products. As a consequence, Spain would not 
be a place of the event giving rise to the damage as to P’s patent, and Spanish courts would 
not have jurisdiction according to Article 7(2). 
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2.2.3.1.5 No reciprocal attribution of the place of the event giving rise to the damage 
according to Article 7(2) in case of several perpetrators 
 
In a number of recent decisions, the ECJ made clear that the mere fact that a tort – in the 
context of this thesis one might think of the infringement of a patent – has been committed by 
several perpetrators, does not justify to ground international jurisdiction of a court in the State 
where one of the infringers acted according to Article 7(2), with regard to all infringers, but 
solely concerning the very infringer who actually acted in this State.566  
 
In this respect, the Melzer decision of the ECJ concerning the interpretation of Article 5(3) of 
the Brussels I Regulation is to be mentioned. In this case, the German Landgericht Düsseldorf 
referred the following question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: 
 
 “In the context of jurisdiction in matters relating to tort or delict under Article 5(3) of Regulation [No 
 44/2001], where there is cross-border participation of several persons in a tort or delict, is reciprocal 
 attribution of the place where the event occurred admissible for determining the place where the 
 harmful event occurred?”567   
 
In line with its constant jurisprudence according to which Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively its predecessors) must be interpreted restrictively because this 
provision constitutes a derogation from the fundamental principle of Article 4(1) (respectively 
its predecessors),568 the ECJ held that 
 
 “(...) in circumstances (...) in which only one among several presumed perpetrators of the alleged 
 harmful act is sued before a court within whose jurisdiction he has not acted, an autonomous 
 interpretation of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, in accordance with the objectives and general 
 scheme thereof, precludes the event giving rise to the damage from being regarded as taking place 
 within the jurisdiction of that court.”569 
 
In its reasoning, the court, in particular, highlighted that Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is based on the existence of a 
particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the courts of the place where the 
harmful event occurred or may occur, with regard to the sound administration of justice and 
efficacious conduct of proceedings.570 Underlining that the relevant connecting factor must be 
situated within the jurisdiction of the court seised,571 the ECJ held that in circumstances in 
which only one among several presumed perpetrators of an alleged harmful act is sued before 
a court within whose jurisdiction this perpetrator has not acted, there is principally no 
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connecting factor based on the defendant's acts.572 In order to take jurisdiction according to 
Article 7(2), the deciding court must establish why the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage still must be regarded as having taken place within its jurisdiction, which would 
require, according to the ECJ, an assessment similar to that to be undertaken when examining 
the substance of the dispute even at the stage of examining jurisdiction.573 The ECJ further 
held that, in the absence of a common concept in the national legal systems on the one hand 
and the European Union on the other hand enabling imputation of the act of one perpetrator to 
other perpetrators, the deciding national court would probably refer to the lex fori.574 
However, the ECJ stressed that such a use of national legal concepts in the context of the 
Brussels I Regulation (and the same applies to the Brussels Ibis Regulation) would create 
different outcomes among the Member States which would impair the aim of unifying the 
rules of jurisdiction pursued by the Regulation,575 and would not be in line with the objective 
of legal certainty and predictability of jurisdiction. For, depending on the applicable law, the 
action of a person which took place in a Member State other than the forum State might or 
might not be classified as the event giving rise to the damage for the purpose of the attribution 
of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation).576 The ECJ made clear that this decision does not impair, in 
particular, the possibility of consolidating actions against several infringers according to 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) where 
the conditions for consolidation are fulfilled.577 Noteworthily, the ECJ confirmed its 
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2.2.3.2 Extraterritorial place where the damage occurred or may occur 
 
Having discussed, in the foregoing paragraphs, the question of whether (respectively where) 
there can be an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage according to 
Article 7(2), I shall now turn to the parallel question of whether there can be, concerning a 
patent infringement, an extraterritorial place where the damage occurred.  
 
 
2.2.3.2.1 Conception 1: Absence of any place where the damage occurred 
 
In contrast to the situation as to the place of the event giving rise to the damage, parts of legal 
doctrine have doubted that a place where the damage occurred can exist with regard to the 
infringement of patents. So, it has been put forward that, in patent infringement cases, the 
forum where damage arises for the purposes of Article 7(2) (respectively its predecessors) is 
necessarily the place where the act of infringement occurred.580 In this respect, it could be 
argued that patents as intellectual property rights, in the absence of any physicalness, cannot 
be localised at a specific place,581 and that only the consequences of a patent infringement can 
be localised, i.e. the material (financial) disadvantages at the expense of the patent holder 
which arise, for instance, through the unauthorised bringing into circulation of a protected 
product by the patent infringer.582 On the basis of this opinion, the question of the eventual 
existence of an extraterritorial place where the damage occurred does not arise. 
 
 
2.2.3.2.2 (Prevailing) conception 2: Place where the damage occurred is the place where 
the patent right has been infringed (“Ort der Rechtsgutverletzung”) 
 
The majority of legal commentators however advocate a conception according to which there 
is a place where the damage occurred with regard to cases of patent infringement, and, 
referring to the principle of territoriality, localise this place (only) at the place where the 
patent right has been infringed, i.e. in the protection State.583 According to this opinion, the 
place of the event giving rise to the damage, regarding the infringement of patents, will 
always be identical with the place where the damage occurred,584 because the infringement of 
the patent is realised where the infringing act is committed.585 Conception 2 was also shared 
by the German Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf in its famous Schussfadengreifer II586 decision 
which was rendered subsequently to the Schussfadengreifer I587 decision by the German 
Landgericht Düsseldorf.  
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In order to curtail jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) on the basis of the place where the harmful event 
occurred, the ECJ held in its Marinari decision that 
 
“(…) the term “place where the harmful event occurred” in Article 5(3) of the [Brussels] Convention of 
27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
does not, on a proper interpretation, cover the place where the victim claims to have suffered financial 
damage following upon initial damage arising and suffered by him in another Contracting State 
[underscore and content in brackets added].”588   
 
Deciding in this way, the ECJ stated clearly that only the initial/direct damage is to be 
considered relevant as damage in the framework of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). Places where subsequent or mediate damage 
comes into existence are therefore irrelevant in jurisdictional respect.589 If such subsequent 
respectively mediate/indirect damage was to be taken into account, this would result in an 
overflowing jurisdiction according to Article 7(2), which would be problematic because 
Article 7(2), with accordance to the constant jurisprudence of the ECJ (as to the predecessors 
of Article 7(2)), is to be interpreted restrictively since it constitutes an exception to Article 
4(1).590 An extensive interpretation of the notion of place where the damage occurred which 
also takes into account indirect damage might even result in the creation of a forum actoris 
which is against the express conception of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.591 Besides, it is to be 
taken into consideration that all preconditions for liability have already been fulfilled in the 
State where the initial damage occurred. As a consequence, aspects of factual proximity 
(proximity to evidence) and efficacious conduct of proceedings do not require to assign 
jurisdiction to courts of another State.592 Last but not least, the ideas of legal certainty and 
predictability of jurisdiction which are inherent to the Brussels Ibis Regulation in order to 
strengthen legal protection of persons domiciled in the European Union require that an 
informed plaintiff is able to foresee before which court(s) he may initiate proceedings, and 
that an informed defendant is able to foresee before which court(s) apart from the courts at his 
domicile he may be sued. These principles of legal certainty and predictability would be 
disregarded if indirect/consequential damage would be relevant for determining the place 
where the damage occurred according to Article 7(2).593   
 
However, Conception 2 does not reach different results in comparison with Conception 1, 
because according to both conceptions jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) will be 
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established at the place of the event giving rise to the damage, be it that no place where the 
harmful event occurred exists, be it that the place of the event giving rise to the damage and 
an existing place where the harmful event occurred are identical.594 As a consequence of both 
conceptions, an extraterritorial place where the damage occurred cannot exist, because a 
patent can only be infringed in the protection State.595  
 
 
2.2.3.2.3 Conception 3: Potential existence of further places where the damage occurred 
besides the place where the patent right has been infringed 
 
Nonetheless, it is doubtful if the principle of territoriality indeed has the effect that the place 
where the damage occurred, as to the infringement of a patent, can only be located at the place 
where the patent right has been infringed, i.e. in the protection State, or if, in addition to that 
place, there can be further places where the damage occurred. To recall the Marinari decision 
of the ECJ, the court held that the place of jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to be determined 
independently from the applicable rules on non-contractual civil liability.596 In this respect, it 
is to be noticed that the substantive principle of territoriality, although it might be existent in 
numerous legal systems, forms a principle of the national law applicable in the specific case 
to be decided. In light of this, determining the place where the damage occurred in the sense 
of Article 7(2) by referring to the principle of territoriality would be irreconcilable with the 
interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) undertaken by the ECJ in Marinari.597 Consequently, assuming that the place 
where the damage occurred must be identical with the place where the patent right has been 
infringed, i.e. in the protection State, does not correspond to the independent interpretation of 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) demanded by the 
ECJ.598 Moreover, in case that, due to the principle of territoriality, jurisdiction according to 
Article 7(2) would only be conferred to the courts in the State where the patent has been 
granted, there would be an automatic synchronism between jurisdiction according to Article 
7(2) and jurisdiction according to Article 24(4).599 With regard to patent infringement, special 
jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) would then lose any importance vis-à-vis exclusive 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) which would mean to deprive Article 7(2) of its effet 
utile. An interpretation of Article 7(2) which effects this result is to be rejected.  
 
In the following, I shall analyse which further places besides the place where the patent right 




2.2.3.2.3.1 Place of domicile (seat) of the patent holder 
 
It could be argued that the place where the damage occurred can be localised at the place of 
domicile of the patent holder, because the patent infringer would have had to pay a licence, 
i.e. he actually omitted to pay a licence at this place what he would have had to do in order to 
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legally make use of the protected product or process. Insofar, the patent holder suffers 
financial loss at this place.600 Besides, financial loss of the patent holder could be effected in 
the form of a reduced sale of products. It could also be put forth that the damage occurs at the 
domicile of the patent holder, because the patent is protected there.601  
 
A closer look on these arguments however reveals that they are not convincing. First of all, it 
is to be underlined that the place where the patent holder suffers financial loss is not relevant 
for the determination of the place where the damage occurred in the sense of Article 7(2), 
because financial loss merely constitutes an indirect, i.e. a consequential damage;602 the initial 
damage is already realised at the place of infringement of the patent right. As illustrated 
above, the ECJ however only accepts initial damage to be relevant in the framework of 
Article 7(2). Furthermore, the place of domicile of the patentee is independent from the 
question in which State patent protection has been gained. The place where the patentee is 
domiciled can be, but does not have to be located in the protection State. In contrast to 
immovable property, which is clearly located at a specific place, a patent is granted for the 
territory of a specific State. Due to the fact that a granted patent exists anywhere in the 
protection State, a localisation is only possible at the place where the infringing act is 
committed, because the patent is realised at this place at the moment of infringement.603 In 
this respect, considering the place of domicile of the patentee in the framework of Article 7(2) 
would also be contrary to the principles of legal predictability and certainty, because the 
patentee can choose his domicile and transfer his patent right to another person whose place 
of domicile would then be decisive in jurisdictional respect, meaning that the place of 
domicile of the patentee could be easily influenced and manipulated by the patentee.604 
Furthermore, considering the place of domicile of the patent holder as a place where the 
damage occurred according to Article 7(2) would mean to create a forum actoris which would 
violate the fundamental principle of Article 4(1)605 because the European legislator has 
neither explicitly provided for an exception from the rule of Article 4(1)606, nor is it evident 
that courts at the place of domicile of the patent holder are per se closer to facts and evidence 
than courts at the place of domicile of the defendant, i.e. the alleged infringer with regard to 
patent infringement.607 The effect of establishing a forum actoris would be severe particularly 
due to the considerable territorial scope of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.608  
 
 
2.2.3.2.3.2 Place of the impact on/saturation of the market (“Ort der 
Marktbeeinflussung”/“Ort der Marktsättigung”) 
 
Further, it could be argued that the place where the damage occurred according to Article 7(2) 
can be determined at the extraterritorial place of impact on the market, i.e. the place of 
saturation of the market, beyond the protection State, concerning a specific product for which 
the patentee holds a patent, by the import of an allegedly infringing product through the 
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alleged infringer, in case that the patent holder loses business relationships at that place as a 
direct (immediate) result of this import.609 This conception must be considered in light of the 
fact that the term “place where the damage occurred”, with accordance to the imprecise 
formulation by the ECJ, may comprise, in German law610, both the “Ort der 
Rechtsgutverletzung” (place of the infringement of the patent) and the “Schadensort” (place 
of the damage). It is to be underlined that “Rechtsgutverletzung” and “Schaden” are to be 
strictly differentiated in German law. The occurrence of a “Rechtsgutverletzung” can, but not 
necessarily does, coincide with the occurrence of a “Schaden”. Regarding this, it has been 
pointed out that the “Schadensort” (place of the damage) has its own relevance in terms of 
jurisdiction, because it reveals a close connection between the dispute and the invoked court 
that goes beyond the mere infringement of the patent right as such.611 
 
Since its Mines de Potasse decision, the ECJ has constantly held that the reason for 
jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), comprising the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage and the place where the damage occurred, is a particularly close connection 
between the dispute and the invoked court, with a view to the efficacious conduct of the 
proceedings. Consequently, the crucial question is whether a particularly close connection 
exists between the place of impact on the market and the court before which proceedings are 
initiated, i.e. whether proceedings before a court at the place of impact on the market can be 
conducted efficaciously.  
 
As to this issue, opponents of the conception being discussed here, according to which the 
place of impact on the market is to be considered a place where the damage occurred, have 
argued that the damage is not a necessary element to prove the infringement of a patent 
(although it is generally an essential element to proving an action in tort).612 Therefore, the 
existence of a particularly close connection between the courts at the place of impact on the 
market and a dispute concerning patent infringement could be denied. However, such a view 
would disregard that the ECJ decided in Marinari that determining jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) may not 
be realised by reference to the applicable rules on non-contractual civil liability.613 
Accordingly, the question of whether a patent infringement per se requires damage cannot be 
answered a priori.  
 
Besides, it could be argued that the plaintiff who sues the alleged infringer of a patent for 
damages must prove the existence of a damage, and the invoked court must examine the 
scope of the alleged damage.614 While parts of legal doctrine have concluded from these 
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circumstances that an efficacious conduct of proceedings will be attained at the place of 
impact on the market due to its proximity to evidence,615 it is doubtful if the significance of 
that place for an efficacious conduct of proceedings is indeed existent. In this respect, it has 
been rightly suggested that a specific proximity to facts and evidence at the place of impact on 
the market will regularly be without particular use, because the amount of damages will 
regularly be determined according to the licence (fees) which would have reasonably been 
agreed between the parties if they had concluded a licence contract. In this context, the 
amount of the manufactured pieces of the concerned product will be a decisive factor. In light 
of this, proximity to facts and evidence in order to determine the amount of damages to pay, 
will be more likely to exist at the place of manufacture, because there the number of 
manufactured pieces can be determined more easily.616 Additionally, it is to be considered that 
evidence (“Beweisführung”) is impaired by the fact that, in cases of cross-border patent 
infringement, the alleged infringer will often claim that he developed a new market for his 
products which would not have been accessible for the patentee.617    
    
However, the decisive question as to the issue if the place of impact on the market can be 
considered a place where the damage occurred in the sense of Article 7(2) is whether this 
conception is reconcilable with the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Marinari decision, where 
the court also explicitly restricted Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) by stating that 
 
“(…) the term “place where the harmful event occurred” in Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention] 
(…) does not, on a proper interpretation, cover the place where the victim claims to have suffered 
financial damage following upon initial damage arising and suffered by him in another Contracting 
State [underscore and content in brackets added].”618 
 
By this, the ECJ made clear that only initial damage constitutes “damage” in the sense of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).619 
Arguing in favour of the conception that an extraterritorial place of impact on the market can 
be considered a place where the damage occurred pursuant to Article 7(2), one might 
emphasise that this damage does not constitute a mere consequential or indirect damage of a 
patent infringement committed in the protection State, which would not be relevant in terms 
of Article 7(2), but rather constitutes an initial (immediate) damage in the other State which is 
relevant for determining jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(2), meaning that the constellation is 
different from that in Marinari and that therefore the cited passage of the Marinari decision 
cannot be applied to this constellation.620 On the other hand, the damage in question could 
also be qualified as a pure consequential damage of the infringement of the patent. As a 
consequence, the place of impact on the market would then be no place where the damage 
occurred according to Article 7(2).621 Differentiating between the infringement of the patent 
right as such and negative financial effects which result from this patent infringement, it 
appears indeed convincing to qualify only the infringement of the patent right as the initial 
damage, which means that all subsequent negative effects can merely constitute a 
consequential damage which has no effect in terms of Article 7(2).622 In light of this, the 
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situation in discussion is actually comparable to the situation in the Marinari case, where the 
act giving rise to a claim for damages was terminated by the seisure, the financial effects in 
Italy being only consequences of this relevant act.623        
 
Last but not least, it could be argued that restricting the interpretation of the place where the 
damage occurred in the sense of Article 7(2) to the place of the infringement of the patent 
would logically result in a synchronism between the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage and the place where the harmful event occurred624 which would considerably deprive 
Article 7(2) of its effet utile.625 However, this argumentation goes astray. While it is true that 
the conception according to which the place where the damage occurred in the sense of 
Article 7(2) is the place of infringement of the patent right, has the effect that the place giving 
rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred are identical as to cases of patent 
infringement,626 this does not impair the fact that both places exist.627 Considering the place of 
impact on the market, respectively the place of saturation of the market as a place where the 
damage occurred in terms of Article 7(2), would rather mean to construct a third type of place 
of jurisdiction according to Article 7(2).628 This would be irreconcilable with the structure of 
Article 7(2) and the constant interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) by the ECJ. 
 
 
2.2.3.2.3.3 Place of the conflict of interests between the patent holder and the infringer 
(“Ort der Interessenkollision”) 
 
Besides, one might think of localising a place where the damage occurred according to Article 
7(2) at the place where the interests of the patent holder are infringed, i.e. at the place where 
the interests of the patent holder and those of the infringer conflict with each other.629 In this 
respect, one might underline that the determination of the place where the damage occurred is 
to be undertaken independently from substantive patent protection according to the applicable 
law of the protection State, which results in the independent evaluation of the parties’ interests 
inasmuch as jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) is concerned.630  
 
However, as this conception actually constitutes a variant of the conception discussed above 
which refers to the place of the impact on the market respectively saturation of the market, it 
is to be rejected for the same reason: In line with the jurisprudence of the ECJ, it is to be 
differentiated between the infringement of the patent right as such and negative financial 
effects which result from this patent infringement. Only the infringement of the patent right 
forms the initial damage which is relevant for the determination of the place of jurisdiction in 
terms of Article 7(2). Further (subsequent) negative effects – comprising any conflicts of 
interests – can merely constitute a consequential damage which has no relevance for 
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As a consequence, it is to be stated that only the place where the patent right has been 
infringed (“Ort der Rechtsgutverletzung”) is to be considered as the place where the damage 
occurred according to Article 7(2). Otherwise the clear differentiation between initial and 
consequential damage which has been purported by the ECJ would be disregarded. 
 
The same applies with regard to the determination of the place where the damage occurred in 
the framework of IP infringements via the internet. The ECJ made clear, in its Wintersteiger 
decision, that, concerning the infringement of a national trade mark registered in a Member 
State through online advertisements by an advertiser domiciled in another Member State,  
 
“(i)t is the courts of the Member State in which the trade mark at issue is registered which are best able 
to assess (…) whether a situation such as that in the main proceedings actually infringes the protected 
national mark. Those courts have the power to determine all the damage allegedly caused to the 
proprietor of the protected right because of an infringement of it and to hear an application seeking 
cessation of all infringements of that right. 
 
Therefore it must be held that an action relating to infringement of a trade mark registered in a Member 
State through the use, by an advertiser, of a keyword identical to that trade mark on a search engine 
website operating under a country-specific top-level domain of another Member State may be brought 
before the courts of the Member State in which the trade mark is registered [underscore added].”631 
 
The ECJ later confirmed and applied this jurisprudence, in its Pinckney decision, with regard 
to the infringement of copyrights via the internet.632 The court held: 
 
“(…) Article 5(3) of the [Brussels I] Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of 
alleged infringement of copyrights protected by the Member State of the court seised, the latter has 
jurisdiction to hear an action to establish liability brought by the author of a work against a company 
established in another Member State and which has, in the latter State, reproduced that work on a 
material support which is subsequently sold by companies established in a third Member State through 
an internet site also accessible with the jurisdiction of the court seised. That court has jurisdiction only 




2.2.4 Territorial scope of the authority to decide of a court pursuant to Article 7(2) 
 
Having treated, in the foregoing paragraphs, the issue of an extraterritorial place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and an extraterritorial place where the damage occurred according 
to Article 7(2), the subsequent question arises in how far the invoked court is authorised to 
decide, in territorial respect, if patents granted in different States are infringed through the 
same act by one (alleged) infringer. This constellation concerns so-called multistate delicts, 
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which schematically constitute a sort of cross-border delicts.634 In case of such parallel 
infringements of different national patents (or national and European patents), the patent 
holder may have an interest to initiate proceedings with regard to all infringements before one 
court in order to reduce costs and avoid the risk of conflicting decisions by different courts.635 
However, the crucial question to examine is whether the invoked court is indeed authorised to 
decide on potential infringements of patents granted for another State than the forum State. It 
is to be clarified whether, besides the above considerations on an extraterritorial place of the 
event giving rise to the damage respectively an extraterritorial place where the damage 
occurred, another possibility can be factually established to conduct patent infringement 
proceedings outside the protection State, based on a comprehensive authority to decide.  
 
 
2.2.4.1 Conception 1: The invoked court only has authority to decide with regard to 
patents granted for the forum State 
 
According to the traditional opinion in legal doctrine and jurisprudence, jurisdiction according 
to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) merely enables a court to decide on patent infringements with regard to 
patents which have been granted for the State where the court is situated.636  
  
Diverse arguments are conceivable for this conception: First of all, it could be argued that the 
wording of Article 7(2) does not cover the constellation of multistate delicts.637 Besides, 
schematic reasons as to the structure of the Brussels Ibis Regulation could be referred to. In 
this respect, it might be underlined that Article 7(2) – in contrast to other provisions of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation such as Articles 4(1) and 8 – does not have the purpose to 
consolidate multiple proceedings before one court, but aims at establishing additional places 
of jurisdiction. Due to the different purposes of Article 7(2) on the one hand, and Articles 4(1) 
and 8 on the other hand, it would not be possible to extend Article 7(2) in the sense of the 
other provisions. On the contrary, it could be reasoned that the fact that Article 8 confers the 
possibility to consolidate multiple proceedings before one court shows that the European 
legislator has been aware of, respectively has taken into consideration the need for a 
consolidation of proceedings, but intendedly refused to provide for a similar rule in Article 7. 
As a consequence, one could conclude that Article 7(2) should not be extended to multistate 
delicts.638 
   
Besides, reference might be made to corresponding provisions of the Community trade mark 
Regulation, the Community designs Regulation (Article 83(2)) and the Litigation Protocol 
annexed to the Community Patent Convention (which has not entered into force) (Article 
17(2)).  
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Article 97 of the Community trade mark Regulation  
 
(…) 
(5) Proceedings in respect of the actions and claims referred to in Article 92, with the exception of 
actions for a declaration of non-infringement of a Community trade mark, may also be brought in the 
courts of the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed or threatened, or in 
which an act within the meaning of Article 9(3), second sentence, has been committed. 
 
 
Article 98 of the Community trade mark Regulation   
 
(…) 
(2) A Community trade mark court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 93(5) shall have jurisdiction 
only in respect of acts committed or threatened within the territory of the Member State in which that 
court is situated. 
 
 
In light of the fact that these provisions clarify that a court having jurisdiction on the basis of 
an act of infringement committed in the forum State has no jurisdiction concerning separate 
acts of infringement committed in other Member States, it could be concluded a fortiori that 
the same must apply in case that no unitary rights such as the Community trade mark or the 
(future) Community patent are concerned, but independent national rights that only have in 
common the European patent grant from which they originated.640 
 
Moreover, one might put forward that restricting the scope of authority to decide in territorial 
respect does not unduly impair the plaintiff, because the plaintiff can always institute parallel 
infringement proceedings before a court which has jurisdiction at the place of domicile of the 
defendant, according to Article 4(1).641 Furthermore, a positive effect of restricting the scope 
of authority to decide in territorial respect would be that forum shopping would be avoided.642 
 
One might also underline that a territorial restriction of the scope of authority to decide can be 
derived from the Shevill decision of the ECJ.643 Although, as illustrated above, the Shevill 
decision concerning rights of personality is not per se transferable to the constellation of the 
cross-border infringement of territorially restricted rights, the result must be relevant a fortiori 
to the cross-border infringement of patents (in the constellation of multistate delicts). If, as the 
ECJ held in Shevill, jurisdiction according to Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) at the place where the damage occurred is restricted in 
the case of a uniform right (such as the right of personality) where the damage occurs at 
multiple places due to the universal character of such a right, the same must go in the case of 
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multiple places of damage which do not ground on a uniform delict, but only on a common 
physical initial act like in the case of patent infringement.644    
 
 
2.2.4.2 Conception 2: The court has authority to decide also with regard to patents 
granted for other States than the forum State 
 
While the majority of legal commentators tend to allocate courts authority to decide merely 
with regard to patents granted for the forum State, the question remains whether such a 
restrictive view is always justified.   
 
The addressed reference to the provisions of the Community trade mark Regulation, the 
Community designs Regulation (Article 83(2)) and the Litigation Protocol annexed to the 
Community Patent Convention (which has not entered into force) (Article 17(2)), and the 
conclusion a fortiori that Article 7(2) does not confer authority to courts to decide on the 
infringement of patents which have been granted outside the forum State, are actually not 
convincing. European patents – in contrast to the Community trade mark, the Community 
design and the (future) European patent with unitary effect – lack the character of unitary 
rights which constitutes a fundamental difference. The national parts of European patents are 
independent from each other which effects that there is a priori no need to ensure a uniform 
treatment.645 In contrast, the cited Regulations and the Litigation Protocol annexed to the 
Community Patent Convention aim at establishing a uniform character of the concerned 
unitary rights,646 and are therefore based on different evaluations which cannot be transferred 
on Article 7(2).647 As a consequence of this fundamental difference between those unitary 
rights and European patents, the restriction of jurisdiction contained in the cited provisions 
cannot be transferred on the issue of jurisdiction according to Article 7(2). 
 
 
2.2.4.3 Effects of the so-called mosaic principle developed in the Shevill decision on the 
territorial scope of cognition of courts concerning cross-border patent infringement 
cases 
 
It has been illustrated above that the Shevill decision of the ECJ on the cross-border 
infringement of rights of personality is not transferable to the constellation of cross-border 
patent infringement cases, due to the nature of patents as rights which are only valid in a 
certain territory which constitutes a significant difference vis-à-vis rights of personality which 
are valid without any territorial restriction. However, it has also already been suggested that 
this result does not necessarily mean that the Shevill decision does not contain any findings 
which may be applicable in the framework of cross-border patent infringement cases. In the 
following, I shall thus deal with the issue whether certain findings of the ECJ in Shevill might 
be helpful for answering the question of whether the court before which patent infringement 
proceedings are brought may also decide on parallel patent infringements concerning patents 
granted for other States than the forum State, and, if so, in which way. In particular, I shall 
treat the so-called mosaic principle. 
 
In its Shevill decision, the ECJ, confirming its jurisprudence in Mines de Potasse that the 
place where the harmful event occurred in the sense of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
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Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) comprises both the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred, clearly 
differentiated between the scope of authority to decide at these places. As to the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage, the ECJ explicated: 
 
“In the case of a libel by a newspaper article distributed in several Contracting States, the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage, within the meaning of those judgments, can only be the place where the 
publisher of the newspaper in question is established, since that is the place where the harmful event 
originated and from which the libel was issued and put into circulation [underscore added].”648  
 
With regard to the scope of authority to decide at the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage, the ECJ held that courts at this place dispose of a wide scope of authority to decide: 
 
“The court of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established must therefore 
have jurisdiction to hear the action for damages for all the harm caused by the unlawful act [underscore 
added].”649 
 
As to the place where the damage occurred, 
 
“(…) the place where the event giving rise to the damage, entailing tortious, delictual or quasi-delictual 
liability, produced its harmful effects upon the victim”,650 
 
the ECJ explicated that   
 
“(i)n the case of an international libel through the press, the injury caused by a defamatory publication 
to the honour, reputation and good name of a natural or legal person occurs in the places where the 
publication is distributed, when the victim is known in those places”651 
 
and postulated that courts at this place are only competent to decide inasmuch as damage 
realised in their territory is affected (mosaic principle):   
 
“It follows that the courts of each Contracting State in which the defamatory publication was distributed 
and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury to his reputation have jurisdiction to rule on the 
injury caused in that State to the victim' s reputation.”652 
 
In order to reason that restriction of authority to decide at the place where the damage 
occurred vis-à-vis the place of the event giving rise to the damage, the ECJ explicitly referred 
to the requirement of the sound administration of justice: 
   
“In accordance with the requirement of the sound administration of justice, the basis of the rule of 
special jurisdiction in Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention], the courts of each Contracting State in 
which the defamatory publication was distributed and in which the victim claims to have suffered injury 
to his reputation are territorially the best placed to assess the libel committed in that State and to 
determine the extent of the corresponding damage [underscore and content in brackets added].”653  
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The so-called mosaic principle developed by the ECJ in Shevill is essentially based on the 
idea of a particularly close connection between the case which is brought before a court and 
this forum, respectively the intensity and scope of such connection. Besides, it has been 
emphasised that this principle also intends to avoid forum shopping, because the plaintiff’s 
possibilities to choose the place where to sue the defendant are restrained.654   
 
In light of this, the question arises in which respect these ideas, i.e. the considerations of a 
particularly close connection and the avoidance of forum shopping, are also relevant as to 
cases of cross-border patent infringements. This might lead to the result that certain 
evaluations as to the scope of authority to decide, developed in the Shevill decision, are 
applicable to those cases as well. 
 
 
2.2.4.3.1 Particularly close connection between the case (the infringement) and the 
forum 
 
In the following paragraphs, I shall analyse separately, regarding courts at the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage and courts at the place where the damage occurred, in how far 
there is a particularly close connection between the deciding court and parallel patent 
infringements, i.e. infringements concerning patents granted in, respectively for another State 
than the forum State. 
 
 
2.2.4.3.1.1 Place of the event giving rise to the damage   
 
As illustrated in detail above, it has on the one hand been put forth that a particularly close 
connection in the sense of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) between a patent infringement and an invoked 
court only exists in the protection State, because only there the patent can be infringed, and 
the law of this State is applied to the patent infringement. Others have affirmed the existence 
of a particularly close connection between an extraterritorial place of manufacture and the 
forum because patent infringement is caused at that place. However, as presented in detail 
above, a differentiation between product patents and process patents seems preferable. With 
regard to product patents, the mere fact of manufacture of an object does not establish such a 
particularly close connection that would be necessary to consider an extraterritorial place of 
manufacture as a place of the event giving rise to the damage in the sense of Article 7(2) 
concerning a patent infringement in the protection State. In contrast, concerning European 
process patents, manufacture forms part of the uniform tort of offering, bringing into 
circulation, using, importing or possessing a product if this product has been manufactured 
according to the protected process (cf. Article 64(2) of the EPC). 
 
 
2.2.4.3.1.2 Place where the damage occurred 
 
As concluded above, the place where the damage occurred according to Article 7(2) is 
necessarily localised at the place where the patent right has been infringed (“Ort der 
Rechtsgutverletzung”). Only at this place there is a particularly close connection between the 
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patent infringement and the forum whereas there is no such particularly close connection 
between a court and a parallel infringement of a foreign patent.655 
 
 
2.2.4.3.2 Avoidance of forum shopping 
 
If courts having jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) were given authority to decide on 
parallel patent infringements, plaintiffs would be widely encouraged to choose the forum 
which they consider best suited to decide according to their opinion, regardless of any 
proximity between the chosen court and the patent infringements on which to decide. 
Favouring the plaintiff overly in such a way would result in a windfall profit for the plaintiff 
and would deny, or at least neglect, the defendant’s legitimate interests.656 It is in this light 
that the mosaic principle as a structural element of Article 7(2) is to be understood, which 
constitutes an obstacle to excessive forum shopping which, due to its general character, 
should not be confined to cases concerning defamation, libel or slander (like in the 





At this point, it is to be stated that the considerations of a particularly close connection on the 
one hand, and the avoidance of forum shopping on the other hand, which are the underlying 
ideas of the Shevill decision are also relevant as to jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) in the 
framework of cross-border patent infringement proceedings. With regard to the idea of a 
particularly close connection, the place of manufacture can be an extraterritorial place of the 
event giving rise to the damage in the case of European process patents, if the infringing 
product has been manufactured according to the protected process. Additionally, it is to be 
underlined that both aspects are of general importance concerning actions for damages which 
militates for their general transferability also to cases of cross-border patent infringements.658 
  
 
2.2.4.4 Consequences for the territorial scope of authority to decide 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, I can draw the following conclusions:  
 
Although the Shevill decision of the ECJ is not applicable as such to the constellation of 
cross-border patent infringement proceedings, considerations made by the ECJ in this 
decision as to the territorial scope of authority to decide of the courts at the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and at the place where the damage occurred can be transferred to 
that constellation.  
 
With regard to the place of the event giving rise to the damage, those in favour of a wide 
interpretation of the term “place of the event giving rise to the damage” according to Article 
5(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), who are of the opinion that the place of manufacture generally suffices to 
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establish such a place of the event giving rise to the damage have – consistently – argued that 
a court at the place of manufacture can also decide on parallel infringements, i.e. also on 
infringements concerning patents granted for another State than the forum State, because all 
these infringements originate at the place of manufacture. According to this view, the acts of 
manufacture and bringing into circulation of the concerned products are actually part of the 
same uniform act.659 However, it has been shown above that this conception is not fully 
convincing, and that a differentiation between European product patents and process patents is 
preferable. For the reasons explicated above, only in the case of European process patents, a 
court at the place of manufacture should also be authorised to decide on the infringement of 
parallel patents granted in respectively for the territory of another State than the forum State, 
provided that the infringing product has been manufactured according to the protected 
process. Such authority to decide serves procedural economy, and the common issue of the 
uniform determination of the extent of protection of the patent (Article 69 of the EPC) can be 
decided by one court.  
 
As to the place where the damage occurred, i.e. the place where the patent right is being 
infringed, the invoked court has only authority to decide on this infringement whereas it does 
not have authority to decide on parallel infringements, i.e. infringements of patents granted 
in, respectively for another State than the forum State. This mosaic principle has been 
confirmed by the ECJ also with regard to infringements via the internet.660  
 
 
2.3 Extension of jurisdiction at the place of domicile of one of several (alleged) infringers 
due to close connection of the claims – Article 8(1) 
 
In the following paragraphs, I shall treat the question in which circumstances infringement 
actions against several (alleged) infringers can be consolidated at the place of domicile of one 
of the defendants. The relevant provision in the Brussels Ibis Regulation is Article 8(1) which 
reads as follows:661 
 
 
 Article 8 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
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 (1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of 
 them is domiciled provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and 




In contrast to Article 4(1), but in accordance with Article 7(2), Article 8(1) does not only 
concern the international jurisdiction, but also affects the local jurisdiction.662 Consequently, 
Article 8(1) is only applicable if one of the defendants has his domicile in the district of the 
invoked court.663  
 
 
2.3.1 Analogous application of Article 8(1) vis-à-vis third State defendants? 
 
Despite the clear wording of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its 
predecessors) which refers to “a person domiciled in a Member State”, a considerable part of 
legal doctrine has advocated anyway a conception according to which Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) should, by way of an analogy, be also 
applied vis-à-vis a co-defendant whose domicile is located in a non-Member State if at least 
one co-defendants is domiciled in a Member State. In this respect, proponents of this 
conception have argued that Article 8(1) should not be restricted, due to the fact that even the 
general place of jurisdiction of a defendant domiciled in a Member State is not protected 
against the applicability of Article 8(1). In light of this, it would appear unjustified to grant 
higher protection to a defendant having his domicile in a non-Member State,664 in that 
consolidation of actions according to Article 8(1) against defendants domiciled in a Member 
State would be possible to a higher degree than with regard to third State defendants.665   
 
Those who are against an analogous application of Article 8(1) vis-à-vis third State 
defendants have however underlined that there are actually no hints that the clear wording of 
Article 8(1)666 does not correspond to the European legislator's will when creating the 
provision.667 With regard to Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, the Jenard Report states, 
by merely referring to “Contracting States”, not mentioning third States: 
 
“It follows from the text of the [Brussels] Convention that, where there are several defendants 
domiciled in different Contracting States, the plaintiff can at his option sue them all in the courts for the 
place where any one of them is domiciled [underscore and content in brackets added].”668 
                                                 
662
 LG Düsseldorf 25 March 1999, 4 O 198/97, (1999)48(8-9) GRUR Int. 775, at p. 777 – Impfstoff II; 
Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 6 EuGVO, para. 2. 
663
 LG Düsseldorf 25 March 1999, 4 O 198/97, (1999)48(8-9) GRUR Int. 775, at p. 777 – Impfstoff II; Hye-
Knudsen 2005, p. 119. 
664
 Neuhaus (1996)87(9) Mitt. 257, at p. 265; Ebner 2004, p. 198; Hölder 2004, pp. 52-53; Hye-Knudsen 2005, 
p. 119; Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 6 EuGVO, para. 7; Gottwald 2013 (Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO), 
EuGVO Art. 6, para. 4; Wagner 2011 (Stein/Jonas – Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung), Art. 6 EuGVVO, 
para. 22. In favour of an extension of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) to defendants domiciled in a third State cf. also Corneloup & Althammer 2012 (unalex Kommentar), 
Art. 6 Brüssel I-VO, para. 22. 
665
 Auer 2014 (Geimer & Schütze, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr), Art. 6 VO (EG) No. 44/2001, para. 16. 
666
 Also stressing this aspect: Grolimund 2000, para. 459; Laubinger 2005, p. 63; Stadler 2012 (Musielak), 
Artikel 6 EuGVVO, para. 3. 
667
 Lüthi 2011, para. 76; others even do not discuss at all an eventual analogous application of Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis  Regulation (respectively its predecessors) vis-à-vis third State defendants, cf. Tritton 2008, para. 
14–030. 
668
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 26, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
 148 
Arguing against an analogous application of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation vis-à-
vis third State defendants, reference may be taken as well to Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation which provides: 
 
 
 Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
 
 (1) If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member 
 State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of 
 that Member State.  
 
   
Remarkably, Article 6(1) contains a special rule for third State defendants,669 according to 
which the provisions concerning jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation shall 
only be applicable exceptionally, namely where Article 18(1), Article 21(2), Article 24 or 
Article 25 are concerned. In all other cases, jurisdiction of Member States courts shall be 
determined by the respective national law of the Member State where the invoked court is 
situated. This is in line with Recital 14 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation reading as follows: 
 
 
 Recital 14 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 A defendant not domiciled in a Member State should in general be subject to the national rules of 
 jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of the court seised.  
 
 However, in order to ensure the protection of consumers and employees, to safeguard the jurisdiction of 
 the courts of the Member States in situations where they have exclusive jurisdiction and to respect the 
 autonomy of the parties, certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the 
 defendant’s domicile.  
 
 
This also corresponds to the following explications of the Jenard Report with regard to Article 
4 of the Brussels Convention (which corresponds to Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation):  
 
“Article 4 [of the Brussels Convention] applies to all proceedings in which the defendant is not 
domiciled in a Contracting State, and provides that the rules of internal law remain in force [content in 
brackets added].”670 
 
“The only exception to the application of the rules of jurisdiction of internal law is the field of exclusive 
jurisdiction (Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention]). The rules which grant exclusive jurisdiction to 
the courts of a State are applicable whatever the domicile of the defendant [content in brackets 
added].”671 
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It has been shown that the European legislator, when creating Article 4(1) of the Brussels 
Convention, actually intended to enable Contracting States to continue to apply, vis-à-vis 
third State defendants, exorbitant jurisdiction rules provided for in national law which would 
not apply any longer vis-à-vis defendants domiciled in Contracting States.672 In light of the 
foregoing, the better arguments therefore militated against an application of Article 8(1) vis-à-
vis third State defendants.673 
 
However, in Ellen Mirjam Sapir, the ECJ had the chance to resolve this controversial issue. In 
this case, the German Bundesgerichtshof expressly referred the following question (among 




 (3) Does Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 also apply to defendants not domiciled in the European 
 Union? (...)”674  
 
The ECJ (rightly) interpreted this question as to comprise  
 
 “(...) whether Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that it is intended 
 to apply to defendants who are not domiciled in a Member State in the case where they are sued in 
 proceedings brought against several defendants, some of whom are also persons domiciled in the 
 European Union.”675  
 
The ECJ denied this question, founding its decision on three arguments which have partly 
already been addressed above. First of all, the ECJ referred to the distinct text of Article 6(1) 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). The court held that 
 
 “(...) as far as concerns the persons to whom it applies, it is clear from the introductory part of Article 
 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 that it refers expressly to defendants in the European Union.”676 
 
Emphasising the exceptional character of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the ECJ further stressed that  
 
 “(...) it is settled case-law that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 lays down a special rule which 
 must be strictly interpreted and cannot be given an interpretation going beyond the cases expressly 
 envisaged by that regulation (...).”677 
 
Third, the ECJ referred to the provision of Article 4(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (which 
essentially corresponds to Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation)678, according to which 
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in case of a defendant domiciled in a third State, jurisdiction of the courts of each Member 
State shall in principle be determined by the national law of the forum State, whereas rules of 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), and prorogation of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 23 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) are also applicable vis-à-vis 
third State defendants. The ECJ made clear that, subject to the latter rules of exclusive 
jurisdiction and prorogation of jurisdiction, 
 
 “(...) Article 4(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 contains an express provision which governs exhaustively 
 the matter of persons domiciled outside the European Union (...) [underscore added].”679 
 
Apart from cases concerning exclusive jurisdiction or prorogation of jurisdiction, co-
defendants within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation/Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation must therefore be domiciled in another Member State.  
 
This result is confirmed by the fact that the European legislator did not change the respective 
text of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation when creating Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. As it is to be expected that the European legislator was well aware of the 
controversial discussion regarding an eventual analogous application of Article 6(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation to third State defendants, one should conclude that the European 
legislator intendedly decided against such an approach when leaving unattached the wording 
of the provision.680 In light of this, the argument that the European legislator, when creating 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, did not sufficiently consider the constellation of third 
State defendants,681 has become obsolete, because the European legislator again had the 
chance to correct his legislative decision when creating the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but did 
not do so. As a consequence, it is to be stressed that there is no unwanted legal gap which 
would justify an analogous application of Article 8(1) vis-à-vis third State defendants.682   
 
In Réunion Européenne, the ECJ had already clarified that Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (which corresponds to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) cannot be 
relied upon to add a defendant domiciled in a Member State to proceedings which have been 
brought against a defendant who is not domiciled in any Member State.683 Answering to a 
reference for a preliminary ruling submitted by the French Cour de Cassation, inter alia with 
regard to the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, the ECJ expressly held, 
underlining in first line the significance of the principle of legal certainty, that 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
678
 It is noteworthy that Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation has been enhanced insofar as it not only 
determines that the Regulation is applicable in matters of exclusive jurisdiction (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis 
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“(…) the objective of legal certainty pursued by the [Brussels] Convention would not be attained if the 
fact that a court in a Contracting State had accepted jurisdiction as regards one of the defendants not 
domiciled in a Contracting State made it possible to bring another defendant, domiciled in a Contracting 
State, before that same court in cases other than those envisaged by the [Brussels] Convention, thereby 
depriving him of the benefits of the protective rules laid down by it [underscore and content in brackets 
added].”684       
 
The difference between the constellations in Ellen Mirjam Sapir and Réunion Européenne 
consists in the inverse roles of the defendants: In Ellen Mirjam Sapir, the Member State 
defendant was the anchor defendant and the third State defendant was the co-defendant, while 
the third State defendant was the anchor defendant and the Member State defendant was the 
co-defendant in Réunion Européenne. 
 
Pursuant both to the text and to the meaning of Article 8(1), it is obvious that Article 8(1) 
cannot be the legal basis for suing a defendant domiciled in a Member State before the court 
of a third State, because the Brussels Ibis Regulation can only determine jurisdiction within 
the Member States.685  
 
 
2.3.2 Close connection 
 
The prerequisite of close connection contained in Article 8(1) (respectively Article 6(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation) has been expressly formulated when the former Brussels Convention 
was replaced by the Brussels I Regulation. However, it is generally accepted that the 
transformation into the Regulation did not effect any change as to the content of the previous 
rule, Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention. In its Kalfelis decision,686 the ECJ referred to 
the wording of Article 22(3) of the Brussels Convention (which corresponds to Article 30(3) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). According to the Tatry decision of the ECJ concerning 
Article 22(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 30(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the 
term “connection” must be interpreted in a broad sense.687  
 
As to patent infringement proceedings, several constellations may occur which could be 
subject to the application of Article 8(1).688 Generally speaking, it can be distinguished 
between the infringement, by multiple infringers, of the same patent right (Constellations 1 to 
3) and the infringement, by multiple infringers, of parallel patent rights (Constellations 4 to 
6). In order to determine the scope of application of Article 8(1), these constellations shall be 
subject to a separate analysis. In its famous (and highly controversial) Roche Nederland 
decision, the ECJ had the opportunity to decide on the (alleged) infringement of parallel 
European patents.689 The consequences of the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ shall be 
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subject to a separate closer analysis. In its subsequent Solvay decision,690 the ECJ modified 
(respectively limited) its jurisprudence given in Roche Nederland. In contrast to Roche 
Nederland, the Solvay decision was based on the constellation of (alleged) infringement, 
committed by several companies from different Member States, of the same national parts of 
European patents being in force in yet another Member State.  
 
As both the constellation of infringement of parallel patents, and the constellation of 
infringement of the same patent, have been subject to fierce discussion before the Roche 
Nederland decision (and the subsequent Solvay decision), they shall be discussed first in the 
following paragraphs. It will become obvious that in particular the Roche Nederland decision 
of the ECJ, rather than contributing to a definite clarification of Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) has actually 
even extended confusion how to interpret this provision in an adequate and reasonable way. In 
this respect, it is remarkable that the ECJ attenuated, in Solvay, its restrictive interpretation of 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) chosen 
in its Roche Nederland decision which has seen a lot of criticism in the literature due to its 
restrictive interpretation of the provision, although it has been criticised, on the other hand, 
that the approach chosen by the ECJ in Solvay is so liberal that the principles of legal certainty 
and predictability have not been sufficiently taken into consideration.691 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Multiple infringers infringing the same patent right 
 
 
2.3.2.1.1 Constellation 1: Infringers acting independently from each other 
 





E holds an English patent concerning a machine. This patent is infringed by a Dutch 
company (D), which sells a machine of identical manner in England (infringement 1). 
Independently from this infringement, E’s patent is also subject to infringement by a 




In this first constellation, it is obvious that, although the identical patent right is concerned, 
there is no inner link between the two infringements. Rights to be derived from infringement 
1 are independent from rights originating from infringement 2.692 As the infringers in this 
constellation act without influencing each other, and thus commit the infringements 
independently from one another, they are not liable for the infringements in a relationship of 
joint debtors.693 As a consequence, the claims lack such a close connection that would be 
required for Article 8(1) to be applicable.  
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2.3.2.1.2 Constellation 2: Infringers acting jointly 
 
The following case shall illustrate the scenario in question: 
 
 
 Case 2: 
 
E holds an English patent concerning a machine. This patent is infringed by a Dutch 
company (D), which sells a machine of identical manner in England (infringement 1). 
As to this business activity (distribution), D is supported by a German company (G) 
(infringement 2).  
 
 
In this constellation, D and G are liable for the patent infringements as joint debtors. In this 
respect it is to be mentioned that already the Jenard Report694 referred to the constellation of 
joint debtors as an example for the applicability of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) when stating: 
 
“In order for this rule to be applicable there must be a connection between the claims made against each 
of the defendants, as for example in the case of joint debtors.”695 
 
Correspondingly, most courts and legal doctrine have accepted that this constellation is 
covered by Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation).696 The required connection between the actions against D and G is 
based on their joint acting, i.e. on the outcome of their joint plans and organisation of their 
business. Given this, the risk, respectively the danger of irreconcilable judgments is to be 
avoided.697 Moreover, the defendants in the constellation in question do not have to be 
protected from being sued, via Article 8(1), before the courts of the State of domicile of 
another defendant, because the defendants voluntarily chose to collaborate as to the patent 
infringements. Consequently, they could take into consideration the possibility of being sued 
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2.3.2.1.3 Constellation 3: Chain of infringers 
 
Another scenario consists in the constellation that multiple infringers infringe the same patent 
right, but, in contrast to the first constellation, the infringements are connected with each other 
in the way of subsequent steps of infringing acts (chain of infringers). Contrary to 
constellation 2 (infringers acting jointly), infringers do not collaborate on the basis of a joint 
plan in constellation 3. Each infringer commits a complete infringement on his own.699   
 
The following case shall illustrate this constellation: 
 
 
 Case 3: 
 
 E holds an English patent concerning a machine. This patent is infringed by a Dutch 
company (D), which produces a machine that is identical with the machine being 
protected by E’s patent, and delivers the machine to the French company F 
(infringement 1). F sells it to the Portuguese company P (infringement 2). P uses the 
machine in his factory (infringement 3). 
 
 
As the Jenard Report explicitly considered joint debtors as an example for the applicability of 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the 
question of whether D, F and P are to be considered joint debtors shall be the initial point of 
further analysis. At least if this was the case, the application of Article 8(1) would appear 
justified.  
 
Two aspects should be taken into consideration in this respect. First, E’s rights against D, F 
and P are of the same nature (based on the patent right as intellectual property right), and they 
are linked with each other by way of an inner context. The multiple infringements are linked 
with each other in the way that a former infringement enables a later infringement to be 
realised, although each infringer commits a complete infringement in persona. A second 
aspect to be taken into consideration specifically concerns E’s right to claim damages on all 
economic steps of infringements, i.e. against D, F and P. However, it is evident that E cannot 
have the right to claim damages, once having successfully sued one of the infringers, against 
the other ones additionally, because he would then get more than pure compensation. In that 
light, it appears most convincing to treat D, F and P as joint debtors.700 Each defendant’s 
interest in being sued before the courts of his State of domicile is predominated by E’s interest 
to sue all defendants before one court via Article 8(1), because the infringers, acting in a chain 
of multiple infringers, must anticipate that they might be sued jointly in a situation of joint 
debtors.  
 
In the discussed sample case, E can therefore sue D, F and P for patent infringement. As the 
multiple infringements are linked with each other in the way that a former infringement 
enables a later infringement to be realised, the connection is close enough that Article 8(1) is 
applicable. Hence, D, F and P can be sued together in the Netherlands, in France and in 
Portugal, because these States are the States of domicile of one of the concerned defendants. 
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However, the question may be asked if the foregoing analysis is also valid for actions for 
injunction (“Unterlassungsklagen”). Usually, a debtor is only responsible for his own 
injunction. Thus there is no situation of joint debtors if multiple infringers are sued for 
injunction. For this reason, Article 8(1) should be considered not applicable in this 
situation.701 In contrast, Article 8(1) should be fully applicable in case that actions for 
damages and for injunction are combined with each other, because both actions are factually 
connected. Moreover, pieces of evidence could then be used in both cases immediately, 
proving the procedural connection between the actions. Consequently, it also corresponds to 
the interests of the defendants to be sued before the same court with regard to both actions, 
because this procedure saves energy, time and money.  
 
Admittedly, the ECJ stated in its Kalfelis decision that  
 
“(...) it must be observed, as already indicated above, that the “special jurisdictions” enumerated in 
Articles 5 and 6 of the [Brussels] Convention constitute derogations from the principle that jurisdiction 
is vested in the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled and as such must be interpreted 
restrictively [content in brackets added].”702 
 
However, in the situation in question, a derogation from the general principle of Article 4(1) 
(rule of forum defensoris/actor sequitur forum rei principle) appears justified because the 
concerned defendant himself benefits from this solution.703 In addition, it must be taken into 
account that contradictory decisions can be avoided by bringing both actions for damages and 
for injunction before the same court, this method being considerably easier than leaving to the 
courts to coordinate their decisions if courts of different Member States are involved, in 
accordance with Article 30(1), which rules: 
 
“Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised may stay its proceedings.” 
 
Finally, with regard to the question of whether there is a constellation of joint debtors, it is to 
be underlined that in the case of several chains of infringers, acting independently from each 
other, each chain of infringers must be treated separately. Hence, the question of whether 




2.3.2.2 Multiple infringers infringing parallel patent rights 
 
In light of the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ in 2006, concerning the infringement of 
several parts of a European patent by multiple infringers, I shall now proceed to the analysis 
in which constellations Article 8(1) is applicable in cases of parallel patent infringements.  
 
For an adequate embedding of the Roche Nederland decision into the existing context, the 
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2.3.2.2.1 Constellation 4: Infringers acting independently from each other by different 
acts and different modes of use  
 
It has never been severely doubted that there is no close connection in the sense of Article 
6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) where multiple infringers commit infringements as to parallel patents which 
might be de facto identical, but are undertaken by different modes of use.705 This constellation 
shall be illustrated by Case 4. 
 
 
 Case 4: 
 
E holds an English patent for a machine. This patent is infringed by an English 
producer (EP) (infringement 1). E also holds a Dutch patent for a machine which 
corresponds to the English patent (a parallel national patent or a European patent with 
the same content). This patent is infringed by a Dutch dealer (D) (infringement 2). 
 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Constellation 5: Infringers acting independently from each other by different 
acts, while the same product is concerned  
 





E holds an English patent for a machine. This patent is infringed by an English 
producer (EP) (infringement 1). E also holds a Dutch patent for a machine which 
corresponds to the English patent (a parallel national patent or a European patent with 
the same content). This patent is infringed by a Dutch dealer (D) who sells the 
products of EP (infringement 2). 
 
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that there is such a close connection between E’s claims 
against EP and D that Article 8(1) is applicable, because the same product is concerned, and 
the use of this product infringes the different patents. This would affect uniform facts.706 As a 
consequence, the English court, respectively the Dutch court could decide on both 
infringements. 
 
However, it is to be emphasised that the claims against the infringers stem from different 
rights, namely from parallel national patent rights or from different parts of a European patent 
which consists in a bundle of national patents.707 Once a European patent has been granted, its 
national parts exist independently from each other, meaning that the different national parts of 
a European patent can be subject to different developments and may have different fates.708 
As a consequence, claims in this situation lack such a close connection as required by Article 
8(1), because the defendants have – both concerning parallel national patents and national 
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parts of a European bundle patent – infringed different patents which are not interrelated. 
Article 2(2) of the European Patent Convention states: 
 
“The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is granted, have the effect of 
and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that State, unless this Convention 
provides otherwise.” 
 
As the European patent shall have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a 
national patent, it can be derived that a European patent, once having been granted, must not 
necessarily have the same legal fate with regard to all States for which the patent has been 
granted. Accordingly, Article 64(1) of the European Patent Convention states: 
 
“A European patent shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor from the date 
on which the mention of its grant is published in the European Patent Bulletin, in each Contracting State 
in respect of which it is granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in 
that State.” 
 
Thus synchronising the effects of European patents and pure national patents, it is logical that 
the question of which law is applicable is solved in a parallel way in Article 64(3) of the 
European Patent Convention: 
 
“Any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by national law.” 
 
In the absence of further connecting circumstances, claims due to infringements of different 
parts of a European patent concerning the same object of infringement therefore lack such a 
close connection as required by Article 8(1).709 
 
 
2.3.2.2.3 Constellation 6: Infringers acting by identical modes of use, while different 
patents are concerned 
 
This constellation may be illustrated by the following case: 
 
 
 Case 6: 
 
A holds a European patent being valid for the territory of England, France and the 
Netherlands. E, having his domicile in England, manufactures products which infringe 
A’s patent, and delivers these products to F, N and S, having their domiciles in France, 
in the Netherlands and in Spain. F, N and S sell the products to customers in their 
States of domicile.  
 
Could A sue E, F, N and S in the Netherlands as N’s State of domicile? 
 
 
At first glance, it becomes obvious that this constellation, too, is characterised by the 
phenomenon of chains of infringers. However, in contrast to the first constellation, there are 
several chains of infringers, namely: E – F – F’s customers; E – N – N’s customers; E – S – 
S’s customers. 
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Consequently, the question arises whether the infringements committed by F, N and S are 
connected in such a close way that Article 8(1) should be applicable. In 1997, the English 
High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) decided that the infringers (in casu several 
companies belonging to the same group) of a European patent granted for several Contracting 
States, by the identical mode of use, could be sued jointly via Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).710 The court considered it sufficient 
that the claims in question were based on parallel patent rights and on the identical mode of 
use, without another link between the parties being necessary for jurisdiction according to 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).711  
 
However, in a later decision, the English High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) denied 
the applicability of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) in the constellation in question, referring to the legal independence of national 
patents, emphasising the lack of contrary decisions when different courts have to decide.712 
This decision was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal.713 The court stressed that the 
European patent consists in a bundle of national patents and that the scope of each national 
part is limited to the territory of the State of registration. Due to the possibility of subsequent 
limitation of the scope of these parts – independently from each other – there would be no risk 
of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings, because a judgment on the 
infringement in one protection State would be based on the applicable national law, having 
effect only in that State.714 
 
Dutch courts originally tended to adopt a rather liberal attitude towards the applicability of 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation).715 However, the Gerechtshof s’-Gravenhage underlined the nature of a 
European patent as a bundle of several national patents, and also emphasised the legal 
independence of such patents as soon as having been granted. Moreover, the court pointed out 
that Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to 
be considered as an exception from the basic rule of Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). In the decided case, the defendants’ interest in 
being sued separately before courts in their respective States of domicile was evaluated higher 
than the plaintiff's interest in connecting the proceedings.716 
 
Accordingly, legal doctrine has mostly agreed with the latter opinion, emphasising the legal 
autonomy of patent rights which also goes for European patents717, and has therefore 
concluded that the infringements of parallel patent rights by an identical mode of use, while 
the objects of infringement are different, do not create a connection which is close enough to 
                                                 
710
 High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 26 March 1997, Coin Controls Limited v Suzo International 
(U.K.) Limited and Others, [1997] F.S.R. 660, 672 – Coin Controls. 
711
 Affirmatively: Franzosi & Tilman (2005)96(2) Mitt. 55, at p. 57 concerning the infringement of a European 
patent. 
712
 High Court of Justice 14 and 16 October 1997, and Court of Appeal 27 October 1997, Fort Dodge Animal 
Health Limited and Others v AKZO Nobel N.V. and Another, [1998] F.S.R. 222, 236 – Fort Dodge. 
713
 High Court of Justice 14 and 16 October 1997, and Court of Appeal 27 October 1997, Fort Dodge Animal 
Health Limited and Others v AKZO Nobel N.V. and Another, [1998] F.S.R. 222, 237 et seq. – Fort Dodge. 
714
 High Court of Justice 14 and 16 October 1997, and Court of Appeal 27 October 1997, Fort Dodge Animal 
Health Limited and Others v AKZO Nobel N.V. and Another, [1998] F.S.R. 222, 243 – Fort Dodge. 
715
 Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 123 with further references; cf. concerning Dutch case-law also Brinkhof (1997)46(6) 
GRUR Int. 489, at p. 492. 
716
 Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage 23 April 1998, Expandable Grafts Partnership and Others v Boston Scientific 
B.V. and Others, [1999] F.S.R. 352 – Expandable Grafts Partnership II.  
717
 Grabinski (1998)100(11) GRUR 857, at p. 865. 
 159 
justify joint jurisdiction via Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).718 
 
In its Kalfelis decision, the ECJ stated:  
 
“(...) The principle laid down in the [Brussels] Convention is that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of 
the State of the defendant's domicile and that the jurisdiction provided for in Article 6(1) is an exception 
to that principle. It follows that an exception of that kind must be treated in such a manner that there is 
no possibility of the very existence of that principle being called in question [underscore and content in 
brackets added].”719 
 
On the basis of this decision of the ECJ, it is to be underlined that the principle according to 
which persons domiciled in a Member State, whatever be their nationality, shall be sued in the 
courts of that Member State, may be abandoned only in exceptional cases. Besides this aspect 
– the protection of the defendant – a generous application of Article 8(1) would promote 
extensive forum shopping. Additionally, one should bear in mind that the ECJ has constantly 
emphasised that the principle of legal certainty is to be ensured. To give an example, the ECJ 
held (again) in Marcello Costa and Ugo Cifone: 
 
“The principle of legal certainty requires, moreover, that rules of law be clear, precise and predictable as 
regards their effects, in particular where they may have unfavourable consequences for individuals and 
undertakings (…).”720 
 
In so far, one should take into consideration that legal certainty also includes the predictability 
of jurisdiction, which can be guaranteed to a higher extent when exceptions from legal 
principles, as the principle founded in Article 4(1), are interpreted in a cautious, restrictive 
way, which can be achieved by the spider-in-the-web rule which shall be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
As a consequence, for Article 8(1) to be applicable, further connecting factors must exist. 
 
The Gerechtshof s’Gravenhage decided in Expandable Grafts v. Boston Scientific721 that 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is only 
applicable in the case that all defendant companies belong to the same group and have jointly 
committed the patent infringement, whereas, for the ground of legal certainty, only the courts 
of that State would have jurisdiction where the principal office which steers the companies’ 
activities has its seat (spider-in-the-web theory). The court in particular referred to the 
assumption of a common plan in this constellation. Although this construction, which has 
been treated controversially both by legal commentators and courts, was finally rejected by 
the ECJ in its Roche Nederland decision in 2006, it shall shortly be illustrated in order to fully 
comprehend the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ, its impact and its importance. An 
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analysis of the spider-in-the-web theory shall also deliver instructive insights how the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation could (should) be amended in the future.722 
 
In particular, Dutch courts have been confronted with cases where the principal company was 
not situated in an EU Member State. Thus the question arose whether the spider-in-the-web 
theory would be also applicable to these cases.  
 
The Rechtbank s’Gravenhage denied this question in Baxter International Inc. v. Pharmacia 
& Upjohn AB et al., where the principal seat was situated in the United States of America.723 
Interestingly, the Rechtbank s’Gravenhage decided contrarily in Augustine Medical Inc. v 
Mallinckrodt Medical BV and Others .724 The court decided in the same way in Genetics 
Institute Inc. et al. v. Baxter International Inc.,725 where it stated explicitly that the spider-in-
the-web criterion does not apply where the principal seat would be situated in a non-Member 
State because of the plaintiff’s need for justice which would require a European judge. In 
G.D. Searle & Co. and the Monsanto Company v. Merck Sharp & Dome B.V. et al., the 
Rechtbank s’Gravenhage held that, due to the fact that the plaintiff was not able to recognise 
the steering structure of the group of defendant companies, the latter could also be sued before 
the courts of every State where one of the defendant companies had its seat.726 It is noticeable 
that after a certain initial reluctance of Dutch courts as to the applicability of the spider-in-the-
web rule, they have rather continuously followed it.727 
 
It has been put forth in literature that the spider-in-the-web construction, despite its – at least 
in the European point of view – negative consequence for proceedings when the principal 
defendant is domiciled in a non-Member State, must be accepted, due to the territorial 
limitation of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation) and 
due to the lack of alternatives (if the plaintiff shall not be granted an unlimited right to choose 
the place of jurisdiction). But this would mean that only the identity of the intellectual 
property right and the object of infringement would be decisive for Article 8(1) to be 
applicable, which would not be justified for the reasons described above.728  
 
However, this point of view has also been contested. First of all, it has been criticised that 
there is no legal foundation – neither in Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) nor in another provision of the 
Regulation – for the restricting spider-in-the-web construction.729 Moreover, it has been put 
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forth that neither the schematic structure of this rule nor its history provide a sufficient basis 
for it.730 Additionally, it might be argued that the restriction of Article 8(1) by the spider-in-
the-web theory constitutes a rule which is definitely not in favour of European companies, 
because multinational groups of companies often have their principal seats in the United 
States of America. On the other hand, it has also been underlined that a plaintiff may often 
simply be incapable to find out which of several joint companies steers all other companies’ 
activities in respect of the common plan of patent infringement.731 For it is not certain that it is 
always the principal company which has organised the infringement. 
 
 
2.3.3 The Roche Nederland case of the ECJ 
 
 
2.3.3.1 The Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ 
 
After years of differing judgments in Europe and numerous comments in legal doctrine, the 
ECJ finally decided in Roche Nederland against the possibility to join claims against affiliated 
companies for coordinated infringement of European bundle patents before the courts in the 
State where the principal office which steers the companies’ activities has its seat.732  
 
The underlying facts in this case were as follows: Two American citizens, Frederick Primus 
and Milton Goldenberg, owned the European patent No 131 627, concerning specific CEA-
family antigens and antibodies, and their methods of use, being valid in ten EPC Contracting 
States. Primus and Goldenberg claimed that the patent was infringed by Roche Nederland BV 
and members of the Roche Group, having their seats in eight different countries (the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, France, Austria, Switzerland and 
Sweden). The defendants were jointly sued before the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage. They 
contested jurisdiction of that court, denied infringement and contested the validity of the 
patent. Both the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage in first instance and the Gerechtshof ‘s-
Gravenhage in second instance attested that Dutch courts would have jurisdiction as to all 
defendants and all patent infringements undertaken in their countries of domicile. However, 
they arrived at different conclusions as to the question of whether the reproach of 
infringement was justified which was affirmed by the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage. Finally, 
the case was brought before the Dutch Hoge Raad. This court decided to stay the proceedings 
and referred two questions to the ECJ in order to clarify the conditions under which claims 
concerning infringements of European patents may be joined before one court. 
 
The following questions were referred for a preliminary ruling: 
  
 “(1) Is there a connection, as required for the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, 
 between a patent infringement action brought by a holder of a European patent against a defendant 
 having its registered office in the State of the court in which the proceedings are brought, on the one 
 hand, and against various defendants having their registered offices in Contracting States other than that 
 of the State of the court in which the proceedings are brought, on the other hand, who, according to the 
 patent holder, are infringing that patent in one or more other Contracting States? 
 
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is not or not unreservedly in the affirmative, in what circumstances is 
such a connection deemed to exist, and is it relevant in this context whether, for example, 
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–       the defendants form part of one and the same group of companies? 
 
–     the defendants are acting together on the basis of a common policy, and if so is the place from 
which that policy originates relevant? 
 
–       the alleged infringing acts of the various defendants are the same or virtually the same?”733 
  
In his Opinion from 8 December 2005, Advocate General Léger carefully explained that the 
decisive criterion in Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), the intent to avoid “irreconcilable judgments”, requires a stricter interpretation 
than with regard to the same term in the context of Article 22(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 30(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).734 Therefore, the Advocate General drew the 
conclusion that a risk for irreconcilable judgments does not exist in the constellation in 
question, because European patents, once having been granted, exist independently from each 
other. As to the objection that the scope of bundle patents is to be determined by the protocol 
governing the interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention, the Advocate 
General stressed that the protocol merely regulates how the content of the patent should be 
defined, distinguishing this issue from the legal scope of patent protection. The Advocate 
General finally pointed out that a legal situation where claims could be connected according 
to the spider-in-the-web rule, would lead to a severe jeopardy of legal certainty which 
represents a high goal of the Brussels Convention (respectively its successors).735 In its 
judgment, the ECJ followed the Advocate General’s Opinion that  
 
“(...) in order that decisions may be regarded as contradictory it is not sufficient that there be a 
divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that divergence must also arise in the context of the same 
situation of law and fact.”736  
 
As to the aspect of the same factual situation, the court then argued that  
 
“(...) the existence of the same situation of fact cannot be inferred (in the case of European patent 
infringement proceedings involving a number of companies established in various Contracting States in 
respect of acts committed in one or more of these States), since the defendants are different and the 
infringements they are accused of, committed in different Contracting States, are not the same.”737 
 
With regard to the requirement of the same legal situation, the court continued by referring to 
Articles 2(2), 64(1) and 64(3) of the European Patent Convention: 
 
“Furthermore, although the Munich Convention lays down common rules on the grant of European 
patents, it is clear from Articles 2(2) and 64(1) of that convention that such a patent continues to be 
governed by the national law of each of the Contracting States for which it has been granted. 
 
In particular, it is apparent from Article 64(3) of the Munich Convention that any action for 
infringement of a European patent must be examined in the light of the relevant national law in force in 
each of the States for which it has been granted. 
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It follows that, where infringement proceedings are brought before a number of courts in different 
Contracting States in respect of a European patent granted in each of those States, against defendants 
domiciled in those States in respect of acts allegedly committed in their territory, any divergences 
between the decisions given by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of the same legal 
situation.”738 
 
Unlike the Advocate General’s reasoning, the ECJ even explicitly declared that  
 
“(...) even if the broadest interpretation of “irreconcilable” judgments, in the sense of contradictory, 
were accepted as the criterion for the existence of the connection required for the application of Article 
6(1) [of the Brussels Convention], it is clear that such a connection could not be established between 
actions for infringement of the same European patent where each action was brought against a company 
established in a different Contracting State in respect of acts which it had committed in that State 
[content in brackets added].”739 
 
According to the ECJ, this result is considered to be the same even in a constellation where 
defendant companies belonging to the same group have acted in an identical or similar 
manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of those companies (spider-
in-the-web constellation). Although in this constellation the factual situation would be the 
same, the legal situation would differ. Consequently, there would be no risk of contradictory 
decisions.740 Besides, the ECJ stressed that consolidating such actions before one court would 
ultimately create a source of risks, because it would effect a multiplication of potential heads 
of jurisdiction with the consequence that the principle of legal certainty, which is of 
fundamental importance under the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors)741 
would be undermined, the damage being even more serious if the defendant had a wide 
choice, which would encourage the practice of forum shopping which the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (and its predecessors) seek(s) to avoid and which the ECJ, in its Kalfelis 
decision742, specifically sought to prevent.743 Moreover, in Roche Nederland, the ECJ 
expressed its reluctance towards a broad application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) insofar as the ECJ underlined that 
the court seised would have to adjudicate on the substance of the case before it could establish 
its jurisdiction, such a preliminary examination eventually producing additional costs and 
prolonging procedural time-limits, while it might happen that jurisdiction finally has to be 
declined.744 The ECJ pointed out that even on the basis of a broader interpretation of Article 
6(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the 
consolidation of the patent infringement actions before one court could not prevent at least a 
partial fragmentation of the patent proceedings, if the issue of validity is brought up in the 
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proceedings regarding the foreign patent with the consequence that all other courts than the 
courts of the State of registration lack jurisdiction.745   
 
 
2.3.3.2 Consequences of the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ and the (attenuating) 
effect/impact of the Solvay decision of the ECJ 
 
Against the background of the fierce dispute before courts and in legal doctrine with regard to 
the scope of application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the question arises which conclusions can and 
must be drawn from the decision of the ECJ in the Roche Nederland case. After the Roche 
Nederland decision, it was feared that consolidation of proceedings in multiple defendant 
situations had become totally impossible with regard to cross-border infringement actions 
concerning national patents and European patents,746 even if companies belong to the same 
group and have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy 
determined by one of those companies.747 Following the argumentation of the ECJ in its 
Roche Nederland decision, by reference to the requirement of the same factual and legal 
situation, it was considered that this not only concerned the national parts of a European 
patent, but also concerned pure national patents, because for the latter the existence of the 
same legal situation is even less probable, because they have not been harmonised 
comparably to European patents by the European Patent Convention.748  
 
Remarkably, the ECJ however attenuated its restrictive jurisprudence developed in Roche 
Nederland in its subsequent Solvay decision which underlines that constellations are still 
conceivable in which consolidation according to Article 8(1) is possible. In Solvay, the 
Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage referred inter alia the following question regarding Article 6(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling: 
 
 “(1) In a situation where two or more companies from different States, in proceedings pending before a 
 court of one of those Member States, are each separately accused of committing an infringement of the 
 same national part of a European patent which is in force in yet another Member State by virtue of their 
 performance of reserved actions with regard to the same product, does the possibility arise of 
 'irreconcilable judgments' resulting from separate proceedings as referred to in Article 6(1) of 
 Regulation No 44/2001 [underscores added]?”749 
 
By reference to its Roche Nederland decision and confirming and further developing the 
criteria for consolidation set up in that decision (risk of irreconcilable judgments due to the 
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existence of the same situation of fact and the same situation of law),750 the ECJ held in its 
Solvay decision that 
 
 “(...) Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that a situation where two 
 or more companies from different Member States, in proceedings pending before a court of one of those 
 Member States, are each separately accused of committing an infringement of the same national part of 
 a European patent which is in force in yet another Member State by virtue of their performance of 
 reserved actions with regard to the same product, is capable of leading to ‘irreconcilable judgments’ 
 resulting from separate proceedings as referred to in that provision. It is for the referring court to assess 
 whether such a risk exists, taking into account all the relevant information in the file [underscores 
 added].”751  
 
In contrast to the constellation in Roche Nederland, where the defendants were sued for 
allegedly infringing the respective national part of a European patent being granted for the 
territory of their State of domicile, it is noteworthy that in the Solvay case, the defendants did 
not deliver the same product in the State where their seat was located, but in common third 
States.752 The case thus concerned the alleged infringement of several foreign parts of a 
European patent. As the products delivered in the third States were identical, the allegedly 
infringing actings were identical as well. If both actions would be dealt with separately at the 
respective place of domicile of the defendants, two courts would have to decide on the same 
foreign facts on the basis of the same foreign legal system.753   
 
Despite certain deficiencies and uncertainties with regard to the reasoning of the ECJ in its 
Solvay decision,754 it can be assumed that regarding the infringement of European patents 
through the same product in the same States by several companies having their seat in 
different States, there is the same situation of fact and of law, which may lead to 
irreconcilable judgments if several courts render a decision. As a consequence, Article 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation principally applies in this constellation.755 Problematically, the 
reasoning of the ECJ why it considered that there was the same situation of fact and of law in 
the concrete constellation raises new questions. So, the ECJ held: 
 
“It follows from the specific features of a case such as that in the main proceedings that potential 
 divergences in the outcome of the proceedings are likely to arise in the same situation of fact and law, 
so that it is possible that they will culminate in irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
 proceedings.”756 
 
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not clarify what such “specific features of a case” may be. The 
court merely explicated that, 
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 “(...) were Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 not applicable, two courts would each have to 
 examine the alleged infringements in the light of the different national legislation governing the various 
 national parts of the European patent alleged to have been infringed (...).”757 
 
In this respect, it is however to be underlined that only the courts of the Member State where 
the defendant is domiciled have jurisdiction to assess the alleged infringement of foreign parts 
of a European patent, according to Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.758 With regard to 
the assessment of whether there is a sufficient close connection to justify a consolidation of 
proceedings according to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the ECJ stated that 
 
 “(...) it is for the national court to take into account, inter alia, the dual fact that, first, the defendants in 
 the main proceeding are each separately accused of committing the same infringements with respect to 
 the same products and, secondly, such infringements were committed in the same Member States, so 
 that they adversely affect national parts of the European patent at issue.”759  
  
In this respect, it has rightly been criticised that it is not clear whether the mentioned “dual 
fact” refers to the same situation of fact, to the same situation of law or eventually to both 
aspects.760  
 
According to the Solvay decision of the ECJ, the mere fact that two companies incidentally 
deliver identical products to a foreign market and thereby commit patent infringements, would 
suffice to consolidate proceedings according to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
because there would be the same situation of fact and of law. Curiously, proceedings against 
several subsidiary companies which each distribute infringing products merely in the State 
where they have their respective seats, could not be consolidated pursuant to Article 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, while proceedings against companies acting fully independently 
of each other which deliver identical products to the same foreign State could be consolidated 
before the courts of the States of their respective seats on the basis of Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.761 Such a broad application of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation seems unjustified in light of the principle of legal certainty and the principle of 
predictability of the rules of jurisdiction being inherent to the Brussels Ibis Regulation and 
also contained in Recital 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation762 in cases where patent 
infringements committed by several defendants through identical products appear without 
mutual knowledge of the defendants.763 Although Recital 16 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation764 
                                                 
757
 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, para. 28, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> 
– Solvay. 
758
 Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at p. 1112; Kühnen 2012, para. 763. 
759
 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, para. 29, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> 
– Solvay. 
760
 Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at p. 1112. 
761
 Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at pp. 1112-1113. 
762
 Recital 15 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: “The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable 
and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile. Jurisdiction should 
always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the 
dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor. The domicile of a legal person must 
be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.” 
763
 Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at p. 1112. 
764 Recital 16 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: “In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be 
alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or in order to 
facilitate the sound administration of justice. The existence of a close connection should ensure legal certainty 
and avoid the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not reasonably 
have foreseen. This is important, particularly in disputes concerning non-contractual obligations arising out of 
violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.” 
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states that alternative grounds of jurisdiction besides jurisdiction at the defendant's domicile 
should be provided for by the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and Recital 21 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation765 demands to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure 
that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in different Member States, which might serve 
as an argument for a broad interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is 
to be emphasised that these aspects cannot set aside the fundamental requirement of 
predictability of rules of jurisdiction.766 Therefore, it has been put forth in legal doctrine that 
consolidating actions on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should 
require a subjective element, which may consist in the fact that the defendants had mutual 
knowledge of their actings,767 or acted as co-perpetrators (“Mittäter”).768  
 
Beyond the constellation considered by the ECJ in Solvay, some further constellations are and 
remain conceivable where consolidation of actions against several infringers with regard to 
cross-border patent infringements can be based on Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. These constellations shall be treated in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
2.3.3.2.1 Joint acting 
 
This constellation can be illustrated by the following sample case: 
 
E holds a European patent for a specific machine, granted for the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Germany. The infringers G, domiciled in Germany, and B, having his 
domicile in Belgium, jointly produce a machine that corresponds to the machine for 
which E holds his patent. 
 
Can E sue both G and B in Germany or in Belgium?  
 
When the ECJ tried to restrict the scope of application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in Roche Nederland, its decision 
was based on the constellation that parallel patent rights were infringed by multiple 
infringers. However, the criteria considering the applicability of Article 8(1) developed by the 
ECJ in this context (the same situation of law and fact) do not affect the constellation where 
multiple persons jointly infringe the same patent right. It is evident that where the same patent 
is concerned through the infringement committed by the same persons who collaborate with 
each other, i.e. where there is a singular identical factual act, both the factual and the legal 







                                                 
765
 Recital 21 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: “In the interests of the harmonious administration of 
justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable 
judgments will not be given in different Member States. There should be a clear and effective mechanism for 
resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions, and for obviating problems flowing from national differences 
as to the determination of the time when a case is regarded as pending. For the purposes of this Regulation, that 
time should be defined autonomously.” 
766
 Similar: Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at p. 1113. 
767
 Schacht (2012)114(11) GRUR 1110, at p. 1113. 
768
 Kühnen 2012, para. 775. 
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2.3.3.2.2 Chain of infringers 
 
Likewise, the constellation of multiple infringers infringing the same patent right 
subsequently (chain of infringers) is not affected by the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ, 
because this decision explicitly referred to parallel patents, i.e. patents not being identical. 
 
 
2.3.3.2.3 Chain of infringers in the case of a European patent with unitary effect 
 
Furthermore, Article 8(1) could be applicable in the case of the infringement of a (future) 
European patent with unitary effect by multiple infringers subsequently committing 
infringements of the same European patent with unitary effect (chain of infringers). The 
outcome of this problem could represent a decisive argument for (or against) such a European 
patent with unitary effect. 
 
Notwithstanding the special nature of such a European patent with unitary effect, the crucial 
question is whether the same situation of fact exists with regard to all infringing acts. In this 
respect one might argue that the ECJ founded, in its Roche Nederland decision, the non-
existence of identical acts of infringement on the fact that the multiple infringers acted in 
different States.769 However, such an argumentation would disregard the fact that the Roche 
Nederland decision expressly concerns the infringement of an ordinary European patent (i.e. 
without unitary effect) and might therefore not be fully transferable to the situation of a 
European patent with unitary effect which differs from an ordinary European Patent insofar as 
it constitutes a unitary right for all the Member States and not only a bundle of national 
patents. Correspondingly, the German Bundesgerichtshof decided in a case after the Roche 
Nederland decision of the ECJ that Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is applicable in the case of a Community trade mark being 
infringed by multiple infringers acting as a chain of infringers.770 Likewise, legal doctrine has 
generally advocated the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in the constellation in question.771  
 
Contrary to that conception, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage denied the existence of the same 
situation of fact in a case of the infringement of a Community trade mark by multiple 
infringers, acting in different countries.772 Referring to the Roche Nederland decision of the 
ECJ, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage underlined that such an identical legal situation can exist 
in the case of a spider-in-the-web constellation, i.e. a situation where multiple companies 
belonging to the same group have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a 
common policy elaborated by one of them. The court stated: 
 
“(...) Er is evenwel geen sprake van eenzelfde feitelijke situatie. Dit kan anders zijn in het geval waarin 
de verwerende vennootschappen tot hetzelfde concern behoren en op dezelfde of nagenoeg dezelfde 
wijze hebben gehandeld in overeenstemming met een gemeenschappelijk beleidsplan dat is uitgegaan 
van slechts een van hen(…).”773  
                                                 
769
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, para. 33 – Roche Nederland. 
770
 BGH 14 December 2006, I ZR 11/04, (2007)56(10) GRUR Int. 864, at p. 866, paras. 14-19 – Aufarbeitung 
von Fahrzeugkomponenten; cf. Norrgård 2009, p. 223; cf. Corneloup & Althammer 2012 (unalex Kommentar), 
Art. 6 Brüssel I-VO, para. 33. 
771
 Knaak (2007)56(5) GRUR Int. 386, at p. 391. 
772
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 23 August 2007, Bacardi & Company Limited v Food Brokers B.V. and Others, 
available at WWW <http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/natcourt/Bacardi-Bat_Beverage.pdf> – Bacardi. 
773
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 23 August 2007, Bacardi & Company Limited v Food Brokers B.V. and Others, 
available at WWW <http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/natcourt/Bacardi-Bat_Beverage.pdf>, para. 13 – Bacardi. 
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(“... However, there is not the same situation of fact. This can be different in the case where the 
defendant companies belong to the same group, and acted in an identical or almost identical manner in 
accordance with a common policy emanating from one of them (…).”)774 
 
In this respect, it is to be emphasised that the Dutch court did not consider the spider-in-the-
web constellation a conditio sine qua non for the existence of the same situation of fact, but 
comprehensively understood this situation to be a non-exclusive assumption for the same 
factual situation being existent.775 
 
However, as has rightly been criticised,776 it is true that also concerning Community 
intellectual property rights such as the Community trade mark or the future European patent 
with unitary effect, the existence of the same legal situation is not self-evident, which has 
been ignored by courts777 as well as by legal doctrine.778 In fact, the existing Regulations 
concerning Community intellectual property rights (the Community trade mark Regulation 
and the Community designs Regulation), and also the Rome II Regulation provide that for all 
matters which are not covered in these Regulations, the law of the Member State shall be 
applicable where the infringement has been committed. 
 
In this respect, Article 101(2) of the Community trade mark Regulation779 provides: 
 
“On all matters not covered by this Regulation a Community trade mark court shall apply its national 
law, including its private international law.” 
 
And Article 102(2) of the Community trade mark Regulation780 adds: 
 
“In all other respects the Community trade mark court shall apply the law of the Member State in which 
the acts of infringement or threatened infringement were committed, including the private international 
law.” 
 
Similarly, Article 88(1) of the Community designs Regulation781 provides: 
 
 “The Community design courts shall apply the provisions of this Regulation.” 
                                                 
774
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
775
 Ultimately consenting to this evaluation of a “spider-in-the-web” constellation: Schauwecker 2009, p. 92; 
however, Schauwecker seems to misinterpret the reasoning of the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage, when stating that 
this court denied the existence of the same situation of fact in default of a “spider-in-the-web“ constellation, thus 
suggesting that the court evaluated the non-existence of such a constellation as a conditio sine qua non for the 
same factual situation. 
776
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 93. 
777
 BGH 14 December 2006, I ZR 11/04, (2007)56(10) GRUR Int. 864, at p. 866, para. 19 – Aufarbeitung von 
Fahrzeugkomponenten. 
778
 Knaak (2007)56(5) GRUR Int. 386, at p. 391. 
779
 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 
March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
780
 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 
March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
781
 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, OJ L3 of 5 January 2002, 
pp. 1-24, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:003:0001:0024:en:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015), amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006, OJ L386 of 29 December 
2006, pp. 14-16, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1891&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
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Article 89(2) of the Community designs Regulation782 completes: 
 
“The Community design court shall take such measures in accordance with its national law as are aimed 
at ensuring that the orders referred to in paragraph 1 are complied with.” 
 
Besides, Article 8(2) of the Rome II Regulation783 rules: 
 
“In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary Community 
intellectual property right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by the relevant 
Community instrument, be the law of the country in which the act of infringement was committed.” 
 
As all of these Regulations provide that national law shall be applicable in the case that the 
Regulations do not contain a rule, the dispute whether the Rome II Regulation prevails over 
the other Regulations does not matter in this context.784 Community intellectual property 
rights like the future European patent with unitary effect certainly effect a definitely higher 
degree of unification than the institute of the ordinary European patent as a mere bundle of 
national rights. Nevertheless, national law keeps the function of filling the gaps. This effects 
that there are not (necessarily) the same factual situations, with regard to infringement actions 
concerning Community intellectual property rights, in case that multiple infringers domiciled 
in different Member States have acted by way of a chain of infringers.  
 
  
2.4 Exclusive jurisdiction – Article 24(4) 
 
2.4.1 Introductory considerations 
 
Industrial property rights not being protected by Article 24(1),785 Article 24(4) is the only 
provision of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which exclusively affects patent proceedings. The 
provision reads:786 
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 Cf. fn. 779. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L199 of 31 July 2007, pp. 40-49, available at WWW 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864&from=EN> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015). 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 93. 
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 Wadlow 1998, para. 2–109; Bukow 2003, p. 203. 
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 The GAT decision of the ECJ (being discussed at a later point), which may be called a landmark decision of 
the ECJ in this context, was rendered under the regime of and with regard to Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention which was replaced (while the content remained unchanged) by Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, the direct predecessor of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. One decisive difference 
between Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation on the one hand and 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the other hand consists in the fact that the text of Article 24(4) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation has been supplemented by the phrase “irrespective of whether the issue is raised by 
way of an action or as a defence”. Since it is exactly this issue – whether the raise of an invalidity defence is 
sufficient for the applicability of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation – which has been subject to the GAT decision of the ECJ, fierce discussion and dispute in case-law 
and legal doctrine before and still after the GAT decision and finally a significant element of several reform 
proposals, special emphasis shall be put on Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention). In contrast to Articles 5(3) and 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation which have, as already 
illustrated, mostly been adopted as Articles 7(2) and 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the situation is 
different concerning the relation between Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation and Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, due to the addressed supplement within the text of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation which codifies the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its GAT decision. For this reason, I refer to the text of 
Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation not only in a footnote, but prefer to concede it the same importance as 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by citing it within the main text.  
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 Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of 
 the parties:  
 
 (...) 
 (4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other 
 similar rights required to be deposited or registered, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of 
 an action or as a defence, the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration has been 
 applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an international 
 convention deemed to have taken place.  
  
 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on the Grant 
 of European Patents, signed at Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall have 
 exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of any European patent 





Remarkably, the predecessor of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (which replaced Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention without 
changes as to its wording and content), provided in a similar way, but without the phrase 
“irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence” being 
contained in Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation:  
 
 
 Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: 
 
(...)  
(4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other 
similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Member State in which the deposit 
or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of a Community instrument or 
an international convention deemed to have taken place. 
 
 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on the Grant 
 of European Patents, signed at Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall have 
 exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity 





As Article 24(4) explicitly refers to the courts of the Member States, it is to be noticed that it 
merely concerns the international jurisdiction of the courts of the EU Member States, while 
the question of local jurisdiction is governed by national procedural law.787 As the Jenard 
                                                                                                                                                        
At this point, it should suffice to mention that the present formulation of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation does not preclude that another solution could be realised in the framework of a future reform of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Details as to this issue shall be discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
Remarkably, the revised Lugano Convention which entered into force on 1 January 2010 already anticipated the 
mentioned change of wording from Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation to Article 24(4) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation (“irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence”), cf. Wagner & 
Janzen (2010)30(4) IPRax 298, at p. 304; cf. also Borrás 2008, pp. 250-251; cf. also Borrás & Hausmann 2012 
(unalex Kommentar), Art. 22 Brüssel I-VO, para. 75.     
787
 Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 22 EuGVO, para. 1; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches 
Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 22 EuGVVO, para. 20. 
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Report has already clarified (with regard to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention), the 
subject-matter of the action is decisive for Article 24(4) to be applicable. On the contrary, it is 
not relevant where the parties – plaintiff and defendant – are domiciled or which nationality 
they have.788 If Article 24(4) is applicable, the jurisdiction conferred is exclusive, and 
prorogation of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 25 is not possible (cf. Article 25(4)): 
 
 
 Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (4) Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if 
 they are contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude 
 have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24.  
 
 
Additionally, Article 24(4) also precedes Article 26, as Article 26(1) states:  
 
 
 Article 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (1) Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Regulation, a court of a Member State 
 before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where 
 appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by 
 virtue of Article 24.  
 
 
Regarding the question of whether proceedings are covered by the scope of application of 
Article 24(4), the ECJ declared in Duijnstee (concerning the interpretation of Article 16(4) of 
the Brussels Convention) that this issue shall be solved by way of an autonomous 
interpretation, not taking into account the lex fori or the lex causae. Concretely, the ECJ ruled: 
 
“In the present case, both an interpretation according to the law of the Contracting State whose courts 
have jurisdiction under Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] and an interpretation according to the 
lex fori would be liable to produce divergent solutions, which would be prejudicial to the principle that 
the rights and obligations which the persons concerned derive from the Convention should be equal and 
uniform. Thus the term “proceedings concerned with the registration, or validity of patents” contained 
in Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] must be regarded as an independent concept intended to 
have uniform application in all the Contracting States [underscore and content in brackets added].”789 
 
As to the ratio legis of Article 24(4) (respectively its predecessors), several aspects have been 
emphasised both by the ECJ and in legal doctrine. On the one hand, the ECJ pointed out in its 
Sanders decision, that the courts which dispose of exclusive jurisdiction are those most 
appropriate to decide: 
 
                                                 
788
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015), 
p. 34: “These rules, which take as their criterion the subject-matter of the action, are applicable regardless of the 
domicile or nationality of the parties. In view of the reasons for laying down rules of exclusive jurisdiction, it 
was necessary to provide for their general application, even in respect of defendants domiciled outside the 
Community.” Cf. Borrás & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), vor Art. 22 Brüssel I-VO, para. 8.  
789
 ECJ 15 November 1983, C-288/82, Ferdinand M. J. J. Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer, [1983] ECR 03663, 
paras. 18-19 – Duijnstee. 
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“As regards the matters listed under subparagraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of that article [Article 16 of the 
Brussels Convention] it is clear that the courts which are given exclusive jurisdiction are those which 
are the best placed to deal with the disputes in question [content in brackets added].”790  
 
Although this decision was given by reference to Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the underlying general idea also applies to 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
because the ECJ explicitly mentioned Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), too. The aspect of proximity to law and evidence was picked 
up by the ECJ in its Duijnstee decision with regard to the interpretation of Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) where the ECJ held: 
 
“In that regard, it must be noted that the exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the 
registration or validity of patents conferred upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit 
or registration has been applied for is justified by the fact that those courts are best placed to adjudicate 
upon cases in which the dispute itself concerns the validity of the patent or the existence of the deposit 
or registration.”791 
 
Correspondingly, the ECJ confirmed in its famous GAT decision: 
 
“In relation to the objective pursued, it should be noted that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction laid down 
in Article 16 of the [Brussels] Convention seek to ensure that jurisdiction rests with courts closely 
linked to the proceedings in fact and law [content in brackets added].”792 
 
This reasoning has been shared in legal doctrine.793 On the other hand, it has been underlined 
already in the Jenard Report that the issue of patents represents an act of national sovereignty 
requiring the courts of the granting State to have exclusive jurisdiction on validity 
questions.794 In addition to this aspect, the ECJ highlighted, also in its GAT decision, that 
patents are granted by national administrative authorities:  
 
“That exclusive jurisdiction is also justified by the fact that the issue of patents necessitates the 
involvement of the national administrative authorities (...).” 795 
 
That alternative explanation and justification for exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 
24(4) has also been supported by legal doctrine.796 
 
It is noteworthy that the ground for exclusive jurisdiction regarding intellectual property such 
as according to Article 24(4) has been characterised as a reincarnation of “formele 
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territorialiteit” (as one component of the “formele-territorialiteitsbeginsel”)797 with a more 
narrow scope constantly shrinking.798 In Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, the former 
“formele territorialiteit” comprising comprehensive protection became a ground for 
exclusive jurisdiction applicable only to registration and validity.799 In this respect, Schaafsma 
impressively explicated: 
 
“(…) Het huidige onbegrip van de conflictregel in het beginsel van nationale behandeling is, als gezegd, 
uiteindelijk het gevolg van een dubbele schaarbeweging waarbij enerzijds het conflictenrecht 
Savigniaans is geworden, en anderzijds het intellectuele-eigendomsrecht is ‘geciviliseerd’. In dat latente 
en langdurige proces is het begrip van de conflictregel in het beginsel van nationale behandeling als 
zijnde het sluitstuk van het formele-territorialiteitsbeginsel, verdampt. En uit de nevelen trad 
uiteindelijk voor auteursrecht en industriële-eigendomsrecht – langs verschillende wegen – de lex loci 
protectionis-conflictregel naar voren. Zo bleef de materiële-territorialiteitscomponent van het formele-
territorialiteitsbeginsel bestaan. De formele-territorialiteitscomponent van dat beginsel verdween; in het 
auteursrecht zonk deze component weg, in het industriële-eigendomsrecht reïncarneerde hij als een 
beperkte exclusieve-bevoegdheidsgrond.”800 
 
(“(…) The current lack of understanding of the conflict-of-law rule in the principle of national treatment 
is, as mentioned, the consequence of double scissor movements, whereas, on the one hand, conflict-of-
law rules have become Savignian, and, on the other hand, intellectual property law has been ‘civilised’. 
In that latent and longsome process, the understanding of the conflict-of-law rule in the principle of 
national treatment as the end of the “principle of formele territorialiteit” evaporated. And out of the 
mists, the conflict-of-law rule of lex loci protectionis appeared – on different paths – for copyright law 
and industrial property law. While the component of “materiële territorialiteit” of the “principle of 
formele territorialiteit” remained, the compont of “formele territorialiteit” of that principle 
disappeared; this component sank away in copyright law, while it reincarnated in industrial property law 
as a restricted ground for exclusive jurisdiction.”)801  
 
Where “formele territorialiteit” has reincarnated as a ground for exclusive jurisdiction, such a 
ground for jurisdiction is to be assumed.802  
 
 
2.4.2 Infringement and nullity (invalidity) of patent rights in infringement proceedings 
 
Probably the most controversial issue with respect to Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) has always been the correlation between patent infringement proceedings and the 
question of nullity of the patent concerned. In particular, two aspects are problematic: First, it 
is essential that with regard to jurisdiction, the general jurisdiction rule of Article 4(1) and the 
special jurisdiction rules of Article 7(2), 8(1), 25 and 26 are applicable to infringement 
proceedings, while actions with regard to the alleged nullity of patent rights are governed by 
the rule of Article 24(4) which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts concerned.803 Second, 
it is to be noticed that the possibilities to bring before court both infringement and nullity 
proceedings differ: On the one hand, there are States where the defendant of an infringement 
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 In this respect, “formele territorialiteit” means that a court merely applies its own national law. In contrast to 
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action can raise the defence of invalidity of the patent in question, having inter partes effect, 
and/or can raise a counter-claim, the latter having erga omnes effect.804 On the other hand, the 
procedural (court) structure of Germany (and Austria) is characterised by the fact that 
jurisdiction for infringement proceedings and nullity proceedings are strictly divided. The 
court seised in infringement proceedings is not empowered to decide on the question of 
validity of a patent, but must generally assume the validity of the concerned patent. If a 
decision on the validity of that patent appears necessary though, the court must stay its 
proceeding according to German civil procedural law (§ 148 ZPO) and wait for a decision of 
the Bundespatentgericht, if a nullity action has been filed there.  
 
Already under Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, it was clear that the respective provision of exclusive jurisdiction was applicable 
when the defendant of an infringement action raised a counter-claim, because a separate 
action is concerned which is not directly linked with the infringement action.805 It was also 
accepted that Article 6(3) of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(3) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable in this constellation, according to which a 
person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued on a counter-claim arising from the 
same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the 
original claim is pending, because Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) overrules Article 6(3) 
of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(3) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) as lex specialis.806 Although, apparently, the ECJ has not made a decision 
concerning the relationship between Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and Article 6(3) of 
the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
yet, the court confirmed in two judgments that Article 17 of the Brussels Convention (Article 
25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a Contracting 
State (i.e. the courts of a Member State in the case of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) if the 
parties have agreed upon a choice of jurisdiction), should take precedence over Article 6(3) of 
the Brussels Convention (Article 8(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). The ECJ explicitly 
stated in both decisions: 
 
“The way in which that provision [Article 17 of the Brussels Convention] is to be applied must be 
interpreted in the light of the effect of the conferment of jurisdiction by consent, which is to exclude 
both the jurisdiction determined by the general principle laid down in Article 2 [of the Brussels 
Convention] and the special jurisdictions provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. (…) 
[content in brackets added]”807 
 
These decisions may at least give a hint how the ECJ would evaluate the relationship between 
Article 24(4) and Article 8(3). Besides, it is even doubtful whether the conditions set up by 
Article 8(3), i.e., basically, a close connection between the original claim and the counter-
claim, are fulfilled in the case of an infringement action and the defence of invalidity of the 
                                                 
804 For instance in the Netherlands (cf. Brinkhof (2000)31(6) IIC 706, at p. 718), in England (cf. Cornish & 
Llewelyn (2000)31(6) IIC 627, at p. 644; Wadlow 1998, paras. 3–133-3–136) and in Italy (cf. Mangini 
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805
 Fawcett & Torremans 2011, paras. 7.40-7.41; Ebner 2004, p. 210.  
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Polstereimaschinen GmbH, [1976] ECR 01831, para. 7 – Salotti; ECJ 14 December 1976, C-25/76, Galeries 
Segoura SPRL v Société Rahim Bonakdarian, [1976] ECR 01851, para. 6 – Segoura. 
 176 
patent, since a counter-claim for revocation is not based on the same facts as an infringement 
action.808 
 
However, due to the fact that the supplement “irrespective of whether the issue is raised by 
way of an action or as a defence” forms part of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
was not contained in Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, it was doubtful until the GAT decision of the ECJ whether, respectively in how far 
the defence, based on the alleged invalidity of a patent, which is put forth in infringement 
proceedings has the effect that Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation is applicable, with the potential consequence that the court invoked for 
the infringement proceeding loses jurisdiction (which would be expectable in cross-border 
proceedings). As the defence of invalidity of the patent is probably the most important 
defence in infringement proceedings,809 the answer to that question must be considered crucial 
for infringement proceedings. 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation before the GAT decision 
 
Until the leading GAT decision delivered by the ECJ, both national courts and legal doctrine 
within the Member States favoured different solutions as to that problem. Before analysing in 
how far the GAT decision brought some light as to the scope of application of Article 16(4) of 
the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation in this respect, a brief 
overview shall be delivered of these perspectives, because the analysis of the GAT decision 
will also have to take into consideration those previous conceptions. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1 United Kingdom 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1.1 Court decisions 
 
Traditionally, English courts have tended to interpret Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation in a broad way. Several leading cases 
have been decided which have considerably formed the English perspective on exclusive 
jurisdiction according to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation.810 These cases shall be presented in the following paragraphs, adhering 
to their chronological order. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1.1.1 Coin Controls 
 
The decision Coin Controls811 of the English High Court of Justice – Chancery Division was 
based on the following facts: The plaintiff was the proprietor of three patents: a United 
Kingdom patent, a German patent and a Spanish patent, for coin dispensing apparatus. These 
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 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 4.59. 
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 Kubis (2007)98(5) Mitt. 220, at p. 221; Adolphsen (2007)27(1) IPRax 15, at p. 17; cf. also Hellstadius & 
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national patents had arisen out of a single patent application made to the European Patent 
Office. The four defendants belonged to the Suzo Group. The plaintiff sued all defendants for 
jointly infringing all three patents.  
 
First, Justice Laddie referred to the judgment of Justice Lloyd in Pearce I, a case concerned 
with copyright infringement, where Justice Lloyd had held that an infringement proceeding on 
a foreign copyright could be instituted in England if international jurisdiction can be based on 
the provisions of the Brussels Convention. He had stated: 
 
“My conclusion on this point is that the Convention does require an English court to accept jurisdiction 
where an action is brought against an English domiciled defendant (with or without other defendants) 
for breach of a Dutch copyright, and to hear that action on the merits, and thus overrides, so far as is 
necessary for that purpose, both Rule 203 and the Moçambique rule, even though neither of them is a 
rule as to jurisdiction. Each of them, to the extent that they would preclude the English court from 
hearing such an action, would in my judgment impair the effectiveness of the Convention by frustrating 
the operation of the basic rule in Article 2 [of the Brussels Convention], and must therefore give way in 
order to allow the jurisdictional rules of the Convention to have their proper effect. The position is quite 
different from other exclusionary rules, such as Acts of State, because both Rule 203 and the 
Moçambique rule proceed on the clear premise that the English courts are not a suitable forum for such 
an action whereas the courts of another country are appropriate. It seems to me that, where that other 
country is another Contracting State, this is a position which subverts the policy and provisions of the 
Convention. To borrow a phrase from another area of Community law, although they are not rules as to 
jurisdiction, they are “measures having an equivalent effect” to rules of jurisdiction, and are inconsistent 
with the mandatory effect of the Convention and its basic rule as to domicile-based jurisdiction in 
Article 2 [of the Brussels Convention] [content in brackets added].”812 
 
This judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in second instance (Pearce II).813 
  
Coming back to Coin Controls, Justice Laddie concluded, as to the relationship between 
patent infringement proceedings and the defence of invalidity of the patent in question, that 
the court before which the infringement proceedings were brought would lose jurisdiction in 
favour of the courts of the State where the patent had been granted. He held: 
 
“As I have said, validity is frequently in issue, and sometimes the most important issue, in English 
patent infringement proceedings. (...) We have always taken the view that you cannot infringe an invalid 
patent. (...) However the fact that the defendant can challenge validity does not mean that he will. (...) 
Until he does, only infringement is in issue and the approach in Pearce applies. The court cannot decline 
jurisdiction on the basis of mere suspicions as to what defence may be run. But once the defendant 
raises validity the court must hand the proceedings over to the courts having exclusive jurisdiction over 
that issue. Furthermore, since Article 19 [of the Brussels Convention] obliges the court to decline 
jurisdiction in relation to claims which are “principally” concerned with Article 16 [of the Brussels 
Convention] issues, it seems to follow that jurisdiction over all of the claim, including that part which is 
not within Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention] must be declined. It may well be that if there are 
multiple discrete issues before a court it will be possible to sever one or more claims from another and 
to decline to accept jurisdiction only over those covered by Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention], but 
I do not believe that that approach applies where infringement and validity of an intellectual property 
right are concerned. They are so closely interrelated that they should be treated for jurisdiction purposes 
as one issue or claim [content in brackets added].”814 
 
Since it was apparent in this case that the validity of the German and the Spanish patents 
would be challenged by the defendants, Justice Laddie denied jurisdiction of the High Court 
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of Justice for the pending infringement proceedings. Justice Laddie mainly founded his 
decision on the wording of Article 19 of the Rome Convention (which corresponds to Article 
25 of the Rome I Regulation)815 and held that the expression “principally concerned” should 
be interpreted in a broad sense, referring also to the Jenard Report: 
 
“In the absence of binding authority, I also do not accept the second argument as to the meaning of 
“principally concerned”. I can see no reason to give the Article a narrow linguistic interpretation. The 
Jenard report suggests that what is excluded is incidental matter. Something which is a major feature of 
the litigation is not incidental and is therefore a matter with which the action is principally concerned. 
The issue which has to be decided then is whether the three foreign claims sought to be raised in the 




2.4.2.1.1.1.2 Fort Dodge 
 
In Fort Dodge817, the Dutch company Akzo Nobel N.V. (A) and one of its subsidiaries and 
exclusive licensee under the patent (B) commenced patent infringement proceedings in the 
Netherlands against the United Kingdom company Animal Health Limited and four other 
companies being all part of the American Home Products group of companies (C, D, E, F, G), 
which made and sold canine parvovirus vaccines. A and B were seeking both interim and 
final relief, in respect of alleged acts of infringement of both Dutch and the United Kingdom 
patents which had been granted to A. Some months later, C, D, E, F and G petitioned the 
Patents Court in England for the revocation of the United Kingdom patent. This part of the 
proceedings concerned an application for an injunction to restrain the respondents from 
bringing or maintaining legal proceedings in the Netherlands in respect of the alleged patent 
infringement by reasons of any act committed within the jurisdiction of the English courts 
(anti-suit injunction). The application was based on the assumption that the only court with 
jurisdiction to determine whether the United Kingdom patent had been infringed was the 
English Patents Court.  
 
Although Justice Laddie generally confirmed that English law provides the procedural means 
of anti-suit injunctions, he explicitly restricted its scope of application, emphasising the 
general principle of mutual trust between courts of different States, by underlining:   
 
“In my view there is a world of difference between restraining a party from bringing or pursuing 
proceedings in a foreign court on the ground that to do so would breach a valid agreement not to do so 
and restraining the party on the ground that you do not trust the foreign court to apply an international 
convention properly or to act fairly.”818 
 
Due to the fact that the question which consequences arise from the defence of invalidity of a 
patent during an infringement process concerning that patent could be solved, in the absence 
of a definite legal provision respectively a decision of the ECJ at that time, in different ways, 
Justice Laddie held that a final decision on that matter could only be taken by the ECJ. He 
frankly declared: 
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“Both the Dutch court and this court are seeking to implement the provisions of the convention. Neither 
has a bigger say than the other as to which construction is right. The ultimate court for determining that 
is the European Court of Justice. It is that court, not this, which can tell the Dutch courts – and us – 
what is the correct construction. It is clearly unsatisfactory that different courts in different countries 
adopted markedly different approaches to a convention which is supposed to bind them equally and to 
create a uniform regime. But the answer to this is not for one nation's courts to try to squeeze out the 
courts of its neighbour. In my judgment the correct course, if the differences continue, is for the matter 
to be brought before the European Court of Justice as soon as possible.”819 
 
The Court of Appeal confirmed this position and underlined that  
 
“(...) the matter is accordingly not “acte clair”. The question which view is right is one of considerable 
importance to the enforcement of intellectual property rights in jurisdictions subject to the Brussels 
Convention. We believe that it is necessary for the European Court of Justice to consider the 
construction of those Articles and their application to the facts and therefore it would be right to refer 
appropriate questions to that Court.820 
 
(...) In those circumstances we do not consider we would be justified in reaching a final conclusion that 
the pursuit, by Akzo, of the claim in the Dutch courts in respect of the United Kingdom patent would be 
vexatious. It follows that we are not prepared to grant a full injunction at this time. The reference is 
necessary in order to decide whether final relief by way of injunction or declaration would be 
appropriate. We now therefore proceed to consider whether interim relief by way of injunction or 
otherwise would be appropriate pending the determination of the reference to the European Court.”821 
 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal referred this question to the ECJ. Interestingly, the Court 
of Appeal decided only few days after Justice Laddie had made his decision. The presumption 
that the Court of Appeal intended to influence the Dutch court before which the infringement 
proceedings were negotiated was even confirmed by the Court of Appeal itself when 
expressing: 
 
“We have every confidence that the Dutch court will, when deciding what to do, take into account that 
this Court will be referring to the European Court of Justice questions to elucidate how Articles 6, 
16(4), 19 and 24 [of the Brussels Convention] should be applied to the dispute. It will give proper 
weight to our conclusion that it would be wrong for this Court to anticipate the decision of the European 
Court. It will, we believe, also consider carefully the other views expressed in this judgement and, of 
course, the submissions of the parties and the facts [content in brackets added].”822 
 
Unfortunately, the ECJ had no opportunity to render a decision because the main proceedings 





The facts of the subsequent Sepracor decision823 were as follows: Sepracor Inc. was the co-
proprietor of a United Kingdom patent for terfenadine carboxylate, and, through applications 
to the European Patent Office, also the proprietor of patents in a number of European 
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countries. One of the defendants had commenced proceedings in Belgium in order to receive a 
declaration that the national designations of the patent in Germany and Belgium were invalid 
or not infringed. Sepracor Inc. alleged that this was done so as to tie in litigation in Germany 
to the timetable in Belgian patent infringement actions, which were liable to take five years to 
resolve. Sepracor Inc. then issued proceedings in England seeking a declaration that the 
United Kingdom patent and its European equivalents were valid and alleging that they had 
been infringed. 
 
Confirming his decision in Fort Dodge, Justice Laddie denied that English courts had 
jurisdiction as to the infringement of foreign patents where their validity was in question. He 
declared: 
 
“In the light of the decision in Fort Dodge, Sepracor Inc. accepts that the pleaded claims in relation to 
the foreign designations are not justiciable.”824 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1.2 Legal doctrine 
 
Some English authors have agreed to the court decisions cited above which clearly 
demonstrate the tendency of English courts to deny jurisdiction for infringement proceedings 
concerning foreign patents when the validity of such patents is called into question.825 Others 
have taken a rather critical attitude towards an extensive application of Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation.826 It has been alternatively 
proposed that the court before which infringement proceedings have been brought shall also 
have jurisdiction as to the evaluation of validity of the patent in question, but only with inter 
partes effect.827 Besides, it has been put forth that the court invoked for infringement 
proceedings shall stay the proceedings until the decision on the validity of the patent has been 
rendered by the foreign court or administrative authority.828 
  
 
2.4.2.1.2 The Netherlands 
 
 
2.4.2.1.2.1 Court decisions 
 
In particular with respect to patent and trade mark litigation, it is to be noticed that Dutch 
procedural law is remarkably coined by the provisional measure of the kort geding according 
to Articles 289 to 291 of the Dutch Civil Procedural Order. In the decision Rhône Poulenc 
Rorer v Prographarm the President of the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage explicitly declared that 
the provision of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation) does not constitute an obstacle for the jurisdiction of the Dutch court concerned 
with infringement proceedings by way of a kort geding due to its provisional character which 
excludes a final judgment on the validity of patents. Although the court will take into 
consideration a defence of invalidity of the patent in question put forth by the defendant, this 
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examination of invalidity merely has the nature of a prognosis and lacks influence on the 
validity of the patent. In case of a defence of invalidity in the main proceedings, the court will 
stay them until the question of validity will have been clarified by the court having 
jurisdiction according to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation).829 The Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage restricted this broad perspective to 
some extent in its decision Hoffmann-La Roche. In this decision, the court held that an 
incidental decision by means of a kort geding should at least be possible if the patent right 
was confirmed, and under the precondition that the case was not too complicated in factual 
and legal respect.830  
 
However, the most important decisions delivered by Dutch courts regarding the question of 
the scope of application of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation were the two decisions in the Expandable Grafts Partnership case. 
These shall be subject of the following paragraphs. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.2.1.1 Expandable Grafts Partnership I 
 
In the joint decision of the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage in Julio Cesar Palmaz and Others v 
Boston Scientific B.V. and Others, and Expandable Grafts Partnership and Others v Boston 
Scientific B.V. and Others831, the decisive facts were as follows: In both proceedings, the 
plaintiffs sued the defendants (two Dutch, one Belgian, one English, one Swiss, one 
Norwegian, one French, one Swedish, one Spanish and one Italian company, all of which 
being interconnected) for infringements of European patents. Expandable Grafts Partnership 
sought determination of the issue of infringement in accelerated proceedings before the 
Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage and, in addition, interim relief including injunctions restraining 
infringement in all the countries (except Germany and the United Kingdom) which had been 
designated in the relevant European patent. At the date of the hearing, there was litigation 
pending between the parties (and further parties) in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden and Spain in all of which (apart from Germany, 
Sweden and Spain) both infringement and validity were in issue. The defendants challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage over the foreign defendants and in respect of 
the Dutch defendants to the extent that the claim covered cross-border relief. They also denied 
patent infringement and alleged that the patents were invalid. In particular, the defendants 
argued that under Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (and the Treaty of Lugano) the 
respective courts of those countries in which validity had been put in issue had exclusive 
jurisdiction and that under Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (and the Treaty of Lugano) 
the invoked Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage should decline jurisdiction. In the process of finding a 
decision, the court took into close consideration832 the English decision in Coin Controls of 
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the English High Court of Justice – Chancery Division833. Although the Rechtbank 's-
Gravenhage ultimately did not share the opinion of the English court, it conceded that 
 
“(...) much store must be given to a decision of another European court – certainly if it concerns a 
thoroughly reasoned and documented decision as in this case.”834 
 
The Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage first analysed how the words “a claim principally concerned 
with” in Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation) are to 
be interpreted, pointing out that any interpretation will have to be made autonomously in 
conformity with the Brussels Convention (Brussels I Regulation).835 As to the crucial problem 
whether the defence of invalidity of the patents renders the claim to an injunction not to 
infringe the patents into one “principally concerned with” the validity of the patents in the 
sense of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation), 
the court made clear that it is decisive that an injunction cannot be obtained without giving a 
decision on the legal validity of the patent. The court reasoned two possible solutions to this 
point: 
 
“This dilemma can be solved in principle in the manner proposed by the defendants: the infringement 
court – which in principle has jurisdiction – has to declare itself not to have jurisdiction as soon as the 
invalidity of the patent is claimed by way of defence. 
 
The dilemma can also be solved in such manner that the infringement court considers itself competent 
to take cognizance of the claim, but – in the occurrence and after estimating, or not, the likelihood of 
invalidation – finds that it cannot give a decision on it until after the invalidity court which has such 
jurisdiction has given its opinion on the validity of the patent, to which end it will stay the infringement 
proceedings, if necessary.”836 
 
Regarding the wording of the Brussels Convention (which largely corresponds to that of the 
Brussels I Regulation) and the Jenard Report, the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage clarified that 
 
“(...) neither the text of the [Brussels] Convention nor the one of the Jenard report compel the choice of 
either solution. After all, the Convention does not say anything on that subject and arguments in both 
senses may be derived from Jenard. We must probably conclude that neither the authors of the 
Convention nor of Jenard took into account that in patent proceedings the discussion of infringement 
and the one of invalidity are almost Siamese twins and hardly ever occur separately [content in brackets 
added].”837 
 
Taking into account the purpose of the Brussels Convention (Brussels I Regulation) which is 
to strengthen the legal protection of persons established within the territory of the Contracting 
States (respectively Member States as to the Brussels I Regulation), the court judged that both 
solutions indicated above could prevent a speedy adjudication in patent litigations and compel 
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the institution of separate related proceedings.838 However, the court finally arrived at the 
conclusion that this risk is higher if the first solution was chosen, because 
 
“(...) it invites defendants to bring invalidation actions with the sole purpose of taking away jurisdiction 
from a court which originally had jurisdiction and thus compelling the patent owner to incur additional 
expenses, or to obtain a gain of time.”839 
 
Additionally, the court pointed out the possibility that – if the patent is valid – there is actually 
no patent infringement, and that the procedure on the merits can then be decided without any 
real need for instituting invalidation proceedings and in any case without waiting for such 
proceedings.840 Besides, the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage emphasised the fact that, according to 
the Duijnstee decision of the ECJ, 
 
“(...) Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Treaty of Lugano, being an exception to the main rule, 
must be interpreted restrictively rather than extensively.”841 
 
On this basis, the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage reasoned that  
 
“(...) an interpretation which would have as a result that the jurisdiction of the Court would not be 
established until after the defence has been pleaded, is contrary to the objectives of the Brussels 
Convention/Treaty of Lugano to such an extent that this possibility should only be chosen if – also 
taking into account the conditions for European integration – it would be unavoidable.”842 
 
The court denied such unavoidability due to the present circumstances in Germany and in the 
Netherlands: 
 
“Practice in the Federal Republic shows that a less drastic solution than the one chosen by the English 
court is possible, namely an assessment of the risk of invalidation and a stay of the infringement 
proceedings if the likelihood of invalidation justifies this. A similar conduct provides a satisfactory 
solution also in the Dutch preliminary proceedings practice in respect of patents the invalidity of which 
is invoked.”843 
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Therefore, the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage reached the conclusion that, at least as to the 
injunction claim, the alleged invalidity of the patents claimed by the defendants did not 
impact jurisdiction of the court. However, the court conceded that it may not be able to reach 
a final decision before a decision has been made by the invalidation courts having jurisdiction 
in the various States for which the injunction was claimed. If necessary, the proceeding 
should be stayed till then.844 
  
 
2.4.2.1.2.1.2 Expandable Grafts Partnership II  
 
The Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage which was concerned with the matter at second instance 
partly shared the opinion of the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage as far as it pointed out the link 
between nullity and infringement as to the main proceeding, stating: 
 
“It is a fact that infringement and nullity are indissolubly linked with each other, since it is impossible to 
infringe a patent that is null and void. Unless it is immediately clear that a nullity action cannot be 
deemed to be meant seriously, in the case of main proceedings on the merits the court which is asked to 
pronounce judgment on the infringement issue will have to adopt a cautious attitude towards the 
infringement action and in principle will have to stay the infringement proceedings until the foreign 
court has pronounced judgment on the nullity issue.”845 
 
However, in contrast to the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage, the Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage 
decided that the same applies to infringement injunctions by way of kort geding, because this 
situation requires at least the same degree of caution.846 Impressively, emphasising the need to 
ameliorate this state, the court noticed: 
 
“Obviously the separate hearing and settlement of the infringement issue and the nullity issue by two 
different national courts is far from ideal. It would be desirable for the infringement and nullity issues to 
be decided by the same court. It would also be desirable if the hearing and settlement of actions for 
infringement and nullity of several patents originating from one European bundle of patents could be 
concentrated in one court. But this solution is barred by Article 16(4) of the Brussels/Lugano 
Convention. National courts cannot make the said wishes come true. Amendment of the Conventions 
seems to be inevitable.”847 
 
 
2.4.2.1.2.2 Legal doctrine 
 
Dutch legal doctrine generally tended to deny the applicability of Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation on proceedings by way of kort geding, 
restricting its scope of application to the main proceeding.848 However, it was put forth that 
constellations are conceivable where Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation must be taken into respect, also with respect to provisional 
(protective) measures: For instance, if a patent infringement is evident, in cases of a “strong” 
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patent which has already been successfully claimed before a court or within administrative 





According to the prevailing opinion in Germany before the GAT decision, the defence of 
nullity/invalidity of a foreign patent in infringement proceedings would not have the effect 
that Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation would 
be applicable giving the courts of the State where the patent had been granted exclusive 
jurisdiction unless the question of validity was not subject to a counter-claim.850  
 
 
2.4.2.1.3.1 Court decisions 
 
German courts did not deny jurisdiction in the case of foreign patents as to the examination of 
their validity if this examination was undertaken by way of  a preliminary question, and under 
the precondition that the defence of invalidity was permitted in the concerned infringement 
proceedings.851 In the following paragraphs, I shall take a closer look on the leading cases 
before German courts. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.3.1.1 Kettenbandförderer III 
 
In the Kettenbandförderer III case,852 the Landgericht Düsseldorf had to decide on the basis 
of the following facts: The plaintiff was the holder of a British patent concerning a special 
conveyor. The defendant who distributed such conveyors was sued by the plaintiff for patent 
infringement. In the course of its judgment, the Landgericht Düsseldorf first made clear that 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation) contains 
a provision of exclusive jurisdiction only for nullity actions. The court explicitly stated: 
 
“Da Artikel 16 Nr. 4 GVÜ eine Ausnahme – im Sinne einer ausschließlichen Zuständigkeit der Gerichte 
des Vertragsstaates, in dem die Erteilung des Patents erfolgt ist – nur für Nichtigkeitsklagen gegen 
Patente vorsieht, gilt Artikel 2 Abs. 1 GVÜ auch für Verletzungsklagen aus einem ausländischen Patent, 
und zwar auch insoweit, als die Klage – wie hier – darauf gerichtet ist, der beklagten Partei die 
Vornahme bestimmter Handlungen in dem betreffenden ausländischen Staat zu untersagen.”853 
 
(“As Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention provides for an exception – in terms of exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting State where the patent has been granted – only for nullity 
actions against patents, Article 2(1) of the Brussels Convention applies also to infringement actions as 
to a foreign patent, and also insofar as the action – as in this case – aims at prohibiting the defendant to 
undertake certain acts in the concerned foreign state.”)854 
 
However, the court pointed out to be empowered to decide on a defence of nullity/invalidity: 
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“(...) Zwar ist der Einwand (der Gültigkeit des Klagepatents) im Verletzungsverfahren an sich statthaft 
(Sec. 74(1) lit. a, (3); Sec. 72(1) lit. a, d, e; Sec. 1(1) lit. a, b PatG-GB (...).”855  
 
(“(...) Indeed the defence (of invalidity of the patent in question) is allowed in the infringement 




2.4.2.1.3.1.2 Reinigungsmittel für Kunststoffverarbeitungsmaschinen 
 
The Landgericht Düsseldorf decided in a similar way in the Reinigungsmittel für 
Kunststoffverarbeitungsmaschinen case.857 Simplifying the facts for reasons of clearness, the 
situation was as follows: The plaintiff was the holder of a European patent being valid for, 
inter alia, Germany and the United Kingdom. Defendant 1 (among several defendants which 
shall be omitted here) was the authorised dealer, for the territory of the United Kingdom, of 
the X company, a licence holder of the plaintiff, concerning a liquid cleaning agent. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant had sold a counterfeit of his products, and raised an action 
for patent infringement. Besides other defences, the defendant also argued that the plaintiff’s 
patent was invalid. Interestingly, and in contrast to its previous decision in 
Kettenbandförderer III, this judgment of the Landgericht Düsseldorf does not reveal a single 
hint that the court felt any doubt to have jurisdiction to consider the defence of invalidity. 
Apparently, the court found it natural to treat the defence of invalidity of the patent according 
to English law, within the framework of the infringement proceeding. This attitude becomes 
obvious when the court, in the middle of its judgment, laconically mentioned: 
 
“Ihrer Inanspruchnahme können die Beklagten auch nicht mit Erfolg den Einwand der Patentnichtigkeit, 
Sec. 74 Absatz 1 des britischen Patentgesetzes (britPatG), entgegenhalten.”858 
 
(“The defendants cannot successfully defend themselves by way of the defence of patent nullity, 





This rather restrictive interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) 
of the Brussels I Regulation was continued in the Schwungrad case860, which was also 
brought before the Landgericht Düsseldorf first, and was then brought before the 
Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf which finally initiated preliminary proceedings before the ECJ. 
The following facts had to be taken into consideration: The plaintiff and the defendant were 
two German companies being active in the field of automobile drive technology. The 
defendant was the holder of two French patents concerning a specific mechanical means. As 
the plaintiff offered such a product to a third party, the defendant sued the plaintiff for alleged 
infringement. The alleged infringer raised a claim for declaration of non-infringement before 
the Landgericht Düsseldorf. In its judgment the court took into consideration the preceding 
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English decisions in Coin Controls and Fort Dodge cited above, where the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal had come to the conclusion that the defence (respectively the counter-
claim) of invalidity/nullity of a patent effected that the court being competent for infringement 
proceedings lost its jurisdiction. However, in conformity with its prior practice in the cases 
Kettenbandförderer III and Reinigungsmittel für Kunststoffverarbeitungsmaschinen cited 
above, the Landgericht Düsseldorf ultimately considered itself competent to adjudicate the 
case brought before it, including an incidental assessment of the validity issue. The court 
declared: 
 
“Die internationale Zuständigkeit ist auch nicht dadurch entfallen, dass sich die Klägerin gegenüber 
dem Verletzungsvorwurf der Beklagten unter anderem mit der Nichtigkeit der Streitpatente verteidigt 
hat. Ein solcher Einwand kann zwar nach französischem Recht, nach dem sich Bestand und 
Schutzwirkungen der (französischen) Streitpatente beurteilt, auch im Verletzungsrechtsstreit erhoben 
werden. Ein solches Vorbringen hat jedoch nicht zur Folge, dass die ausschließliche Zuständigkeit 
französischer Gerichte nach Artikel 16 Nr. 4 EuGVÜ für den hier zu entscheidenden Rechtsstreit 
begründet wird.”861 
 
(“International jurisdiction has not been taken away either by the fact that the plaintiff, vis-à-vis the 
claim of infringement by the defendant, has raised the defence of nullity of the patents in question. Such 
a defence can, in accordance with French law which is applicable as to the question of the existence and 
the protective effects of the (French) patents in question, also be raised in infringement proceedings. 
However, such a defence does not effect that the exclusive jurisdiction of French courts according to 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention will be established for this trial.”)862    
 
Besides references to Dutch court decisions the Landgericht Düsseldorf explicitly referred to 
the decision Duijnstee of the ECJ in order to justify its decision to give preference to a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation): 
 
“Die Kammer hält an ihrer Auslegung insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Rechtsprechung des EuGH 
fest, wonach die vertragsautonom auszulegende Bestimmung des Artikel 16 Nr. 4 EuGVÜ restriktiv 
auszulegen ist.”863 
 
(“The Chamber adheres to its interpretation in particular with respect to the case-law of the European 
Court of Justice, according to which the provision of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, to be 
interpreted autonomously, must be interpreted restrictively.”)864   
 
The Landgericht Düsseldorf finally dismissed the claim. Upon appeal by the plaintiff, the case 
was brought before the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, which made a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the ECJ on the question of whether exclusive jurisdiction only applies 
when a claim is raised for declaration of patent invalidity, or also when the issue of validity or 
invalidity is raised by one of the parties in proceedings concerning the infringement of a 
patent by way of a defence.865 This was the start of the famous GAT case of the ECJ 
illustrated above that has – at least to a considerable extent – effected a fundamental change 
of legal theory and practice in Europe as to the interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, and has finally led to the reformulation 
of the provision in Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
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2.4.2.1.3.2 Legal doctrine 
 
The perspective of the Landgericht Düsseldorf has generally been shared by the prevailing 
opinion in German legal doctrine, at least under the condition that the law of the State where 
the patent has been granted provides for the possibility of an incidental examination of the 
validity of the patent.866  
This attitude has been based on three main aspects: First, it has been emphasised that the joint 
enforcement of the national parts of a European patent would not be possible if there was the 
danger that a defence of nullity of the patent in question would influence the jurisdiction of 
the court deciding on an infringement action.867 Additionally, reference has been taken to the 
wording of Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation) 
which is closely connected to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the 
Brussels I Regulation).868 Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels I 
Regulation) provides: 
 
“Where a court of a Contracting State (Member State) is seised of a claim which is principally 
concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Contracting State (Member State) have 
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16 (Article 25), it shall declare of its own motion that it has no 
jurisdiction.” 
 
It has been emphasised that the term “principally concerned” points at the interpretation that a 
mere defence of nullity/invalidity of a patent would not be sufficient to effect the applicability 
of Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation). This 
argumentation is supported by the French version of the Brussels Convention which reads: 
 
“Le juge d'un État contractant, saisi à titre principal d'un litige pour lequel une juridiction d'un autre 
État contractant est exclusivement compétente en vertu de l'article 16, se déclare d'office incompétent.” 
 
In this context, one might argue that in the case of a mere defence of invalidity, in opposition 
to the case of a counter-claim, the question of invalidity of the patent is only a preliminary 
question and thus cannot influence the question of jurisdiction.869 
 
In light of the danger that infringement proceedings might be seriously delayed when the 
court invoked for infringement proceedings loses jurisdiction due to a raised defence of 
invalidity of a patent before a court in the State where the patent has been granted, the danger 
of a misuse of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation) has been stressed. Even if the defence was not successful in the end, it would be 
possible indeed that the patent would not be valid any longer and that the opponent could 
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2.4.2.2 Interpretation after the GAT decision 
 
As has been shown, the interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 
22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation varied to a remarkable extent within the Member States 
and, besides, also between courts and legal doctrine. Against this background, the GAT 
decision of the ECJ was awaited with tension and the hope that some major issues of conflict 
of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation would finally be resolved. Unfortunately, 
the ECJ did not fulfil these expectations. In contrast, the subsequent analysis will demonstrate 
that the GAT decision has even produced more problems and uncertainties than have been 
solved by the judgment.871 
 
In essence, the ECJ held that 
 
“(…) Article 16(4) of the [Brussels] Convention is to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of 
exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein concern all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of 
a patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection [content in 
brackets added].”872  
 
 
2.4.2.3 The scope of the GAT decision 
 
As to the facts of the GAT case, it has already been mentioned that the dispute took place 
between two companies having their seats in Germany, i.e. within an EU Member State, about 
two French patents, i.e. patents granted by an EU Member State. Independently from 
questions of how to interpret the GAT decision in detail, and of which further requirements 
should be demanded, an interesting problem is whether the judgment also applies in case that 
a potential infringer has his habitual residence outside the European Union and/or other 
patents than national patents granted by an EU Member State are concerned. These latter two 
constellations shall be subject to research first. After that, I shall analyse the constellation that 
a patent granted by a third State, i.e. a non-Member State of the European Union respectively 
Contracting State of the Lugano Convention, or a patent granted by the EPO for such a 
State,873 is subject to infringement. 
 
 
2.4.2.3.1 Potential infringer having his habitual residence outside the European Union 
 
Due to the construction of Articles 4 to 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, these provisions are 
not applicable in the case of a potential infringer having his habitual residence in a non-
Member State. As a consequence, international jurisdiction of a Member State court can then 
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only come into existence by way of a prorogation of jurisdiction according to Article 25 
which is expressly permitted by Article 6(1): 
 
 
 Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State 
shall, subject to Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of that Member State. 
 
 
Article 25 provides: 
 
  
 Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State 
are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, unless the agreement is 
null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State. Such jurisdiction shall be 




(4) Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if 
they are contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude 





Due to the restricting reference to Article 24, in Article 25(4), it is clear that Article 24 must 
also be taken into account if the parties have agreed on a prorogation of jurisdiction. In the 
absence of a valid prorogation of jurisdiction, Article 24(4) still applies, because Article 6(1) 
rules that Article 24 is also applicable if the jurisdiction for patent infringement proceedings is 
determined by national law (“subject to (...) Article(s) 24”).874       
 
 
2.4.2.3.2 Infringement of a European patent 
 
A second variation to the scenario dealt with in the GAT case consists in the following 
constellation: The defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State, but the patent being subject 
to an infringement proceeding is not a national patent, but a European patent. The question 
arises if the ECJ would then have decided in the same way as it did in GAT. In this respect, I 
shall have a closer look on the argumentation pursued by the ECJ in its GAT decision. The 
ECJ pointed out that those courts shall be competent which are closely linked to the 
proceedings in fact and law.875 As one main item of argumentation for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of national courts in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of 
patents, the Court stressed: 
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“That exclusive jurisdiction is also justified by the fact that the issue of patents necessitates the 
involvement of the national administrative authorities.”876 
 
It might be argued that this idea does not apply in the case of European patents which are 
granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), being situated in Munich (place of the register) 
and The Hague, while no national authority has been involved in their grant.877 However, it 
should be kept in mind that after the grant of a European patent, the patent will be also 
registered in the national registers.  
 
Additionally, it is to be mentioned that national patents and European patents, i. e. bundles of 
national patents, are equalised as to their effect and treatment by Articles 2 and 64 of the 
European Patent Convention (EPC). Article 2(2) of the EPC states: 
 
 
 Article 2 of the EPC 
  
 (2) The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is granted, have the effect 
 of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that State, unless otherwise 
 provided in this Convention. 
 
 
Additionally, Article 64(1) EPC provides: 
 
 
 Article 64 of the EPC 
  
(1) A European patent shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor from the 
date of publication of the mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in respect of which it is 
granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State. 
 
 
As to the treatment of infringement of such European patents, Article 64(3) EPC completes: 
 
 
 Article 64 of the EPC 
   
 (3) Any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by national law. 
 
 
Besides its argumentation of exclusive jurisdiction due to a close link to the proceedings in 
fact and law, the ECJ also stressed the importance of the position of Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention within the scheme of the Brussels Convention (and the same goes for 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation within the scheme of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), stating: 
 
“In the light of the position of Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] within the scheme of the 
Convention and the objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided 
for by that provision should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent’s 
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validity is raised, be it by way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the case is brought or at a 
later stage in the proceedings [content in brackets added].”878 
 
This latter idea, which was developed by the ECJ in the course of the judgment, applies both 
to national patents and European patents. As a consequence, the GAT decision is also relevant 
for European patents. 
 
 
2.4.2.3.3 Infringement of a patent granted by a third State, or by the EPO for such a 
State 
 
If an infringement proceeding is initiated against the defendant before the court of a Member 
State having jurisdiction according to Article 4(1) (if the defendant is domiciled in the 
Member State where the court is situated), Article 6(2) (if the defendant is domiciled in a non-
Member State) or according to Article 25 or Article 26 (the two latter provisions being 
applicable independently from the domicile), the crucial question is whether Article 24(4) is 
applicable.  
 
First, it is to be borne in mind that Article 24 is applicable regardless of the jurisdiction for 
patent infringement proceedings being determined by national law. Therefore the fact that the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation does not serve itself as a source of jurisdiction does not hinder or 
even exclude the application of Article 24(4). 
 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, it has been put forth that the Brussels I Regulation (and the 
same position might now also be taken as to the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable, 
but “that national basis of jurisdiction (should) apply to the issue whether a court has 
jurisdiction in cases involving a patent registered outside the European Judicial Area.”879 
However, this conception misconceives that, according to the fundamental provision of 
Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (which is now Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), it is the domicile of the defendant which is to be considered the decisive factor 
for the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation (and the same goes now with regard to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). The fact of where a patent has been registered is not relevant for 
this question.  
 
Having clarified that the application of Article 24(4) does not have to be denied for structural 
reasons, the probably most important problem consists in the wording of Article 24(4) which 
allows the direct application of this provision only in the case that a patent has been granted in 
or for a Member State: 
 
 
 Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 




(4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other 
similar rights required to be deposited or registered, (...), the courts of the Member State in which the 
deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the  
Union or an international convention deemed to have taken place. 
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The question of whether, respectively in which way Article 24(4) can be applied with regard 
to the other constellations indicated above is one of the main problems which have been 
discussed both in literature and case-law before the GAT decision – and are continuously 
being discussed after it. Several approaches have been proposed which shall be subject to a 
closer analysis in the following paragraphs.880    
 
 
2.4.2.3.3.1 Conception 1: Exhaustive regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
Based on the wording of Article 24 which expressly refers to the courts of Member States in 
which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of 
an instrument of the Union or an international convention deemed to have taken place, one 
could argue that, where the Brussels Ibis Regulation is affected, exclusive jurisdiction can 
only be derived from the rules of that Regulation. This would mean to allot the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation not only a binding, but also an exhaustive and concluding scope of application. As 
a consequence, jurisdiction granted by the Brussels Ibis Regulation would have to be accepted 
and respected, and must not be influenced by (a defence granted by) national (procedural) 
law. 
 
When discussing the relationship between the Brussels Ibis Regulation and rules of national 
procedural law, the decision of the ECJ in Owusu must be taken into consideration which was 
made pursuant to a reference for a preliminary ruling by the English Court of Appeal.881 This 
decision was based on the following facts: A defendant domiciled in England was sued in the 
English courts, under Article 2 of the Brussels Convention (Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), in connection with a tort committed in Jamaica. On the basis of the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens882, the defendant sought a stay of the proceedings putting forward that 
the courts of Jamaica were the most appropriate forum. The ECJ denied such a stay and 
emphasised that a Contracting State of the Brussels Convention may not apply the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens: 
 
“(...) the Brussels Convention precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State 
would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other 
Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting 
State.”883 
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In the light of this decision one might argue that a court of a Member State before which 
patent infringement proceedings have been initiated would not be entitled to decline 
jurisdiction, according to its national law, for the sole reason that a court of a non-Member 
State demands exclusive jurisdiction where the defence of invalidity of the patent has been 
raised.  
 
However, a closer analysis of the Owusu decision reveals that its scope was explicitly limited. 
The ECJ addressed only the issue of staying proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds in 
cases subject to Article 2 of the Brussels Convention (Article 4 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation).884 As to the further question raised by the referring English Court of Appeal of 
whether the application of forum non conveniens was ruled out in all circumstances, the ECJ 
left open if a different result might be possible, and national law preserved, in cases involving 
a different basis of jurisdiction, and (importantly) a different ground for declining to exercise 
jurisdiction,885 because of the hypothetical nature of that question which was not relevant in 
the concrete case. In light of this, the ECJ held: 
 
“Thus, the justification for a reference for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions 
on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective 
resolution of a dispute (...).”886 
 
It is to be underlined that the ECJ explicitly understood the further question as to concern  
 
“(...) cases where there were identical or related proceedings pending before a court of a non-
Contracting State, a convention granting jurisdiction to such a court or a connection with that State of 
the same type as those referred to in Article 16 of the Brussels Convention.”887 
 
With regard to this second question, it seems to go too far to construe that the silence of the 
ECJ as such contains a further meaning, because the court simply could not answer that 
question.888 It is therefore interesting and necessary to subject the Owusu decision to a further 
general analysis. 
 
Remarkably, the ECJ essentially founded its reasoning on general considerations when 
researching whether the forum non conveniens doctrine is compatible with the Brussels 
Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation).   
 
On the one hand, the ECJ underlined the importance of legal certainty, declaring: 
 
“Respect for the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the objectives of the Brussels Convention 
(...) would not be fully guaranteed if the court having jurisdiction under the Convention had to be 
allowed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine.”889 
 
As to the constellation of patent infringement proceedings where the invoked court would 
decline jurisdiction in favour of a court in a non-Member State, the decision of the first court 
to act in this way would also be determined by its discretion which would be contrary to legal 
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certainty. Furthermore, the consequences of a defence of invalidity for the jurisdiction of a 
court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated differ between the Member 
States as to patents granted in and for third States.890 
 
Besides, the ECJ pointed out the importance of the legal protection of persons domiciled in 
the Community (respectively in the Union according to the wording used in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) which is relevant in the constellation in question, too: 
 
“The legal protection of persons established in the Community would also be undermined. First, a 
defendant, who is generally better placed to conduct his defence before the courts of his domicile, 
would not be able, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, reasonably to foresee before 
which other court he may be sued. Second, where a plea is raised on the basis that a foreign court is a 
more appropriate forum to try the action, it is for the claimant to establish that he will not be able to 
obtain justice before that foreign court or, if the court seised decides to allow the plea, that the foreign 
court has in fact no jurisdiction to try the action or that the claimant does not, in practice, have access to 
effective justice before that court, irrespective of the cost entailed by the bringing of a fresh action 
before a court of another State and the prolongation of the procedural time-limits.”891   
  
Another rather general aspect emphasised by the ECJ is the necessity to guarantee a uniform 
application of rules of jurisdiction:  
 
“Moreover, allowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to 
affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is 
recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels 
Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules.”892 
 
If – and only if – the general considerations employed in Owusu also concerned the 
constellation to be discussed here, one might conclude that national (procedural) law must 
never be applied in the event that the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains any rules such as 
Article 24(4) in the constellation concerned. Consequently, this interpretation of Article 24(4) 
would be clearly in line with the Owusu decision:893 It would guarantee that the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation exclusively rules jurisdiction. Furthermore, a uniform interpretation and 
application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation between the Member States would be ensured 
which would also create and ensure legal certainty. Additionally, such an interpretation of 
Article 24(4) would conduce to legal protection of persons domiciled in the EU due to the 
obligation of Member States courts to exert jurisdiction and to respect the rules of recognition 
and enforcement. 
 
However, the crucial question is the following: Is the constellation which was decided in 
Owusu actually sufficiently comparable to the constellation under research here? On the one 
hand, one might be tempted to agree based on the reasoning that, if patent proceedings are 
dismissed due to an exclusive jurisdiction in another State, this decision is also based on 
considerations of forum non conveniens.894 The only difference could be considered the fact 
of exclusive jurisdiction becoming relevant in the patent cases.895 One might argue that the 
ECJ, in Owusu, merely intended to restrict the general possibility of a forum non convenience 
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defence.896 Thus, a dismissal of an action in certain, defined cases might be admitted.897 
However, this only means to shift the problem at another level: Which are these cases? How 
can they be defined? And according to which criteria? Who is entitled to define them? 
 
Besides, further doubts remain. When the ECJ held that  
 
“(i)t must be observed, first, that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, 
according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases 
expressly provided for by the Convention (...)”898 
 
it is to be pointed out that this idea cannot per se apply to the constellations in question here. 
For this argument being applicable, it would be rather necessary to allocate Articles 24(4) and 
27 an concluding character as to the dismissal of an action due to lack of jurisdiction, i. e. to 
allocate Articles 24(4) and 27 the additional content that jurisdiction existing according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation must be exerted in all cases which are not covered. However, doing 
so would not respect the fact that the Brussels Ibis Regulation is restricted to the 
“innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsverkehr”. There is no justification respectively no legal basis 
for the Brussels Ibis Regulation to allocate jurisdiction to courts of third States.899 
 
Other doubts as to such an interpretation of Article 24(4) ground on a comparison with other 
case-law of the ECJ. I shall continue my research with an analysis of the judgment of the ECJ 
in Coreck Maritime900 which was delivered before Owusu, and strangely ignored by the ECJ 
in the latter case.901 This analysis will reveal that the situation is not as clear as it might seem 
in the light of an isolated evaluation of the Owusu judgment. 
 
In Coreck Maritime, the ECJ had to decide on four questions concerning the interpretation of 
Article 17(1) of the Brussels Convention, on the occasion of a reference for a preliminary 
ruling by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, Netherlands. Those questions were raised in 
proceedings concerning the validity of a jurisdiction clause between Coreck Maritime GmbH, 
a company incorporated according to German law established in Hamburg, Germany, the 
issuer of the bills of lading, and Handelsveem BV, the holder in due course of the bills of 
lading, V. Berg and Sons Ltd and Man Producten Rotterdam BV, the owners of the cargo 
under the bills of lading, and The People's Insurance Company of China, the insurer of that 
cargo. As to the question of which law should govern the validity of a third-state jurisdiction 
agreement to the exclusive jurisdiction of a non-Member State, the ECJ decided in favour of 
the law applicable under the conflicts rules of the forum:  
 
“(...) Article 17 of the [Brussels] Convention does not apply to clauses designating a court in a third 
country. A court situated in a Contracting State must, if it is seised notwithstanding such a jurisdiction 
clause, assess the validity of the clause according to the applicable law, including conflict of laws rules, 
where it sits (...) [content in brackets added].”902  
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In the course of its reasoning, the ECJ explicitly referred to the Schlosser Report on the 
Brussels Convention903.904 This report clearly states: 
 
“In cases where parties agree to bring their disputes before the courts of a State which is not a party to 
the 1968 Convention there is obviously nothing in the 1968 Convention to prevent such courts from 
declaring themselves competent, if their law recognizes the validity of such an agreement. (...) If a court 
within the Community is applied to despite such an agreement, its decision on the validity of the 
agreement depriving it of jurisdiction must be taken in accordance with its own lex fori. In so far as the 
local rules of conflict of laws support the authority of provisions of foreign law, the latter will apply 
(…).”905 
 
The rules of private international law as to jurisdiction of the forum thus being decisive in this 
constellation, the report clearly provides:  
 
“(…) If, when these tests are applied, the agreement is found to be invalid, then the jurisdictional 
provisions of the 1968 Convention become applicable.”906 
 
However, a contrario, this inescapably implies that a court must have the power to decline 
jurisdiction if such an agreement is valid, because then the European regime is inapplicable, 
allowing a court to decline jurisdiction under national law. Coreck Maritime thus suggests 
that a national court might in certain cases decline to exercise jurisdiction derived from the 
Regulation.907  
 
In this light – although Coreck Maritime did not directly concern Article 16 of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – at least severe doubts seem justified 
as to an exhaustive understanding of the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to which (a 
defence provided by) national procedural law would principally not be applicable where the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation contains any applicable rule of jurisdiction. 
 
It has been rightly underlined that such a conception would produce “results which could 
hardly be justified” (“kaum zu rechtfertigende Ergebnisse”)908 where parties had agreed on an 
exclusive prorogation of jurisdiction in favour of a court or courts of a third State – a situation 
similar to the situation of Article 25 as to Member States – but at least the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State; then Article 4 would give jurisdiction to the courts of the State 
of domicile of the defendant, Article 25 not conferring exclusive character to such jurisdiction 
due to its wording which only refers to courts of Member States. And Article 4(1) provides 
that its restriction is merely possible “subject to this Regulation”, the latter not containing any 
specific rules as to the prorogation of jurisdiction in favour of courts of third States.909 A 
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Member State court would thus be obliged to decide on a patent infringement case brought 
before it although parties might have agreed on the jurisdiction of a court of a third State.910 
 
Additionally, it is to be pointed out that, according to the conception in question, a Member 
State court could neither dismiss the action, nor would it be allowed to stay the proceedings, 
because the Brussels Ibis Regulation exhaustively rules the stay of proceedings911 and, 
moreover, a stay would partly limit the jurisdiction, as a court of a third State would then be 
competent to decide on the validity question. With reference to the Owusu judgment, this 
would not only be contrary to the principle of legal certainty by guaranteeing a binding order 
of jurisdiction without discretionary consideration912, but would also disregard the principle of 
legal protection of persons domiciled in the Community. The deciding court would be forced 
to decide by way of an inter partes decision or would have to presume – against the 
defendant – the validity of the patent. As a consequence, the legal situation would be 
completely different in comparison with Member State patents where courts are not allowed 
to examine their validity by way of an inter partes decision according to the GAT decision.913  
 
It would actually appear hard to accept that the Brussels Ibis Regulation intends to 
compromise the interests of persons within the EU in such a way.914 Actually, the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation cannot contain a rule which explicitly imposes on third States to exert an 
exclusive jurisdiction. That “legal impossibility of enacting a rule that the courts of a non-
Member State have jurisdiction”915 may not be misunderstood in such a way that this aspect 
has been implicitly ruled.916 For this would be clearly beyond the competences of the 
European legislator. 
 
Consequently, the conception of an exhaustive regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
implying that national (procedural) law can in no way have effect if the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation provides a respective rule – even if it is not applicable in the specific case – is to 
be rejected.  
 
 
2.4.2.3.3.2 Conception 2: Regulatory sovereignty of national law  
 
In view of the insight that the conception of an exhaustive regime of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation as described above does not offer an appropriate solution, a possible alternative 
could be to fall back on national law as has been carved out impressively by Fentiman: “Or 
does it suggest that such cases are the province of national law?”917 Following this approach, 
one could think of determining the effects of a defence of nullity of a patent granted in or for a 
third State solely pursuant to the rules of national (procedural) law. 
 
In this respect, it has been suggested that the domicile of the defendant or places of special 
jurisdiction do not create a sufficient link to the forum in the Member State, so that national 
law must be applied.918 However, against the background of Owusu, it must be stated that, 
even if a dismissal of an action was admitted in certain, defined cases, it would not be 
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defensible to confer national law the competence to decide if jurisdiction according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation could be denied by sovereign national law. Independently from the 
outcome of the question of whether Owusu is fully applicable to the constellation under 
research, it seems obvious anyway at least that it cannot be completely ignored. So a reference 
to national law would seem only justified if and inasmuch as this would create a smaller 
opposition to the fundamental principles of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and their essential 
goals of legal certainty and unique application than the application of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens which has been subject to the Owusu decision.919 
 
 
2.4.2.3.3.3 Conception 3: Reflexive application of Article 24(4) 
 
Having denied an exhaustive effect of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, while also refusing 
regulatory sovereignty of national law in cases where jurisdiction is granted by the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, the question must be posed if a solution may be found in between those 
positions.  
 
Actually two major approaches have been elaborated and developed in this respect. It is to be 
noticed that the dividing lines between these two approaches are rather diffuse. Moreover, not 
all supporters of what is being characterised as a “reflexive application of Article 24(4)” in 
this thesis actually distinctly differentiate between these two theories.  
 
On the one hand, it is conceivable to apply Article 24 by way of an analogy in cases where a 
patent is granted in or for a third State. This approach is commonly referred to as a direct 
reflexive application. On the other hand, one could also apply national law in these cases, but 
import principles of the Brussels Ibis Regulation into the respective national (procedural) laws 
(indirect reflexive application).  
 
With regard to both approaches, it is to be borne in mind that such an extended interpretation 
of Article 24 is anything but self-evident and needs to be founded on good reasons.920 It must 
be founded on a balancing of the concerned interests relevant in the field of PIL.921 
Additionally, it is to be borne in mind that refusing jurisdiction to the courts of a Member 
State which, in principle, have jurisdiction according to Article 4, can only be justified if the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation does not provide any solution being more appropriate.922   
 
 
2.4.2.3.3.3.1 Indirect reflexive application of Article 24(4) 
 
The theory of the effet réflexe was originally elaborated by Droz in his famous work 
“Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marché Commun” which was 
published in 1972. Having in mind primarily the situation of immovables, ruled in Article 
16(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation),923 Droz 
reasoned that Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) rules that certain connecting elements are decisive to give courts exclusive 
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jurisdiction, and that this does not change in the situation that these courts are situated in a 
third State. He impressively stated: 
 
“En effet, les raisons qui ont conduit à l’énumération du catalogue de l’article 16 [de la Convention de 
Bruxelles] subsistent dans le cas où les éléments de rattachement sont situés hors de la Communauté. Si 
le droit commun français veut que les juges français soient incompétents pour trancher un litige relatif à 
un immeuble situé à l’étranger, les raisons qui militent en France pour cette solution conservent leur 
valeur: les juges français ne seront pas mieux armés pour trancher des questions ayant trait par exemple 
à une immatriculation sur un registre foncier autrichien. Il en est de même lorsqu’on estime qu’un juge 
français n’a pas à intervenir pour prononcer la mainlevée d’une saisie-arrêt effectuée à l’étranger.”924  
 
(“Actually, the reasons which have led to the enumeration of the catalogue of Article 16 [of the Brussels 
Convention] persist in the case that the connecting elements are situated outside the Community. If 
French law rules that French courts do not have jurisdiction to solve a case concerning immovable 
property being situated abroad, the reasons which strike for this solution in France keep their validity: 
French courts will not be better armed for solving questions dealing with, for instance, a registration in 
an Austrian land register. The same is true when considering that a French court shall not intervene to 
pronounce the dissolution of a seizure effected abroad.”)925 
 
In a later publication, appearing in 1990, Droz reformulated: 
 
“Si donc un juge français est radicalement incompétent pour juger d’un immeuble ou d’un brevet 
allemand, en raison de la spécificité et de la particularité du droit réel ou du droit des brevets allemands, 
on ne voit pas pourquoi il serait mieux armé pour juger d’un bail rural argentin ou de la validité d’un 
brevet japonais!”926  
 
(“Consequently, if a French court does not have jurisdiction to decide on German immovables or on a 
German patent, due to the originality and the peculiarity of German real property law or patent law, 
there is no reason why the court would be better armed for deciding on an Argentinian lease of land or 
on the validity of a Japanese patent.”)927  
 
As to the legal nature of the “effet réflexe”, Droz qualified the reflexive application as a 
specific case of application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens: 
 
“Cette prise en considération indirecte de l’article 16 constitue en fait un cas d’application 
exceptionnelle de la théorie du forum non conveniens et il n’est pas étonnant que notre position ait 
trouvé écho en pays de Common Law.”928  
 
(“This indirect consideration of Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention] actually constitutes a specific 
case of application of the theory of forum non conveniens and it is not surprising that our position has 
been echoed in common law countries [content in brackets added].”)929   
 
According to Droz’s conception, national laws should thus have the possibility to decide 
whether to apply Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) vis-à-vis third States.930 However, while this approach might have been possible 
under the Brussels Convention (although such a possibility for the Contracting States actually 
would not promote legal certainty and predictability), it has at the latest become obsolete with 
the creation of the Brussels I Regulation, and continues to be under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, because the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessor) is directly 
                                                 
924 Droz 1972, para. 167. 
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 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
926
 Droz (1990)79(1) Rev. crit. DIP 1, at p. 14. 
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 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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applicable in the Member States. Further, it has to be applied in an identical way by the 
Member States, its content being subject to an autonomous interpretation.931  
 
With regard to Article 16 of the Brussels Convention, it could, in theory, be put forth that 
treaty law takes preference over national law and, consequently, an extensive application of 
Article 16 of the Brussels Convention as such vis-à-vis third States – instead of applying rules 
of national law – would be preferable. However, proponents of an indirect reflexive 
application of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) have put forth that this objection is rather theoretical and Droz’s approach would 
only construe the Brussels Convention in a reasonable way.932 Arguing in favour of Droz’s 
idea of an indirect reflexive effect of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), it has also been put forward that, in the event that the defendant is 
not domiciled within the EU, national private international law is decisive anyway, by virtue 
of the express provision of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 6(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation); then it could be considered reasonable to reach the same result in 
the case of a defendant domiciled within the EU.933 
 
A major merit of the approach of an indirect reflexive application of Article 24(4) would 
certainly be that it would be in line with the decision of the ECJ in Coreck Maritime, because 
(nominally) national law would be applicable. Moreover, the approach would be conform to 
the Owusu decision of the ECJ, because courts of Member States would not decline 
jurisdiction conferred by the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to national law for the mere 
reason that another court would be a more convenient forum. For national (procedural) law 
would only be applicable if it effected identical or at least almost identical legal 
consequences as Article 24(4),934 i.e. if it corresponded to “evaluations immanent to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation” (“verordnungsimmanente Wertungen”) founding on the common 
ground that the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides the claimant, in certain circumstances, with 
one forum only, excluding all other competing jurisdictions.935 
 
However, while the latter consideration definitely bears some theoretical charm, it is highly 
doubtful how it could be practically realised. According to the idea that principles/evaluations 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would have to be respected when applying national 
(procedural) law, it would be necessary to determine which degree of consistency between 
national (procedural) law and the Brussels Ibis Regulation is required to assume that such 
“evaluations immanent to the Brussels Ibis Regulation”936 are preserved. Following this 
reasoning, it has been proposed to differentiate between six degrees of consistency: 
Consistency in terms; consistency in specific objectives, provided that national law is non-
discretionary; consistency in specific objectives, whether or not the rule of national law is 
discretionary; consistency in general objectives, whether or not the rule of national law is 
discretionary; consistency in general objectives, provided that national law is non-
discretionary; consistency in design.937 At this point, the disadvantages of the discussed 
approach become obvious: First, such a categorisation appears arbitrary and therefore does 
                                                 
931
 ECJ 15 November 1983, C-288/82, Ferdinand M. J. J. Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer, [1983] ECR 03663, 
paras. 18-19 – Duijnstee. 
932 J.P. Verheul (case note) Rb. Amsterdam 13 May 1975, Eurotex Italia (Italy) v C. Rensel (Netherlands), 
(1975)22 N.I.L.R. 209.  
933
 As to Article 16 of the Brussels Convention: J.P. Verheul (case note) Rb. Amsterdam 13 May 1975, Eurotex 
Italia (Italy) v C. Rensel (Netherlands), (1975)22 N.I.L.R. 209. 
934
 Schauwecker (2009)58(3) GRUR Int. 187, at p. 193. 
935
 As to the Brussels I Regulation: Heinze & Dutta (2005)25(3) IPRax 224, at p. 227. 
936
 As to the Brussels I Regulation: Heinze & Dutta (2005)25(3) IPRax 224, at p. 227. 
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not promote legal certainty. Besides, even if it was possible to define clear categories, it 
would be rather difficult to determine in which category a specific case falls. In light of this, 
the approach discussed obviously offers no pragmatic solution. Moreover, differing 
interpretations in the Member States would be provoked, with the potential (but probable) 
effect of an inconsistent application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the Member States due 
to the fact that the rules of national law of the Member States vary from each other.938 The 
ECJ has clearly stated that this situation should be avoided.939 Furthermore, one might at least 
theoretically think of the legal situation that a State does not provide in its legal order a rule 
(respectively a legal consequence) comparable with Article 24(4). Then the danger of a 
“Normenmangel” (i.e. a legal “gap” due to the absence of a provision) would exist because 
then the national law could not be applied, while Article 24(4) would not be applicable 
either.940 
 
Last but not least it is probable that the ECJ – if the court had to decide at this very moment – 
would choose a solution which strives for taking into account both its Coreck Maritime 
decision and its Owusu decision. As has been mentioned above,941 the ECJ ignored Coreck 
Maritime when deciding Owusu. It is conceivable that the ECJ simply lost sight of its decision 
in Coreck Maritime or that the court did not recognise potential parallels between the two 
cases. But it is also possible that the ECJ deliberately did not take into account Coreck 
Maritime when deciding Owusu because the court was of the opinion that no such parallels 
existed. Given the latter hypothesis being true, one would have to conclude that only Owusu 
was relevant in the constellation under discussion, which implies that national (procedural) 
law would not be applicable at all.942 
 
 
2.4.2.3.3.3.2 Direct reflexive application of Article 24(4) 
 
Having researched the approach of an indirect reflexive application of Article 24(4) in the 
sense that the evaluations of this provisions must be reflected in national (procedural) 
provisions in order to make them being applicable, I shall now treat the variant of a direct 
reflexive application of Article 24(4) in the event of patent infringement proceedings as to 
patents granted in or for third States, when the defence of invalidity of the patent has been 
raised. According to this approach, the defence of invalidity would have the same effect 
concerning patents granted in an EU Member State and in a non-Member State. 
 
To begin the analysis of the arguments which militate for and against the theory of a direct 
reflexive application of Article 24(4), it is to be mentioned that this issue is probably one of 
the most controversial subjects with regard to Article 24(4). First of all, it is to be underlined 
that the “advantage” of a (direct) reflexive application of Article 24(4) in case that a patent 
has been granted by or in another State, which might be seen in the fact that the law of such 
third States would not have to be determined by Member States courts because courts of such 
third States then have exclusive jurisdiction, should be neglected, because this argument 
would apply in all cases where different legal systems are involved and would therefore mean 
the end of (the need for) private international law.943 
 
                                                 
938
 Schauwecker (2009)58(3) GRUR Int. 187, at p. 193. 
939
 This aspect is explicitly emphasised by Heinze/Dutta, cf. Heinze & Dutta (2005)25(3) IPRax 224, at p. 228. 
940
 Schauwecker (2009)58(3) GRUR Int. 187, at p. 193.  
941
 Fentiman 2008, p. 174. 
942
 Schauwecker (2009)58(3) GRUR Int. 187, at p. 193. 
943
 Geimer 2015, paras. 930-931. 
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As an argument against the concept of a direct application of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively its predecessors), it may be referred to the clear wording of both 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation944 and Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation945 (respectively the predecessors of these provisions). Both provisions explicitly 
use the terms “courts of the Member State” (Article 24) respectively “courts of another 
Member State” (Article 27). It is to be underlined that the Brussels Ibis Regulation, as a legal 
act between the Member States, cannot contain a positive allocation of jurisdiction to courts 
of third States, because the Brussels Ibis Regulation has no power to force third States to 
decide on cases.946 International jurisdiction of such third States is rather determined by the 
law applicable in and for their territory.947 Thus, Article 24 merely allocates international 
jurisdiction to the courts of Member States, and does not contain such provisions regarding 
third States.948  
 
Although the wording of Article 24 and Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(respectively their predecessors) may be distinct, the foregoing argumentation against a direct 
reflexive application of Article 24(4) – being purely based on the wording of Article 24(4) – 
is actually not convincing. Noteworthily, this is not for the reasons that provisions of national 
procedural law which contain rules concerning local jurisdiction (i.e. with regard to courts 
within the respective State), are generally recognised to enclose also rules of international 
jurisdiction, and, similarly, the Brussels Convention (the same argument would apply as to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) expressly addresses Contracting States (Member States) and should 
however be considered to also have effect vis-à-vis third States.949 The latter argumentation 
cannot be correct, because it would imply comparing two things which simply lack 
comparability, a typical comparison of “apples to oranges”: Whilst the extending 
interpretation from local jurisdiction to international jurisdiction concerns different factual 
aspects, an extending interpretation from Contracting States (Member States) to third States 
would concern different addressees. Additionally, it is to be noticed that a conclusion based 
on national attitudes respectively habits of interpretation might be relevant with regard to the 
interpretation of a Convention which becomes incorporated national law (if at all); however, 
as to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is to be noted that it must be interpreted by way of an 
autonomous interpretation.950 The foregoing argumentation referring to the clear wording of 
Article 24 and Article 27 suffers from an equalisation of a direct application of Article 24(4) 
and the allocation of a direct reflexive effect to Article 24(4). Regarding the criticism that the 
construct of a reflexive effect of a legal provision generally does not exist,951 meaning that 
Article 24(4) is simply not applicable in the case of a patent which is granted in a third 
State,952 it is to be underlined that a direct reflexive application as understood in this context 
structurally constitutes an application by way of an analogy. In other words, the discussion is 
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 Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 22 EuGVVO, para. 12; with 
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fn. 22; Martiny 1984, para. 183. 
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not about applying Article 24(4) directly vis-à-vis third States, but by allocating Article 24(4) 
a direct reflexive effect, i.e. applying Article 24(4) by way of an analogy. An analogy 
premises the existence of a “legal gap” which was not intended by the legislator, and the 
existence of a comparable situation which should be ruled in the same way as the 
constellation being explicitly ruled. Therefore, the fact that the wording of Article 24 and 
Article 27 expressly refers to courts of Member States, cannot serve as an argument against 
the concept of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4), but simply demonstrates that 
Article 24(4) cannot be applied directly if the patent in question has been granted in or for a 
third State, while an analogous application of Article 24(4) would remain possible.  
 
Arguing against a direct reflexive application of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) by way of a historical interpretation, recourse has 
been taken to the Almeida Cruz-Desantes Real-Jenard Report953 and the Jenard-Möller 
Report954, both concerning Article 16 of the Brussels Convention. The Almeida Cruz-
Desantes Real-Jenard Report, referring to the Jenard-Möller Report, actually stated:  
 
“25.(d) As already pointed out in the Jenard-Möller Report (paragraph 54), 'Article 16(1) applies 
only if the property is situated in the territory of a Contracting State. The text is sufficiently explicit on 
this point. If the property is situated in the territory of a third State, the other provisions of the 
Convention apply, e.g. Article 2 if the defendant is domiciled in the territory of a Contracting State, and 
Article 4 if he is domiciled in the territory of a third State, etc.”955 
 
Admittedly, the point of view of the report as to the application of Article 16 of the Brussels 
Convention has also been subject to critique956 as it lacks profound arguments but rather 
restricts itself to regard the wording without analysing its content and further meaning. Also 
for this reason, proponents of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4) (respectively its 
predecessors) have characterised the view in the report as “bad sense and worse law”.957 
 
Nonetheless, proponents of such a direct reflexive application have additionally referred to the 
following part of Opinion 1/03 of the ECJ from 7 February 2006 (Lugano):958  
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“(…) Thus, where the new Lugano Convention contains articles identical to Articles 22 and 23 of 
Regulation No 44/2001 and leads on that basis to selection as the appropriate forum of a court of a non-
member country which is a party to that Convention, where the defendant is domiciled in a Member 
State, in the absence of the Convention, that latter State would be the appropriate forum, whereas under 
the Convention it is the non-member country.”959 
 
Another crucial argument against the concept of a direct effet réflexe of Article 24(4) is the 
fact that the essential goal and the basis of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (as well as its 
predecessors) – to create legal certainty by providing for predictable places of jurisdiction, 
and by avoiding opposing decisions – is restricted to the Community (Union) territory.960 The 
whole Brussels Ibis Regulation is, due to Article 81 TFEU (ex Article 65 TEC), limited to the 
creation of a system of jurisdiction within the Community (Union). The basis of conferring 
jurisdiction to other Member States courts is the mutual trust in the equivalence of Member 
States courts. As to the Brussels Convention, it was already underlined that its sole mission 
was to circumscribe jurisdictions of Contracting States from each other, not between 
Contracting States and third States.961 Otherwise conflicts would come into existence between 
the Brussels Convention and such conventions on recognition and enforcement which 
Contracting States to the Brussels Convention and third States have agreed on deviant rules 
on jurisdiction. Consequently, such conventions on recognition and enforcement between 
single Contracting States and third States would be precluded, because the Brussels 
Convention at least already contained rules on jurisdiction and therefore, insofar, this aspect 
could only be ruled jointly by all Contracting States of the Brussels Convention. However, 
Article 59 of the Brussels Convention would allow for bilateral conventions on the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments between Contracting States and third States. This 
would imply that these parties can also negotiate on jurisdiction.962  
 
Even Droz, a strong supporter of the effet réflexe of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), admitted: 
 
“En effet, l’article 16 [de la Convention de Bruxelles] a pour objet essentiel d’assurer la compétence 
directe exclusive des tribunaux des Etats contractants et non pas de poser des règles relatives à leur 
incompétence. Dans les relations intercommunautaires, l’incompétence se déduit de la compétence du 
tribunal exclusivement désigné.”963  
 
(“Actually, Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention] pursues the essential goal to guarantee the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States, and not to deliver rules concerning their non-
jurisdiction. Within intra-community relations, non-jurisdiction is deduced from the jurisdiction of the 
court which has exclusive jurisdiction [underscores and content in brackets added].”)964   
  
Droz restated his notion in a later publication in the following way: 
 
“(...) il est certain que l’article 16 [de la Convention de Bruxelles] ne vise expressément que les 
immeubles situés ou encore les brevets enregistrés dans un Etat contractant.”965 
 
(“(...) certainly, Article 16 [of the Brussels Convention] expressly concerns only immovables situated or 
patents registered in a Contracting State [underscores and content in brackets added].”)966   
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Nevertheless, arguing in favour of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4) where a 
patent has been granted in or for a third State, it might be argued that, even if the creation of 
legal certainty by providing for predictable places of jurisdiction, and by avoiding opposing 
decisions, was restricted to the Community (Union) territory, that would not imply that this 
objective could not be extended to third States. On the basis of this line of reasoning, one 
might find that Article 24(4), conferring exclusive jurisdiction, contains such a compellent 
allocation of jurisdiction that it should also be applied vis-à-vis third States. One might even 
argue that Article 24(4) does not intend to confer jurisdiction to a Member State court as such, 
but to a court of the State where the patent has been granted. In this respect, the Brussels 
Convention (and the same might be argued for the Brussels Ibis Regulation) has been 
considered to be not only a “core of a European civil procedural law”967, but also the basis of 
a European civil procedural code vis-à-vis third States.968  
 
However, the idea of such an extension of jurisdiction to third States would disregard the fact 
that the courts of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled are not only entitled, but 
also obliged to grant jurisdiction (“Justizgewährungsanspruch”), and that the same goes for 
the courts of the Member States having jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 7 et seq. of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors).969 The idea of this reasoning is 
that the claimant must not be deprived of his right to benefit from a certain head of 
jurisdiction under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.970 As a matter of fact, obligations of a 
Member State towards third States arising from conventions can only be fulfilled in the 
framework of Article 71,971 because the claimant’s “Justizgewährungsanspruch” and his 
guarantee of a venue (“Gerichtsstand”) which are both inherent to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, would be violated otherwise.972 In view of this, a reflexive application of Article 
24(4) actually seems to be in opposition to the fundamental principle of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation that the exceptions to the rule of Article 4(1) (jurisdiction of the courts where the 
defendant has his domicile) provided in Article 7 to 26 must be interpreted in a narrow 
way.973  
 
Arguing anyway in favour of a reflexive application of Article 24(4), it could be put forth, 
while admitting that, due to the fundamental importance of the principle of Article 4(1), other 
provisions ruling jurisdiction, including Article 24, must not be interpreted too broadly, that 
given Article 24(4) contains a compellent allocation of jurisdiction, Article 4(1) cannot per se 
overrule Article 24(4). For this would not appear justified in view of the importance of rules 
of exclusive jurisdiction, given that exclusive jurisdiction is merely granted in circumstances 
enumerated in Article 24 (besides Article 25 according to which Member States courts can be 
granted exclusive jurisdiction by way of a prorogation of jurisdiction).  
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However, as a matter of fact, Article 24 does not prohibit the courts of the Member States to 
declare themselves competent, because the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not prescribe that 
the litigation must be brought before the courts of the third State where the patent has been 
granted even if the validity issue has been raised (as the Regulation would do in favour of 
Member States courts if the validity of a Member State patent or European patent was 
concerned),974 because the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not affect the jurisdiction of courts 
in third States. In this respect, one may refer to Article 6(2), 5(2).975 More precisely, it is to be 
stated that Article 24 can only found jurisdiction of a court of a Member State, but it cannot 
preclude jurisdiction of a court of a Member State.976 It is therefore not true that even if 
Article 24(4) did not create the jurisdiction of a court of a non-Member State, its negative 
effect (excluding jurisdiction of the Member State court where infringement proceedings have 
been initiated) would have to be respected.977 
 
In practice, chaos would be caused, if courts of non-Member States were granted exclusive 
jurisdiction to the same extent as Article 24 confers to the courts of Member States, because 
this would mean to apply Community standards to non-Member States which will certainly 
have their own standards. Consequently, if exclusive jurisdiction was to be respected it would 
have to be exclusive jurisdiction to the extent as it is demanded by the respective non-Member 
State.978 In this context, it is to be underlined that one should not blindly trust the grounds on 
which third States claim exclusive jurisdiction for their courts. As a consequence, a double-
checking by applying some controlling Community standard has been considered to be 
necessary.979 In this respect, the Groupe Européen de Droit International Privé – GEDIP 
(European Group for Private International Law – EGPIL), in the framework of an proposed 
amendment of the Brussels I Regulation, proposed to accept (in the absence of any exclusive 
jurisdiction vested in Member States courts) exclusive jurisdiction by courts of non-Member 
States if the following two conditions are fulfilled: First, such jurisdiction must be founded 
under the law of the respective non-Member State on the basis of its own provisions. Second, 
such provisions must be analogous to Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation). According to the working group, these ideas should be 
integrated in a separate provision (Article 22bis).980 Although this approach might be logical, 
it is complicated and rather hard to manage by practitioners who mostly are not familiar with 
international procedural law on a day-to-day basis.981  
 
Arguing in favour of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4), it might be put forth, with 
regard to the addressed risk of the potential creation of chaos, that denying a reflexive 
application of Article 24(4) would be opposed to the objective, the conception and the spirit 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which has, in Article 24, defined certain connecting factors 
which are considered solely appropriate in the affected constellations.982 Following this 
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& Schütze), Art. 16 EuGVÜ, para. 7, Grundmann (1985)5(5) IPRax 249, at p. 251 et seq.; similar: Droz 1972, 
paras. 164 ff; Gothot & Holleaux 1985, para. 37; Gaudemet-Tallon 2010, para. 100; Briggs & Rees 2009, paras. 
2.62 and 2.259; Gottwald 2013 (Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO), EuGVO Art. 22, para. 6; cf. also the Dutch 
decisions concerning the application of Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention with regard to cases where 
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approach, it might be argued that it cannot be assumed that the creators of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively its predecessors) intended to disrespect, vis-à-vis third States, a 
criterion which has been considered reasonable vis-à-vis Member States (respectively 
Contracting States with regard to the Brussels Convention).983 Furthermore, it could be argued 
that, with regard to immovables (Article 16(1) of the Brussels Convention respectively Article 
24(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) it has equally been remarked that it is justified to apply 
this rule of jurisdiction also vis-à-vis third States, if there are compellent reasons for 
establishing a “Belegenheitszuständigkeit” as exclusive jurisdiction. It could be put forth that 
international chaos would be the consequence or at least provoked in the very event that these 
compellent reasons are disregarded.984 
  
However, it is to be emphasised that such a respect of exclusive jurisdiction in non-Member 
States can neither be based on the sovereignty of a foreign State which would ban courts of 
other States from deciding on immovables situated within their territory,985 nor on the idea of 
“international fairness”.986 First, it is not clear who shall be protected by this principle; no 
defendant domiciled in a Member State would be protected. Besides, in the constellation 
where, for instance, a Dutch court decides on a dispute between a Dutch claimant and a Dutch 
defendant concerning a European patent granted for Norway, most pieces of evidence being 
available in the Netherlands, this would not appear to be “unfair”, but “fairly” reasonable.  
 
Another argument which may be stressed against a direct reflexive application of Article 24 is 
the presumed danger of negative conflicts of competence (“negative Kompetenzkonflikte”) 
arising if the courts of a Member State consider to lack jurisdiction, due to a reflexive 
application of Article 24, in favour of the courts of a non-Member State, which however do 
not claim exclusive jurisdiction according to the law of this third State and consider 
themselves not competent.987 It may be demanded that, in the absence of a positive allocation 
of jurisdiction to third States, there must not be the possibility of derogation either, in order to 
avoid such negative conflicts of competence, which could come into existence due to the fact 
that the Brussels Ibis Regulation might use other connecting elements than national laws, and 
the scope of application of Article 24 and provisions of national (procedural) laws of third 
States might therefore differ.988 In this context it is to be pointed out that it is not sure that the 
foreign third State actually utilises the exclusive jurisdiction granted by way of a reflexive 
application of Article 24,989 although it is a matter of fact that, concerning patents, the States 
where a patent has been granted generally claim exclusive jurisdiction as to the question of 
the validity of the respective patent, at least concerning decisions having erga omnes effect.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vermögensanlage GmbH-Emissions KG (Germany) v Orspan SA (Spain), NJ 1978, 621, with case note J.C. 
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In order to avoid the risk of negative conflicts of competence, assuming a direct reflexive 
effect of Article 24(4) would at least require that certain conditions are fulfilled.990 First, the 
condition has been set up that the third State’s courts concretely claim exclusive 
jurisdiction.991 This condition has been considered necessary to meet the fundamental concern 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessor) to grant access to the courts (of 
the Member States), as free as possible, if certain minimal connections exist. Otherwise, if the 
third State does not provide international jurisdiction of its courts for this dispute, denial of 
justice (“Justizverweigerung”) could be the consequence.992 On the other hand, the condition 
that the third State demands an exclusive jurisdiction would take into account the fact that a 
reflexive application of Article 24 must not be imposed on sovereign third States.993 In 
reaction to this condition, the argument has been brought forward that a limitation of a 
reflexive effect to the cases in which a third State also claims exclusive jurisdiction, would 
force courts to determine foreign rules of jurisdiction which would overburden the 
examination by the courts of the Member States.994 Besides, it has been highlighted that such 
an approach would hardly be compatible with the basic principles of legal certainty and 
previsibility.995 Additionally, the courts would have to enquire which heads of exclusive 
jurisdiction exist in the law of a non-Member State. Whilst the forum seised can easily resort 
to lists of heads of exclusive jurisdiction of courts of Member States, the situation is much 
more complicated vis-à-vis courts of third States where such an easy way of information does 
not exist.996 This all being true, it is to be admitted that the situation as to patent litigations 
seems less problematic, at least in this respect, as illustrated by some fundamental opponents 
of the idea of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4). There is no doubt that, as to 
patent litigation, States generally confer exclusive jurisdiction to their courts as to registration 
and validity issues.997 
 
As a second condition, it has been claimed that the third State is able to grant effective legal 
(judicial) protection998. Regarding this issue, it is to be noticed that the third State where the 
patent has been granted is usually closest to the relevant facts and evidence (proximity to facts 
and evidence, “Sach- und Beweisnähe”) and can therefore offer the (most) appropriate forum 
for proceedings when the validity of the patent is contested,999 although cases are conceivable 
where another solution would seem preferable. Another opinion has put forth, in relation to 
immovables, that, for instance, witnesses domiciled in a Member State or documents placed 
in a Member State might be relevant pieces of evidence besides the importance of the place of 
registration in the third State, and that the aspect of proximity to facts and evidence of that 
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third State would therefore be of minor relevance.1000 Inasmuch as this objection is concerned, 
it is to be underlined that it is not convincing to conclude1001 that the aspect of proximity to 
facts and evidence militates for the contrary. This aspect neither militates for an exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts where the patent has been granted and registered, nor for the 
jurisdiction of other courts; it simply does not bear any relevance at all in this respect.  
 
As an additional aspect concerning the condition of an effective legal (judicial) protection to 
be granted in the third State, it has even been put forth on the contrary, with regard to 
immovables,1002 that court decisions rendered outside the “Belegenheitsstaat” (third State), 
i.e. decisions produced in a Contracting State/Member State, suffer from a lack of effectivity 
due to the idea that such decisions will not be recognised in the “Belegenheitsstaat”.1003 
However, this objection is not convincing. Although it cannot be denied that this consequence 
may occur, it is not sure that it will necessarily occur.1004 Besides, parties should be given the 
possibility and responsibility to assess this risk and weigh it against the advantages of quick 
legal protection before a Member State court.1005 After all, the judgment at least exists and is 
effective in the forum State,1006 and the effects of such a judgment will have to be taken into 
account in subsequent proceedings.1007 Furthermore, it is to be considered that assigning 
exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the third State means that the possibilities of provisional 
measures are substantially restricted. This is even more severe as provisional measures of 
foreign courts are generally not recognised.1008 
 
A third condition that has been set up consists in the requirement that a decision of the courts 
of the third State can be recognised and enforced in the Member State whose courts have been 
invoked, which will regularly be the defendant’s State of domicile.1009 With regard to Article 
16(1) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the argument 
has been raised against a reflexive effect of the respective provision that the courts of a 
Contracting State (Member State) would have to assume international jurisdiction of the 
courts of a third State even if the judgment delivered in that third State did not fall under the 
scope of application of the Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation).1010 This might 
lead to the result that the judgment by a court of the third State eventually could not be 
recognised and executed in the Member State.1011 Where it was not sure that a decision made 
in the concerned third State would be recognised in the Member State where infringement 
proceedings have been initiated,1012 further complications could arise when a decision 
delivered in the concerned third State is recognised in the forum Member State where 
infringement proceedings have been initiated, but is not recognised in other Member States 
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(because no respective international agreement exists), while the forum Member State might 
potentially be obliged by an international agreement to recognise such decisions.1013 Multiple 
constellations are conceivable in this respect which would make it impossible to simply grant 
exclusive jurisdiction to third States in general in cases where Article 24(4) would apply if a 
Member State was concerned.1014 
 
In this context, concerning the condition of a reflexive application of Article 24(4) that a 
decision of the courts of the third State could be recognised and enforced in the Member State 
where the defendant is domiciled, it might be argued that the courts of that Member State, 
having jurisdiction according to Article 4, do not have to decline jurisdiction in favour of a 
court of a third State claiming exclusive jurisdiction, where such exclusive jurisdiction would 
exist if the court of the third State was a court of a Member State, for the sole reason that the 
judgment of the courts of the third State would be recognisable in the Member State. 
Otherwise, there would be no competent court in a Member State if a judgment of a court of a 
third State could be recognised and executed in that Member State.1015 In this respect, it might 
be put forth that positive conflicts of competence (“positive Kompetenzkonflikte”) in the 
relationship with a third State which demands exclusive jurisdiction must generally be 
accepted and be solved by rules of lis pendens and recognition pursuant to national law.1016 
 
Arguing in favour of a direct reflexive application of Article 24(4), it might be put forward 
that, in the absence of such a reflexive application, there would be the risk that a decision 
produced in a Member State would not be recognised in a third State, inasfar as that third 
State concretely demands to exert an exclusive jurisdiction.1017 As a consequence, “hinkende 
Rechtsverhältnisse” could come into existence.1018 In this respect it might be argued that it 
would not seem to be sufficient to simply state that this danger is to be operated by the parties 
and not by the legislator1019 and that the plaintiff may choose a forum which suits his 
interests,1020 as has been proclaimed by Mankowski who is generally against a reflexive 
application of Article 24(4), although he admits that “a real danger of that kind [the danger 
that a decision produced in a Member State is not recognised in a third State] means a 
considerable incentive for the claimant against an action in a Member State.”1021 However, 
several arguments can actually be brought forward against the danger of arising “hinkende 
Rechtsverhältnisse”. First, this risk is actually relativised by the fact that the recognition in 
that third State might not be decisive, because the winning claimant can have sufficient 
measures against the defendant in the defendant’s State of domicile to force him to undertake 
certain acts or omissions.1022 This is a matter of “Inlandsvollstreckung”.1023 On the contrary, 
enforcement against the defendant can then be even more effective than it would be if the 
claimant had to obtain a judgment in the third State, as, in particular, cross-border 
enforcement of orders to act in a certain way (“Handlungsgebote”) is difficult and 
problematic.1024 Furthermore, cross-border enforcement (“Auslandsvollstreckung”) is not 
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necessary in the case of a sentence to make a declaration either.1025 It must also be emphasised 
that the argument of the potential danger that a decision produced in a Member State is not 
recognised in a third State, inasfar as that third State concretely demands to exert an exclusive 
jurisdiction, is further relativised by the fact that it becomes relevant only if recognition and 
enforcement is sought in that respective non-Member State, whereas it would not be existent 
vis-à-vis other non-Member States. An effet réflexe would actually go beyond this scenario 
and extend even to cases where the judgment could be easily executed in the forum State or 
enforced in any other Member State.1026 In view of this, it has been pointed out that “the 
potential danger of “hinkende Rechtsverhältnisse” does not justify to create mistaken rules of 
jurisdiction.”1027 
 
Additionally, it has to be taken into consideration that a reflexive application of Article 24 
would also affect Article 27, which refers to Article 24 when determining in which 
circumstances a court of a Member State declares of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction. 
This could pose “quite another obstacle and a high hurdle in the way of such effect.”1028 It 
must therefore be underlined that, due to the severe consequences created, a reflexive 
application of Article 24 could only be justified in the event of a situation highly comparable 
to the very situation explicitly described in Article 24.  
 
Furthermore, if Article 24(4) was applied by way of a reflexive application, Article 
45(1)(e)(ii) which refers to Article 24 would have to be applied in the same way, too.1029 
According to Article 45(1)(e)(ii), the recognition of a judgment shall be refused, on the 
application of any interested party, if the judgment conflicts with Section 6 of Chapter II of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, i.e Article 24 (which is the only article contained in Section 6).    
This could impede the recognition and enforcement of decisions of Member States courts and 
would therefore be in conflict with a fundamental principle of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.1030  
 
Arguing in favour of a reflexive application of Article 24(4), it has been highlighted that this 
approach would encourage further European integration, because it would promote the 
identity of results of proceedings in Member States regardless of in which Member State 
proceedings have been initiated.1031 However, the same would be true for the contrary view, 
because the results of proceedings initiated in Member States would also be identical if 
Article 24 was generally not applied by way of a reflexive application vis-à-vis third States. It 
might also be argued that a reflexive application of Article 24 entails the advantage that 
defendants would be treated in the same way regardless of whether they are domiciled in a 
Member State or in a third State, and that by way of a reflexive application of Article 24, 
defendants domiciled in Member States would thus no longer be discriminated against 
defendants domiciled in third States,1032 considering that the spirit of the Brussels Ibis 
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Regulation is to protect EU citizens.1033 However, this argumentation is not convincing 
because the decisive factor for Article 24 to be applicable is not the domicile of the defendant, 
but the State where the concerned patent has been granted. Whether the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State or in a third State has no influence on the application of Article 
24. 
 
Last but not least, there are actually several further crucial arguments which militate against a 
reflexive application of Article 24(4) vis-à-vis courts of third States. The claimant who 
initiates proceedings in a Member State although the patent has been granted in or for a third 
State can act on the basis of comprehensible reasons. The defendant’s interest to litigate in the 
third State does not deserve protection, because his interest in an adequate defence is 
sufficiently ensured in the State of domicile (Member State).1034 It is a matter of fact that a 
reflexive application of Article 24 would also bring along consequential problems like the 
following: How exact would the equivalence between “internal” and “external” cases have to 
be?1035 Must grounds for declining jurisdiction be identical, or is judicial discretion sufficient? 
The answer to the latter question would be decisive as to common law jurisdiction employing 
the minimum contacts-doctrine and the doctrine of forum non conveniens.1036 And, finally, it 
must not be lost out of sight that the ECJ, in its Coreck Maritime decision, expressly denied a 
reflexive application of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention (Article 25 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) in favour of the application of national law.1037 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, I am convinced that Article 24(4) should not be applied by 
way of a direct reflexive application either in case of patents granted in respectively for a third 
State. The contrary conception which argues that a reflexive application of Article 24(4) 
should be accepted even if parties have agreed on the jurisdiction of a Member State court 
(prorogation),1038 because a prorogation lacks any legal force in case of an exclusive 
jurisdiction (cf. Article 25(4),1039 does not sufficiently take into consideration that conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 is based on the mutual trust between the 
Member States and the idea of equivalence of the legal systems of the Member States, which 
cannot simply be extended to third States.1040 This has become clear in the course of the 
reform of the Brussels I Regulation towards the present Brussels Ibis Regulation. Obviously, 
the European legislator, although being aware of this controversial issue, decided against 
extending the wording and scope of Article 24 such as to also explicitly confer exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of third States where the concerned patent has been granted in or for 
a third State.1041    
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2.4.2.4 Requirements as to the defence of invalidity 
 
Having clarified that Article 24(4) is not to be taken into consideration if the concerned patent 
has been granted in or for a third State, I shall now turn to the issue which are the specific 
requirements for submitting a defence of invalidity of a patent in infringement proceedings.  
 
 
2.4.2.4.1 Must the defence of invalidity of the patent be admissible?  
 
In its GAT decision, the ECJ recognised the comprehensive relevance of Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation independently of the fact 
whether the aspect of the alleged invalidity of a patent is brought into play:    
 
“In the light of the position of Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] within the scheme of the 
Convention and the objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided 
for by that provision should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent’s 
validity is raised, be it by way of an action or a plea in objection (...) [underscore and content in 
brackets added].”1042 
   
This conception has been confirmed and codified in the meanwhile by the European legislator 
through the creation of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, by supplementing the 
phrase “irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence” to the 
previous wording of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
 
However, the question remains if Article 24(4) might eventually be inapplicable a priori in 
the case that the defence of invalidity is not admissible. In this respect it is to be noticed that 
some EU Member States provide for the possibility that the nullity of a patent is claimed in 
infringement proceedings, while this possibility does not exist in other legal system like the 
German or Austrian system where even different authorities decide on infringement 
respectively nullity/invalidity of a patent.1043 Dealing with the problem of a potential 




2.4.2.4.1.1 Nature of the aspect of admissibility of the defence of invalidity of the patent 
 
2.4.2.4.1.1.1 Admissibility of the defence of invalidity: procedural law 
 
On the one hand, it has been argued that the question of the admissibility of the defence of 
invalidity is to be qualified as procedural law. Consequently, it has been concluded that the 
strict separation between infringement and invalidity proceedings in Germany cannot be 
exported to other countries where such a separation does not exist,1044 because the lex fori 
decides independently about procedural rules. Vice versa, German courts being concerned 
with patent infringement proceedings have also decided on the validity of the non-German 
                                                                                                                                                        
97, at pp. 101, 106). However, it should be borne in mind that Recital 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation merely 
contains a discretionary rule and has no binding effect at all. 
1042
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 25 – GAT. 
1043
 For instance, according to the German system, the Bundesgerichtshof is the highest instance as to patent 
infringement proceedings, whilst the Bundespatentgericht is the highest instance concerning proceedings with 
regard to the validity/invalidity of patents.  
1044
 Adolphsen 2009, para. 435. 
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patent in question if a defence of invalidity had been raised by the defendant.1045 While it is to 
be admitted that the latter decision is to be approved insofar as the strict separation between 
infringement and invalidity proceedings is based on the sole fact that a German patent is 
granted by an administrative act which shall not be overruled by a non-administrative 
court,1046 this inconsequent treatment of comparable situations reveals the weakness of the 
procedural conception in question. At least, on the basis of that procedural perspective, the 
question of whether Article 24(4) might be inapplicable due to the inadmissibility of a 
defence of invalidity would not arise, because such a defence would not affect foreign patents 
and courts outside the State where the patent was granted, due to the autonomy of the lex fori. 
   
 
2.4.2.4.1.1.2 Admissibility of the defence of invalidity: substantive law 
 
Besides the inconsistency of a procedural conception, it cannot be denied that the problem of 
the admissibility of the defence of invalidity of a patent shows a close connection with 
substantive patent law and is consequently rightly to be qualified as substantive law,1047 
bearing the consequence that the lex loci protectionis is decisive.1048  
 
 
2.4.2.4.1.2 Scope of Article 24(4) 
 
Interestingly, neither Article 24(4) nor the rest of the Brussels Ibis Regulation contain any 
specific rules as to the problem of whether a defence of invalidity needs to be admissible for 
Article 24(4) to be applicable.1049 The question to be posed therefore is whether the case-law 
of the ECJ may deliver some guidance.  
 
In the Shevill decision, dealing with the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the ECJ expressly restricted the 
scope of the Brussels Convention (this jurisprudence being also relevant for the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), stating that  
 
“(...) the sole object of the [Brussels] Convention is to determine which court or courts have jurisdiction 
to hear the dispute by reference to the place or places where an event considered harmful occurred (...) 
[content in brackets added].”1050 
 
and continuing that 
 
“[the Brussels Convention] does not, however, specify the circumstances in which the event giving rise 
to the harm may be considered to be harmful to the victim, or the evidence which the plaintiff must 
adduce before the court seised to enable it to rule on the merits of the case [content in brackets 
added].”1051 
                                                 
1045
 Adolphsen 2009, paras. 436, 437. 
1046
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 250. 
1047
 Similar, but inconsistent: Schauwecker 2009, p. 250: “Zwar handelt es sich bei der Zulässigkeit der 
Ungültigkeitseinrede um eine ihrer Natur nach verfahrensrechtliche Frage; (...) sollte diese jedoch 
materiellrechtlich qualifiziert werden [underscore added].”   
1048
 Bukow 2003, p. 255; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 22 
EuGVVO, para. 237; Schauwecker 2009, p. 250. 
1049
 Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 22 EuGVVO, para. 237; Bukow 
2003, p. 220.  
1050
 ECJ 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA, [1995] ECR I-00415, para. 37 – 
Shevill. 
1051
 ECJ 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA, [1995] ECR I-00415, para. 38 – 
Shevill. 
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This conception of the ECJ, underlining the importance and relevance of national law, beyond 
international jurisdiction, has been confirmed in the Danvaern decision, on the interpretation 
of Articles 6(3) and 22 of the Brussels Convention (Articles 8(3) and 30 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), where the ECJ held, as to the treatment of defences: 
 
“The defences which may be raised and the conditions under which they may be raised are determined 
by national law.”1052 
   
But what can be derived from this case-law, for the initial question of whether a defence of 
invalidity needs to be admissible for Article 24(4) to be applicable, in view of the GAT 
decision? The ECJ distinctly established – in line with its Duijnstee decision – that pure 
infringement proceedings where no defence of invalidity of the concerned patent is raised are 
not affected by Article 24(4):  
 
“If (...) the dispute does not concern the validity of the patent or the existence of the deposit or 
registration and these matters are not disputed by the parties, the dispute will not be covered by Article 
16(4) of the [Brussels] Convention (Duijnstee, paragraphs 25 and 26). Such would be the case, for 
example, with an infringement action, in which the question of the validity of the patent allegedly 
infringed is not called into question [content in brackets added].”1053 
 
In this respect the argument could be put forth that it cannot make a difference if no defence 
of invalidity of the concerned patent is raised at all, or if an inadmissible defence of invalidity 
is raised which, due to the inadmissibility, has no effect. The effet utile of Article 24(4) would 
not be impaired either, because the question of the existence of a patent is not affected in 
infringement proceedings where the invalidity defence is not effectively raised. 
 
This being so, it is however also true that the ECJ, in its GAT decision (again in line with the 
Duijnstee decision), explicitly underlined its wish to avoid conflicts created by the fact that 
some legal systems provide the possibility for courts dealing with infringement proceedings to 
decide on the validity of patents with erga omnes effect: 
 
“(...) In order to avoid the risk of contradictory decisions, it is therefore necessary to limit the 
jurisdiction of the courts of a State other than that in which the patent is issued to rule indirectly on the 
validity of a foreign patent to only those cases in which, under the applicable national law, the effects of 
the decision to be given are limited to the parties to the proceedings. Such a limitation would, however, 
lead to distortions, thereby undermining the equality and uniformity of rights and obligations arising 
from the Convention for the Contracting States and the persons concerned (Duijnstee, paragraph 
13).”1054 
 
Where the ECJ thus emphasises the importance and necessity of the equality and uniformity 
of rights and obligations based on the Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation), in 
order to demonstrate that existing differences as to the effect of decisions (inter partes 
effect/erga omnes effect) may not affect jurisdiction, it is to be pointed out that both such 
different effects of decisions and the divergences as to a defence of invalidity of a patent are 
based on the different structures of patent systems, concerning the question of whether that 
defence can be raised before the same court where infringement proceedings have been 
initiated.1055 Consequently, if the inadmissibility of a defence of invalidity had the effect that 
                                                 
1052
 ECJ 13 July 1995, C-341/93, Danværn Production A/S v Schuhfabriken Otterbeck GmbH & Co., [1995] 
ECR I-02053, para. 13 – Danværn. 
1053
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 16 – GAT. 
1054
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 30 – GAT. 
1055
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 254. 
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Article 24(4) would not be applicable, distortions which the ECJ obviously intends to avoids, 
would actually be provoked. As a consequence, although the effet utile of Article 24(4) would 
not be impaired (cf. above), the effet utile of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in general would be 
affected. For this reason, Article 24(4) should be considered applicable regardless of a 
defence of invalidity of a patent raised in infringement proceedings is admissible or not.    
 
 
2.4.2.4.2 Must the defence of invalidity of the patent be sufficiently substantiated? 
 
In light of the finding that the admissibility of a defence of invalidity of a patent does not 
influence the applicability of Article 24(4), a subsequent question is to be treated: Must such a 
defence be sufficiently substantiated in order to be taken into account? In the course of the 
analysis, I will start with the reference for a preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf in the GAT case, and then turn to general considerations. 
 
When raising its famous question as to the interpretation of Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation), the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf 
formulated inter alia: 
 
“(...) irrespective of whether the court seised of the proceedings considers the plea to be substantiated or 
unsubstantiated (...).”1056 
 
Interestingly, neither Advocate General Geelhoed, in his Opinion delivered on 16 September 
2004, nor the ECJ in its decision from 13 July 2006, expressly treated this aspect of the 
admittedly extensive question of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf. The Advocate General 
merely treated the aspect of the defendant’s acting in bad faith: 
 
“(…) The court judging the infringement can (...) deal with the case itself where a defendant acts in bad 
faith.”1057 
 
However, regardless of whether this standpoint should be followed, it is to be underlined at 
this stage that, in contrast to other authors who obviously do not undertake such a 
differentiation,1058 the defendant’s acting in bad faith and an unsubstantiatedly raised defence 
of invalidity should rather not be equalised, because acting in bad faith can be, but not 
necessarily is, based on an unsubstantiated defence, where on the other hand the raise of a 
defence in an unsubstantiated way can be, but not necessarily is, an acting in bad faith 
either.1059 Consequently, the lack of substantiation of a defence is not to be considered a 
subset of acting in bad faith, and vice versa. Rather, the picture of two overlapping circles 
seems most appropriate. In this regard, it is to be underlined that the acting in bad faith 
implies the subjective element of the (defendant’s) will, while the lack of a sufficient 
substantiation of a defence is an objective fact which can be examined and evaluated by the 
deciding court.   
 
Given the fact that neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ have solved the indicated 
problem in GAT, I shall take recourse to other court decisions and general considerations.  
 
                                                 
1056
 OLG Düsseldorf 5 December 2002, 2 U 104/01, (2003)52(12) GRUR Int. 1030 – GAT. 
1057
 Advocate General 16 September 2004, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen 
und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 46 – GAT. 
1058
 Heinze & Roffael (2006)55(10) GRUR Int. 787, at p. 797; Adolphsen (2007)27(1) IPRax 15, at p. 19. 
1059
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 273.  
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In this respect, the Knorr-Bremse decision of the English High Court of Justice (Chancery 
Division, Patents Court), rendered after the GAT decision of the ECJ, is of particular interest. 
In this case, the claimant was an English company which was part of the Knorr-Bremse 
Group (KBS), the world’s largest manufacturer of brake systems. The defendant, a German 
company, was part of the Haldex Group (Haldex), another leading manufacturer of brake 
systems. Haldex initiated proceedings in Germany alleging infringement of two German 
patents which were the German national versions of two European Patents. The dispute was 
settled in a settlement agreement in 2006. Later, the claimant initiated proceedings for a 
declaration of non-infringement. Haldex applied for a stay of the proceedings on the ground 
that by the settlement agreement the parties had conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the 
Landgericht Düsseldorf. Notably, there was no pleaded claim for invalidity of the patents. 
 
Referring to the judgement of Laddie J. in Coin Controls1060, subsequently approved by the 
Court of Appeal in Fort Dodge1061, Lewison J. held inter alia: 
 
“It is clear in my judgment that Laddie J. held that where it is clear that validity “is to be” put in issue 
(i.e. in the future) the court should decide the application on the basis that validity is one of the issues in 
the case. It is not necessary for the allegation of invalidity to be formally pleaded. I respectfully agree. 
(…)”1062 
 
The High Court of Justice thus repeatedly stated that the pure possibility that a defence of 
invalidity is raised suffices for rules of exclusive jurisdiction to be applicable. In view of this, 
it would not seem logical, but even contradictory, to demand that a defence which has actually 
been raised must be substantiated, because in the case of the unsubstantiated raise of a 
defence, the defendant has at least undertaken more as if he had raised no defence at all.1063   
 
However, that jurisprudence has not been pursued by all courts. For instance, the Rechtbank 
's-Gravenhage, in contrast to the English High Court of Justice, decided, in Sisvel, that a 
defence of invalidity of a patent must in fact be raised in order to be taken into account. In this 
case, the claimant was the Italian company Societa Italiana Per Lo Sviluppo Dell'Elettronica 
S.I.S.V.E.L. SPA (Sisvel). The defendants were Sandisk Corporation (Sandisk), an U.S. 
company, Moduslink B.V. (Moduslink), a Dutch company, and UPS SCS (Nederland) B.V. 
(UPS), another Dutch company. The dispute essentially concerned the alleged infringement of 
a European patent for several States. In the course of the proceedings, Moduslink announced 
to raise a defence of invalidity as to this European patent, but did not actually raise it. In this 
respect, the Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage held: 
 
“Moduslink heeft aangekondigd de geldigheid van de buitenlandse octrooien bij wege van exceptie in 
 deze procedure aan de orde te zullen stellen. Die aankondiging alleen is onvoldoende om reeds nu te 
 concluderen dat de rechtbank onbevoegd is om van de vorderingen van Sisvel, voorzover die betrekking 
 hebben op (dreigende) octrooi-inbreuk en zien op andere landen dan Nederland, kennis te nemen 
(…).“1064       
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 High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) 26 March 1997, Coin Controls Limited v Suzo International 
(U.K.) Limited and Others, [1997] F.S.R. 660 – Coin Controls. 
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 High Court of Justice 14 and 16 October 1997, and Court of Appeal 27 October 1997, Fort Dodge Animal 
Health Limited and Others v AKZO Nobel N.V. and Another, [1998] F.S.R. 222 – Fort Dodge. 
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Commercial Vehicles LDT v Haldex Brake Products GmbH, [2008] F.S.R. 30, 770 – Knorr-Bremse. 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 277. 
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 Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage 9 August 2006, Case No. 257421 / HA ZA 06-167, and Case No. 257423 / HA ZA 06, 
Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo dell’Elettronica S.I.S.V.E.L. SpA v Sandisk Corporation and Others, NJF 2006, 
540, para. 6.7 – Sisvel. 
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(“Moduslink has announced to raise a defence of invalidity as to the foreign patents in this proceeding. 
 That mere announcement does not suffice to conclude already at this stage that the court does not have 
 jurisdiction to take notice of the claims of Sisvel, inasmuch as they are related to (imminent) patent 
 infringement and concern other States than the Netherlands (…).”)1065           
 
In light of the varying jurisprudence of different courts, it seems inevitable to take recourse to 
general, schematic considerations to solve the question of whether the unsubstantiated raise of 
a defence suffices to make Article 24(4) applicable. In the first place, it seems essential to 
determine the type of patent (validity) proceedings. In this respect, it is to be borne in mind 
that there are patent systems where the same courts have jurisdiction on infringement and 
validity proceedings, and patent systems where different courts are competent to decide on 
such proceedings. As to the second variant of systems, it is to be highlighted that numerous 
Member States treat proceedings concerning the existence of a patent as administrative 
proceedings.1066 Remarkably, it is to be mentioned that the latter aspect also goes for States 
which, despite the general competence of courts dealing with infringement proceedings for 
validity issues, additionally provide for separate proceedings before special courts which 
specifically deal with the question of the validity of the patent in question.1067 According to a 
general rule, administrative proceedings in the Member States are determined by the principle 
that the court examines and clarifies the facts ex officio. It is thus generally the invoked court 
which has to make sure that it founds its decision on substantiated facts. Consequently, the 
defendant at least does not bear the (full) burden of evidence in such proceedings, i.e. 
regarding a raised defence of invalidity of a patent that is subject to an infringement 
proceeding. Inter alia in its GAT decision, the ECJ has continuously emphasised the 
importance of  
 
“(...) the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the [Brussels] Convention (...) [content in 
brackets added].”1068 
 
This principle would be compromised if the requirements as to the substantiation of a defence 
of invalidity in infringement proceedings would be (considerably) higher than the 
requirements in pure nullity proceedings.  
 
However, also with regard to such nullity proceedings, it is true that the party who claims the 
nullity of a patent may not simply affirm the nullity without any reasons, but has to 
conclusively bring forward the underlying facts which form the basis of the accusation of 
nullity. The deciding court must thus be enabled to actually make a decision. As a 
consequence, it is to be stated at a first level that a defence of invalidity of a patent raised in 
infringement proceedings must be substantiated.  
 
Though, the subsequent question arises, on a second level, before which court a defence of 
nullity must be raised in such a substantiated way. In its GAT decision, the ECJ explicated 
that the courts of the State where a patent has been granted shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
due to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), as to the question of validity of the patent. It is therefore logical that a 
substantiated defence is required before those courts, while a defence of invalidity of a patent 
does not have to meet the same level of substantiation before the courts of infringement 
proceedings. Otherwise, the danger would be provoked that the courts before which 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 273. 
1067 Schneider 2005, p. 178 et seq. 
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 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 28 – GAT. 
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infringement proceedings are brought might even be forced to deal with the question of 
invalidity in detail.1069   
 
As a result, it is to be concluded that Article 24(4) is applicable regardless of the fact of 
whether, in the course of patent infringement proceedings, a substantiated defence of 
invalidity of the concerned patent is raised before the courts having jurisdiction for such 
infringement proceedings. However, the defence must then be raised in a sufficiently 
substantiated way before the courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4).   
 
 
2.4.2.4.3 Are there temporal restrictions as to the raise of a defence of invalidity? 
 
Furthermore, the question is to be answered whether a defence of invalidity can be raised at 
any time during infringement proceedings or if this procedural means is limited in temporal 
respect. 
 
The Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf which initially made a reference for a preliminary ruling to 
the ECJ, thus giving the starting shot for the later GAT decision of the ECJ, already addressed 
that problem when formulating inter alia:     
 
“(...) irrespective of (...) when the plea is raised during the course of the proceedings.”1070 
 
In his Opinion delivered on 16 September 2004, Advocate General Geelhoed favoured a 
solution according to which there should be no temporal restrictions as to the raise of a 
defence of invalidity, remarking that 
 
“(...) it is immaterial when in the course of the proceedings its validity [i.e. the validity of the patent in 
question] is challenged (...) [content in brackets added].”1071 
 
However, the General Advocate did not restrict himself to this statement, but nebulously 
continued as follows: 
 
“(...) all this apart from the fact that, as far as possible, the Brussels Convention should be 
autonomously interpreted, independently of the procedural law of the Member States.”1072 
 
On the basis of this perspective, the following problem arises: If the Brussels Convention, 
respectively the Brussels Ibis Regulation, is to be interpreted autonomously – this actually 
corresponds to the constant case-law of the ECJ – which rules shall be decisive if there are no 
relevant rules in the Brussels Convention (respectively Brussels Ibis Regulation)? As the 
problem must be solved, the answer can only be that rules of national procedural law come 
into play, despite the fact that the Advocate General’s expression “independently of the 
procedural law of the Member States” then seems at least mistakable, because it is not 
“independently of” but rather “due to the fact that the Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) does not contain a respective rule” that national law is decisive.1073   
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Be that as it may, what is decisive in the end is the ultimate judgment of the ECJ. In this 
respect it is to be noticed however that the ECJ unfortunately has not explicitly analysed the 
problem of a potential temporal restriction of a defence of invalidity. Throughout the whole 
judgment, the ECJ actually mentioned this issue only once, stating that 
 
“(...) in the light of the position of Article 16(4) within the scheme of the [Brussels] Convention and the 
objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision 
should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent's validity is raised, be it by 
way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the case is brought or at a later stage in the 
proceedings [underscore and content in brackets added].”1074 
 
After a threefold argumentation for this evaluation, the ECJ laconically remarked in its final 
conclusion, even without mentioning the temporal aspect: 
 
“In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred must be that Article 16(4) of the 
Convention is to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein 
concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the 
issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection [underscore added].”1075 
 
It is exactly – and merely – this aspect which has been integrated in the amended wording of 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
At first glance, an isolated evaluation of the cited passages of the GAT decision might suggest 
that the ECJ did not recognise any temporal restrictions as to the raise of a defence of 
invalidity at all – in particular because it even did not mention this aspect in its final 
conclusion. However, it seems more convincing that the Brussels Convention respectively the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation does not contain such temporal restrictions, while this does not 
exclude the existence of such provisions in national laws. On the contrary, the temporal 
restrictions of the right to raise a defence as well as other aspects which have not been ruled 
by the European legislator principally fall into the scope of application of national procedural 
law,1076 as far as the effet utile of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Brussels Convention) is not 
compromised.1077 In this respect, the ECJ pointed out, in Duijnstee: 
 
“The principle of legal certainty in the Community legal order and the aims pursued by the [Brussels] 
Convention in accordance with Article 220 of the Treaty, on which it is based, require that the equality 
and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from the Convention for the Contracting States and the 
persons concerned must be ensured, regardless of the rules laid down in that regard in the laws of those 
States [underscore and content in brackets added].”1078  
 
This idea has been constantly confirmed by the ECJ in subsequent decisions, such as the 
following: 
 
“It should be noted, however, that the application of national procedural rules may not impair the 
effectiveness of the [Brussels] Convention. As the Court has held, in particular in its judgment of 15 
November 1983 in Case 288/82 Duijnstee v Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663, a court may not apply 
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conditions of admissibility laid down by national law which would have the effect of restricting the 
application of the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the Convention [underscores and content in brackets 
added].”1079  
 
“The answer to the referring court must accordingly be that the criteria for assessing whether the event 
in question is harmful and the evidence required of the existence and extent of the harm alleged by the 
victim of the defamation are not governed by the [Brussels] Convention but by the substantive law 
determined by the national conflict of laws rules of the court seised, provided that the effectiveness of 
the Convention is not thereby impaired [underscore and content in brackets added].”1080 
 
Ultimately, the ECJ continued this approach in its GAT decision when, by reference to 
Duijnstee, warning against the  
 
“(...) undermining (of) the equality and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from the [Brussels] 
Convention for the Contracting States and the persons concerned (Duijnstee, paragraph 13) [content in 
brackets added].”1081   
 
The applicability of national rules as to the determination of the point in time when preclusion 
comes into existence does not impair the effet utile of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, because 
such rules do not lead to a general preclusion of a defence of invalidity and thus do not 
generally preclude the application of Article 24(4). Rather, provisions as to the preclusion of 
defences are typically part of the national legal systems of the Member States. This applies 
even more as to the national patents of the Member States (as well as European patents), 
because rules of preclusion form part of the lex fori regardless of the fact in or for which State 
the concerned patent has been granted.1082  
 
Besides it is to be underlined that the principle that a late assertion will not influence 
jurisdiction is generally inherent in the Brussels Ibis Regulation itself. In this respect, the 
interplay between Article 26(1) and Article 29 becomes relevant. Article 26(1) provides: 
 
 “(1) Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Regulation, a court of a Member State 
 before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where 
 appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by 
 virtue of Article 24.”  
 
By Article 26(1), the general jurisdictional order can thus be omitted. This provision is 
complemented by Article 29(3) that states: 
 
 “(3) Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first 
 seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.” 
 
As a consequence, it can be derived that an assertion will only have effect on jurisdiction if it 
is brought forward before the jurisdiction of another court has been established. The exact 
point in time when preclusion comes into existence is, also in this context, to be determined 
by national procedural law (lex fori).1083 This was expressly held by the ECJ in the case 
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Elefanten Schuh, on the interpretation of Articles 17, 18 and 22 of the Brussels Convention, 
where the ECJ stated that  
 
“(…) it follows from the aim of Article 18 [of the Brussels Convention] that if the challenge to 
jurisdiction is not preliminary to any defence as to the substance it may not in any event occur after the 
making of the submissions which under national procedural law are considered to be the first defence 
addressed to the court seised [underscore and content in brackets added].”1084 
 
To conclude, the initial question posed at the beginning of this paragraph of whether a 
defence of invalidity can be raised at any time during infringement proceedings or whether 
this procedural means is limited in temporal respect, is to be answered in a differentiated way: 
while there are no such immediate restrictions within the provisions of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, provisions of national procedural law, constituting the lex fori, determine whether 
such a defence is precluded. 
 
 
2.4.2.4.4 Is the defence of invalidity of the patent excluded if the defendant acts in bad 
faith? 
 
As has been mentioned above, Advocate General Geelgoed's Opinion in GAT from 16 
September 2004 contains – in contrast to the ECJ's subsequent decision – the following 
considerations concerning the defendant’s acting in bad faith: 
 
“The court judging the infringement can (...) deal with the case itself where a defendant acts in bad 
faith.”1085 
 
In particular after the GAT decision (but actually in accordance with previous case-law and 
parts of legal doctrine), the idea that the defendant's acting in bad faith may void the defence 
of invalidity of the concerned patent with the consequence that Article 24(4) is not applicable 
was picked up in posterior court decisions. For instance, the Hoge Raad, in a decision from 30 
November 2007, referred to the cited passage of Advocate General Geelhoed's Opinion, while 
not deciding the question as such:1086 
 
 “Of de rechter, niettegenstaande een nietigheidsverweer of -vordering, de inbreukprocedure mag 
 voortzetten indien hij van oordeel is dat de verweerder te kwader trouw handelt en aldus misbruik van 
 procesrecht maakt, zoals door de Advocaat-Generaal Geelhoed bepleit, kan thans in het midden blijven, 
 nu [verweerder] c.s. een degelijke stelling in dit geding niet hebben betrokken.”1087 
 
 (“Whether the court may continue the infringement proceeding, despite a defence of invalidity or a 
 claim of invalidity, if the court is of the opinion that the defendant acts in bad faith and thus misuses 
 procedural law, as supported by Advocate General Geelhoed, does not have to be answered at present, 
 as the defendants have not acted in such a manner in this procedure.”)1088 
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As to the question of how to treat an invalidity defence raised in a mala fide manner, it is to be 
underlined that the ECJ has confirmed at several occasions the obligation to act in a bona fide 
manner, for instance:  
 
 “(...) (I)t would be contrary to good faith for the recipient of the confirmation to deny the existence of a 
 jurisdiction conferred by consent, even if he had given no acceptance in writing [underscore added].”1089 
 
 “(...) In those circumstances, it would be contrary to good faith to deny the existence of a jurisdiction 
 agreement [underscore added].”1090 
 
 “(...) It would therefore be a breach of good faith for a party who did not raise any objection 
 subsequently to contest the application of the oral agreement (...) [underscore added].”1091 
 
On the basis of this emphasis of the importance of an acting in good faith, one might put forth 
that a defence of invalidity should not be taken into consideration if that defence was raised in 
a mala fide manner, meaning that Article 24(4) would only be applicable if there is a certain 
minimum of doubts as to the validity of the patent subject to infringement proceedings.1092  
 
On the other hand, it is to be taken into consideration that the ECJ rendered other judgments 
which suggest that a party's acting in bad faith does not influence the jurisdictional order 
provided by the Rome I Regulation (and the same applied to the Rome Convention). In 
particular, two cases shall be mentioned because they are of special interest in this respect. 
 
In the Gasser case, which dealt with the interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels 
Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
whereas the content of the provision has been modified), the ECJ decided that  
 
 “(...) an interpretation of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention whereby the application of that article 
 should be set aside where the court first seised belongs to a Member State in whose courts there are, in 
 general, excessive delays in dealing with cases would be manifestly contrary both to the letter and spirit 
 and to the aim of the Convention.”1093 
 
The ECJ reasoned this evaluation by stressing that 
 
 “(f)irst, the Convention contains no provision under which its articles, and in particular Article 21, cease 




“(s)econd, it must be borne in mind that the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which 
 the Contracting States accord to each other's legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust 
which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the 
purview of the Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the 
right to apply their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a 
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simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments. It is also common ground that 
the Convention thereby seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient 
certainty which court will have jurisdiction [underscores added].”1095 
 
Furthermore, in the Turner case, on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention as well, the 
ECJ held with regard to the procedural means of an anti-suit injunction, provided for in 
English procedural law: 
 
  “However, a prohibition imposed by a court, backed by a penalty, restraining a party from commencing 
 or continuing proceedings before a foreign court undermines the latter court's jurisdiction to determine 
 the dispute. Any injunction prohibiting a claimant from bringing such an action must be seen as 
 constituting interference with the jurisdiction of the foreign court which, as such, is incompatible with 
 the system of the Convention.”1096 
 
As to the aspect of the defendant's (potential) acting in a mala fide manner, the ECJ explicitly 
explicated that 
  
 “(...) such interference cannot be justified by the fact that it is only indirect and is intended to prevent an 
 abuse of process by the defendant in the proceedings in the forum State. In so far as the conduct for 
 which the defendant is criticised consists in recourse to the jurisdiction of the court of another Member 
 State, the judgment made as to the abusive nature of that conduct implies an assessment of the 
 appropriateness of bringing proceedings before a court of another Member State. Such an assessment 
 runs counter to the principle of mutual trust which (...) underpins the Convention and prohibits a court, 
 except in special circumstances (...) from reviewing the jurisdiction of the court of another Member 
 State [underscore added].”1097 
 
However, the crucial question is whether the ECJ’s decisions in Gasser and Turner may 
actually have such a guiding effect, as it would seem to be the case at first glance, as to the 
problem which effects the defendant’s acting in bad faith has. Remarkably, the ECJ explicitly 
founded its reasoning in both decisions on the aspect that the Brussels Convention (and the 
same goes for the Brussels Ibis Regulation to an even higher extent) has been constructed on 
the basis of the mutual trust of the Contracting States (concerning the Brussels Convention, 
respectively Member States concerning the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in their legal systems 
and judicial institutions. In this respect, it is to be underlined that one major difference 
between the constellation of the disregard of an invalidity defence in a mala fide manner and 
the disregard of a defence which is raised to bring proceedings before a court of a State where 
proceedings usually last a relatively long time, for exactly this reason (torpedo), consists in 
the circumstance that in the first constellation, it is only the defendant’s bad faith which is 
criticised, whereas in the second constellation, the indirect criticism of another legal system 
and judicial system comes into play. In this light, neither the Gasser decision nor the Turner 
decision of the ECJ imply that an invalidity defence raised in bad faith (constellation 1) must 
not be taken into consideration.1098  
 
Though, besides the Gasser and Turner decisions, it is generally doubtful anyway if 
subjective criteria should be taken into account when deciding whether the invalidity defence 
is to be excluded.1099 In contrast to the objective criteria discussed above, the requirement to 
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prove that a potential infringer acts in bad faith when raising an invalidity defence would 
certainly lead to considerable legal uncertainty, due to the fact that no defined clear criteria 
have been developed yet which are considered abusive.1100 Therefore, only objective criteria 
should be taken into account, as long as such a binding definition has not been created.1101 In 
this context, it is to be emphasised (again) that the ECJ has also underlined the importance of 
legal certainty in its Gasser decision. This eventually harsh result can be attenuated to some 




2.4.2.4.5 Is the invalidity defence excluded if it is obviously unfounded? 
 
A question to be differentiated from the problem of a sufficient substantiation of the invalidity 
defence which has already been discussed above, is whether a defence of invalidity of a patent 
must not be obviously unfounded in order to be taken into consideration. This concerns the 
constellation where, in contrast to the unsubstantiated raise of a defence, the defendant brings 
forward a defence on the basis of a substantiated reasoning, but where it is obvious due to 
other reasons that his defence will not be successful. At the beginning of the following 
analysis, it is to be highlighted again that the ECJ established in GAT that Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation) applies both as to a claim 
regarding the validity/invalidity of a patent, and a defence of invalidity of a patent, even if the 
decision has only inter partes effect,1102 which has been codified in Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation in the meanwhile:              
 
“In the light of the position of Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] within the scheme of the 
Convention and the objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided 
for by that provision should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent's 
validity is raised, be it by way of an action or a plea in objection (…) [content in brackets added].”1103 
 
Consequently, the courts where infringement proceedings have been initiated are deprived of 
jurisdiction as soon as the invalidity defence has been raised, and are therefore generally not 
competent any longer to evaluate the prospects of success of an invalidity defence raised if 
this requires an own decision on the validity of the patent in question. It follows from the 
foregoing that the invalidity defence should only be excluded, due to obvious unfoundedness, 




2.4.2.4.5.1 Missing substantive entitlement   
 
First, I shall analyse if a missing substantive entitlement of the defendant concerning the 
patent as to which the defence of invalidity is raised eventually leads to the result that Article 
24(4) is not applicable despite of the raise of that defence. 
 
As to European patents, Article 138 of the European Patent Convention states inter alia: 
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“(1) Subject to Article 139 [of the European Patent Convention], a European patent may be revoked 
with effect for a Contracting State only on the grounds that: 
 
(…) (e) the proprietor of the European patent is not entitled under Article 60, paragraph 1 [of the 
European Patent Convention] [content in brackets added].” 
 
On the basis of this legal determination that the fact of substantive entitlement is decisive in 
the cited way, one might argue that the defence of invalidity of a patent raised by a defendant 
who himself lacks substantive entitlement, would not affect Article 24(4). In this respect, the 
question arises in how far the court before which infringement proceedings have been 
instituted may examine and decide who is entitled with regard to the concerned patent. 
 
Again, I shall take recourse to jurisprudence rendered by the ECJ. In the Duijnstee case, the 
ECJ expressly denied the applicability of Article 24(4) with regard to the question of whether 
an employee or his employer is entitled to a patent: 
 
“In a case such as the present, neither the validity of the patents nor the legality of their registration in 
the various countries is disputed by the parties to the main action. The outcome of the case in fact 
depends exclusively on the question whether Mr Goderbauer or the insolvent company BV 
Schroefboutenfabriek is entitled to the patent, which must be determined on the basis of the legal 
relationship which existed between the parties concerned. Therefore the special jurisdiction rule 
contained in Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] should not be applied [content in brackets 
added].”1104 
 
Before the GAT decision of the ECJ, it had therefore partly been put forth that disputes on the 
question of the substantive entitlement generally do not fall into the scope of application of 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).1105 This conception is supported by the provision of 
Article 60(3) of the European Patent Convention with regard to the applicant for a European 
patent: 
 
 “In proceedings before the European Patent Office, the applicant shall be deemed to be entitled to 
 exercise the right to a European patent.”  
 
Correspondingly, also Article 61 of the European Patent Convention excludes, from the 
procedure of the grant of a European patent, disputes concerning the entitlement to the patent, 
and allocates actions against the applicant, by which the claim of granting of a European 
patent is brought forward, to the courts of the Contracting States of the European Patent 
Convention:1106 
 
“(1) If by a final decision it is adjudged that a person other than the applicant is entitled to the grant of 
the European patent, that person may, in accordance with the Implementing Regulations:  
(a) prosecute the European patent application as his own application in place of the applicant;  
(b) file a new European patent application in respect of the same invention; or  
(c) request that the European patent application be refused.  
(2) Article 76, paragraph 1, shall apply mutatis mutandis to a new European patent application filed 
under paragraph 1(b).” 
 
However, the question arises in which way, if any, this conception can be upheld after the 
GAT decision in which the ECJ emphasised that Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention 
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(Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation) is applicable if the defence of invalidity of a 
patent is raised on the ground of the question of the substantive entitlement to a patent,1107 this 
jurisprudence having been confirmed by the reformulation of Article 24(4) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation which constitutes an obvious (confirming) reaction to the GAT decision of the 
ECJ. According to GAT, the court before which infringement proceedings have been 
instituted has no jurisdiction to examine whether the holder of the concerned patent is entitled 
to this patent, if the defendant has founded the defence of invalidity on this ground of 
invalidity.1108 The court is not only deprived of the possibility to declare the patent void due to 
the missing substantive entitlement, but it is even prevented from examining if the defence of 
invalidity is justified on this ground. On the other hand, the ECJ explicitly stated, in 
Duijnstee, that the court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated may 
examine the entitlement to the concerned patent, if the validity of the patent as such is not 
disputed by the parties. However, the problem is that conferring such jurisdiction to a court to 
examine the defendant’s entitlement to the concerned patent logically implies to give the court 
the competence to simultaneously decide on the (missing) entitlement of the claimant, and 
therefore, mediately, on the (in)validity of the concerned patent. In this respect, the Duijnstee 
decision and the GAT decision are to be considered contradictory. In this respect, it is not 
convincing to argue that both decisions could be harmonised by interpreting the GAT decision 
in the way that the examination of the defendant’s missing substantive entitlement to the 
patent does not positively contain any statement on the actual substantive entitlement to the 
patent and thus the validity of the patent.1109 On the basis of a rational consideration, it seems 
rather preferable to accept that the ECJ has, inasmuch as this problem is affected, modified its 
jurisprudence and overruled Duijnstee.    
 
 
2.4.2.4.5.2 Legally binding decision on the validity of the patent in the State where it has 
been granted 
 
Another constellation in which one might consider Article 24(4) not to be applicable despite 
the defendant’s defence of invalidity of the patent while infringement proceedings have been 
instituted, due to the fact that the defence is obviously unfounded, is the existence of a legally 
binding decision on the validity of the concerned patent, confirming its validity, and based on 
the same ground of invalidity as well as the same reasoning and the same facts as the 
invalidity defence, by the administrative authority which has granted the patent or by a court 
in the State where the patent has been granted. Concerning European patents, decisions of the 
European Patent Office would be relevant. Article 99(2) of the European Patent Convention 
states as to the ambit of an opposition to a granted European patent:   
 
“(2) The opposition shall apply to the European patent in all the Contracting States in which that patent 
has effect.”  
 
With regard to national patents, it is to be differentiated between systems in which the 
competent national authorities examine both the formal and substantive conditions of a patent 
before granting it – then legally binding decisions of these national authorities would be 
relevant – and other systems in which national authorities merely examine the formal 
conditions of a patent. Within States which follow the latter system, court decisions would 
become relevant in this context.  
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However, it is to be pointed out that the defendant is not prevented, by such decisions of an 
administrative authority or a court, regardless of their legally binding effect, from instituting 
an invalidity action in the State where the patent has been granted, at least under the condition 
that the respective legal system provides that possibility.1110  
 
Consequently, if the defence of invalidity would be excluded in the said conditions, the 
defendant would be restricted in his rights of effective legal protection, guaranteed by Article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights which states inter alia:  
 
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (…), everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  
 
It is highly doubtful if the defendant could be given the same possibilities to defend himself 
before the (foreign) court where infringement proceedings have been instituted. While one 
should expect the deciding court to manage to comprehend the foreign patent law and the 
foreign practice of staying proceedings,1111 it is indeed to be emphasised that such an 
approach would lead to a different application of Article 24(4) on identical facts between the 
Member States.1112 This would be distinctly contrary to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, which 
expressly warned, in its GAT decision, against 
 
“(…) distortions, (…) undermining the equality and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from 
the Convention for the Contracting States and the persons concerned (…).”1113 
 
This outcome is even more compelling as the legal effects of decisions significantly vary 
between decisions with inter partes effect (the decision on the validity of a patent by way of a 
preliminary question by the courts which have merely jurisdiction as to infringement 
proceedings, but not concerning validity proceedings) and decisions having erga omnes effect 
(for instance the opposition procedure before the European Patent Office). Furthermore, some 
Member States have installed specialised courts for decisions on the validity of patents, while 
civil courts are also or exclusively competent for (in)validity proceedings in other Member 
States.1114   
 
For reasons of completeness and accuracy, it is to be underlined that the fact that the disregard 
of the defendant’s invalidity defence in infringement proceedings would effect the disregard 
of Article 24(4), conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts in the State where the patent 
has been granted, cannot be grounded on the reasoning of the ECJ in GAT that      
 
“(…) the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for or 
made is justified by the fact that those courts are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the 




“(t)hat exclusive jurisdiction is also justified by the fact that the issue of patents necessitates the 
involvement of the national administrative authorities (…)”,1116 
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because both aspects are actually not affected if the court before which infringement 
proceedings have been instituted does not take into consideration an invalidity defence when 
there is already a legally binding decision on the validity of the patent in the State where it 
was granted. In this constellation, the disregard of the raised defence of invalidity would even 
mean, on the contrary, that the cited consideration would be taken serious, because the foreign 
court which decides on the infringement of the patent does not decide on the (in)validity of 
the concerned patent, but takes into consideration the (in)validity decision of the court in the 
State where the patent has been granted.1117  
 
To conclude, it is to be postulated, on the basis of the foregoing paragraphs, that a defence of 
invalidity of a patent is to be taken into consideration once it has been raised, regardless of the 
question if it is obviously unfounded.  
 
 
2.4.2.5 Consequences of the defence of invalidity 
 
Having analysed the requirements which are to be set up as to the defence of invalidity, I shall 
now turn to a subsequent issue: the question which consequences such a defence will effect 
exactly. As the consequences of the invalidity defence differ depending on whether it is raised 
in principal proceedings or in proceedings of interim relief, I will treat these constellations 
separately. I shall start with an analysis of the consequences of the invalidity defence raised in 
principal proceedings. The question of which consequences the raise of the invalidity defence 
has in provisional proceedings shall be analysed in detail when discussing cross-border 
interim relief. 
 
Remarkably, the wording of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which has obviously 
been inspired by and created in reaction to the GAT decision of the ECJ has not delivered a 
definite clarification of this issue, but restricts itself to adhering to the wording of the ECJ in 
its GAT decision. Therefore, I shall take into consideration the previous legal situation under 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, in 
particular the reference for a preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf which 
formed the starting point of the GAT case of the ECJ, the Opinion of the Advocate General, 
the GAT decision of the ECJ as such and relevant opinions in legal doctrine.  
 
Advocate General Geelhoed traced, in his Opinion in the GAT case, three different possible 
variants of such consequences. He noted: 
 
“(…) The court judging the infringement can transfer the case completely, it can stay the proceedings 
until the court of another Member State with jurisdiction under Article 16(4) [of the Brussels 
Convention] rules upon the validity of the patent, or it can deal with the case itself where a defendant 
acts in bad faith [content in brackets added].”1118 
 
While it has been suggested that the Advocate General intended to grant the invoked court the 
free choice how to act in such a situation,1119 I shall focus, in the following paragraphs, on the 
said eventualities and analyse their strengths and weaknesses, to ultimately conclude which 
solution should be chosen. At this place, it is to be stressed that the ECJ itself, in its GAT 
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decision, did not refer to the Advocate General’s considerations, but rather avoided to take an 
explicit position.1120  
 
 
2.4.2.5.1 Complete transfer of the case by the infringement court to a court having 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4)   
 
According to the first possibility noted by the Advocate General, the court before which an 
infringement proceeding has been initiated, would have to transfer the case completely to the 
(locally competent) court of the State where or, in case of a European patent, for which the 
patent has been granted. As has been shown above, this solution has in particular been 
advocated by English courts before the GAT decision of the ECJ and has also been upheld 
after this decision. Besides, parts of legal doctrine have shared this conception.1121  
First, it has been stressed that the GAT decision of the ECJ should be evaluated in the light of 
the reference for a preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf which expressly 
referred, in its question, to the problem of whether an infringement action as such – and not 
only the preliminary question of the validity of the patent – has as its object the validity of the 
patent with the consequence that Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation) is applicable in case that an invalidity defence was raised by the 
defendant:1122 
 
“Ist Art. 16 Nr. 4 EuGVÜ dahin auszulegen, dass die nach dieser Vorschrift begründete ausschließliche 
Zuständigkeit der Gerichte des Vertragsstaates, in dessen Hoheitsgebiet die Hinterlegung oder 
Registrierung eines Patentes beantragt oder vorgenommen worden ist oder aufgrund eines 
zwischenstaatlichen Übereinkommens als vorgenommen gilt, nur dann besteht, wenn eine Klage (mit 
Wirkung erga omnes) auf die Nichtigerklärung des Patentes erhoben ist, oder hat eine Klage im Sinne 
der vorgenannten Vorschrift die Gültigkeit von Patenten schon dann zum Gegenstand, wenn in einem 
Patentverletzungsverfahren der Beklagte oder in einem Verfahren auf Feststellung der Nichtverletzung 
eines Patentes der Kläger den Einwand erhebt, das Patent sei nicht gültig bzw. nichtig und auch aus 
diesem Grunde liege keine Patentverletzung vor (…) [underscores added]?”1123 
 
In this respect, it is instructive to have a look on the official English translation of this 
reference for a preliminary ruling which reads as follows: 
 
“Is Article 16(4) of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (‘the Brussels Convention’) to be interpreted as meaning that the exclusive 
jurisdiction conferred by that provision on the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or 
registration of a patent has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an international 
convention deemed to have taken place only applies if proceedings (with erga omnes effect) are brought 
to declare the patent invalid or are proceedings deemed to be concerned with the validity of patents 
within the meaning of the aforementioned provision where the defendant in a patent infringement action 
or the claimant in a declaratory action to establish that a patent is not infringed pleads that the patent is 
invalid or a nullity and that there is also no patent infringement for that reason (…) [underscores 
added]?”1124 
 
In the English version, the German term “Klage” has not been translated as “action”, but the 
broader expression “proceedings” has been chosen. Although this fact could certainly be 
based on a mere minor impreciseness, it might also underline indirectly that the 
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Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf actually stressed in its reference for a preliminary ruling the 
possibility that the whole infringement proceeding could be affected by the application of 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). 
However, it appears to go too far to conclude from the formulation of the discussed reference 
for a preliminary ruling that the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf itself assumed that Article 
16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) would be 
applicable to the whole infringement proceeding as soon as the invalidity defence has been 
raised.1125 The court rather chose a neutral formulation that could be answered in the positive 
as well as in the negative. In addition, it would seem exaggerated to derive such a conception 
of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf from the fact that it would otherwise have posed the 
additional question to the ECJ which are the jurisdictional consequences for infringement 
proceedings as such if only the validity aspect was to be decided by the courts having 
jurisdiction according to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation).1126  
 
Be that as it may: In the absence of a clear legal provision – as has already been mentioned, 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not deliver such clarity with regard to the 
concerned issue – it is ultimately the judgment of the ECJ which is decisive. Despite a certain 
correlation between a reference for a preliminary ruling and the respective judgment of the 
ECJ inasfar as the ECJ may not decide more than is covered by the reference, this does not 
imply that the ECJ silently adopts (or even has to adopt) a specific understanding of legal 
constructions and consequences of the referring court. In light of this, the mere fact that the 
ECJ did not expressly decide on the legal consequences of the applicability of Article 16(4) of 
the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) does not strike for the 
interpretation that the court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated is fully 
deprived of jurisdiction when an invalidity defence is raised.1127  
 
Furthermore, it has been concluded from the fact that the ECJ, in its GAT decision, did not 
treat, let alone take into account the variant eventualities indicated by the Advocate General of 
staying the proceedings until the court of another Member State with jurisdiction under 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) rules 
upon the validity of the patent, or dealing with the case itself where a defendant acts in bad 
faith, but merely pointed to the applicability of Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and Article 17 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) also in the case of the raise of an invalidity 
defence, that Articles 16(4) and 17 of the Brussels Convention (Articles 24(4) and 27 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be applied to the complete infringement proceeding.1128 Again, 
it is to be stressed that the mere fact of the ECJ’s silence with regard to the Advocate 
General’s Opinion does not suffice to derive further consequences from it. What the ECJ had 
in mind when rendering its GAT decision must be established from what the ECJ has 
positively stated in this decision as well as in previous decisions. In this respect, it is to be 
noticed that the ECJ explicitly confirmed that other courts than the courts of the States where 
(or for which) patents have been granted can have jurisdiction where the validity of the 
concerned patent is not doubted: 
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“If, on the other hand, the dispute does not concern the validity of the patent (…) and these matters are 
not disputed by the parties, the dispute will not be covered by Article 16(4) of the [Brussels] 
Convention (Duijnstee, paragraphs 25 and 26). Such would be the case, for example, with an 
infringement action, in which the question of the validity of the patent allegedly infringed is not called 
into question [content in brackets added].”1129  
 
Although it is true that not all alleged infringers will raise the issue of invalidity, some of 
them refraining from filing an invalidity action because of the costs involved in invalidity 
proceedings, others being contractually prevented from doing so, for instance if they are the 
patent holder’s licensees,1130 it is nonetheless expectable that the defence of invalidity will 
frequently (or even usually) be raised. This matter of fact has been explicitly pronounced by 
the ECJ in its Roche Nederland decision, stating that it 
 
“(…) is frequently the case in practice (…) (that) the validity of the patent would be raised 
indirectly.”1131 
 
Therefore, a conception according to which the court before which infringement proceedings 
have been initiated completely loses jurisdiction would have the effect that the quoted passage 
of the GAT decision actually becomes senseless. Besides, it is to be considered that the 
fundamental jurisdictional principle of actor sequitur forum rei, codified in Article 4(1), 
would be severely compromised if the court invoked with regard to infringement proceedings 
completely lost jurisdiction as a consequence of a raised invalidity defence, because, due to 
the mentioned fact that such a defence is often raised in the course of infringement 
proceedings, a lot of extraterritorial patent infringement proceedings could not be decided by 
the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled.1132   
 
Additionally, it must be borne in mind that the principle of perpetuatio fori would be 
disregarded or even devalued1133 if a court before which infringement proceedings have been 
brought would totally lose jurisdiction afterwards due to the pure fact of a defence raised by 
the defendant. This principle does not only apply to Article 4, but is also applicable to all 
other places of jurisdiction.1134 According to this principle, a court will not lose jurisdiction by 
posterior incidents after the action has been submitted, because the claimant’s trust in that 
what he knew when submitting the action shall be protected.1135 In particular, the defendant 
must not be enabled to deprive the claimant of the established place of jurisdiction.1136 The 
ECJ has at several occasions confirmed this principle of perpetuatio fori. In its decision in 
Danmarks Rederiforening, on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, 
the court held, also referring to previous case-law: 
 
“(…) (I)t must be observed that, according to settled case-law, the strengthening of the legal protection 
of persons established in the Community by enabling the claimant to identify easily the court in which 
he may sue and the defendant reasonably to foresee in which court he may be sued, is one of the 
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objectives of the Brussels Convention (Case C-256/00 Besix [2002] ECR I-1699, paragraphs 25 and 26, 
and Case C-334/00 Tacconi [2002] ECR I-7357, paragraph 20).”1137 
 
“That objective would not be achieved if, after an action falling within Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention is brought before the court of a Contracting State having jurisdiction, the suspension by the 
defendant of the tortious conduct giving rise to that action could have the effect of depriving the court 
seised of its jurisdiction, and of jurisdiction being assigned to a court in another Contracting State.”1138 
 
In the Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber decision, on the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, the ECJ 
confirmed its jurisprudence as to the principle of perpetuatio fori, deciding as follows: 
 
“In the fourth recital in the preamble to the Regulation, the Community legislature records its intention 
to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to 
another, seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position. That objective would not be achieved if the 
debtor could move the centre of his main interests to another Member State between the time when the 
request to open insolvency proceedings was lodged and the time when the judgment opening the 
proceedings was delivered and thus determine the court having jurisdiction and the applicable law.”1139 
  
“Such a transfer of jurisdiction would also be contrary to the objective, stated in the second and eighth 
recitals in the preamble to the Regulation, of efficient and effective cross-border proceedings, as it 
would oblige creditors to be in continual pursuit of the debtor wherever he chose to establish himself 
more or less permanently and would often mean in practice that the proceedings would be 
prolonged.”1140 
 
“Furthermore, retaining the jurisdiction of the first court seised ensures greater judicial certainty for 
creditors who have assessed the risks to be assumed in the event of the debtor's insolvency with regard 
to the place where the centre of his main interests was situated when they entered into a legal 
relationship with him.”1141 
 
It is to be emphasised that a complete transfer of the case by the infringement court to a court 
having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) would extend the competence of the latter court 
in an unjustified way, although provisions of exclusive jurisdiction should generally be 
interpreted in a restrictive way, because they structurally form exceptional rules.1142 
 
If the court before which infringement proceedings have been brought was completely 
deprived of jurisdiction, the claimant could even suffer – contrary to the fundamental right 
guaranteed in Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) – a denial 
of justice if, for instance, the claim was already considered prescribed in the State of the court 
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 Article 6(1) ECHR 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (…), everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law (…).  
 
 
However, arguing in favour of the complete transfer of the case by the infringement court to a 
court having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4), it could be referred to Article 27 which 
provides: 
 
“Where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over 
which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24, it shall 
declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.” 
 
In this respect, it could be put forth that Article 27 logically requires that the infringement 
action is totally dismissed and the case is completely transferred to the courts having 
jurisdiction with accordance to Article 24(4), because it would be contradictory to state first, 
according to the ECJ in GAT, that the courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) 
generally have jurisdiction as to the validity issue, and to state afterwards that Article 27 
justifies a dismissal only if the issue of the validity of the patent forms the principal 
issue1144.1145  
 
Particularly before1146 the GAT decision of the ECJ, but also after it1147, Article 19 of the 
Brussels Convention/Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation, the predecessors of Article 27 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, have been referred to with regard to the question of how to 
interpret Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention/Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
The ECJ has, in GAT, explicitly denied this conception:   
 
“Article 19 of the [Brussels] Convention, which, in certain language versions, refers to a claim being 
brought 'principally', does not provide further clarity. Apart from the fact that the degree of clarity of the 
wording of that provision varies according to the particular language version, that provision, as the 
Commission has observed, does not confer jurisdiction but merely requires the court seised to examine 
whether it has jurisdiction and in certain cases to declare of its own motion that it has none [content in 
brackets added].”1148 
 
In GAT, the ECJ “brings the very same article back in via the back door in paragraph 24 to 
back up its approach to the very same issue”1149, holding:  
 
“(…) Where a court of a Contracting State is seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a 
matter over which the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16 [of 
the Brussels Convention], it must declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction (Article 19 of the 
Convention). A judgment given which falls foul of the provisions of Article 16 does not benefit from 
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the system of recognition and enforcement under the Convention (first paragraph of Article 28 and 
second paragraph of Article 34 thereof) [content in brackets added].”1150 
 
Despite that later reference to Article 19 of the Brussels Convention, it has been rightly stated 
that the ECJ made clear that Articles 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) and Article 19 of the Brussels Convention (Article 27 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be interpreted independently from each other, although there is 
a connection between both provisions.1151 This result is confirmed by the following 
consideration: While, according to the GAT decision, Article 16 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is also applicable in the case of an invalidity 
defence (and not only in the case of an invalidity counter-claim), Article 19 of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) merely affects a claim which is 
principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another Member State have 
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16 of the Brussels Convention (Article 24 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). According to this conception, Article 27 actually bears an 
independent meaning. 
 
In this respect, it is to be noticed that the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, in its reference for a 
preliminary ruling, took into consideration both the constellation of an invalidity defence 
raised during an infringement proceeding and the constellation of a separate declaratory 
action initiated by the defendant of the infringement proceeding, formulating: 
 
“(…) where the defendant in a patent infringement action or the claimant in a declaratory action to 
establish that a patent is not infringed pleads that the patent is invalid or a nullity (…)?”1152 
 
The ECJ likewise addressed both constellations when deciding that 
 
“(…) Article 16(4) of the [Brussels] Convention is to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of 
exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein concerns all proceedings relating to the registration or validity 
of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection [content 
in brackets added].”1153 
 
This jurisprudence of the ECJ has been codified in Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. 
 
It can be presumed from the formulation of the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, and actually 
derived from the GAT decision of the ECJ and the present formulation in Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, that an invalidity defence and a separate invalidity/nullity counter-
claim are to be treated equally as to their jurisdictional consequences. However, it is not 
doubted that, in the case of a separate invalidity/nullity counter-claim, Article 24(4) merely 
affects that latter action and not the infringement action, and consequently the duty of the 
court according to Article 27 to declare that it is not competent to decide only concerns the 
invalidity/nullity counter-claim. In light of this, it is logical to proceed in the same way as to 
an invalidity defence raised in the framework of an infringement proceeding, i.e. to apply 
Article 24(4) and Article 27 only to the issue of validity of the concerned patent, leaving 
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jurisdiction for the remaining infringement proceeding to the court where the infringement 
proceeding has been initiated.1154                   
 
The insight that Article 27 is to be interpreted independently from Article 24 is also 
underlined by the Jenard Report (concerning the previous provisions of the Brussels 
Convention): 
 
“The words 'principally concerned' have the effect that the court is not obliged to declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction if an issue which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of another 
court is raised only as a preliminary or incidental matter [underscores added].”1155  
 
Remarkably, the English version of the Jenard Report refers to the term “issue” which can be 
interpreted as being in contrast to the whole proceeding. Such an interpretation is supported 
by the comparison with other language versions of the Jenard Report such as the German, 
French or Dutch versions which read as follows:   
 
“Aus den Worten ‘wegen einer Streitigkeit angerufen’ ergibt sich, daß dieses Gericht sich nicht von 
Amts wegen für unzuständig erklären darf, wenn ein Streitpunkt, der zur ausschließlichen Zuständigkeit 
eines anderen Gerichts gehört, lediglich als Vorfrage aufgeworfen wird [underscores added].”1156 
 
“Il résulte des mots ‘saisi à titre principal’ que ce juge ne doit pas se déclarer d'office incompétent si la 
question qui relève de la compétence exclusive à un autre tribunal n'est soulevée qu'à titre d'exception 
[underscores added].”1157 
 
“Uit de woorden ‘bij wie een geschil aanhangig is gemaakt’ volgt, dat deze rechter zich niet ambtshalve 
onbevoegd moet verklaren indien de vraag die tot de uitsluitende bevoegdheid van een ander gerecht 
behoort slechts als exceptie is opgeworpen [underscores added].”1158 
 
Even more impressively than in the English version of the discussed passage of the report, 
these other language versions reveal the undertaken differentiation between Streitigkeit – 
Streitpunkt, titre principal – question, and geschil – vraag. In this light, it seems convincing 
to interpret Article 27 in the way that it only affects the issue that is actually covered by 
Article 24, i.e. it is only to this extent, namely as to the question of invalidity of the concerned 
patent, that the court seised must declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.1159 
 
Besides, it has been rightly highlighted that the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ, which 
was rendered on the same day as the GAT decision and explicitly refers to it, is to be 
considered in this context.1160 In Roche Nederland, the ECJ held: 
 
“Finally, even assuming that the court seised by the defendant were able to accept jurisdiction on the 
basis of the criteria laid down by the national court, the consolidation of the patent infringement actions 
before that court could not prevent at least a partial fragmentation of the patent proceedings, since, as is 
frequently the case in practice and as is the case in the main proceedings, the validity of the patent 
would be raised indirectly. That issue, whether it is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection, is a 
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matter of exclusive jurisdiction laid down in Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention in favour of the 
courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has taken place or is deemed to have 
taken place (GAT, paragraph 31) (…) [underscore added].”1161 
 
The question to be answered is what the ECJ had in mind when using the term “partial 
fragmentation”. To be more precise, the question may be formulated as follows: Which 
constellation is conceivable in the given context where patent proceedings would be at least 
partially fragmented? In this respect, it seems reasonable that the ECJ had in mind the 
situation that the raise of an invalidity defence as well as the initiation of an invalidity/nullity 
counter-claim have the effect that the courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) 
gain exclusive competence as to the validity issue, but the court before which the 
infringement proceeding has been initiated stays competent for the rest of the dispute beyond 
that validity issue.1162  
 
To conclude, it is to be pointed out that Advocate General Geelhoed’s traced possibility of a 
complete transfer of the case by the infringement court to a court having jurisdiction 
according to Article 24(4), if the invalidity issue has been raised, is to be rejected. 
 
 
2.4.2.5.2 Decision by the infringement court assuming that the concerned patent is 
existent and valid 
 
Having denied the possibility of a complete dismissal of an infringement action in the case 
that the defendant raises the defence of the invalidity of the patent in question, I shall now 
examine if, respectively in which circumstances, the infringement court may decide on the 
infringement action, on the assumption that there is an existent and valid patent.1163 
 
In the analysis, I shall again start from the GAT decision of the ECJ. The court formulated in a 
comprehensive way: 
 
“In the light of the position of Article 16(4) [of the Brussels Convention] within the scheme of the 
Convention and the objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided 
for by that provision should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent's 
validity is raised, be it by way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the case is brought or at a 
later stage in the proceedings [content in brackets added].”1164 
 
This corresponds to the wording of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The crucial 
question which arises in this context is the following: Does the GAT decision of the ECJ mean 
that the infringement court is completely barred from dealing with the validity issue – 
including simply assuming the validity of the concerned patent – or did the ECJ merely intend 
to avoid that the infringement court positively decides – the outcome of this decision being 
open – on the validity issue?  
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It has been depicted as a (theoretical) possibility1165 or even as an inevitable fact1166 that, if 
infringement litigation takes place in a court not being competent according to Article 24(4) 
(respectively its predecessors), which does not stay the proceedings, validity cannot be settled 
and infringement should be decided on the assumption that there is an existent, valid right 
under another Member State law.      
 
However, a closer analysis of the GAT decision of the ECJ reveals that the court did not 
intend to achieve that result.1167 In this respect, it is to be noticed that the ECJ founded its 
decision as to the justification of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 16 of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) on the idea of a sufficient link 
between the deciding court and the proceedings in fact and law: 
 
“In relation to the objective pursued, it should be noted that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction laid down 
in Article 16 of the [Brussels] Convention seek to ensure that jurisdiction rests with courts closely 
linked to the proceedings in fact and law [content in brackets added].”1168 
 
The ECJ then explicitly addressed two aspects to explain when such a close link exists:  
 
“Thus, the exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents 
conferred upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied 
for or made is justified by the fact that those courts are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the 
dispute itself concerns the validity of the patent (…). The courts of the Contracting State on whose 
territory the registers are kept may rule, applying their own national law, on the validity and effects of 
the patents which have been issued in that State. This concern for the sound administration of justice 
becomes all the more important in the field of patents since, given the specialised nature of this area, a 
number of Contracting States have set up a system of specific judicial protection, to ensure that these 
types of cases are dealt with by specialised courts [underscore added].”1169 
 
“That exclusive jurisdiction is also justified by the fact that the issue of patents necessitates the 
involvement of the national administrative authorities (…) [underscore added].”1170 
 
It is to be noticed that the ECJ generally referred to the jurisprudence upon cases in which the 
validity issue is concerned, and emphasised the essential involvement of the respective 
national administrative authorities. These considerations illustrate clearly the ECJ’s 
conception that Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) does not only confer exclusive jurisdiction on the respective courts with regard to 
the decision that a patent be invalid, but rather covers the whole process of dealing with a 
patent’s validity, i. e. including the mere assumption of the validity of the concerned patent. In 
this light, a decision of the court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated 
on the infringement action, on the assumption of an existent and valid patent, would form a 
violation of Article 24(4).1171  
 
Similarly, the Hoge Raad held in a decision in the course of infringement proceedings 
concerning a European patent, rendered after the GAT decision of the ECJ: 
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“Door de beslissing van het HvJ EG in het arrest GAT/Luk is m.i. het fundament weggenomen onder de 
opvatting dat de geadieerde rechter (…) mag uitgaan van de geldigheid van het buitenlandse deel van de 
octrooibundel zolang de daartoe bevoegde buitenlandse autoriteit niet heeft beslist dat het 
desbetreffende recht ongeldig of nietig is. Het enkele feit dat de verweerder het bestaan of de geldigheid 
van het uitsluitend recht betwist is volgens het HvJ EG al voldoende om de geadieerde rechter (…) 
onbevoegd te maken tot enigerlei beslissing die betrekking heeft op het geschil over de geldigheid of 
ongeldigheid van het buitenlandse deel van de octrooibundel. Oudere andersluidende opvattingen zijn 
door deze beslissing van het HvJ EG achterhaald.”1172 
 
(“According to my opinion, the decision of the ECJ in GAT/Luk has taken away the basis of the 
conception that the deciding court (…) may assume the validity of the foreign part of the bundle of 
patents as long as the competent foreign authority has not decided that the respective right is invalid or a 
nullity. The mere fact that the defendant contests the existence or the validity of the exclusive right 
suffices, according to the ECJ, to deprive the deciding court (…) of jurisdiction as to any decision that 
concerns the dispute on the validity or the invalidity of the foreign part of the bundle of patents. 
Previous different conceptions have become obsolete as a consequence of this decision of the ECJ 
[underscore added].”)1173  
 
But even if one denied a violation of Article 24(4) in this constellation, because the 
infringement court would simply respect the decision of the national administrative authority 
which granted the patent, there would be the problem that some EU Member States dispose of 
register systems in which patents are granted without a previous examination of the 
substantive conditions of patentability, bearing the consequence that there is actually no 
assumption of the validity of the concerned patent. In these systems, the task of examining the 
patentability, and thus the validity of a patent, is rather conferred on the courts in case of an 
initiated proceeding. Consequently, the sole assumption of the validity of a patent, by the 
infringement court, would be irreconcilable with the mentioned register systems.1174   
 
Besides, the assumption of the validity of the patent in question would promote and even 
provoke forum shopping by the claimant who would be tempted not to sue the defendant in 
the State where or for which territory a patent was granted, but in another State where the 
defendant could not effectively raise the defence of invalidity of the patent. Admittedly, it is 
to be borne in mind that the provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on exclusive 
jurisdiction, such as Article 24(4), are to be considered exceptions from the general provision 
of Article 4(1) and the provisions of special jurisdiction. It is also a fact that pure patent 
infringement proceedings are not affected by Article 24(4) which has been confirmed by the 
ECJ in its GAT decision concerning Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention: 
 
“If (…) the dispute does not concern the validity of the patent (…) and these matters are not disputed by 
the parties, the dispute will not be covered by Article 16(4) of the [Brussels] Convention (…). Such 
would be the case, for example, with an infringement action, in which the question of the validity of the 
patent allegedly infringed is not called into question [content in brackets added].”1175 
 
However, as has been rightly criticised, such an approach would ultimately be contrary to the 
concept of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as a whole,1176 because it would be based on the 
devaluation of particular provisions, providing an incentive to circumvent them. As a 
consequence, the effet utile of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would be seriously jeopardised.  
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Furthermore, it is to be underlined that depriving the defendant of the possibility to raise the 
defence of invalidity of the patent would at the same moment form a severe restriction of the 
defendant’s rights in a proceeding and must be considered contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR 
which guarantees the right to a fair trial. 
  
Having arrived at the conclusion that the infringement court may not simply assume that the 
patent in question is existent and valid despite a raised invalidity defence, I shall now turn to 
the examination whether this outcome should apply without exceptions or whether specific 
circumstances are conceivable in which the court before which infringement proceedings have 
been initiated should have jurisdiction to decide although the defendant has raised the validity 
issue. In this respect, it has been proposed by parts of legal doctrine to admit such an 
exception in the case that the raised invalidity defence is not decisive, because the allegation 
of an infringement of the concerned patent must be denied for other reasons, such as a right to 
use the patent granted to the alleged infringer.1177 It has been put forward that the defendant’s 
rights will actually not be jeopardised in this constellation because his invalidity defence will 
have no effect if the existence of a patent infringement is excluded for other reasons. In 
addition, it has also been underlined that the invalidity defence will usually be made under the 
condition (as a “last resort”) that no other defence will effect that the accusation of a patent 
infringement is invalidated.1178 Although, beyond dispute, these considerations provide a 
certain attraction, because they obviously attempt to find a balance between procedural reality 
and the jurisprudence of the ECJ, they should not be followed for several reasons. 
 
First of all, it is not for sure that the invalidity defence is regularly raised as a “last resort”. 
And even if this should be the case, then a different treatment of cases in which the invalidity 
defence has been raised as “last resort” and other cases in which only this defence has been 
raised should be avoided, because the defendant has the possibility to recall a defence. 
Should, where the defendant initially raised two defences, among those the invalidity defence, 
and in the course of the proceeding merely adheres to the invalidity defence, the infringement 
court lose jurisdiction at this moment, maybe after having almost rendered a decision? For 
reasons of clearness and procedural economy, the answer should definitely be in the negative, 
although it is admitted that the described constellation may resemble the constellation where 
initially no defence at all has been raised and the invalidity defence is then raised in the course 
of the infringement proceeding. In its GAT decision, the ECJ stated as to Article 16(4) of the 
Brussels Convention that  
 
“(…) the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision should apply (…) at the time the case is 
brought or at a later stage in the proceedings [underscore added].”1179      
 
Secondly, it is to be pointed out that the ECJ, in its GAT decision, stated clearly that Article 
24(4) is to be applied in any case where the defendant has raised the defence of invalidity of 
the concerned patent, and that this jurisprudence has been codified in Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation in the meanwhile. While it is true that an invalidity defence will 
finally have no effect if the accusation of patent infringement is invalidated by another 
defence, it stays a matter of fact that it has been raised and that its mere raise deprives the 
court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated of jurisdiction. The 
argumentation that the defence of invalidity, in the described constellation, is only raised due 
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to formal reasons, because defences are normally brought collectively, also in order to meet 
rules of preclusion,1180 is not convincing, because it cannot override the explicit ruling of the 
ECJ in GAT, where the court merely referred to the raise of an invalidity defence 
independently of the reason why the defence has been raised, let alone set aside the clear text 
of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect, another viewpoint is to be 
considered irreconcilable with the ECJ’s jurisprudence in GAT, respectively the clear will of 
the European legislator who, inspired by the GAT decision and in reaction to it, changed the 
wording of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation into the wording of Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. The evaluation that the described situation would be comparable to 
the situation where no invalidity defence has been raised because the action failed for another 
reason,1181 goes astray.   
 
In summary, it is to be highlighted that the infringement court may not, without any 
exceptions, simply assume that the concerned patent exists and is valid, where the validity 
issue is raised by the defendant. 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3 Stay of the infringement proceedings until the court of another Member State 
with jurisdiction under Article 24(4) has ruled upon the validity of the patent 
 
Having denied both the possibility of a complete transfer of the case by the infringement court 
to a court having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) and the solution that the infringement 
court renders a decision on the assumption that the concerned patent is existent and valid, I 
shall now analyse the third possibility proposed by Advocate General Geelhoed, according to 
which the infringement court would stay infringement proceedings until a court having 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) has decided the validity issue.  
 
Remarkably, this solution has been advocated to a considerable extent both by legal 
doctrine1182 and courts after the GAT decision of the ECJ. For instance, the Rechtbank ‘s-
Gravenhage held in the Sisvel decision: 
 
“(…) Moduslink [one of the defendants] heeft immers nog niet voor antwoord geconcludeerd en 
derhalve nog geen verweer ten principale gevoerd. Een beslissing omtrent de thans aan de orde gestelde 
grensoverschrijdende bevoegdheid kan pas daarna worden genomen. In verband daarmee zal die 
beslissing worden aangehouden tot de einduitspraak in de hoofdzaak [underscore and content in 
brackets added].”1183 
 
(“(…) Moduslink [one of the defendants] still has not replied to the action and therefore has not raised a 
defence concerning the principal proceeding. A decision as to the currently contested cross-border 
jurisdiction can only be rendered afterwards. In this context, that decision shall be stayed until the final 
judgment in the principal proceeding [underscore and content in brackets added].”)1184   
 
Similarly, the Hoge Raad has decided, in Roche Nederland: 
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“(…) Art. 16, onder 4, EEX/EVEX, zoals deze bepaling door het HvJ EG wordt uitgelegd, brengt – 
ongeacht de woonplaats van de verweerder –  mee dat de Nederlandse rechter geen uitspraak kan doen 
in een geschil over de geldigheid van het buitenlandse deel van de octrooibundel. In theorie laat de 
uitspraak van het HvJ EG de geadieerde Nederlandse rechter ruimte om de beslissing in de inbreukzaak 
aan te houden in afwachting van de onherroepelijke uitkomst van een elders te voeren procedure over 
de geldigheid van het uitsluitend recht. Na afloop kan de behandeling van de inbreukzaak worden 
hervat en kan de Nederlandse rechter, zich onvoorwaardelijk richtend naar de uitkomst van de 
procedure in het in art. 16, onder 4, EEX/EVEX aangewezen land (waarmee vast staat of het 
desbetreffende buitenlandse deel van de octrooibundel wel of niet geldig is), een oordeel geven over de 
vraag of de gestelde inbreuk heeft plaatsgevonden en wat daarvan de rechtsgevolgen zijn (…) 
[underscore added].”1185 
 
(“(…) Article 16(4) of the Brussels/Lugano Convention implies, according to the interpretation of this 
provision of the ECJ, notwithstanding the defendant’s place of domicile, that the Dutch court cannot 
render a judgment in a dispute on the validity of the foreign part of the bundle of patents. In theory, the 
decision of the ECJ leaves the possibility to the deciding Dutch court to stay infringement proceedings 
until the irrevocable outcome of a proceeding, on the validity of the exclusive right, which has to be 
conducted first. After finishing that, the treatment of the infringement proceedings can be resumed, and 
the Dutch court can, acting unconditionally in accordance with the outcome of the proceeding in the 
State determined by Article 16(4) of the Brussels/Lugano Convention (whereby it is certain whether the 
respective foreign part of the bundle of patents is valid or not), render a judgment on the issue of 
whether the alleged infringement took place and which are the legal consequences thereof (…) 
[underscore added].”)1186              
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1 On which legal basis can a stay of infringement proceedings be founded? 
 
In the following paragraphs I shall first address the essential problem on which legal basis a 
court before which infringement proceedings have been initiated can/shall stay the 
proceedings until the validity issue, if and as soon as it has been raised, has been decided by a 
court having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4).  
 
Due to the primacy in application of the provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation vis-à-vis 
provisions of the national (procedural) laws of the Member States, it is to be considered first 
whether the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains a rule that can serve as legal basis for the 
described constellation. In Section 9 (Lis pendens – related actions), the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation contains several provisions (Articles 29 to 34) dealing with constellations that 
might fit to the constellation in question. The goal of the following research is to find out if 
one of these provisions is applicable.     
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1.1 Article 29 
 
Section 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation starts with the provision of Article 29 that reads:  
 
 
 Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) Without prejudice to Article 31(2), where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the 
court first seised is established. 
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(2) In cases referred to in paragraph 1, upon request by a court seised of the dispute, any other court 
 seised shall without delay inform the former court of the date when it was seised in accordance with 
 Article 32.  
 
(2) Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first 
seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
 
 
As to the concerned constellation that the court before which infringement proceedings have 
been initiated first stays infringement proceedings until a court competent according to Article 
24(4) has decided on the validity issue, it is obvious that Article 29 cannot serve as a legal 
basis. First of all, it is to be noticed that both proceedings in question are led by the same 
parties, but do not involve the same cause of action,1187 even if this term is interpreted in a 
broad sense.1188 Besides, Article 29 requires that two actions have been brought in the courts 
of different Member States. In this respect, Article 32 contains specific rules to define when a 
court is to be considered as seised: 
 
 
 Article 32 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Section, a court shall be deemed to be seised: 
 
 (a) at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is 
 lodged with the court, provided that the claimant has not subsequently failed to take the steps 
 he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant, or 
 
 (b) if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the time when it is 
 received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the claimant has not 
 subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with 
 the court. 
 
The authority responsible for service referred to in point (b) shall be the first authority receiving the 
documents to be served. 
 
(2) The court, or the authority responsible for service, referred to in paragraph 1, shall note, 
respectively, the date of the lodging of the document instituting the proceedings or the equivalent 
document, or the date of receipt of the documents to be served.  
 
 
In the constellation in question, the raise of the defence of invalidity of the concerned patent 
does not imply that a nullity action has already been brought in the court having jurisdiction 
according to Article 24(4) in the moment when the invalidity defence is raised. Moreover, it is 
to be underlined that the legal consequence of Article 29 would be that only the court first 
seised would be entitled to make a decision. As a consequence, it would be the court before 
which infringement proceedings were initiated that would completely keep jurisdiction, 
Article 24(4) thus going astray, what would actually mean an irreconcilable conflict between 
Article 24(4) and Article 29. In addition to the latter argument, it is to be remarked that the 
intention of Article 29 is that the court seised after another court, in the situation described, 
shall grant time to the court seised first to examine if it has jurisdiction (Article 29(1)) and, if 
and once it has been established that the court first seised has jurisdiction, that the court 
secondly seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised. In contrast to this 
conception, which is based on the situation that the whole case shall be decided by one single 
court, the constellation as to a stay of infringement proceedings until the validity issue has 
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been solved by a court being competent with accordance to Article 24(4) is characterised by 
the situation that it is not doubted that the principal proceedings as to the alleged infringement 
of the concerned patent are decided by the infringement court, whereas only the validity issue 
shall be decided by a court having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4).1189  
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1.2 Article 30 
 
As the stay of infringement proceedings, until the decision of the validity issue by the 
competent court, thus cannot be founded on Article 29, I shall now turn to an analysis of 
whether Article 30 can serve as a legal basis for that procedure. Article 30 provides: 
 
 
 Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
 
(2) Where the action in the court first seised is pending at first instance, any other court may also, on the 
application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the 
actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof. 
  
(3) For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
 
 
Again, it is to be stated that, in the case of infringement proceedings where an invalidity 
defence has been raised, there is only one action – the infringement action. Structurally, it is 
incorrect to equalise an invalidity defence and a counter-claim such as a nullity/invalidity 
action, because the latter constitutes a separate (individual) procedural means, in contrast to 
an accessory defence which can only be raised in existing proceedings. However, this 
differentiation has sometimes been disregarded.1190    
 
Another issue is whether the “actions” are related as Article 30(1) requires. In this respect, 
Article 30(3) is to be taken into consideration, defining actions to be related if there is such a 
connection “that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”, resulting in a broad 
comprehension of Article 30.1191 In this light, two actions are to be considered related if the 
decision on the one action prejudices the decision on the other action. An infringement action 
is founded if the patent has been declared a nullity; an invalidity/nullity proceeding therefore 
has prejudicial effect for the infringement proceeding.1192 In contrast to Article 29, a defence 
raised by the defendant is also to be taken into account with regard to the evaluation of 
whether the actions are related according to Article 30, because it is sufficient for the 
application of Article 30 that it is simply “expedient” to hear and determine both actions 
together.1193 However, comparably to the situation indicated with regard to Article 29, it is to 
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be underlined that Article 30 merely provides the opportunity that the court secondly seised 
may decline jurisdiction, whereas the infringement court is first seised in the constellation 
discussed here. As a result, Article 30 is not applicable due to its clear wording.1194 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1.3 Article 31(1) 
 
The last provision in Section 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that could eventually serve as a 
legal basis for a stay of infringement proceedings is Article 31(1) that provides:   
 
 
 Article 31 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the 





Apart from the fact that Article 31(1), similarly to Articles 29 and 30, tends to give 
jurisdiction to the court first seised, it is to be mentioned that a stay of infringement 
proceedings in the constellation in question cannot be based on Article 31(1) because this 
provision premises the existence of the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, whereas there 
is only one exclusive jurisdiction in the discussed constellation, namely with regard to the 
courts of the State where the patent has been granted.1195  
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1.4 Analogous application of Article 30 (as the provision of Section 9 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation that relatively fits best) 
 
In light of the fact that Section 9 (Lis pendens – related actions) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation does not contain a provision on which the stay of infringement proceedings, when 
an invalidity defence has been raised, can be founded by way of a direct application of such a 
provision, it has been proposed in legal doctrine to resort to an analogous application of 
Article 30 (respectively its predecessors under the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation).1196 While, for the reasons mentioned above, it is to be appreciated that an 
analogous application of Articles 29 or 31(1) (respectively its predecessors under the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation) has not been brought into play, because these provisions 
concern constellations which are without any doubt completely different from the 
constellation concerned here, it is however doubtful, too, whether Article 30 can be applied by 
way of an analogy here. In order to argue for an analogous application of Article 30 to the 
constellation in question, it might be put forth that the ratio legis of Article 30 consists in the 
idea that in a situation where two proceedings are closely linked with each other, the outcome 
of the one proceeding shall be adapted to the outcome of the other proceeding. Besides, it 
could be considered that Article 30 intends to solve the conflict of two different places of 
jurisdiction in such proceedings which are closely linked with each other.1197 Referring both 
to the jurisprudence of the ECJ according to which opposing judgments in such proceedings 
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are to be avoided, and to the Jenard Report which stated that Article 22 of the Brussels 
Convention (which structurally corresponds to Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation)  
 
“(…) also serves to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments and thus to facilitate the proper 
administration of justice in the Community (…)”,1198 
 
it could be postulated that the goal of a proper administration of justice is so paramount that 
the fact that Article 30 actually brings along the legal consequence that the court first seised 
keeps jurisdiction, in contrast to the constellation in question in which the court secondly 
brought into play is primarily competent, is less important and does not constitute a principal 
obstacle for an analogous application of Article 30.1199 
 
However, the crucial question is whether it is indeed justified to apply Article 30 by way of an 
analogy in the given context. More precisely, it is to be questioned: Are the preconditions for 
an analogy actually fulfilled? Analogy premises that a factual and legal situation A for which 
the legislator has not foreseen any legal provisions, is comparable to a situation B, which has 
been ruled by the legislator, to such an extent that it seems justified that the legal provisions 
as to situation B are also applied to situation A. But – and this is essential – such an approach 
is only possible where it can be excluded that the legislator has not made an intentional 
decision when not establishing rules as to situation A. In other words, an analogy is merely 
possible where it is clear that the legislator has simply “forgotten” to create a provision to rule 
a specific constellation. Concerning the question of comparability between the constellation 
ruled in Article 30 and the constellation in question, it is to be stated that Article 30 covers 
only civil proceedings and cannot be extended to proceedings relating to the infringement of a 
patent and proceedings as to the validity, i.e. existence, of a patent, which can be derived from 
Article 30(2) which explicitly premises actions “at first instance”. Besides, the Jenard Report 
points towards this direction when stating:  
 
“(…) The proceedings must, however, be pending at the same level of adjudication, for otherwise the 
object of the proceedings would be different and one of the parties might be deprived of a step in the 
hierarchy of the courts.”1200 
 
As a consequence, the constellation in question is actually not comparable to the constellation 
which is ruled in Article 30. It is already for this reason that there is no space for an analogous 
application of Article 30. Moreover, the further question of whether the gap of rules within 
Section 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation has not been intended by the legislator must be 
denied. With regard to the constellation in question, it is hardly conceivable that the European 
legislator has “forgotten” to create a provision for the constellation in question. First of all, it 
is to be underlined that the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains specific rules of jurisdiction for 
infringement proceedings (general provisions) and for invalidity proceedings (Article 24(4)). 
Second, the national procedural laws of the EU Member States contain specific provisions 
that rule exactly the concerned issue of a stay of infringement proceedings when an invalidity 
defence has been raised within these proceedings. Last but not least, it is a fact that this issue 
has already been discussed under the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. 
Although Article 30 has been changed in comparison with its predecessor, Article 28 of the 
Brussels I Regulation, the wording of Article 30 has not been constructed in such a way as to 
(directly) cover the concerned constellation. In light of the foregoing, it must be concluded 
                                                 
1198
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 41, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1199
 Bukow 2003, p. 276. 
1200
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 41, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
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that the European legislator thus intentionally has not created a provision within the 
framework of the Brussels Ibis Regulation for this constellation. In these circumstances, it is 
not possible to fill the existing legal gap by way of an analogous application of a provision of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Any other acting would be against the clear will of the 
legislator.1201 Last but not least, it has rightly been emphasised that an analogous application 
would also contravene the first-in-time principle that forms the basis of Articles 29, 30 and 
31, as it is always the court first seised which shall primarily keep and exert jurisdiction.1202 
An exception from this fundamental principle cannot simply be construed by way of an 
analogous application of a provision of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1203       
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that Article 30 is not applicable in the discussed constellation by 
way of an analogy, either. 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.1.5 Provisions of national (procedural) law 
 
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not contain any 
provision which can serve as a legal basis for the infringement court to stay proceedings if the 
defence of invalidity of the concerned patent has been raised by the defendant, meaning that 
Article 24(4) is applicable, and having analysed as well that an analogous application of 
Article 30 (as the provision of Section 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that relatively fits 
best) is not possible either, the national law of the Member States remains as a last resort.  
 
At first glance, one might be tempted to argue that Section 9 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
contains an exhaustive system of provisions dealing with aspects of lis pendens and that, 
consequently, recourse to provisions of national law of the Member States is blocked, in 
particular in the light of the fundamental first-in-time principle which forms the basis of 
Articles 29, 30 and 31, which might be undermined by such a recourse to provisions of 
national law. Indeed, it is to be underlined that the Brussels Ibis Regulation constitutes a 
closed system of jurisdictional rules as far as it is applicable.1204 So, in case that a provision 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable, the first-in-time principle is to be respected, and 
only the court secondly seised will have to, respectively may, stay proceedings brought before 
it until the other court will have made a decision. However, I have established above that 
Articles 29, 30 and 31(1) concern completely different constellations than the constellation in 
question, without any actual comparability, and that the European legislator intentionally did 
not create a provision for the constellation in question within the framework of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. Thus, the first-in-time principle is not applicable in the constellation 
concerned here, either. Logically, it therefore cannot be undermined by the application of 
rules of national law of the Member States.1205 It is generally accepted that rules of national 
procedural law concerning jurisdiction will be applied where and as far as the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is not applicable.1206     
 
                                                 
1201
 Coming to the same conclusion as to the Brussels I Regulation: Schauwecker 2009, p. 300. Since the reform 
of the Brussels I Regulation into the existing system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation has not brought a clear 
solution of this problem, the argumentation that the European legislator intentionally has not created a clarifying 
provision gains even more weight than before the creation of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
1202
 Cf. Gebauer 2007, pp. 89-100. 
1203
 As to the Brussels I Regulation: Schauwecker 2009, p. 301. 
1204
 Mankowski 2011 (Rauscher), Vorbem Art 2 Brüssel I-VO, para. 17. 
1205
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 303. 
1206
 Mankowski 2011 (Rauscher), Vorbem Art 2 Brüssel I-VO, para. 17. 
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It is to be mentioned that the national laws of all Member States include rules as to the stay of 
patent infringement proceedings until a decision of the competent court on the validity of the 
concerned patent.1207 The question to be answered is whether the issue of a stay of 
infringement proceedings is a matter of substantive law or procedural law. In the first case, 
the lex causae would be applicable, in the second case, the lex fori would apply according to 
the fundamental forum regit processum-principle.1208 Partly, the national laws of the Member 
States contain general procedural provisions regarding the stay of proceedings until a specific 
aspect has been decided by the competent authority. For instance, Section 148 of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure1209 provides: 
 
 
 Section 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
 
Das Gericht kann, wenn die Entscheidung des Rechtsstreits ganz oder zum Teil von dem Bestehen oder 
Nichtbestehen eines Rechtsverhältnisses abhängt, das den Gegenstand eines anderen anhängigen 
Rechtsstreits bildet oder von einer Verwaltungsbehörde festzustellen ist, anordnen, dass die 
Verhandlung bis zur Erledigung des anderen Rechtsstreits oder bis zur Entscheidung der 
Verwaltungsbehörde auszusetzen sei. 
  
(Where the decision on a legal dispute depends either wholly or in part on the question of whether a 
legal relationship does or does not exist, and this relationship forms the subject matter of another legal 
dispute that is pending, or that is to be determined by an administrative agency, the court may direct that 
the hearing be suspended until the other legal dispute has been dealt with and terminated, or until the 
administrative agency has issued its decision.)1210 
 
 
Under English law, the court has inherent power to grant a stay of any proceedings where it 
thinks fit to do so because the justice of the case so demands.1211 Rule 3.1(2)(f) of the English 
Civil Procedure Rules provides with regard to the court’s general powers of management:  
 
 
 Rule 3.1(2)(f) of the English Civil Procedure Rules 
 
Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may – 
 
(…) 








                                                 
1207
 Cf. Treichel 2001, p. 45 et seq.; Schauwecker 2009, p. 301 et seq.; Dagg (2003)94(1) Mitt. 1, at p. 1 et seq.; 
Hölder 2004, p. 177. 
1208
 Geimer 2015, para. 319; Schack 2010, paras. 45-50; Hölder 2004, pp. 174-177. 
1209
 Cf. Reimann & Kreye 2003, pp. 587-597. 
1210
 Translation provided by Samson-Übersetzungen GmbH, Dr. Carmen von Schöning, published on the website 
of the German Federal Ministry of Justice, at WWW <http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html#p0581> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1211
 Hölder 2004, p. 177, there fn. 1160; Layton & Mercer 2004, para. 9.028 and there fn. 52. 
1212
 Legal text available at WWW <http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part03#3.1> 
(lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1213
 Cf. Treichel 2001, p. 45 et seq.; cf. Mousseron, Raynard & Véron (1998)29(8) IIC 884, at p. 904. 
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 Article 378 of the New Code of Civil Procedure 
 
La décision de sursis suspend le cours de l'instance pour le temps ou jusqu'à la survenance de 
l'événement qu'elle détermine.1214 
 
(The decision to stay proceedings suspends the court before which proceedings have been brought for 
the time or until the occurrence of the event that it determines.)1215 
 
 
Other national legal provisions contain special rules which specifically concern simultaneous 
patent infringement and invalidity/nullity proceedings. Some of these provisions have a pure 




 Article L. 614-15 of the French Code of Intellectual Property 
 
Le tribunal saisi d'une action en contrefaçon d'un brevet français qui couvre la même invention qu'un 
brevet européen demandé par le même inventeur ou délivré à celui-ci ou à son ayant cause avec la 
même date de priorité surseoit à statuer jusqu'à la date à laquelle le brevet français cesse de produire ses 
effets aux termes de l'article L. 614-13 ou jusqu'à la date à laquelle la demande de brevet européen est 
rejetée, retirée ou réputée retirée, ou le brevet européen révoqué (…).1216 
   
(The court before which infringement proceedings have been brought concerning a French patent that 
covers the same invention as a European patent claimed by the same inventor or granted to him or his 
legal successor with the same priority date stays proceedings until the moment when the French patent 
is not any longer effective with regard to Article L. 614-13 or until the moment when the claim of the 
European patent has been rejected, withdrawn or is considered withdrawn, or the European patent has 
been withdrawn (…).)1217    
 
  
Besides, there are national provisions which concern substantive law, such as Article 83(3), 
(4) of the Dutch Patent Act 1995, reading: 
 
 
 Article 83(3), (4) of the Dutch Patent Act 1995 
 
 (3) Indien de rechter meent, dat op de beslissing van een geschil van invloed kan zijn een 
 rechtsvordering, die op grond van artikel 10, 75, 77 of 78 is of zou kunnen worden ingesteld, kan hij de 
 behandeling van het aanhangige geschil met of zonder tijdsbepaling schorsen. Gelijke bevoegdheid 
 bezit hij, indien op de beslissing inzake zulk een rechtsvordering een uit anderen hoofde ingestelde 
 rechtsvordering van invloed kan zijn.  
                                                 
1214
 Legal text available at WWW 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=C74904491A8E3D9BEF71DC99660DB782.tpdjo08v
_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006149667&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070716&dateTexte=20121208> 
(lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1215
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1216
 Legal text available at WWW  
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=56A1718872AABB3B2C187F56104C075F.tpdjo04v_
1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006191140&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069414&dateTexte=20130101> 
(lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1217
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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(4) De rechter kan de behandeling van een geschil ter zake van een Europees octrooi met of zonder 
tijdsbepaling schorsen, indien bij het Europees Octrooibureau tegen dat octrooi oppositie is ingesteld 
ingevolge artikel 99 van het Europees Octrooiverdrag.”1218 
 
 
((3) If it appears to the court that a decision on a matter in dispute may be influenced by proceedings 
instituted or possibly to be instituted according to Articles 10, 75, 77 or 78, the court may stay the 
proceedings relating to the matter in dispute, with or without setting a time limit. The court may also act 
in this way if a decision relating to such proceedings may be affected by proceedings instituted on 
different grounds. 
 
(4) The court may stay proceedings relating to a dispute in respect of a European patent, with or without 
setting a time limit, if notice has been given to the European Patent Office of opposition to that patent 
by virtue of Article 99 of the European Patent Convention.)1219 
 
 
Explicitly with regard to Section 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, it has been 
argued that this provision is closely linked with the particularity of German patent law that the 
defendant cannot raise the defence of invalidity in infringement proceedings for substantive 
reasons, and that this provision constitutes, concerning patent law, an essential part of the 
substantive rules of German patent law.1220 However, this evaluation is to be rejected. First, 
the situation that a court is bound by the decision of another authority which has to decide 
first is not a unique feature of patent law, but a general principle of civil procedural law.1221 
Second, it is to be underlined that the previous German particularity that the German 
infringement court was not allowed to decide on the validity of German patents, while it was 
allowed to decide – with inter partes effect – on the validity of foreign patents of (at least)1222 
all Member States (but also could stay proceedings) has been relativised by the GAT decision 
of the ECJ, where the ECJ held that infringement proceedings must generally be stayed when 
the defence of invalidity of the concerned patent is raised. Accordingly, the previous 
argumentation against the decisiveness of a German particularity as to the qualification of 
Section 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure which stressed that it was not decisive 
whether a stay of infringement proceedings was mandatory concerning German patents, while 
it was voluntary with regard to non-German patents1223, has become obsolete.     
 
Due to the fact that the national laws of all Member States include rules with regard to the 
stay of patent infringement proceedings until a decision of the competent court on the validity 
of the concerned patent has been rendered, there is no need for a substantive qualification 
either. Therefore, the issue of a stay of infringement proceedings should be considered a 
matter of procedural law.  
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that a stay of infringement proceedings can and is to be based 
on provisions of national procedural law of the Member States.  
 
                                                 
1218
 Legal text available at WWW 
<http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0007118/Hoofdstuk6/Artikel83/geldigheidsdatum_09-12-2012> (lastly 
accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1219
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1220 Stauder (1976)25(12) GRUR Int. 510, at p. 515; Stauder (1997)46(11) GRUR Int. 859, at p. 860; Stauder 
(1998)18(5) IPRax 317, at p. 321, there fn. 19; Kieninger (1998)47(4) GRUR Int. 280, at p. 281; cf. Kubis 1999, 
p. 225; cf. also Treichel 2001, p. 41. 
1221
 Hölder 2004, p. 176. 
1222
 Under the condition of accepting a reflexive effect of Article 24(4), this statement would be also relevant 
with regard to the courts of third States. 
1223
 Arguing in this way before the GAT decision of the ECJ: Hölder 2004, pp. 176-177. 
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2.4.2.5.3.2 Is there a time limit for the initiation of counter-proceedings 
(invalidity/nullity proceedings respectively revocation proceedings or opposition 
proceedings (European patent)? 
 
Having come to the conclusion that the national procedural rules of the Member States 
constitute the legal basis for a stay of infringement proceedings if the defendant has raised the 
defence of invalidity of the concerned patent, it is to be noticed that this approach as such 
does not guarantee that the defendant, after raising the invalidity defence, subsequently 
initiates invalidity proceedings before the courts being competent according to Article 24(4) 
immediately (promptly) after infringement proceedings have been stayed. However, it is 
evident that the defendant must not be enabled to permanently block the decision of the 
infringement court. In this respect, it is to be emphasised that a number of patent systems 
(like, for instance, the German patent system) do not grant, to the patent holder, the possibility 
to have the validity of the patent confirmed, as the validity is presumed.1224 As a consequence, 
the defendant who has raised an invalidity defence should be obliged to initiate 
invalidity/nullity proceedings in a relatively short term afterwards. As there should be space 
for individual decisions, it does not seem reasonable to indicate an exact term. Regarding the 
question of whether the infringement court should have discretion with respect to the 
determination of the length of this term, the parallel rule concerning the Community trade 
mark could be taken into consideration. Article 100(7) of the Community trade mark 
Regulation1225 provides:  
  
 
Article 100(7) of the Community trade mark Regulation 
 
The Community trade mark court hearing a counterclaim for revocation or for a declaration of invalidity 
may stay the proceedings on application by the proprietor of the Community trade mark and after 
hearing the other parties and may request the defendant to submit an application for revocation or for a 
declaration of invalidity to the Office within a time limit which it shall determine. If the application is 
not made within the time limit, the proceedings shall continue; the counterclaim shall be deemed 
withdrawn. Article 104(3) shall apply. 
 
 
Comparably to this situation with regard to the Community trade mark, the determination of 
the length of this term should also be open to the discretion of the court where infringement 
proceedings have been instituted.1226 Additionally, it has rightly been pointed out that the 
defendant, instead of instituting invalidity/nullity proceedings, may also institute, given the 
period for objection is still running, revocation proceedings before the competent national 
authorities or opposition proceedings. With regard to a European patent, initiating opposition 
proceedings before the European patent office will also effect that infringement proceedings 






                                                 
1224
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 311. 
1225 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 
March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
1226
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 311. 
1227
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 312 with reference to case-law. 
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2.4.2.5.3.3 Must the defendant institute counter-proceedings in persona?  
 
An interesting question which arises in this respect is whether the defendant of the respective 
infringement proceeding must institute a nullity/invalidity action (or initiate revocation/ 
opposition proceedings) in persona, or whether it is sufficient that a third party undertakes 
these steps.  
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.3.1 The insight of Roche Nederland 
 
First, this consideration leads back to the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ where the 
court, as has been treated in detail above, stated in essence that  
 
“(…) Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it does not apply in 
European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of companies established in various 
Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States even where those 
companies, which belong to the same group, may have acted in an identical or similar manner in 
accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of them.”1228 
 
As the ECJ thus denied a close connection according to Article 6(1) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in the addressed constellation, it can 
be derived that a stay of the concerned infringement proceedings will only be effected if and 
only inasfar as the concerned defendants institute a nullity/invalidity action respectively 
initiate revocation proceedings, due to the fact that national patents exist independently from 
each other. As to defendants who do not act in this way, infringement proceedings will not be 
stayed. However, the situation is different with regard to opposition proceedings before the 
European Patent Office as Article 99(2) of the EPC provides: 
 
 
 Article 99(2) of the EPC 
 
 The opposition shall apply to the European patent in all the Contracting States in which that patent has 
 effect.”  
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.3.2 Constellations beyond Roche Nederland 
 
However, further constellations are conceivable which are not affected by the Roche 
Nederland decision of the ECJ. They shall be subject to the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
  
2.4.2.5.3.3.2.1 Constellation 1: Joint infringement proceedings against several 
defendants; only one defendant institutes counter-proceedings 
 
On the one hand, one might put forth that the fact that infringement proceedings have been 
initiated jointly against several defendants (A and B), on the basis of Article 8(1) in a situation 
where this provision is still applicable after Roche Nederland, should per se have the effect 
that the procedural acting of one defendant should also entail consequences for other joint 
defendants. However, such a conception would wrongly deny the procedural autonomy of 
defendants even if proceedings have been jointly initiated against them. It is to be noticed that 
                                                 
1228
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, para. 41 – Roche Nederland. 
 254 
the institution of counter-proceedings by one defendant could only have effect for other 
defendants under the condition of the same ground of nullity/invalidity and the same facts 
with regard to all those defendants, which is rather unlikely to be the case.1229 In the 
concerned constellation, defendant B is not prevented from initiating counter-proceedings by 
the fact that defendant A has done so before. This result is confirmed by a study of the 
provisions of the European Patent Convention. Article 105 of the EPC explicitly rules the 
intervention of third parties in opposition proceedings after the expiration of the opposition 
period:    
  
 
 Article 105 of the EPC 
 
(1) Any third party may, in accordance with the Implementing Regulations, intervene in opposition 
proceedings after the opposition period has expired, if the third party proves that 
   
(a) proceedings for infringement of the same patent have been instituted against him, or  
 
(b) following a request of the proprietor of the patent to cease alleged infringement, the third party has 
instituted proceedings for a ruling that he is not infringing the patent.  
 
(2) An admissible intervention shall be treated as an opposition. 
 
 
Such a provision would not be necessary but actually senseless if the institution of opposition 
proceedings by defendant A would automatically have effect as to defendant B, too. If 
defendant A has initiated nullity/invalidity proceedings, B may intervene as well if the 
national procedural provisions provide for this possibility. 
 
Moreover, Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, containing provisions for the refusal of 
recognition of judgments, must be taken into consideration. Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation provides:  
 
 
 Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
  
(1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
 
 (…) 
 (c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the 
 Member State addressed. 
 
 
Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation also stresses the fact that the same parties are 
concerned, thus excluding third parties.1230  
 
Last but not least, it is to be emphasised that the court before which infringement proceedings 
have been initiated is not prevented from staying the infringement proceedings also with 
regard to defendant B if defendant A has instituted counter-proceedings, if this complies with 
the national procedural rules of the lex fori. However, the court is not forced to stay 
infringement proceedings as to defendant B in this situation.1231 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 313. 
1230
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 314. 
1231
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 314. 
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2.4.2.5.3.3.2.2 Constellation 2: Independent infringement proceedings against several 
defendants; only one defendant institutes counter-proceedings 
 
Given that the institution of counter-proceedings by only one out of several defendants does 
not affect the relationship between the claimant and the other defendants of the infringement 
proceedings, resulting in the fact that each defendant must institute counter-proceedings in 
order to effect a stay of infringement proceedings, it is to be stated a maiore ad minus that the 
result must be the same in the case of independent infringement proceedings against several 
defendants. In this constellation, there is even less ground to award effect to the institution of 
counter-proceedings by one defendant to another defendant. 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.4 Must the infringement court stay proceedings when a nullity/invalidity 
defence has been raised?  
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.4.1 General considerations 
 
Above under 2.4.2.5.3.1.5, I have arrived at the conclusion that a stay of infringement 
proceedings can and must be based on provisions of national procedural law of the Member 
States. Problematically, the relevant legal provisions generally1232 provide for the discretion of 
the deciding court whether infringement proceedings are stayed or not. For instance, this goes 
for Section 148 of the German Code of Civil Procedure1233, Rule 3.1(2)(f) of the English Civil 
Procedure Rules1234, Article 378 of the New Code of Civil Procedure1235 or Article 83(3), (4) 
of the Dutch Patent Act 19951236. Nonetheless, it is doubtful if such discretion is justified in 
the situation in question. In GAT, Advocate General Geelhoed had restricted himself to 
enumerate the potential options of the infringement court once a defence of invalidity has 
been raised1237: 
 
“(…) The court judging the infringement can transfer the case completely, it can stay the proceedings 
until the court of another Member State with jurisdiction under Article 16(4) [of the Brussels 
Convention] rules upon the validity of the patent, or it can deal with the case itself where a defendant 
acts in bad faith [content in brackets added].”1238 
 
Although the ECJ subsequently did not make a definite statement as to this question either, it 
is remarkable that the ECJ distinctively underlined the decision-making authority of the courts 
of the State where the patent in question has been granted as to the validity issue. Beyond that, 
the ECJ emphasised the need for and the significance of the principle of legal certainty, 
warning that 
 
“(…) multiplying the heads of jurisdiction (…) would be liable to undermine the predictability of the 
rules of jurisdiction laid down by the [Brussels] Convention, and consequently to undermine the 
                                                 
1232
 There are exceptions such as Article L. 614-15 of the French Code of Intellectual Property, cf. fn. 1193. 
1233
 Cf. fn. 1187. 
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 Cf. fn. 1189. 
1235
 Cf. fn. 1191. 
1236
 Cf. fn. 1195. 
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 Mistakably: Schauwecker 2009, p. 304. 
1238
 Advocate General 16 September 2004, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen 
und Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 46 – GAT. 
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principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the [Brussels] Convention (…) [content in brackets 
added].”1239      
 
At least under the current regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,1240 it would clearly be 
contrary to the fundamental principle of legal certainty if the infringement court was given 
discretion as to the decision on a stay of infringement proceedings. To guarantee the effet utile 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a discretion potentially provided for by provisions of national 
procedural law should not be exerted (respectively is to be considered not to exist) with regard 




2.4.2.5.3.4.2 Are the parties’ interests to be taken into account? 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.4.2.1 The claimant’s interests 
 
Having shown that the infringement court must not be granted discretion when deciding on 
the stay of proceedings once an invalidity defence has been raised, I shall now dedicate my 
research on the issue of whether the consideration of the claimant’s and the defendant’s 
interests might lead to the result that the infringement court can (or even has to) transfer the 
whole case, i.e. both with regard to the infringement and the validity issue, to a court being 
competent according to Article 24(4). At first glance, this idea might seem clearly inconsistent 
with the above finding that a complete transfer of the case by the infringement court to a court 
having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4), if the invalidity issue has been raised, is to be 
rejected. However, such an evaluation might be overhasty. It might turn out that the 
infringement court, where not being obliged to undertake ex officio a complete transfer of the 
case to a court being exclusively competent with accordance to Article 24(4), might do so 
upon request of the claimant. In this respect, the situation is conceivable that the claimant in 
infringement proceedings who initiated infringement proceedings before a court not having 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) in the course of which an invalidity defence has been 
raised, intends to have the case decided by one court in order to accelerate proceedings.1242  
 
Again, the first issue to be solved consists in the tracing of an adequate legal basis on which 
such an approach can be founded. As has been analysed in detail above, Article 30 
(concerning related actions) does not cover this constellation and actually would not justify a 
complete transfer of proceedings to the second court.  
 
Besides, it has been proposed to take recourse to Article 27 (respectively its predecessors of 
the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation) as a legal basis.1243 In the course of the 
following analysis, I shall research whether this approach is actually convincing. For reasons 




                                                 
1239
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 28 – GAT. 
1240
 As shall be demonstrated in the following chapter, a different solution is conceivable when amending the 
Regulation. 
1241
 Coming to the same conclusion: Schauwecker 2009, p. 304. 
1242
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 305. 
1243
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 305 et seq. 
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Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
  
Where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over 
which the courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24, it shall 
declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction. 
 
 
As I have established above, Articles 24 and 27 must be interpreted independently from each 
other, which is also underlined by the Jenard Report (as to the respective provisions of the 
Brussels Convention). It has been demonstrated that Article 27 is to be interpreted in the way 
that it only affects the issue actually covered by Article 24, i.e. it is only to this extent, namely 
with regard to the invalidity issue, that the court seised must declare of its own motion that it 
has no jurisdiction. However, this might not necessarily imply that the infringement court is a 
priori prevented from declaring itself incompetent also for the infringement proceeding. For a 
closer research of another aspect of the relevant passage in the Jenard Report, I shall refer 
once again to the English, German, French and Dutch version of the report: 
 
“The words 'principally concerned' have the effect that the court is not obliged to declare of its own 
motion that it has no jurisdiction if an issue which comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of another 
court is raised only as a preliminary or incidental matter [underscore added].”1244  
 
“Aus den Worten ‘wegen einer Streitigkeit angerufen’ ergibt sich, daß dieses Gericht sich nicht von 
Amts wegen für unzuständig erklären darf, wenn ein Streitpunkt, der zur ausschließlichen Zuständigkeit 
eines anderen Gerichts gehört, lediglich als Vorfrage aufgeworfen wird [underscore added].”1245 
 
“Il résulte des mots ‘saisi à titre principal’ que ce juge ne doit pas se déclarer d'office incompétent si la 
question qui relève de la compétence exclusive à un autre tribunal n'est soulevée qu'à titre d'exception 
[underscore added].”1246 
 
“Uit de woorden ‘bij wie een geschil aanhangig is gemaakt’ volgt, dat deze rechter zich niet ambtshalve 
onbevoegd moet verklaren indien de vraag die tot de uitsluitende bevoegdheid van een ander gerecht 
behoort slechts als exceptie is opgeworpen [underscore added].”1247 
 
The report clearly states, in all cited language versions, that the infringement court may not 
declare “of its own motion” (“von Amts wegen”, “d’office”, “ambtshalve”) (ex officio), i.e. 
without a request of the claimant being necessary, that it has no jurisdiction. The question of 
whether the court is entitled to declare its incompetence for the rest of the proceedings, 
namely the infringement issue, is not answered by the Jenard Report. As a consequence, it is 
to be concluded that an approach according to which the infringement court can also declare 
itself incompetent for the infringement proceeding should be considered at least in line with 
Article 27. However, a conception according to which Article 27 is considered the legal basis 
for the power of the infringement court to completely transfer the whole case to the courts 
having jurisdiction with accordance to Article 24(4) would go too far, due to the clear 
wording of Article 27.1248 Nonetheless, it is to be underlined that such an approach of the 
                                                 
1244
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 39, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1245
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 39, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:DE:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1246
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 39, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:FR:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1247
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 39, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:NL:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1248
 Differently: Schauwecker 2009, p. 305, who actually treats Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) as a legal basis for a complete transfer of infringement proceedings to the 
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infringement court at least corresponds to the idea (ratio legis) of Article 27. Although there 
is no explicit legal basis for a complete transfer of both infringement and invalidity 
proceedings to the courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4), it is to be concluded 
that such an approach can be based on an overall view of jurisdictional rules of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation.  
 
Besides, it is to be underlined that this result takes into account that the stay of proceedings is 
generally based on national procedural rules which mostly do not require the claimant’s 
request for such a stay of proceedings. Therefore, demanding a request in order to ensure the 
effet utile of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would not be justified.1249   
 
Additionally, it is to be underlined that the approach pursued here according to which the 
complete transfer of the proceedings provided that the claimant requests so, while 
infringement proceedings are stayed in the case of a lack of such a request, corresponds to the 
insight in line with the GAT decision of the ECJ that the application of Article 24(4) 
principally effects the stay of proceedings according to national law (as principal legal 
consequence) and that there is no general duty to dismiss proceedings (as exceptional legal 
consequence) ex officio. A variant conception according to which the stay of proceedings 
depends on the claimant’s request1250, while in the absence of such a request the court would 
be obliged to dismiss the claim, would disregard that relationship (principle – exception).1251 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.4.2.2 The defendant’s interests 
 
Having analysed that the claimant may request proceedings to be totally transferred to the 
courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4), the question arises whether, respectively 
to which extent the defendant’s interests are to be taken into consideration in this respect. 
 
 
2.4.2.5.3.4.2.2.1 Vis-à-vis the claimant’s request for a transfer in toto 
 
First of all, it is to be examined whether the defendant is impaired by the claimant’s request 
for a transfer of proceedings in toto to the courts being competent according to Article 24(4). 
In light of the jurisdictional system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation the claimant is entitled to 
choose a forum provided by the rules of the Regulation. Instead of initiating infringement 
proceedings before another court, the claimant could institute infringement proceedings 
directly before the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled, i. e. actually the very 
State, in principle, where proceedings in question shall be totally dealt with. As a 
consequence, it is justified to undertake such a complete transfer of proceedings upon the 
claimant’s request. Besides, it is to be underlined that the result of proceedings bundled in the 
State where the patent has been granted generally corresponds to the defendant’s interests, as 
it is the defendant himself who, by raising the defence of invalidity/nullity of the concerned 
patent, brings into play Article 24(4) which otherwise would not become relevant.1252   
                                                                                                                                                        
courts having jurisdiction with accordance to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) upon request of the claimant, once the invalidity defence has been raised.    
1249
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 307.  
1250
 As to the decision of the Hoge Raad in Roche Nederland, it is unclear whether the court pursued this 
approach as the wording of the decision leaves open both conceptions, cf. HR 30 November 2007, C02/228HR 
and C02/280HR, Roche Nederland BV (Netherlands) and Others v Dr. F.J. Primus and Dr. M.D. Goldenberg, NJ 
2008, 77, Conclusion, para. 2.16 – Roche Nederland. 
1251
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 306. 
1252
 Similar: Schauwecker 2009, p. 307. 
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2.4.2.5.3.4.2.2.2 Defendant’s personal interest in a transfer in toto 
 
Another issue is whether there is a personal interest of the defendant in a complete transfer of 
both infringement and invalidity proceedings once the invalidity defence has been raised. 
Such an interest could be justified by the fact that the defendant must raise a separate nullity 
action in the case that infringement proceedings are stayed by the infringement court until the 
validity issue has been decided by a separate court having jurisdiction according to Article 
24(4), while in the case of negotiating infringement proceedings before the courts being 
competent according to Article 24(4), the mere raise of the invalidity defence would suffice in 
numerous Member States.1253 In this respect, it might be argued that the necessity of an 
invalidity action in the first case, which inevitably produces costs, might lead to the 
consequence that both the defendant’s fundamental right to an effective defence, guaranteed 
by Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and the favor 
defensoris-principle, laid down in Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, are violated.1254 
Defendants of infringement proceedings might refrain from filing an invalidity action because 
of the costs involved in validity proceedings.1255 It is actually conceivable that infringement 
proceedings are deliberately initiated before courts outside the State where the patent has been 
granted, in order to avoid that the defendant may raise an invalidity defence without initiating 
a separate nullity action.1256 The consequence would be an incentive to institute infringement 
proceedings in States where nullity/invalidity of a patent must be dealt with separately from 
the infringement issue – the defendant being deprived of the invalidity defence in such 
proceedings – rather than before courts of States where the nullity/invalidity issue can be 
treated incidentally. That might result in disadvantages for the defendant of infringement 
proceedings and, at another level, might be considered contrary to the jurisdictional system of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation that provides for the possibility of initiating infringement 
proceedings before courts of another State than the State for whose territory the concerned 
patent has been granted, but does not allow the complete privation of these proceedings from 
that State. It has therefore been questioned if the infringement court should be obliged – ex 
officio or upon the defendant’s request – to completely dismiss proceedings, in cases in which 
national law provides for the possibility that the infringement court also decides on the 
existence of the concerned patent, and transfer them to the courts of the State where the patent 
has been granted, which are competent according to Article 7(2).1257 In this respect, it is to be 
stated first that the defendant does not need more protection than he may pursue himself. In 
this light, a transfer ex officio should be excluded a priori. At the utmost a transfer upon the 
defendant’s request might be discussed. Regarding this, it seems to go too far to interpret the 
defendant’s raise of the invalidity defence as a request to transfer complete proceedings to the 
courts being competent according to Article 24(4) (on the assumption that the defendant 
chooses the defence which is easier for him).1258  
 
However, several aspects clearly militate against the defendant’s possibility to attain the 
complete transfer of proceedings by request. First of all, it is to be emphasised that the 
condition that the defendant, depending on the State where infringement proceedings have 
been instituted, must initiate a separate nullity/invalidity action or merely raise the invalidity 
defence, is based on the fact that the Brussels Ibis Regulation simply does not provide for 
                                                 
1253
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 308. 
1254
 Cf. Wadlow 1998, para. 3–125. 
1255
 Gonzalez Beilfuss 2008, p. 86. 
1256
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 308. 
1257
 This idea has been raised by Schauwecker, while finally rejecting it himself, cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 308 et 
seq. 
1258
 Though arguing in this direction: Schauwecker 2009, p. 309. 
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proper means for the treatment of parallel infringement and invalidity proceedings.1259 If the 
defendant would be granted the opportunity to influence the allocation of jurisdiction in the 
relationship of the infringement court and the court having jurisdiction as to the validity issue 
according to Article 24(4), this would be against the ECJ’s intention, expressly stated in its 
GAT decision, to avoid  
 
“(…) distortions (…) undermining the equality and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from the 
[Brussels] Convention for the Contracting States and the persons concerned [content in brackets 
added]”1260   
 
because patents would be treated differently depending on which system exists in the State 
where they have been granted. In States which provide for the possibility that an invalidity 
defence can also be decided by infringement courts (by way of an inter partes decision), 
proceedings would always have to be transferred to the courts having jurisdiction according to 
Article 24(4) once an invalidity defence has been raised. In contrast, infringement 
proceedings concerning patents granted in or for States which do not provide for the 
possibility that an invalidity defence may be treated by infringement courts (as it is the legal 
situation in Germany, for instance) could be conducted before the courts of another State. 
 
Additionally, granting the defendant the opportunity to request to completely transfer 
proceedings to the courts having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) would result in the 
situation that the principle elaborated above of a relationship between a stay of infringement 
proceedings as the rule and a transfer in toto (at the claimant’s request) as the exception, 
would be undermined.   
   
Besides, the argument that the defendant who must initiate invalidity proceedings would be 
severely impaired loses much of its importance when regarding that there are various 
procedural means to ease potential burdens, such as the possibility of the court to reduce costs 
for an economically weak party, grant legal aid or employ principles of equity.1261  
 
Beyond that, with regard to the aspect of the alleged impairment of the favor defensoris-
principle, it is to be emphasised that leaving the infringement court jurisdiction for the 
infringement proceedings already initiated regularly does take into account the defendant’s 
interests, when this jurisdiction is based on Article 4(1), the actor sequitur forum rei-principle 
forming the strongest incorporation of the favor defensoris-principle.1262  
 
As to the fear that infringement proceedings might be increasingly instituted in States where 
nullity/invalidity of a patent must be dealt with separately from the infringement issue, rather 
than before courts of States where the nullity/invalidity issue can be treated incidentally, I am 
not convinced that this fear is really justified. Besides the fact that in the case of a complete 
transfer of proceedings to one court a decision will expectably be rendered earlier, the 
claimant may also be more interested in a inter partes decision than in a decision with erga 
omnes effect if there is the danger that the patent will be declared void.1263   
 
                                                 
1259
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 310. 
1260
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 30 – GAT. 
1261
 Particularly as to provisions of German patent law: Schauwecker 2009, p. 309. 
1262
 Contrary to Schauwecker (Schauwecker 2009, p. 309 et seq.), jurisdiction in this respect cannot only be 
founded on Article 4(1), but, depending on the constellation, also on Article 7(2) or Article 8(1). 
1263
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 310. 
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For these reasons, the defendant should not be granted the possibility to effect a complete 





To conclude, the infringement court must stay proceedings when a nullity/invalidity defence 
has been raised. Upon the claimant’s request, proceedings are to be completely transferred to 
the courts being competent pursuant Article 24(4), while the defendant cannot influence the 
place of jurisdiction by raising the invalidity defence. 
 
 
2.5 Cross-border interim relief  
 
 
2.5.1 Importance of interim relief with regard to intellectual property infringement 
 
In particular with regard to intellectual property litigation, provisional measures have been 
characterised as “the most important and effective weapon in international litigation”.1264 IP 
rights holders are in general primarily interested in stopping the allegedly infringing activities 
and only then considering what other remedies should be sought.1265 
 
The importance of interim relief is due to several aspects. First of all, it is to be noticed that 
many intellectual property disputes actually never go beyond the stage of the application for 
interlocutory relief, because they are already solved by way of ordering a preliminary 
injunction.1266 This fact must be considered in light of the situation that only quick measures 
against acts of patent infringement will prevent the patent holder from suffering severe 
economic damage which would occur the longer the patent infringement continues.1267 In this 
respect, it is to be borne in mind that international litigation is often characterised by a long 
duration of proceedings.1268 As a result of this situation, the enforcement and realisation of 
substantive rights is delayed.1269 Without the possibility to gain interim relief, principal 
proceedings in cases of patent infringement would eventually lose much of their importance 
or would ultimately become senseless because the patent holder would already be ruined 
before a final decision could be rendered, which proves the significance of interim relief for 
ensuring effective legal protection.1270 This idea has been clearly expressed in Recital 22 of 
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (hereinafter Enforcement Directive) that provides: 
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 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 3.128; as to the significance of interim relief cf. also Tsikrikas & Hausmann 
2012 (unalex Kommentar), vor Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1; cf. also McGuire 2014 (Burgstaller, Neumayr, 
Geroldinger & Schmaranzer), Art 31 EuGVO, para. 2 as to Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation: “Die 
Regelung ist von erheblicher praktischer Bedeutung” (“The provision has considerable practical significance”). 
1265
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 112. 
1266 Adams (1995)17(10) E.I.P.R. 497; Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 3.128; Bertrams (1995)44(3) GRUR Int. 193, 
at p. 197; Hellstadius & Meier-Ewert (2005)36(3) IIC 313, at p. 323; cf. Kruger 2005, p. 312. 
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 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1; Tsikrikas & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), 
vor Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1. 
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 Tsikrikas & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), vor Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1. 
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 Tsikrikas & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), vor Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 1, cf. also Pörnbacher 
2014 (Geimer & Schütze, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr), Art. 31 VO (EG) No. 44/2001, para. 1 
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 Recital 22 of Directive 2004/48/EC 
 
It is also essential to provide for provisional measures for the immediate termination of infringements, 
without awaiting a decision on the substance of the case, while observing the rights of the defence, 
ensuring the proportionality of the provisional measures as appropriate to the characteristics of the case 
in question and providing the guarantees needed to cover the costs and the injury caused to the 
defendant by an unjustified request. Such measures are particularly justified where any delay would 
cause irreparable harm to the holder of an intellectual property right. 
 
 
In this respect, it is to be added that a proceeding must be finished in an adequate term in 
order to meet the requirements of a “Rechtsstaat”, which is also guaranteed by Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights which states inter alia:  
 
 
 Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations (…), everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time (…). 
 
 
However, as Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is not sufficient for 
an effective protection of the requirement of an adequate term of proceedings, this 
requirement must be concretised and realised by further legal rules such as those of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation which therefore must be considered in the light of underlying 
(procedural) principles.1271 Furthermore, it is true that, for instance, the importance of the 
Dutch kort geding has increasingly developed into a quasi-principal proceeding, given that it 
is considered faster, more efficient and cheaper than a regular principal proceeding.1272 
 
Notably, national laws provide for a broad diversity of measures of interim relief. Indeed, a 
certain amount of minimum standards for the WTO Member States have been established by 
Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement which provides: 
 
 
 Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
(1) The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures:  
 
 (a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from occurring, and in 
 particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of goods, 
 including imported goods immediately after customs clearance;  
 
 (b) to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.  
 
(2) The judicial authorities shall have the authority to adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte 
where appropriate, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, 
or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.  
 
(3) The judicial authorities shall have the authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably 
available evidence in order to satisfy themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant 
is the right holder and that the applicant's right is being infringed or that such infringement is imminent, 
and to order the applicant to provide a security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the 
defendant and to prevent abuse.  
 
                                                 
1271
 Cf. König 2012, p. 65. 
1272
 Bertrams (1995)44(3) GRUR Int. 193, at p. 197. 
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(4) Where provisional measures have been adopted inaudita altera parte, the parties affected shall be 
given notice, without delay after the execution of the measures at the latest. A review, including a right 
to be heard, shall take place upon request of the defendant with a view to deciding, within a reasonable 
period after the notification of the measures, whether these measures shall be modified, revoked or 
confirmed.  
 
(5) The applicant may be required to supply other information necessary for the identification of the 
goods concerned by the authority that will execute the provisional measures.  
 
(6) Without prejudice to paragraph 4, provisional measures taken on the basis of paragraphs 1 and 2 
shall, upon request by the defendant, be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect, if proceedings 
leading to a decision on the merits of the case are not initiated within a reasonable period, to be 
determined by the judicial authority ordering the measures where a Member's law so permits or, in the 
absence of such a determination, not to exceed 20 working days or 31 calendar days, whichever is the 
longer.  
 
(7) Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any act or omission by the 
applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no infringement or threat of 
infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order 
the applicant, upon request of the defendant, to provide the defendant appropriate compensation for any 
injury caused by these measures.  
 
(8) To the extent that any provisional measure can be ordered as a result of administrative procedures, 
such procedures shall conform to principles equivalent in substance to those set forth in this Section.  
 
 
On the European level, some harmonisation between the EU Member States has been created 
by the Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the enforcement of intellectual property law (Enforcement Directive), which prescribes 
rules for measures for preserving evidence (Article 7) and for provisional and precautionary 
measures (Article 9).  
 
However, the national laws of the Member States – and even more among the States beyond 
the European Union – still show considerable differences regarding kind and coverage (scope) 
of provisional measures.1273 For this reason, patent holders who tend to enforce their rights in 
different national legal systems can and must make a clever choice between the provisional 
measures available in those legal frameworks.1274 
 
 
2.5.2 Interim relief within the scope of application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
In Section 10, the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains a specific rule, Article 35, on jurisdiction 
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 Pansch 2003, pp. 1-2; Gassauer-Fleissner 2006, p. 263; Wannenmacher 2007, p. 233; Schauwecker 2009, p. 
168 et seq. 
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 Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation almost identically provided: 
“Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, measures 
as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member 
State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.” 
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Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, 
measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if the courts of another Member 
State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 
However, this does not mean that jurisdiction for provisional measures may not be based on 
Articles 4 and 7 to 26. These articles are applicable – jurisdiction based on these provisions 
not being subject to further preconditions1276 – and are completed by provisions of national 
law via Article 35.1277 This has been confirmed by the ECJ in its Van Uden and its Mietz 
decisions which both have been rendered with regard to the Brussels Convention. In Van 
Uden, the ECJ explicitly explicated: 
 
“The first point to be made, as regards the jurisdiction of a court hearing an application for interim 
relief, is that it is accepted that a court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case in accordance 
with Articles 2 and 5 to 18 of the [Brussels] Convention also has jurisdiction to order any provisional or 
protective measures which may prove necessary [content in brackets added].”1278 
 
“Thus, the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case under one of the heads of jurisdiction 
laid down in the [Brussels] Convention also has jurisdiction to order provisional or protective measures, 
without that jurisdiction being subject to any further conditions (…) [content in brackets added].”1279 
 
This jurisprudence has been referred to and confirmed in the Mietz decision, where the ECJ 
held: 
 
“It is important to stress that it is not necessary for the court hearing an application for provisional or 
protective measures to have recourse to Article 24 of the Convention where it has, in any event, 
jurisdiction as to the substance of a case in accordance with Articles 2 and 5 to 18 of the Convention 
(see, to that effect, Case C-391/95 Van Uden ν Deco-Line [1998] ECR 1-7091, paragraph 19).”1280 
 
The side-by-side existence of jurisdiction for provisional measures pursuant to Articles 4 and 
7 to 26 on the one hand, and Article 35 in conjunction with national law on the other hand is 




 Recital 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (33) Where provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to 
 the substance of the matter, their free circulation should be ensured under this Regulation. (...) Where 
 provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court of a Member State not having 
 jurisdiction as to  the substance of the matter, the effect of such measures should be confined, under this 
 Regulation, to the territory of that Member State.  
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The claimant may freely choose between those jurisdictions.1281 In case that the national court 
has jurisdiction on the merits under one of the heads of jurisdiction set out in Articles 4 and 7 
to 26, it may issue any injunction that may prove necessary, and the ECJ left the definition of 
such measures to the national law,1282 which has already been addressed in the Jenard Report 
on the Brussels Convention as follows: 
 
“In each State, application may (…) be made to the competent courts for provisional or protective 
measures to be imposed or suspended, or for rulings on the validity of such measures, without regard to 
the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the [Brussels] Convention. As regards the measures which may be 
taken, reference should be made to the internal law of the country concerned [content in brackets 
added].”1283 
 
In accordance with the Van Uden and Mietz decisions of the ECJ cited above, I will pursue a 
dualistic approach when illustrating according to which rules provisional measures may be 
ordered in the framework of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, differentiating between provisional 
proceedings before a court being competent according to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 and, on the 
other hand, provisional proceedings on the basis of Article 35 in conjunction with national 
law.1284 In contrast, some authors have undertaken a tripartite approach, making a further 
differentiation between actual and mere fictitious/potential jurisdiction on the merits.1285 In 
the following paragraphs I shall first deal with this conceptional issue before then subjecting 
Article 35 to a deepened analysis. 
 
 
2.5.2.1 Provisional proceedings before a court having jurisdiction according to Articles 4 
or 7 to 26 (jurisdiction as to the substance/jurisdiction on the merits) and therefore 





First of all, it is to be stated that jurisdiction for provisional measures of the court of the 
principal proceedings (accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures)1286 does not 
                                                 
1281
 Gottwald 2013 (Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO), EuGVO Art. 31, para. 8; Nagel & Gottwald 2013, § 17, 
para. 7; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, paras. 2, 14; differently: Schlosser 2009, Art. 31 
EuGVVO, para. 17. 
1282
 Szychowska 2008, p. 213; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 16.  
1283
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1284
 Similar for instance: Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 199 et seq. 
1285
 Heß & Vollkommer (1999)19(4) IPRax 220, at p. 221; Heß (2000)20(5) IPRax 370, at p. 373; Laubinger 
2005, p. 94.  
1286
 In this thesis, the wording “accessory jurisdiction (for provisional measures)” is used as a synonym for the 
jurisdiction for provisional measures of the courts which have jurisdiction on the merits. It is noteworthy that 
such “accessory jurisdiction” must not be confused with the notion of “aanvullende bevoegdheidsregel” which 
is contained in the Dutch text version of the Van Uden decision of the ECJ in context with jurisdiction according 
to Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) (cf. ECJ 17 November 
1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma 
Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 20 – Van Uden) and which, according to the terminology 
used in this thesis, is named “independent jurisdiction”. However, apart from the fact that “aanvullend” would 
rather be translated as “additional” – the English text version of the Van Uden decision in fact contains the 
words “in addition” and “adds” (cf. ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as 
Van Uden Africa Line, v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 
20 – Van Uden) – the term of “accessory jurisdiction” is also used, inter alia, by the Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles (cf. for instance Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, paras. 2:501.C02 and 2:501.C03).    
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prerequisite that principal proceedings have already been initiated.1287 But, regarding the 
constellation that principal proceedings have actually been commenced, it has been discussed 
controversially whether provisional proceedings can only be initiated before this very court, 
or whether interim relief may also be sought before a court that could have also been invoked 
in principal proceedings (fictitious/potential jurisdiction on the merits).  
 
 
2.5.2.1.1.1 Conception 1: Requirement of factual jurisdiction on the merits 
 
On the one hand, it might be argued indeed that, if a court has been invoked in principal 
proceedings on the basis of Articles 4 or 7 to 26, only this very court can be competent to 
decide on provisional measures, too. In this respect, it has been put forth that jurisdiction as to 
the decision on provisional measures is (logically) bound to the actual jurisdiction concerning 
principal proceedings. By choosing a court for provisional proceedings, the claimant is thus 
considered to have already used his right of choice.1288 Following this conception, a court 




 Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) Without prejudice to Article 31(2), where proceedings involving the same cause of action and 
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the 
court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the 
court first seised is established. 
 
(2) In cases referred to in paragraph 1, upon request by a court seised of the dispute, any other court 
seised shall without delay inform the former court of the date when it was seised in accordance with 
Article 32. 
 
(3) Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the court first 
seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
 
 
Proponents of such an understanding have underlined that only this conception would avoid a 
checkout of the different courts having jurisdiction in principal proceedings. It has been 
feared that the claimant could otherwise check out, with regard to provisional measures, the 
variant courts having jurisdiction as to principal proceedings in order to ultimately choose the 
court most favourable for him for actually instituting such principal proceedings.1289 It has 
been stressed that, due to Article 29, a court invoked in principal proceedings after another 
court has already been invoked, cannot render a decision and that, as a consequence, there 
would be no need to secure a decision in principal proceedings which will never be rendered. 
This viewpoint has also been considered to be supported by the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its 
Van Uden decision where the ECJ explicated: 1290 
 
“Where the parties have validly excluded the jurisdiction of the courts in a dispute arising under a 
contract and have referred that dispute to arbitration, there are no courts of any State that have 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case for the purposes of the Convention. Consequently, a party to 
such a contract is not in a position to make an application for provisional or protective measures to a 
                                                 
1287
 Laubinger 2005, p. 95; Wannenmacher 2007, p. 208 et seq.; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches 
Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 31 EuGVVO, para. 7; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 18. 
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 Wolf & Lange (2003)49(1) RIW 55, at p. 61. 
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 Wolf & Lange (2003)49(1) RIW 55, at p. 61. 
1290
 Pansch 2003, p. 69.  
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court that would have jurisdiction under the Convention as to the substance of the case [underscore 
added].”1291 
  
According to this viewpoint, it might be concluded from the foregoing that, in accordance 
with Article 29, only such courts can decide on provisional measures which actually exert 
jurisdiction in principal proceedings,1292 whereas this does not apply in the case that 
jurisdiction for provisional measures is based on Article 35. In that constellation, a court may 
decide on provisional measures even if it is deprived of jurisdiction concerning principal 
proceedings due to Article 29 which has also been confirmed by the ECJ in its Van Uden 
decision:1293 
 
“In such a case, it is only under Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] that a court may be empowered 
under the [Brussels] Convention to order provisional or protective measures [content in brackets 
added].”1294 
 
In other words, proponents of this conception, although admitting that Article 29 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessor, Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation) 
is not applicable as such to the constellation in question,1295 still extend the effects of Article 
29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation) which premises 
the existence of two principal proceedings, to the coincidence of principal proceedings and 
provisional proceedings,1296 although Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (Article 27 of 
the Brussels I Regulation) actually concerns a completely different situation and therefore 
lacks applicability at all.1297  
 
This result has also been founded on the argument that the court before which principal 
proceedings have been initiated is particularly familiar with the subject-matter to decide and 
that for this reason the goal of procedural economy militates for considering only this court 
competent to decide on provisional measures as well.1298  
 
 
2.5.2.1.1.2 Conception 2: Sufficiency of “fictitious/potential” jurisdiction on the merits  
 
Although some of the foregoing arguments seem persuasive at first glance, Conception 1 is 
ultimately not convincing for several reasons. Neither is it notionally required, nor is it 
justified.1299 For a conception according to which, if principal proceedings have been initiated, 
only the very court before which those principal proceedings actually have been brought has 
jurisdiction as to provisional measures, would impose territorial and factual restrictions on all 
other courts which are provided with jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
As a consequence, the jurisdiction system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would be vitally 
                                                 
1291
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 24 – Van Uden. 
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 Cf. P. Vlas (case note) HR 21 June 2002, C01/241HR, Spray Network N.V. v Telenor Venture AS and 
Others, NJ 2002, 563. 
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 Pansch 2003, p. 70; Wannenmacher 2007, p. 277 et seq. 
1294
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 25 – Van Uden. 
1295
 Cf. for instance Wannenmacher 2007, p. 277. 
1296
 As to a similar interpretation of that conception cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 178. 
1297
 Cf. in place of many others Stadler (1999)54(22) JZ 1089, at p. 1094; Hye-Knudsen 2005, p. 204; 
Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 27 EuGVO, para. 14. 
1298
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 279. 
1299 Lindacher 2009, p. 257; cf. also Tsikrikas & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, 
para. 19. 
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devaluated.1300 In this respect, it is to be stressed that the factual proximity (“Sachnähe”) to a 
court which is competent according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not affected by the fact 
that another court which is also competent has been invoked.1301 Although it is to be taken 
into account that interim relief can still be gained on the basis of Article 35, it cannot be 
excluded that Conception 1 would effect severe gaps as to legal protection.1302 In this respect, 
it must be borne in mind that Article 35 intends to grant effective legal protection by offering 
the possibility of invoking the courts of other Member States. Best legal protection is however 
achieved by offering as many as possible places of jurisdictions.1303 The idea of effective legal 
protection would be foiled if jurisdictions were restricted in the case that courts are invoked 
on the basis of provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As to the argument that it is 
necessary to avoid a checkout of the different courts having jurisdiction in principal 
proceedings, it must be emphasised that such a checkout would also be possible before the 
courts having jurisdiction according to national law.1304 After all, the striking argument for 
also allowing jurisdiction to the courts which dispose of mere “fictitious/potential” 
jurisdiction on the merits is that the Van Uden decision of the ECJ which is in the first 
instance referred to when arguing against this conception as a matter of fact lacks 
comparability to the constellation in question. A closer analysis of the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ in its Van Uden decision reveals that the court actually decided on a constellation where 
the parties had excluded jurisdiction of Member States courts. The court decided that  
 
“(w)here the parties have validly excluded the jurisdiction of the courts in a dispute arising under a 
contract and have referred that dispute to arbitration, there are no courts of any State that have 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case for the purposes of the [Brussels] Convention. Consequently, 
a party to such a contract is not in a position to make an application for provisional or protective 
measures to a court that would have jurisdiction under the [Brussels] Convention as to the substance of 
the case [underscores and content in brackets added].”1305 
 
Thus, this decision was expressly rendered on the basis that there is no jurisdiction of the 
courts according to the Brussels Convention, respectively Brussels Ibis Regulation at all. 
Remarkably, the ECJ did not, in its Van Uden decision, mention in any way that a court 
would lose jurisdiction to grant interim relief after principal proceedings have been initiated 
before another court competent according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, due to the rule of 
Article 29.1306 The reference to the Van Uden decision in the framework of the issue discussed 
here may therefore be characterised as a comparison of “apples to oranges”.  
 
This result is confirmed by the uncontested fact that the Van Uden decision of the ECJ does 
not affect jurisdiction according to national provisions. However, it is not evident why the 
ECJ should intend to establish a more restricted approach as to jurisdiction according to the 
Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation) than concerning jurisdiction on the basis of 
national provisions. Particularly in light of the concern of the ECJ to secure sufficient factual 
proximity, it is to be emphasised that courts being competent according to national law do not 
always bear the guarantee of such a sufficient factual proximity, due to the fact that such 
courts can also be competent with accordance to the rules of national jurisdiction of which the 
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Member States are to notify the Commission (Article 76(1)(a)) and which are excluded 
according to Article 5(2) when jurisdiction is based on the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1307 
Article 5(2) provides: 
 
 
 Article 5(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
In particular the rules of national jurisdiction of which the Member States are to notify the Commission 
pursuant to point (a) of Article 76(1) shall not be applicable as against the persons referred to in 
paragraph 1 [i.e.: persons domiciled in a Member State, cf. Article 5(1)] [content in brackets added]. 
 
 
Consequently, jurisdiction according to national rules would be more consistent than 




2.5.2.1.1.3 Conclusion  
 
As a consequence, it is to be concluded that, where courts have jurisdiction according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, these courts remain competent unless specific rules, as Article 29 in 
the case of several principal proceedings, exclude this result. Courts having jurisdiction 
according to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 remain competent to decide on provisional measures 
regardless of whether principal proceedings have been initiated before another court 
according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.       
 
 
2.5.2.1.2 Requirements of cross-border legal protection by way of interim relief 
 
In principle, jurisdiction for provisional measures rendered by the courts which also have 
jurisdiction with regard to principal proceedings according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
does not premise the fulfilment of further requirements. On the other hand, that jurisdiction 
does not go beyond jurisdiction concerning principal proceedings either. 
 
In contrast to provisional measures rendered on the basis of Article 35 in conjunction with 
national law, recognition and enforcement of provisional measures rendered on the basis of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) is principally possible which has 
been (indirectly) restated by the ECJ in Van Uden: 
 
“Thus, the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case under one of the heads of jurisdiction 
laid down in the [Brussels] Convention also has jurisdiction to order provisional or protective measures, 
without that jurisdiction being subject to any further conditions (…) [content in brackets added].”1308 
  
However, the ECJ has established several restrictions which must be fulfilled for cross-border 
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 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
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2.5.2.1.2.1 Grant of the right to a hearing 
 
As to the right to a hearing, the ECJ already stated expressly in its Denilauler decision on the 
interpretation of Articles 24, 27, 34, 36, 46 and 47 of the Brussels Convention: 
 
“Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] does not preclude provisional or protective measures ordered 
in the State of origin pursuant to adversary proceedings – even though by default – from being the 
subject of recognition and an authorization for enforcement on the conditions laid down in Articles 25 
to 49 of the [Brussels] Convention. On the other hand the conditions imposed by Title III of the 
[Brussels] Convention on the recognition and the enforcement of judicial decisions are not fulfilled in 
the case of provisional or protective measures which are ordered or authorized by a court without the 
party against whom they are directed having been summoned to appear and which are intended to be 
enforced without prior service on that party. It follows that this type of judicial decision is not covered 
by the simplified enforcement procedure provided for by Title III of the [Brussels] Convention (…) 
[content in brackets added].”1309 
 
As a consequence, a provisional measure rendered in favour of a patent holder could only be 
recognised and enforced in another Member State if the alleged infringer had been granted the 
right to a hearing. Ex parte-decisions were thus excluded from recognition and enforcement. 
In this regard, it was irrelevant if the alleged infringer was subsequently given the opportunity 
of legal remedies, as the ECJ expressly held in its Minalmet decision on the interpretation of 
Article 27(2) of the Brussels Convention: 
 
“It must be emphasized in that regard that (…) the proper time for the defendant to have an opportunity 
to defend himself is the time at which proceedings are commenced. The possibility of having recourse, 
at a later stage, to a legal remedy against a judgment given in default of appearance, which has already 
become enforceable, cannot constitute an equally effective alternative to defending the proceedings 
before judgment is delivered.”1310 
 
“(…) As correctly pointed out by the national court, once a judgment has been delivered and has 
become enforceable, the defendant can obtain suspension of its enforcement, if suspension is 
appropriate, only under more difficult circumstances and may also find himself confronted by 
procedural difficulties. The possibility for a defaulting defendant to defend himself is thus considerably 
diminished.” (…)1311 
 
“It follows from all the foregoing considerations that recognition in one contracting State of a judgment 
delivered in default of appearance in another contracting State must be refused where the document 
which instituted the proceedings was not duly served on the defendant, even if the defendant had notice 
of the judgment and did not have recourse to the available legal remedies.”1312 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECJ in Denilauler which filled a legal gap under the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, has in the meanwhile been codified in the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. So, Article 2(a) provides that decisions on the grant of provisional measures 
are recognised and enforced in another Member State only if the defendant was given the 
right to a hearing, respectively if the judgment containing the provisional measure is served 
on the defendant before enforcement is sought. Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
rules: 
 
                                                 
1309
 ECJ 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v S.N.C. Couchet Frères, [1980] ECR 01553, para. 17 – 
Denilauler. 
1310
 ECJ 12 November 1992, C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd, [1992] ECR I-05661, para. 19 – 
Minalmet. 
1311
 ECJ 12 November 1992, C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd, [1992] ECR I-05661, para. 20 – 
Minalmet. 
1312
 ECJ 12 November 1992, C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd, [1992] ECR I-05661, para. 21 – 
Minalmet. 
 271 
 Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
   
 For the purposes of this Regulation: 
 
 (a) (...) For the purposes of Chapter III, 'judgment' includes provisional, including protective, measures 
 ordered by a court or tribunal which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
 the matter. It does not include a provisional, including protective, measure which is ordered by such a 
 court or tribunal without the defendant being summoned to appear, unless the judgment containing the 
 measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement. 
 
 
Since Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation at least requires that the judgment 
containing the provisional measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement, Article 




 Article 42(2)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (...) 
 (2) For the purposes of enforcement in a Member State of a judgment given in another Member State 
 ordering a provisional, including a protective, measure, the applicant shall provide the competent 
 enforcement authority with: 
 
  (...) 
  (c) where the measure was ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, proof of 
  service of the judgment.   
 
 
Besides, in order to strengthen the protection of the defendant, Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation provides: 
 
 
 Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
 
 (1) On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
 
(...) 
(b) where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with 
the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time 
and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to 
commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so. 
 
 
It is remarkable that the Brussels Ibis Regulation thus pursues an approach which is more in 
favour of the defendant against whom provisional measures are ordered, by rigorously 
excluding provisional measures from cross-border recognition and enforcement where the 
defendant has not been granted the right to a hearing, unless the judgment containing the 
provisional measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement (cf. Article 2(a) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation).1313 For Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not 
consider it sufficient that the defendant disposes of the opportunity of challenging the measure 
according to national law after enforcement has been accomplished.  
  
                                                 
1313 Von Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at p. 107 et seq.; Pohl (2013)33(2) IPRax 109, at p. 114. 
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Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is consistent with Recital 33 2nd sentence of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation which is supplemented by the 3rd sentence: 
 
 
 Recital 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (33) Where provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to 
 the substance of the matter, their free circulation should be ensured under this Regulation. However, 
 provisional, including protective, measures which were ordered by such a court without the defendant 
 being summoned to appear, should not be recognised and enforced under this Regulation unless the 
 judgment containing the measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement. This should not 
 preclude the recognition and enforcement of such measures under national law. Where provisional, 
 including protective, measures are ordered by a court of a Member State not having jurisdiction as to 
 the substance of the matter, the effect of such measures should be confined, under this Regulation, to 
 the territory of that Member State.  
 
 
Although Recital 33 3rd sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation makes clear that ex parte 
measures of interim relief granted on the basis of accessory jurisdiction for provisional 
measures may be recognisable and enforceable pursuant to the national law of the Member 
States,1314 it is to be noticed that this solution does not promote legal unification or at least 
harmonisation among the Member States.1315 On the contrary, it considerably impedes, at the 
expense of the applicant of a provisional measure, the exploitation of the surprise effect of 
that measure.1316 
 
While it is to be appreciated that the ECJ's jurisprudence in Denilauler as well as its 
codification in Articles 2(a), 42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation intend to 
protect the debtor’s rights by setting up the requirement of the debtor's right to a hearing, it is 
to be kept in mind as well that international interim relief may be deprived of its most 
important characteristic: its surprise effect.1317 The claimant is thus practically forced to 
initiate separate proceedings in the Member States where the final decision shall ultimately be 
enforced.1318 It has been rightly put forth that this consequence actually brings along the effect 
that cross-border interim relief has lost much of its effectivity.1319 On the other hand, it must 
be considered that cross-border interim relief still has not become completely useless, because 
ex parte-decisions can be recognised once the right to a hearing will have been granted at a 
later stage of proceedings.1320   
  
 
2.5.2.1.2.2 Refusal of recognition and enforcement of provisional measures in case of 
irreconcilability with decisions in the State of enforcement 
 
As has already been mentioned, Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its 
predecessors under the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation) is not applicable 
to the constellation of a coincidence of principal and provisional proceedings. As a 
consequence, a patent holder may simultaneously institute provisional proceedings before 
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 273 
several courts of Member States, and it may happen that these courts render conflicting 
decisions. 
 
The ECJ decided on such a constellation in its Italian Leather case on the interpretation of 
Article 27 of the Brussels Convention which was based on the following facts: Italian Leather 
SpA, an Italian company selling upholstered furniture (hereinafter IT), sought interim relief 
both in Germany and in Italy to prevent WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., a German 
company busy in the same economic field (hereinafter W) from marketing products with IT’s 
brand name. The German courts refused the relief sought due to the fact that IT could not 
show that there was a risk of irreparable damage or of a definitive loss of rights as required by 
the German Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, the Italian courts found that the 
requirement of urgency specified by Italian law was satisfied and granted the relief sought. IT 
sought to enforce the judgment rendered by the Italian courts in Germany. At first instance, 
the enforcement order was granted. On appeal, the court concluded that the Italian and 
German judgments on interim measures were irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 
27(3) of the Brussels Convention. On appeal to the Bundesgerichtshof, a reference for a 
preliminary ruling was made to the ECJ, on the interpretation of this provision which 
provides:   
 
 
 Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention 
  
A judgment shall not be recognized: 
 
(…) 
(3) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the 
State in which recognition is sought (…). 
 
 
This provision corresponds to Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation: 
 
 
 Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
A judgment shall not be recognised: 
 
(…) 
(3) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought (…). 
 
 
In its decision, the ECJ affirmed a strict application of Article 27(3) of the Brussels 
Convention (Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation) in the case of interim relief. 
Essentially, the court founded its decision on two aspects. First of all, the ECJ made clear that 
the wording of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention does not differentiate between both 
types of proceedings (principal proceedings/provisional proceedings): 
 
“(…) (I)t is unimportant whether the judgments at issue have been delivered in proceedings for interim 
measures or in proceedings on the substance. As Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention (…) refers to 
‘judgments’ without further precision, it has general application (…).”1321  
       
                                                 
1321 ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995, 
para. 41 – Italian Leather. 
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Besides, the court confirmed its jurisprudence in the Hoffmann decision where the court had 
held that  
 
“(i)n order to ascertain whether the two judgments are irreconcilable within the meaning of Article 
27(3), it should be examined whether they entail legal consequences that are mutually exclusive”1322  
 
and stated that  
 
“(…) irreconcilability lies in the effects of judgments. (…)”1323   
 
On this basis, the ECJ held that  
 
“(…) on a proper construction of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention, a foreign decision on interim 
measures ordering an obligor not to carry out certain acts is irreconcilable with a decision on interim 
measures refusing to grant such an order in a dispute between the same parties in the State where 
recognition is sought.”1324 
 
Additionally, the court made clear:  
 
“(…) (W)here a court of the State in which recognition is sought finds that a judgment of a court of 
another Contracting State is irreconcilable with a judgment given by a court of the former State in a 
dispute between the same parties, it is required to refuse to recognise the foreign judgment.”1325 
 
As a consequence, the State in which recognition is sought may not waive the enforcement of 
its own decision, as, according to the ECJ,  
 
“(…) it would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty (…) to interpret Article 27(3) as conferring 
on the court of the State in which recognition is sought the power to authorise recognition of a foreign 
judgment when it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in that Contracting State.”1326 
 
However, this conception has not remained uncontested: It has been feared that, due to the 
fact that Article 27 has, if any, only a limited scope of application as to interim proceedings, 
the danger of opposing decisions in the internal market constitutes a more significant threat 
for legal certainty.1327 
 
Unlike the Brussels I Regulation where the recognition of a judgment rendered in a Member 
State in another Member State does not require any special procedure (Article 33(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation), while its enforcement in another Member State requires its 
enforceability in the Member State of origin as well as a declaration of enforceability for the 
other Member State (Article 38(1) of the Brussels I Regulation), Article 36(1) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation contains a similar rule as Article 33(1) of the Brussels I Regulation at the 
                                                 
1322
 ECJ 4 February 1988, C-145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg, [1988] ECR 00645, 
para. 22 – Hoffmann; cf. B. Hess (case note) ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO 
Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., (2005)25(1) IPRax 23, at p. 24. 
1323 ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995, 
para. 44 – Italian Leather. 
1324
 ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995, 
para. 47 – Italian Leather. 
1325
 ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995, 
para. 52 – Italian Leather. 
1326
 ECJ 6 June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995, 
para. 51 – Italian Leather. 
1327
 Wolf & Lange (2003)49(1) RIW 55, at p. 58. 
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recognition level, but Article 39 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation generally abolishes the need 
of declaring the judgment enforceable:1328 
 
 
 Article 39 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 A judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in 
 the other Member States without any declaration of enforceability being required. 
 
 
However, Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (which is similar to Article 
34(3), (4) of the Brussels I Regulation) provides for the possibility of a refusal of the 
recognition of a judgment rendered in another Member State. But in contrast to Article 34 of 
the Brussels I Regulation (“a judgment shall not be recognised”), Article 45 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation requires a party's application: 
 
 
 Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
 
  (...) 
  (c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the 
  Member State addressed; 
 
  (d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or 
  in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that 
  the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State 
  addressed. 
 
 
As has been cited above, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation determines that "for the 
purposes of Chapter III" of the Brussels Ibis Regulation dealing with recognition and 
enforcement, provisional measures shall be considered judgments if they are issued by a 
Member State court which has jurisdiction for the substance of a matter according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation:  
 
 
 Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
  
 For the purposes of this Regulation: 
 
 (a) (...) For the purposes of Chapter III, 'judgment' includes provisional, including protective, 
 measures ordered by a court or tribunal which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the 
 substance of the matter.(...) 
 
 
Besides, according to Article 46 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the enforcement of a 
judgment rendered in another Member State shall be denied where, on the application of the 
defendant, the court accepts the existence of one of the grounds addressed in Article 45, thus 
including Article 45(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: 
 
 
                                                 
1328
 Von Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at p. 109. 
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 Article 46 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 On the application of the person against whom enforcement is sought, the enforcement of a judgment 
 shall be refused where one of the grounds referred to in Article 45 is found to exist.  
 
 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation thus provides for extended possibilities for a refusal of 
enforcement of a judgment rendered in another Member State. It may happen that recognition 
and enforcement of a provisional measure of the court having jurisdiction for the substance of 
a case is denied in another Member State where courts (merely) have independent jurisdiction 
for provisional measures (in conjunction with national law), due to the fact that the decision is 
irreconcilable with an earlier judgment on the grant of interim relief rendered in that other 
Member State.1329 
 
By creating Article 45(1)(c) and (d) and Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 
European legislator codified (and restrictively modified) the jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
Italian Leather, clarifying that Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is 
(only) applicable to such provisional measures ordered by a court having accessory 
jurisdiction for provisional measures. In contrast, provisional measures ordered by a court on 
the basis of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures do not constitute a “judgment” 
within the meaning of Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (cf. Article 2(a) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), meaning that Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not 
applicable in the latter constellation. This means a considerable deviation from the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in Italian Leather developed under the Brussels Convention (and 
still applicable under the Brussels I Regulation) which did not differentiate, with regard to 
Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention/Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation between 
accessory and independent jurisdiction for provisional measures.  
 
 
2.5.2.2 Provisional proceedings before a court having jurisdiction according to Article 35  
 
Before going into details as to which requirements must be considered in the framework of 
Article 35, some basic issues shall be addressed to illustrate the particular character and effect 
of Article 35, and to clarify the personal and territorial scope of application of this provision.   
 
 
2.5.2.2.1 Character and effect of Article 35 
 
 
2.5.2.2.1.1 Conception 1: Article 35 does not per se confer jurisdiction, but merely refers 
to national laws  
 
On the one hand, it might be argued that Article 35 (respectively its predecessors) lacks the 
character of an autonomous head of jurisdiction,1330 and merely refers to national laws.1331 
According to this opinion, Article 35 would not have any legal effect in the case that the 
                                                 
1329
 Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 548, with reference to the Italian Leather decision of the ECJ (cf. ECJ 6 
June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995 – Italian 
Leather). 
1330
 Pörnbacher 2014 (Geimer & Schütze, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr), Art. 31 VO (EG) No. 44/2001, para. 1. 
1331
 Among others: Layton & Mercer 2004, para. 23.002; Gothot & Holleaux 1985, paras. 201 et seq.; 
Gaudemet-Tallon 2010, para. 311; Tsikrikas & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), Art. 31 Brüssel I-VO, 
para. 20. 
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national law of an invoked court does not provide a jurisdictional basis for the grant of a 
provisional measure.  
 
Besides considering the brief wording of Article 35, such a viewpoint could also be based on 
the schematic location of Article 35 in Section 10 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that does not 
belong to the sections of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which provide for the uniform 
jurisdiction rules.1332 Article 5(1) – which actually does not mention Section 10 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation – reads: 
 
 
 Article 5(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State only by 
virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Chapter [underscore added]. 
 
 
However, arguing against a conception according to which Article 35 does not per se confer 
jurisdiction but is merely effective in conjunction with national provisions, it may be referred 
to a sentence of the ECJ in its Van Uden decision where the court held inter alia:1333 
 
“It follows that the granting of provisional or protective measures on the basis of Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] is conditional on, inter alia, the existence of a real connecting link between the 
subject-matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of the court 
before which those measures are sought [content in brackets added].”1334 
 
 
2.5.2.2.1.2 Conception 2: Article 35 is an autonomous head of jurisdiction 
 
However, the better reasons militate for a conception according to which Article 35 is per se 
sufficient to allocate jurisdiction rather than merely constituting a mechanism to invoke 
national rules of jurisdiction in disputes which fall within the ratione materiae scope of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. According to this conception, Article 35 refers to the internal law of 
the forum only with regard to the measures which may be granted by the court, and not 
regarding the national rules of jurisdiction.1335 It is noteworthy that legal writers advocating 
this opinion have also referred to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Van Uden, interpreting it in 
a different way. So, it has been put forth that the ECJ implicitly confirmed that the use of 
Article 35 does not require the recourse to any national rule of jurisdiction, and that 
provisional proceedings can therefore be filed exclusively on the basis of Article 35, without 
any reference to a national (exorbitant) rule of international jurisdiction,1336 as the court held: 
 
“With regard more particularly to the fact that the national court has in this instance based its 
jurisdiction on one of the national provisions listed in the second paragraph of Article 3 of the 
[Brussels] Convention, it must be borne in mind that, in accordance with the first paragraph of that 
article, persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State 
only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 6 of Title II, that is to say Articles 5 to 18, of the 
[Brussels] Convention. Consequently, the prohibition in Article 3 [of the Brussels Convention] of 
                                                 
1332
 Cf. Szychowska 2008, p. 229 (although Szychowska finally advocates another conception). 
1333 Cf. again among others Gothot & Holleaux 1985, paras. 201 et seq.; Gaudemet-Tallon 2010, para. 311. 
1334
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 40 – Van Uden. 
1335
 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 3.138. 
1336
 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 3.139. 
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reliance on rules of exorbitant jurisdiction does not apply to the special regime provided for by Article 
24 [of the Brussels Convention] [underscore and content in brackets added].”1337 
 
Apart from the foregoing, other paragraphs in the Van Uden decision reveal even more clearly 
that the ECJ actually favoured an autonomous interpretation of Article 35 (respectively 
Article 24 of the Brussels Convention). So the ECJ explicated:  
 
“In addition, Article 24, in Section 9 of the [Brussels] Convention, adds a rule of jurisdiction falling 
outside the system set out in Articles 2 and 5 to 18 [of the Brussels Convention], whereby a court may 
order provisional or protective measures even if it does not have jurisdiction as to the substance of the 
case (…) [underscore and content in brackets added].”1338 
 
Notably, the ECJ thus awarded to Article 35 per se the quality of adding a rule of jurisdiction, 
not mentioning rules of national law in this context. This significant role of Article 35 
according to the ECJ ultimately becomes obvious in two further paragraphs of the Van Uden 
decision: 
 
“(…) (T)he mere fact that proceedings have been, or may be, commenced on the substance of the case 
before a court of a Contracting State [of the Brussels Convention] does not deprive a court of another 
Contracting State of its jurisdiction under Article 24 of the Brussels Convention [underscore and 
content in brackets added].”1339 
 
“(…) Where, as in the case in the main proceedings, the subject-matter of an application for provisional 
measures relates to a question falling within the scope ratione materiae of the Brussels Convention, the 
Convention is applicable and Article 24 thereof may confer jurisdiction on the court hearing that 
application even where proceedings have already been, or may be, commenced on the substance of the 





Apart from the fact that the jurisprudence of the ECJ is to be considered to be definitive as to 
this issue,1341 a characterisation of Article 35 as an autonomous head of jurisdiction can also 
be founded on logical grounds. The fundamental reason underlying this conception is the need 
for a harmonisation of procedural rules governing the jurisdiction in provisional proceedings 
across the European Union.1342 If Article 35 was to be interpreted as lacking an autonomous 
character, with the consequence that a national court would always have to look for a proper 
basis of jurisdiction in its national law, provisional measures could be ordered on the basis of 
an exorbitant head of jurisdiction in certain Member States, while in other Member States the 
national jurisdictional rules applying to provisional proceedings are much more restrictive and 
in some they do not exist at all. In contrast to this scenario, an autonomous understanding of 
Article 35 is appropriate to prevent an incoherent application of this provision which would 
be the consequence of divergent national laws.1343  
                                                 
1337
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 42 – Van Uden. 
1338
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 20 – Van Uden.  
1339
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 29 – Van Uden. 
1340
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 34 – Van Uden. 
1341
 It has partly been put forth that this issue has not been resolved yet and that a clarifying decision by the ECJ 
is still to be awaited, cf. Szychowska 2008, p. 230. 
1342
 Szychowska 2008, p. 229. 
1343
 Szychowska 2008, p. 229. 
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2.5.2.2.2 Personal and territorial scope of application of Article 35  
 
Beyond this aspect of the autonomous nature of Article 35 addressed above, another issue 
discussed controversially is whether Article 35 is to be considered autonomous also with 
regard to all other provisions of Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, i.e. also with 
regard to Article 6(1) which provides: 
 
 
 Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member 
State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of 
that Member State. 
 
 
If this question should be answered in the positive, a court could also employ Article 35 to 
grant provisional measures against a defendant who is not domiciled in a Member State.  
 
 
2.5.2.2.2.1 Conception 1: Applicability of Article 35 vis-à-vis defendants domiciled in 
non-Member States 
 
Interestingly, in particular Belgian courts have constantly favoured a conception according to 
which Article 35 (respectively its predecessors under the Brussels Convention and the 
Brussels I Regulation) is applicable also vis-à-vis defendants domiciled in a non-Member 
State (respectively a non-Contracting State under the Brussels Convention),1344 even in 
opposition to the demand of the plaintiffs invoking the internal rules of jurisdiction according 
to Article 6(1).1345 According to this conception, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(respectively its predecessors) constitutes a fully operative jurisdiction rule independent from 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors), and jurisdiction in 
provisional proceedings can thus be founded if only the relief sought falls within the scope of 
application rationae materiae of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors), 
and if there is a connecting link between the measure and the territory of the State where the 
court is situated.1346 
 
Parts of legal doctrine have supported this conception. Essentially, two lines of reasoning 
shall be subject to a closer analysis in this respect. On the one hand, starting from the fact that 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which tends to harmonise the rules of jurisdiction 
applicable towards the defendants domiciled in the Member States, only mentions Sections 2 
to 7 of Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and not Section 10 where Article 35 is 
located, it might be derived that Article 5 covers only the rules applicable in principal 
proceedings. On the assumption that Article 6 must be read in conjunction with Article 5 as it 
completes the idea expressed in this provision, it could be argued that the reach of Article 6 is 
also limited to Sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Consequently, 
following this argumentation, Article 35 would be left beyond the scope of application of 
Article 6, too, and would thus be independent.1347    
 
                                                 
1344
 Szychowska 2008, pp. 229-231 with references to Belgian case-law. 
1345
 Szychowska 2008, p. 231 with references to Belgian case-law. 
1346
 Szychowska 2008, p. 231. 
1347
 Cf. Szychowska 2008, p. 233. 
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Furthermore, alleged parallels between Articles 29 and 30 on the one hand, and Article 35 on 
the other hand (respectively between the predecessors of these provisions) have been stressed 
in order to prove that the defendant’s domicile is irrelevant as to the applicability of Article 35 
(respectively its predecessors). Indeed, the ECJ held in its Overseas Union Insurance decision 
on the interpretation of inter alia Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (Article 29 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) that this provision must be applied irrespectively of the domicile of 
the defendant. In concreto, the court decided that   
 
“(…) the wording of Article 21 [of the Brussels Convention], unlike the wording of other provisions of 
the [Brussels] Convention, makes no reference to the domicile of the parties to the proceedings. 
Moreover, Article 21 does not draw any distinction between the various heads of jurisdiction provided 
for in the [Brussels] Convention. In particular, it does not provide for any derogation to cover a case 
where, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the [Brussels] Convention, a court of a 
Contracting State exercises its jurisdiction by virtue of the law of that State over a defendant who is not 
domiciled in a Contracting State. 
 
Consequently, it appears from the wording of Article 21 that it must be applied both where the 
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the [Brussels] Convention itself and where it is derived from 
the legislation of a Contracting State in accordance with Article 4 of the [Brussels] Convention [content 
in brackets added].”1348 
 
In this regard, one might conclude1349 that the ECJ followed the same logic in its Van Uden 
decision when the court stated that  
 
“(…) the prohibition in Article 3 [of the Brussels Convention] of reliance on rules of exorbitant 
jurisdiction does not apply to the special regime provided for by Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] 
[content in brackets added].”1350 
 
On this basis, it might be derived that the principal criterion of the ECJ regarding the 
application of Article 35 in the Van Uden case was not the domicile of the defendant, but the 
simple filing of an application for the interim relief before a Member State court.1351 Even 
clearer, it might be concluded that the rule of applicability rationae loci set out in Article 5 is 
not to be considered as the rule of applicability of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as such, but 
only of the uniform rules of it, bearing the consequence that the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
applies wherever the defendant is domiciled, but if he is domiciled in the European Union, he 
may not be sued otherwise than by virtue of the uniform rules established in Sections 2 to 7 of 
Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1352 
 
 
2.5.2.2.2.2 Conception 2: Applicability of Article 35 merely vis-à-vis defendants 
domiciled in Member States 
 
The approach dealt with in the foregoing paragraphs, which noticeably has been repeatedly 
pursued by Belgian courts and may for this reason be called the “Belgian approach”, has 
remained rather unique, while the majority of legal commentators and Member States courts – 
if this issue has been found worthwhile for broad discussion and detailed analysis at all – have 
                                                 
1348
 ECJ 27 June 1991, C-351/89, Overseas Union Insurance Limited and Others v New Hampshire Insurance 
Company, [1991] ECR I-03317, paras. 13-14 – Overseas Union Insurance. 
1349
 Cf. Szychowska 2008, p. 233. 
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 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 42 – Van Uden. 
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 Szychowska 2008, p. 233. 
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 Szychowska 2008, p. 234. 
 281 
advocated an interpretation of Article 35 (respectively its predecessors) according to which 
this provision is not applicable vis-à-vis defendants who are domiciled in a third State.  
 
For instance, the Dutch Hoge Raad decided in this way in the Postech case. The decision was 
based on the following facts: The plaintiff, the Dutch company Philips, sued several 
companies, amongst them Postech Corporation, established in Taiwan, Princo Corporation, 
established in Taiwan, and Princo Switzerland AG, established in Switzerland, for 
infringement of Philips’ patent rights, after Dutch customs officials had detained a 
consignment of CD-R discs on their way from Taiwan to Switzerland. The defendants 
demanded the release of the CD-R discs due to the fact that they had merely been in transit 
via the Netherlands. The defendants put forth that the mere transit of goods could not be 
considered as patent infringement according to Dutch law. As to the issue of jurisdiction of 
Dutch courts to grant interim relief towards defendants being domiciled in third States, the 
Hoge Raad held:    
 
“(…) Voorzover het hof [= Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage] mocht hebben geoordeeld dat deze 
terughoudendheid geboden is op grond van het door het hof genoemde arrest van het HvJEG van 21 mei 
1980 (Denilauler/Couchet Frères) heeft het hof uit het oog verloren dat de in dat arrest gegeven 
aanwijzing om bij het treffen van grensoverschrijdende voorlopige of bewarende maatregelen 
terughoudendheid te betrachten, niet geldt ten opzichte van Postech en Princo Taiwan, nu deze 
vennootschappen niet zijn gevestigd op het grond-gebied van een staat die partij is bij het EEX-Verdrag 
of van het EVEX, zodat ten aanzien van deze vennootschappen de regeling van het EEX-verdrag of het 
EVEX niet van toepassing is (…) [underscore and content in brackets added].”1353 
 
(“(…) As far as the court [= Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage] may have judged that this restraint is 
necessary due to the order, as quoted by the court, of the ECJ from 21 May 1980 (Denilauler/Couchet 
Frères), the court has lost sight of the fact that the indication given in that order to practice restraint 
when taking cross-border temporary or conservatory measures does not apply to Postech and Princo 
Taiwan, because these companies are not established on the territory of a State being party to the 
Brussels Convention or the Lugano Convention, so that the arrangements of the Brussels Convention or 
the Lugano Convention do not apply to these companies (…) [underscore and content in brackets 
added].” )1354 
 
In legal doctrine as well, it has been postulated that Article 35 (respectively its predecessors) 
cannot be invoked where the defendant is not domiciled in the territory covered by the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation), except where the 
proceedings on the merits fall within the scope of the rules on exclusive (or protective) 
jurisdiction or submission, as these provisions apply regardless of the place where the 
defendant is domiciled.1355  
 
As has been illustrated above, the Van Uden decision of the ECJ demonstrates quite clearly 
the court’s interpretation of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) as an autonomous head of jurisdiction. In view of this, it seems 
comprehensible and logical to submit Article 35 to the same regime and to interpret it in the 
same way in the light of Article 5 as other common rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. Such an understanding is also supported by Recitals 13 and 14 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation which, in principle,1356 require the defendant’s domicile in a Member State as 
a prerequisite for the common rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels Ibis Regulation to be 
applicable. Recitals 13 and 14 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation read as follows: 
                                                 
1353 HR 19 March 2004, C02/110HR, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v Postech Corporation and Others, NJ 
2007, 585, para. 3.4.3, with case note P. Vlas – Postech. 
1354
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 3.130. 
1356
 Cf. Recital 14 2nd sentence for exceptions. 
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 Recitals 13 and 14 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(13) There must be a connection between proceedings to which this Regulation applies and the territory 
of the Member States. Accordingly, common rules of jurisdiction should, in principle, apply when the 
defendant is domiciled in a Member State. 
 
(14) A defendant not domiciled in a Member State should in general be subject to national rules of 
 jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of the court seised. 
 
 However, in order to ensure the protection of consumers and employees, to safeguard the jurisdiction of 
 the courts of the Member States in situations where they have exclusive jurisdiction and to respect the 
 autonomy of the parties, certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of the 
 defendant’s domicile.  
 
 
Noteworthily, Article 6(1) immediately refers to the national laws of the Member States, not 
requiring the detour via Article 35. Consequently, given that Article 6(1) is applicable, i.e. if 
the defendant is domiciled in a non-Member State, provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
as to jurisdiction are (subject to Articles 18(1), 21(2), 24 and 25) merely determined by the 
national laws of the Member States. So, the constellation discussed here lies outside the scope 
of application of Article 35.1357  
 
Moreover, it is actually doubtful that Articles 5 and 6 are to be read in such a context that the 
reach of Article 6 is also limited to Sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation – as it is the case regarding Article 5 – with the effect that Article 35 would be left 
beyond the scope of application of Article 6, too, and would thus be independent. Indeed, 
Article 6, in contrast to Article 5, does not mention Sections 2 to 7 of Chapter II of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation at all, which rather implies that Article 6 is generally applicable 
when the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State. 
 
As to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Overseas Union Insurance case where the court held 
that Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be 
applied both where the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the Brussels Convention 
(Brussels Ibis Regulation) itself and where it is derived from the legislation of a Member State 
in accordance with Article 4 of the Brussels Convention (Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), the crucial question is whether Articles 29 and 30 on the one hand and Article 35 
on the other hand, are actually comparable to such an extent that judicial evaluations 
concerning one of these provisions may be applied to the others. It is noteworthy that even 
proponents of the opposite view have admitted that these provisions pursue different 
objectives, given that Articles 29 and 30 (respectively their predecessors) are aimed at 
limiting the risk of irreconcilable judgments being given in parallel proceedings, while Article 
35 (respectively its predecessors) intends to avoid to cause loss to the parties as a result of the 
long delays which are inherent to any international litigation.1358 In light of this, the line of 
reasoning pursued by the opposite opinion reveals its weak point at least regarding the 
following aspect: If the alleged parallels between Articles 29 and 30 on the one hand, and 
Article 35 on the other hand, thus turn out not to exist, respectively not to exist to the asserted 
extent, then it seems indeed highly doubtful, due to the opposing aims of these provisions, 
that the clear statement of the ECJ in Overseas Union Insurance as to the application of 
Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) may be 
employed with regard to Article 35. Besides, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Van Uden, 
referred to by the opposite opinion, that  
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 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 6. 
1358
 Conceding this fact: Szychowska 2008, p. 233. 
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“(…) the prohibition in Article 3 [of the Brussels Convention] of reliance on rules of exorbitant 
jurisdiction does not apply to the special regime provided for by Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] 
[content in brackets added]”1359 
 
does not necessarily militate for the conception that Article 35 is applicable regardless the 
place where the defendant’s domicile is located, but also makes sense on the basis of a 
conception according to which Article 35 is merely applicable if the defendant is domiciled in 
a Member State.     
 
 
2.5.2.2.2.3 Conclusion  
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, the conception of an interpretation of Article 35 
according to which Article 35 merely applies vis-à-vis defendants domiciled in Member 
States is to be supported, because it corresponds best to the interpretation of the ECJ, revealed 
in its Van Uden decision, of Article 35 as an autonomous head of jurisdiction. Additionally, 
the schematic structure of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in particular the fact that Article 6(1) 
immediately refers to the national laws of the Member States without Article 35 being 
involved regarding this reference, argues for such a conception of Article 35.   
 
However, it should be pointed out that this result cannot be founded on the theoretical 
consideration that the application of Article 35 vis-à-vis defendants domiciled in non-Member 
States must be denied due to the fact that provisional proceedings are considered to be a sort 
of introduction to the principal proceedings which should regularly be initiated 
simultaneously or at least in a short time after the filing of the application for an interim relief, 
and that it would thus seem artificial to apply the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the provisional 
proceedings and the national rules in the proceedings on the merits.1360 In this respect it is to 
be underlined that there is no justification for a continuous application of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation on every stage of the proceedings.1361 Additionally, as has already been stressed 
above, it is a matter of fact that many intellectual property disputes do not even reach the 
stage of principal proceedings, after provisional proceedings have been commenced.  
 
Similarly, this finding cannot be grounded on the argument either that Article 35 per se 
requires the simultaneous application of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in conformity with all 
the criteria of its applicability, because the wording of Article 35 reveals that the provisional 
measures may be applied for  
 
“(…) even if, under this Regulation, the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter”, 
  
and thus eventually implies, by the use of the present tense, that Article 35 may be applied 
only if the dispute as to the principal proceedings could be simultaneously attached to the 
court of one of the Member States on the grounds set out by the Brussels Ibis Regulation. One 
might conclude then that the entire Brussels Ibis Regulation must be applicable, rationae 
materiae and rationae loci.1362 Indeed, such an understanding of Article 35 could – at least in 
theory – be derived from the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its De Cavel case where the court 
                                                 
1359
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 42 – Van Uden. 
1360
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1361
 Szychowska 2008, p. 235. 
1362
 Cf. Szychowska 2008, p. 234. 
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held inter alia with regard to Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation): 
 
“(…) In fact that provision [Article 24 of the Brussels Convention] expressly envisages the case of 
provisional measures in a Contracting State where “under this Convention” the courts of another 
Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter and it cannot, therefore, be relied on 
to bring within the scope of the Convention provisional or protective measures relating to matters which 
are excluded therefrom [content in brackets added].”1363 
 
However, it is at least possible as well to comprehend the wording of Article 35 with the 
reference to other rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as a reference also to Article 6. When 
applying the national rules in order to establish whether it has jurisdiction over a defendant 
domiciled in a third State, the court acts by virtue of Article 6, i.e. “under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation” even though it borrows the jurisdictional rule from the national law.1364     
 
 
2.5.2.2.3 Specific requirements of Article 35 
 
As has been illustrated above, it is to be emphasised that interim relief is of utmost importance 
in order to grant effective legal protection. Therefore, at first glance, it might seem logical to 
interpret Article 35 in a broad way in order to confer jurisdiction to take provisional measures 
according to Article 35 in conjunction with national provisions to a multitude of national 
courts. However, such an approach would lose sight of the fact that the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation also implies further objectives which would certainly be foiled if national courts 
would be given too extensive competence to grant interim relief via Article 35. In this regard, 
it is to be noticed that the creators of the Brussels Ibis Regulation have emphasised, in its 
Recitals 15 and 16, the importance of legal predictability and the significance of the principle 
that the defendant’s domicile shall be primarily decisive as to the question of which court has 
jurisdiction, whereas other courts shall be competent only in case of a sufficient connection:   
 
 
 Recitals 15 and 16 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (15) The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that 
 jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available on 
 this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject-matter of the dispute or the 
 autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor. (...)  
 
 (16) In addition to the defendant’s domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on 
 a close connection between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of 
 justice. The existence of a close connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the 
 defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not reasonably have foreseen. (...) 
 
 
As to interim relief granted according to Article 35, in particular, the ECJ explicitly stated in 
its St. Paul Dairy decision on the interpretation of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention, 
referring to the Denilauler and Van Uden decisions: 
 
“The granting of this type of measure requires on the part of the court, in addition to particular care, 
detailed knowledge of the actual circumstances in which the measures are to take effect. Generally, the 
                                                 
1363
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court must be able to make its authorisation subject to all conditions guaranteeing the provisional or 
protective character of the measure ordered (…) [underscore added].”1365  
 
This limiting perspective is thus to be considered in the light of the general objectives that 
proceedings should be brought before a court which is particularly close to the facts (factual 
proximity), and that forum shopping should be reduced to a reasonable degree1366 by 
providing predictable places of jurisdiction.1367  
 
On this basis, the ECJ has developed, beyond the wording of Article 35 (respectively its 
predecessors), several restrictions as to the jurisdiction according to this provision which shall 
be subject to a deepened analysis in the following paragraphs.    
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.1 Which provisional measures fall under the scope of application of Article 35? 
 
One major difference between jurisdiction to take provisional measures, according to Articles 
7 to 26 on the one hand, and Article 35 in conjunction with provisions of national law on the 
other hand, consists in the fact that in the second case a court may not automatically take all 
provisional measures provided by its national law. Rather, the term “provisional, including 
protective, measures” used in Article 35 is to be interpreted in an autonomous, European way, 
due to the general interest of a harmonised application of the provisions of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation which could not be reached if national legal systems were decisive in this 
respect.1368  
 
Like its predecessors, the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation does not specify in Article 35 or another Article which measures are to be 
considered “provisional, including protective, measures”. In any event, in contrast to the 
Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
at least vaguely outlines the term “provisional, including protective, measures” as follows: 
 
 
 Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 (25) The notion of provisional, including protective, measures should include, for example, protective 
 orders aimed at obtaining information or preserving evidence as referred to in Articles 6 and 7 of 
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
 enforcement of intellectual property rights. It should not include measures which are not of a protective 
 nature, such as measures ordering the hearing of a witness. This should be without prejudice to the 
 application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the 
 courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters. 
 
 
Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains several important statements. First, it 
underlines that evidence orders are not a priori excluded from the scope of provisional 
measures. However, for being considered as provisional measures, they must have a 
protective character. Measures which lack such a protective character (such as measures 
ordering the hearing of a witness), may be covered by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
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1206/2001 (Evidence Regulation)1369. However, given it has been discussed controversially 
whether the Evidence Regulation generally prevails over Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively its predecessors),1370 it would have been desirable to formulate this 
“rule” in a more distinct way and to integrate it in the text of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.1371 After all, it is to be underlined that the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not 
establish a general positive definition of “provisional, including protective, measures”.1372  
 
In light of this, I shall analyse in which way the ECJ has constantly shaped the content of the 
term “provisional, including protective, measures” under the Brussels Convention1373 and the 
Brussels I Regulation. It will become obvious that this jurisprudence of the ECJ has partly 
been picked up in Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
In its Reichert II decision on the interpretation of Articles 5(3), 16(5) and 24 of the Brussels 
Convention, the court held:    
 
“The expression ‘provisional, including protective, measures’ within the meaning of Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] must (…) be understood as referring to measures which, in matters within the 
scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights 
the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the matter [underscore and content in brackets added].”1374 
 
Subsequently, referring to the Reichert II decision, this (attempt of a) definition has been 
confirmed in Van Uden1375 and St. Paul Dairy1376 by using the same wording. However, 
having a closer look on that definition, it becomes clear that, in truth, the formulation is quite 
vague. 
 
It is noteworthy that the ECJ has until now merely decided that interim performance orders 
concerning contractual obligations may (under certain conditions) fall within the scope of that 
definition. So, the ECJ held in Van Uden as to interim payments of a contractual 
consideration: 
 
                                                 
1369
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member 
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WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R1206&from=en> (lastly 
accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1370 Cf. Mankowski (2005)60(23) JZ 1144, at pp. 1146-1148; Ubertazzi (2008)57(10) GRUR Int. 807, at pp. 811-
812; Heinze (2008)28(6) IPRax 480, at pp. 482-484; Hess & Zhou (2007)27(3) IPRax 183, at pp. 183-190; J. 
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predecessors) with separate scopes of application: Knöfel (2008)19(9) EuZW 267, at p. 268; Knöfel 2014 
(Geimer & Schütze, Internationaler Rechtsverkehr), Art. 1 VO Nr. 1206/2001 (Beweisaufnahme-VO), para. 33.     
1371
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Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 547. 
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“However, an order for interim payment of a sum of money is, by its very nature, such that it may 
preempt the decision on the substance of the case. If, moreover, the plaintiff were entitled to secure 
interim payment of a contractual consideration before the courts of the place where he is himself 
domiciled, where those courts have no jurisdiction over the substance of the case under Articles 2 to 18 
of the [Brussels] Convention, and thereafter to have the order in question recognised and enforced in the 
defendant's State, the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the [Brussels] Convention could be 
circumvented. 
 
Consequently, interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional measure 
within the meaning of Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] unless, first, repayment to the defendant 
of the sum awarded is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim 
and, second, the measure sought relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located 
within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which application is made [underscores 
and content in brackets added].”1377  
  
This jurisprudence has subsequently been confirmed in Mietz.1378 In this light, the crucial 
question is whether this jurisprudence can also be extended to non-contractual liability. It has 
been rightly emphasised that interim performance orders also cover the constellations that a 
patent holder claims restitution of objects infringing the concerned patent, or requests the 
recall or the destruction1379 of such objects, or requests the issue of information on the scope 
and the identity of involved persons as to an infringement.1380 Besides, it is to be questioned if 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ also concerns interim injunctions which are considerably 
important in matters of intellectual property, because they often form the only way to secure a 
right until a decision in the principal proceeding has been taken.1381 Last but not least, I shall 
research whether interim measures to obtain or secure evidence are affected by the said 
jurisprudence of the ECJ.1382  
 
An analysis must start from the two aspects stressed by the ECJ in its Van Uden and Mietz 
decisions: first, the necessity for an interim payment of a contractual consideration to have the 
character of a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 35, that repayment is 
guaranteed, and second, that rules of jurisdiction shall not be circumvented. More generally, it 
may be derived from this jurisprudence that provisional measures within the meaning of 
Article 35 generally comprise only such measures which do not effect an irreversible 
anticipation of a decision in principal proceedings and also do not effect a circumvention of 
jurisdiction rules laid down in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect, it is to be stated 
that the danger that a decision in principal proceedings is anticipated by an interlocutory 
injunction, resulting in a potential circumvention of rules of jurisdiction as to principal 
proceedings, exists both with regard to contractual and non-contractual obligations.1383 As a 
consequence, it seems justified to apply the cited jurisprudence of the ECJ in Van Uden and 
Mietz to non-contractual liability.1384 This result is confirmed by the fact that the ECJ, in its 
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Van Uden decision, referred to a decision on general Community law (Article 243 EC Treaty) 
affecting a non-contractual claim for damages. The court held:     
 
“(…) (I)t is not possible to rule out in advance, in a general and abstract manner, that interim payment 
of a contractual consideration, even in an amount corresponding to that sought as principal relief, may 
be necessary in order to ensure the practical effect of the decision on the substance of the case and may, 
in certain cases, appear justified with regard to the interests involved (see, in the context of Community 
law, Case C-393/96 P(R) Antonissen v Council and Commission [1997] ECR I-441, paragraph 37).”1385 
 
In light of this, it has partly been concluded that other injunctions than the injunction of an 
interim payment of damages would not fall under the ambit of this jurisprudence of the ECJ 
due to their irreversibility.1386 However, given that not all interim injunctions mean an 
anticipation of a decision in the principal proceedings, and that protection of the defendant is 
possible in numerous cases,1387 it is more convincing not to exclude interim injunctions from 
the discussed jurisprudence of the ECJ. Taking into consideration the formulation of the ECJ 
in Van Uden where the court stressed the general aspect that the outcome of principal 
proceedings should not be irreversibly anticipated, while, remarkably, not excluding specific 
forms of preliminary injunctions, no form of interlocutory injunctions should per se be 
excluded. Rather, it must be examined from case to case whether an unjustified interlocutory 
injunction is reversible, comparably to the constellation decided in Van Uden where the ECJ 
held that the repayment of an interim payment must be guaranteed.1388 In this sense, 
“guarantee of repayment” should be interpreted as “guarantee of temporariness”.1389 
   
As to interim measures concerning evidence, this notion comprises both interim measures to 
obtain evidence and interim measures to secure evidence.1390 With regard to the question of 
whether such interim measures to obtain or secure evidence fall under the scope of Article 35, 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ in St. Paul Dairy is to be considered. In this case the ECJ 
explicated inter alia: 
 
“(…) Article 24 of the [Brussels] Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a measure ordering 
the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, 
determine whether it would be well founded and assess the relevance of evidence which might be 
adduced in that regard is not covered by the notion of 'provisional, including protective, measures' 
[underscores and content in brackets added].”1391 
 
At first glance, it might be concluded from this judgment that evidentiary measures are 
principally governed exclusively by the rules on judicial cooperation in the taking of 
evidence. In the European context, this would mean that the rules of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the 
taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters (Evidence Regulation) are decisive. In the 
international arena, the corresponding instrument would be the Hague Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.1392 However, Article 50(1)(b) 
TRIPS explicitly qualifies measures to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged 
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infringement as provisional measures. Also in light of this, it is doubtful whether that 
conception can be correct.1393    
 
In order to show that another interpretation of the cited passage of the St. Paul Dairy decision 
of the ECJ is more convincing, the same passage shall be cited again, but underscored in a 
different way to illustrate the difference between both conceptions and highlight the actual 
context in which single parts of the decision must be understood: 
 
“(…) Article 24 of the [Brussels] Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a measure ordering 
the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, 
determine whether it would be well founded and assess the relevance of evidence which might be 
adduced in that regard is not covered by the notion of 'provisional, including protective, measures' 
[underscore and content in brackets added].”1394 
 
Having a closer look on the cited passage reveals that the decisive part of this passage is the 
following: “(...) for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, 
determine whether it would be well founded and assess the relevance of evidence which 
might be adduced in that regard”. This formulation referring to the purpose of such an interim 
measure actually makes clear the attitude of the ECJ that interim measures to obtain or secure 
evidence are not per se excluded from the ambit of Article 35, but only if the sole purpose of 
such measures consists in assessing the chances or risks of principal proceedings. Such an 
interpretation is indeed supported by another passage of the St. Paul Dairy decision where the 
ECJ also suggested that an interim measure to obtain or secure evidence falls under the scope 
of Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation)   
 
“(…) only to the extent that the measure sought pursues the aims of that article.”1395 
 
As a consequence, interim measures to obtain or secure evidence may constitute measures 
according to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation if their purpose is to preserve evidence 
to be employed in principal proceedings, i.e. if they shall prevent the loss of that evidence in 
order to enforce a claim in principal proceedings respectively enforce such claim without 
considerable delay.1396   
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2 The prerequisite of a “real connecting link” 
 
While it has been analysed in the foregoing paragraphs that interim performance orders, 
interim injunctions and evidence orders can generally be decided by a court having 
jurisdiction according to Article 35, it has not been clarified yet whether such measures can 
also be decided, on the basis of Article 35, if the patent concerned was granted in or for 
another State than the State of the deciding court. In this respect, the ECJ suggested, in its 
Denilauler decision, the necessity of a geographical link between the deciding court and the 
assets affected by (interim) measures, formulating:    
 
“The courts of the place or, in any event, of the Contracting State, where the assets subject to the 
measures sought are located, are those best able to assess the circumstances which may lead to the grant 
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or refusal of the measures sought or to the laying down of procedures and conditions which the plaintiff 
must observe in order to guarantee the provisional and protective character of the measures ordered. 
The [Brussels] Convention has taken account of these requirements by providing in Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] that application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such 
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, 
under the [Brussels] Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter [underscore and content in brackets added].”1397 
 
This idea of the requirement of a sufficient link between a provisional measure and 
jurisdiction of the deciding court has later been concretised in the Van Uden decision where 
the ECJ held explicitly: 
 
“It follows that the granting of provisional or protective measures on the basis of Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] is conditional on, inter alia, the existence of a real connecting link between the 
subject-matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of the court 
before which those measures are sought [underscore and content in brackets added].”1398 
 
However, despite the setting up of the criterion of a “real connecting link” it is far from being 
clear what exactly is its meaning.1399  
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.1 Reference objects of the “real connecting link”  
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.1.1 Conception 1: Relevance of the “Belegenheitsanknüpfung”/“Wirkungsort” 
 
On the one hand it might be argued that such a “real connecting link” must exist between the 
provisional measure and the State where the concerned patent was granted. In this respect, it 
could be reasoned that, regarding intellectual property rights, such a territorial link exists only 
in the State where the right was granted (“Belegenheitsstaat”), because the right can only be 
used in that State due to the principle of territoriality. As a consequence, any provisional 
measure concerning this right could only have effect in that State.1400 Arguing for this 
conception, it has been put forth that the ECJ, when referring to the ability of the court to 
“assess the circumstances which may lead to the grant or refusal of the measures sought or to 
the laying down of procedures and conditions which the plaintiff must observe in order to 
guarantee the provisional and protective character of the measures ordered”1401, did not 
explicitly address the aspect of enforcement.1402 Rather, the ECJ merely referred to the factual 
proximity of the measure and the court, without differentiating between securing and non-
securing measures.1403. Besides, it has been underlined that regarding some constellations 
(“rechtsgestaltende Maßnahmen”), there is no enforcement at all. A concept based on the 
relevance of the aspect of enforcement would thus go astray in these constellations.1404 
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Additionally, in comparative respect, it has been referred to Article 20(1) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIbis Regulation)1405 which provides: 
 
 
Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 
 
(1) In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member State 
from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State 
as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court of 
another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 
It may be argued that the cited provision only determines that the persons or assets affected by 
the provisional measure must be situated in the State of the deciding court, and that Article 
20(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation also concerns pure “rechtsgestaltende Entscheidungen” 
which cannot be enforced.1406 As to provisional measures which aim at a payment, a local 
enforcement reference may not be decisive if assets are spread over numerous countries, 
because the totality of assets may not be determinable and can be transferred to another State 
as well.1407 On the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that cases are conceivable in which 
enforcement of provisional measures abroad can make sense and that, in such cases, the 
restriction that enforcement may only be undertaken in the forum State would not be sensible. 
As to interim injunctions, it might happen that all assets are located in another State than the 
State where omission is owed.1408  
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.1.2 Conception 2: Relevance of the “Vollstreckungsort” 
 
Alternatively, one might argue as well (like the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine) that the 
criterion of a “real connecting link” should be understood in connection with the enforcement 
of the interim measure concerned, meaning that the courts of the Member States are 
competent pursuant to Article 35 to order provisional measures if these provisional measures 
can respectively shall be enforced in the forum State.1409  
 
In this respect, it is to be emphasised that the ECJ, in its Van Uden decision, tended to avoid 
that a court that lacks sufficient factual proximity to the case orders enforceable provisional 
measures, which could subsequently be enforced abroad.1410 Otherwise, Articles 7 to 26 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, and the exclusion of exorbitant jurisdiction according to Article 
5(2), might be circumvented. This underlying idea can be derived from the following 
formulation of the ECJ in Van Uden: 
 
                                                 
1405
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L338 of 23 December 2003, pp. 1-29, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R2201&rid=1> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1406
 Carl 2007, p. 264. 
1407
 Carl 2007, p. 263; Heß & Vollkommer (1999)19(4) IPRax 220, at p. 224 et seq. 
1408
 Carl 2007, p. 264. 
1409
 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 24; Heinze 2007, p. 251; Gaudemet-Tallon 2010, para. 
311; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 31 EuGVVO, para. 14; 
Czernich, Tiefenthaler & Kodek 2009, Art 31, para. 6; Schack 2010, para. 486; Heß & Vollkommer (1999)19(4) 
IPRax 220, at p. 224 et seq.; Wolf & Lange (2003)49(1) RIW 55, at p. 57; Wannenmacher 2007, p. 245; Pålsson 
2000, p. 630; cf. also Hof van Cassatie 3 September 2000, (2001)50(1) GRUR Int. 73, at p. 74 –  
Sanac/Variantsystemen. 
1410
 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 23; Treichel (2001)50(8-9) GRUR Int. 690, at p. 702. 
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“(…) If, moreover, the plaintiff were entitled to secure interim payment of a contractual consideration 
before the courts of the place where he is himself domiciled, where those courts have no jurisdiction 
over the substance of the case under Articles 2 to 18 of the [Brussels] Convention, and thereafter to 
have the order in question recognised and enforced in the defendant's State, the rules of jurisdiction laid 
down by the [Brussels] Convention could be circumvented [content in brackets added].”1411 
 
Starting from this, it becomes clear that the ECJ equalised the aspects of factual proximity 
between a provisional measure and the State where it is enforced.   
 
Furthermore, in its Van Uden decision, the ECJ set up the requirement that specific assets 
must be affected by the respective provisional measure having a territorial reference to the 
court deciding on the measure. As a consequence, only the courts of that Member State have 
jurisdiction according to Article 35 where the defendant disposes of sufficient assets.1412 The 
ECJ expressly held: 
 
“(…) Consequently, interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional 
measure within the meaning of Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] unless (…) the measure sought 
relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located within the confines of the 




2.5.2.2.3.2.1.3 Conception 3: “Real connecting link” between the provisional measure 
and the applicable law 
 
However, the question arises if another interpretation of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Van 
Uden is conceivable and preferable. In this respect, one might question if the requirement of a 
“real connecting link” should be understood in a substantive way rather than attributing a 
procedural meaning to it. In other words, could it be that the ECJ wanted to set up the 
requirement that there is “real connecting link” between the provisional measure and the 
applicable law? In fact, the English Court of Appeal granted a worldwide freezing order on 
the mere fact that there was a link to English law and English jurisdiction in the statutes of the 
company the shares of which had been sold, and “under the circumstances of jurisdiction of 
this court by agreement of the parties.”1414 
  
The latter variant of interpretation could in fact be grounded on the wording of the English 
and French versions of the respective paragraph of the Van Uden decision of the ECJ which 
shall therefore be cited once again: 
 
“It follows that the granting of provisional or protective measures on the basis of Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] is conditional on, inter alia, the existence of a real connecting link between the 
subject-matter of the measures sought and the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State of the court 
before which those measures are sought [underscore and content in brackets added].”1415 
 
                                                 
1411
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 46 – Van Uden. 
1412
 Carl 2007, p. 264; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, 
Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 31 EuGVVO, para. 14 (“the provisional measure must indicate 
domestic assets, in which enforcement is possible in the forum State”). 
1413
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 47 – Van Uden. 
1414
 Court of Appeal 12 June 2003, Motorola Credit Corpn v Uzan And Others (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 752, 
[2004] 1 W.L.R. 113 – Motorola Credit, cited in: Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 605. 
1415
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 40 – Van Uden. 
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“Il s’ensuit que l’octroi de mesures provisoires ou conservatoires en vertu de l’article 24 est 
subordonné, notamment, à la condition de l’existence d’un lien de rattachement réel entre l’objet des 
mesures sollicitées et la compétence territoriale de l’Etat contractant du juge saisi [underscore added].” 
 
It is noteworthy that the expressions “jurisdiction” and “compétence” do not exclusively, i.e. 
compellingly, have a procedural connotation, but can also refer to the applicable law, which 
becomes obvious when taking into consideration the Anglo-American terms 
“legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction” and “judicial/administrative jurisdiction”.1416 
 
As a consequence, it would thus seem logical that only the courts of that State would have 
competence to order provisional measures according to Article 35 where the concerned patent 
was granted, because, due to the principle of territoriality, only the law of that State would be 
applicable to patent matters. This result could be based on the formulation of the above cited 
paragraph of the Denilauler decision where the ECJ emphasised that the requirement of a 
“real connecting link” was to ensure the suitability of the deciding court. In this respect, it 
would seem comprehensible that the courts of the State where the concerned patent was 
granted are most able to decide on provisional measures in patent matters because courts have 
best knowledge of their own national law, no foreign law must be applied, and no translations 
must be produced. 
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.1.4  Conclusion 
 
However, Conception 3 is not convincing for several reasons. To begin with the above cited 
text versions of the Van Uden decision, it is to be underlined that the interpretation of a 
decision must not only take into consideration specific (single) language versions, but must be 
consistent regarding all official language versions. As to the cited passage of the Van Uden 
decision of the ECJ, it is to be emphasised that the latter interpretation would not be in line 
with the German and the Dutch text versions which read as follows:  
 
“Daraus folgt, dass die Anordnung einstweiliger oder sichernder Maßnahmen nach Artikel 24 
insbesondere voraussetzt, dass zwischen dem Gegenstand der beantragten Maßnahmen und der 
gebietbezogenen Zuständigkeit des Vertragsstaats des angerufenen Gerichts eine reale Verknüpfung 
besteht [underscore added].” 
 
“Hieruit volgt, dat het toestaan van voorlopige of bewarende maatregelen krachtens artikel 24 met name 
afhankelijk is van de voorwaarde, dat er een reële band bestaat tussen het voorwerp van de gevraagde 
maatregelen en de op territoriale criteria gebaseerde bevoegdheid van de verdraagsluitende staat van de 
aangezochte rechter [underscore added].”  
 
These text versions clearly demonstrate that the applicable law cannot be considered the 
reference point of the required “real connecting link”, because neither “Zuständigkeit” nor 
“bevoegdheid” have a substantive meaning, but solely refer to procedural law.   
 
Besides this comparative argument and the general insight of Private International Law that 
procedural and substantive matters are principally to be considered independent from each 
other and should not be mingled,1417 a closer analysis of the formulation of the respective 
paragraphs of the Denilauler and Van Uden decisions reveal that the ECJ, when referring to 
the suitability of the deciding court, did not refer to the suitability regarding the knowledge of 
                                                 
1416
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 189. 
1417
 Cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 192 with further references (there fn. 722). 
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the applicable law, but rather referred to the ability of the court to examine the specific 
conditions of the case. The ECJ formulated:  
 
“The courts of the place or, in any event, of the Contracting State, where the assets subject to the 
measures sought are located, are those best able to assess the circumstances which may lead to the grant 
or refusal of the measures sought or to the laying down of procedures and conditions which the plaintiff 
must observe in order to guarantee the provisional and protective character of the measures ordered (…) 
[underscore added].”1418 
 
“(…) (T)he Court held at paragraph 16 of Denilauler that the courts of the place – or, in any event, of 
the Contracting State – where the assets subject to the measures sought are located are those best able to 
assess the circumstances which may lead to the grant or refusal of the measures sought or to the laying 
down of procedures and conditions which the plaintiff must observe in order to guarantee the 
provisional and protective character of the measures authorised [underscore added].”1419 
 
The intention of the ECJ was thus to ensure that jurisdiction according to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) is conferred on the very court that is 
factually best able to ensure that provisional measures rendered keep their specific character 
as instruments of interim relief. The ECJ obviously considers those courts to be best suited 
where such provisional measures take effect.1420  
 
In this respect, a second comparison may be helpful as well. In Article 20(1) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels IIbis Regulation)1421, the European legislator ruled, 
regarding provisional, including protective, measures:  
 
 
 Article 20 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
 
(1) In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member State 
from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State 
as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court of 
another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 
As Article 20(1) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation thus restricts jurisdiction according to 
Article 20 of this Regulation in conjunction with national law to provisional measures 
concerning persons or assets being situated in the State of the deciding court, it seems sensible 
to interpret Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the same way.1422 
 
However, the main argument for the correctness of a procedural meaning of the term “real 
connecting link” consists in a third comparison: a comparison between the jurisdiction to 
order provisional measures according to Articles 7 to 26 and the jurisdiction according to 
Article 35 in conjunction with national law. The jurisdiction of courts which have jurisdiction 
according to Articles 7 to 26, to order provisional measures as well, is based on the particular 
                                                 
1418
 ECJ 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v S.N.C. Couchet Frères, [1980] ECR 01553, para. 16 – 
Denilauler. 
1419
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 39 – Van Uden. 
1420
 Heinze 2007, p. 246. 
1421
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L338 of 23 December 2003, pp. 1-29, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R2201&rid=1> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1422
 As to the Brussels I Regulation: Heinze 2007, p. 246. 
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factual proximity (“Sachnähe”) of such courts embedded in those provisions.1423 This being 
so, it seems logical to demand that jurisdiction to order provisional measures on the basis of 
Article 35 in conjunction with national law must also be justified by particular considerations 
embedded in Article 35. Any other conception would clearly have to be qualified as 
contradictory. Regarding measures of interim relief, the decisive factor is their preliminary 
character, respectively the possibility and necessity to guarantee this character by way of their 
concrete nature.1424 In this light, the aspect of the enforcement of the concerned interim 
measure constitutes an adequate criterion as to the question which Member States courts are 
competent to render provisional decisions with accordance to Article 35. In contrast, the 
aspect of legal proximity (“Rechtsnähe”) recedes, as the knowledge of the applicable law 
does not necessarily come along with the (best) ability to asses the circumstances eventually 
leading to the grant or refusal of interim measures, i.e. the ability to secure the provisional 
character of such measures. Furthermore, it must be underlined that the applicable law will 
only be examined in a summary way in interim proceedings. This aspect also demonstrates 
that the question of which law is applicable is not a decisive issue in proceedings of interim 
relief. Where the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction are not excluded when a court has jurisdiction 
according to Article 35, the factual link between the deciding court and the respective 
provisional measure(s) gains even more importance. 
 
Last but not least, it is remarkable that the ECJ, when referring to the applicable law, used the 
wording “close connecting factor” instead of “real connecting factor”, for instance in its 
Mines de Potasse decision on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention:1425   
 
“This freedom of choice was introduced having regard to the existence, in certain clearly defined 
situations, of a particularly close connecting factor between a dispute and the court which may be called 
upon to hear it, with a view of the efficacious conduct of the proceedings [underscore added].”1426 
 
It should be expected that the ECJ would have used the same wording in its Denilauler and 
Van Uden decisions if the court had wanted to refer to the applicable law in the latter 
decisions as well. On the contrary, the choice of such different wording rather suggests that 
different aspects should be addressed.  
 
As a consequence, a procedural conception is preferable vis-à-vis a conception which refers to 
the applicable law.1427 Regarding the two variants which have been presented in this respect 
(Conceptions 1 and Conception 2), good arguments militate for both conceptions. Although 
the aspect of enforcement ultimately seems to be essential in order to guarantee the effectivity 
of provisional measures, it is true that a “real connecting link” may also exist between the 
provisional measure and the State where the concerned patent was granted. Both aspects 
should therefore be taken into consideration. I will show in the following paragraphs that a 
differentiation seems an adequate solution with regard to different types of provisional 
measures. 
 
As to the enforcement criterion, it has been partly argued that it suffices that Article 35 
(respectively its predecessors) can already serve as an adequate basis to take jurisdiction over 
a cross-border dispute where the requested measures will be partially enforceable in the 
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 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 17. 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 191. 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 190. 
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 ECJ 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 
[1976] ECR 01735, para. 11 – Mines de Potasse. 
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forum State,1428 “insofar as the connection with the territory of the seised court is not artificial 
or insignificant”.1429 However, if jurisdiction according to Article 35 is based on the 
enforcement aspect and not already on the aspect that the concerned patent has been granted 
for the forum State, it is more convincing to demand that Article 35 confers jurisdiction only 
where the provisional measures in question are fully enforceable in the State of the issuing 
court, because the justification of conferring jurisdiction being inherent in Article 35 precisely 
consists in the real possibility of enforcement in the forum State.1430 
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.2 Specific meaning of the term “real connecting link” regarding different 
types of provisional measures 
 
Given that the aspects of both enforcement of a provisional measure, and identity of the forum 
State and the protection State may be decisive for establishing a “real connecting link” 
between the measure and the court, the subsequent question arises what this result exactly 
means with regard to the different provisional measures mentioned above, i.e. interim 
injunctions, interim performance orders and evidence orders. As there might be variances, I 
shall differentiate between these types of provisional measures in the following analysis. 
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.2.1 Interim injunctions 
 
Regarding interim injunctions, one might argue at first glance that (only) the courts of the 
State are competent according to Article 35 where the infringement has been undertaken and 
where such acting must therefore be omitted in the future.1431 Although the forum protectionis 
will often be available already according to Article 7(2), this may not be the case where such 
infringement jurisdiction is excluded, for instance in case of exclusive jurisdiction or if a 
jurisdiction or an arbitration agreement has been concluded. Conferring jurisdiction to the 
courts of the State for which the concerned patent has been granted means to adequately take 
into consideration the plaintiff's interests in gaining interim relief without having to 
demonstrate the probability of enforcement in the granting State. 
 
However, conferring jurisdiction for the order of an interim injunction according to Article 35 
to the courts of the protection State (i.e. the State where the (committed) infringement must be 
omitted) can only be an addendum besides jurisdiction pursuant to Article 35 of the courts in 
the State where the interim injunction shall be enforced. This idea can be based on several 
arguments. 
 
First of all, there is the inherent risk that the interim injunction cannot be enforced in the end 
in case that the defendant does not dispose of sufficient assets in the State where the patent 
was granted. As a consequence, merely referring to the place of infringement can turn out 
ineffective, because effective enforcement presupposes the existence of assets as adequate 
objects of enforcement.  
 
Another problem connected with a conception allocating relevance, as to jurisdiction 
according to Article 35, (only) to the place of infringement, consists in the subsequent 
problem which State respectively which place should be relevant regarding the infringement 
                                                 
1428
 Pertegás Sender 2002, paras. 3.158-3.161.  
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 Pertegás Sender 2007 (Magnus & Mankowski), Art 31 Brussels I Regulation, para. 29. 
1430
 Cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 202. 
1431
 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25; Hölder 2004, pp. 200-201. 
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in question: the place of the physical acting or the place of the effects of the infringement. 
Regarding cross-border infringements, these places/States regularly fall apart. This problem 
can be illustrated by the following case: 
 
Patent holder P holds a patent in State A. Infringer INF offers and sells a product 
which infringes P’s patent, in State B (respectively via internet from state B). P wants 
to sue INF for patent infringement, and to apply for a provisional injunction.  
Can P proceed in this way before the courts of State A or State B on the basis of 
Article 35? 
 
At first glance, one might argue that it is exactly this falling apart of the place of physical 
acting and the place of the effects of the infringement in such a case which underlines the 
benefit of a conception according to which (only) courts of the State shall have jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 35 where the infringing act has been physically undertaken and must be 
omitted in the future. However, it is noteworthy that such a conception would mingle aspects 
of substantive law – the question of territoriality of the patent right – with procedural law – 
the question of jurisdiction according to Article 35. This approach would also ultimately lead 
to the consequence that one would refer to the applicable law which has already been rejected 
above. Last but not least, the insight that it will be decisive at the end of the day that an 
interim injunction, as any other interim measure, can be effectively enforced which 
presupposes that there is a sufficient financial basis for enforcement which is not necessarily 
the case at the place where the infringing act occurred, militates against a conception 
according to which only the courts of the State where the patent has been granted have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 35.   
   
To conclude, concerning interim injunctions, the courts of the State should therefore be 
considered competent according to Article 35 where the defendant disposes of sufficient 
assets that the interim injunction can be enforced. Besides, courts of the State where the patent 
has been granted are also competent pursuant to Article 35. 
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.2.2 Interim performance orders 
 
As to specific actings being imposed on the defendant by way of an interim performance 
order, the courts of the State should be considered competent pursuant to Article 35 where the 
defendant actually disposes of sufficient assets to secure the enforcement of the measure. To 
repeat, the ECJ expressly held in Van Uden as to interim payments of a contractual 
consideration: 
 
“Consequently, interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional 
measure within the meaning of Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] unless (…) the measure sought 
relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located within the confines of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court to which application is made [underscores and content in brackets 
added].”1432 
 
Regarding fungible actings, the place of the physical acting should be decisive for a “real 
connecting link”.1433 Applying the place of the legal effects of the acting would namely 
mingle aspects of substantive and procedural law, and should therefore be avoided.1434  
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 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 47 – Van Uden. 
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With regard to interim measures concerning the restitution, the recall or the destruction of 
concrete objects infringing the concerned patent, it would seem most effective in matters of 
enforcement to refer to the State where these objects are situated.1435  
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.2.3 Evidence orders 
 
Also concerning measures to protect and obtain information and evidence (evidence orders), 
the decisive question is whether the concerned measure is enforceable in the forum State.1436 
In contrast to a judgment of the French Cour d’appel de Versailles rendered before the Van 
Uden judgment of the ECJ,1437 a court outside the protection State may not order provisional 
measures to obtain or secure evidence to be enforced in another State than the forum State, be 
it the protection State or any other State.  
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.3 Are cross-border interim measures generally excluded in case of legal or 
factual complexity of cases? 
 
As to interim measures in patent cases, there is the problem that, on the one hand, patent cases 
may raise highly technical questions and require sufficient understanding of complicated 
foreign legal provisions which per se constitutes an ambitious challenge for a foreign judge. 
On the other hand, the situation is aggravated by the fact that interim proceedings have a 
summary character meaning that the case will not be examined in depth comparably with 
principal proceedings where full evidence may be taken. As a consequence, one might indeed 
question of whether cross-border provisional measures should be considered excluded if the 
matter to decide turns out to be too complex for a judicial decision by the foreign judge. 
While in particular Dutch courts formerly tended to grant cross-border interim injunctions 
rather generously,1438 this practice has changed in the meantime. For instance, the Dutch 
Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage suggested in its decision in Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Organon 
Teknika B.V. and Others that an incidental decision by means of a kort geding could be 
possible if the patent right is confirmed, and under the precondition that the case is not too 
complicated in factual and legal respect.1439  
 
In this respect, one might put forth that Article 9(3) of the Enforcement Directive (similarly to 
Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement) contains the obligation for Contracting States to provide 
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 Cf. for instance Cf. Hof van Cassatie 3 September 2000, (2001)50(1) GRUR Int. 73, at p. 74 –  
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 Article 9(3) of the Enforcement Directive 
 
The judicial authorities shall, in respect of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, have the 
authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably available evidence in order to satisfy 
themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is the rightholder and that the 
applicant’s right is being infringed, or that such infringement is imminent.  
 
 
However, a closer look on both provisions reveals that they in fact merely contain the 
obligation to secure that patent rights can be effectively enforced in the granting State. 
Beyond this, neither Article 9(3) of the Enforcement Directive nor Article 50 of the TRIPS 
Agreement prescribe that cross-border interim measures must be available.1440 The limited 




 Recitals 8 and 11 of the Enforcement Directive 
 
(8) The disparities between the systems of the Member States as regards the means of enforcing 
intellectual property rights are prejudicial to the proper functioning of the Internal Market and make it 
impossible to ensure that intellectual property rights enjoy an equivalent level of protection throughout 
the Community. This situation does not promote free movement within the internal market or create an 
environment conducive to healthy competition. 
 
(11) This Directive does not aim to establish harmonised rules for judicial cooperation, jurisdiction, the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters, or deal with applicable law. 
There are Community instruments which govern such matters in general terms and are, in principle, 
equally applicable to intellectual property. 
 
 
As neither Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement nor the Enforcement Directive answer the 
raised question of whether cross-border interim measures are generally excluded in case of 
complexity of the case, it is necessary to resort to general considerations. Structurally, the 
question of whether rejecting an application for a cross-border provisional measure for the 
reason that the court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient claim 
(“Maßnahmeanspruch”) or ground to grant the measure (“Maßnahmegrund”), actually 
constitutes a matter of foundedness rather than a question of admissibility.1441 As a 
consequence, legal or factual complexity of cases has no effect on the question of whether 
courts have jurisdiction to order provisional measures pursuant to Article 35.    
 
 
2.5.2.2.3.2.4 Scope of jurisdiction in the case of multistate patent infringements 
 
Having arrived at the conclusion that Article 35 generally confers jurisdiction to order 
provisional measures, regarding the infringement of foreign patents, to courts of the State 
where such measures shall be enforced (and additionally, in the case of interim injunctions, to 
the courts of the protection State), I shall now turn to the question of which competence is 
given to the deciding court in the case of multistate patent infringements.  
 
Regarding jurisdiction pursuant to Article 35 of the courts of the State where provisional 
measures shall be enforced, it has been stated above that the real possibility of enforcement in 
the forum State is the precondition for a comprehensive jurisdiction according to Article 35 in 
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conjunction with national law. A provisional measure ordered by a court which is competent 
according to Article 35 on this basis can have effect in a multitude of other States where 
patent infringements have been committed, meaning that interim performance orders (e.g. to 
pay damages), interim injunctions or measures to protect and obtain information and evidence 
(evidence orders) can be taken, given that there are sufficient assets in the forum State to 
enable enforcement of these measures.1442 As a further consequence, a court will only be 
competent on this basis insofar as there are sufficient assets in the forum State concerning 
which enforcement will be possible, meaning that a court may partly have jurisdiction 
only.1443  
 
In this respect, the question arises whether this understanding of a comprehensive jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 35 is contradictory to the more restricted scope of jurisdiction according to 
Article 7(2) to order provisional measures, which is limited to the State where the patent was 
granted. While a different scope of jurisdiction according to Articles 7(2) and 35 might seem 
illogical at first sight, a different treatment of these grounds of jurisdiction is indeed justified, 
on the basis of a twofold reasoning. First, it is to be borne in mind that the fact that courts 
which are competent according to Articles 7 to 26 can also order provisional measures, is 
based on the circumstance that Articles 7 to 26 per se imply a sufficient factual proximity 
between the measure and the deciding court.1444 In the case of jurisdiction according to Article 
35 of courts of a State where the provisional measure shall be enforced, such a factual 
proximity is only established by the fact that the provisional measure can be, respectively is to 
be enforced in the forum State.1445 On the basis of the emphasis of the factual proximity, it is 
logical to refer, in a second step, to that criterion also with regard to the scope of jurisdiction. 
Due to the principle of territoriality, jurisdiction based on Article 7(2) is restricted to the 
courts of the State where, respectively for whose territory a patent has been granted, meaning 
that multiple infringing actings in different States must be treated independently. In this 
respect, there is no inner link between patent infringements in different States. In contrast to 
this situation, jurisdiction according to Article 35 with regard to courts of a State where the 
provisional measure shall be enforced, is not limited by the principle of territoriality, but by 
the different conditions of enforceability of the provisional measure. Courts of States where 
provisional measures can be enforced fulfil the requirement of such an inner link, i.e. a “real 
connecting link” as demanded by the ECJ. Besides, the broader scope of jurisdiction with 
regard to Article 35 is also justified by the fact that not all provisional measures may be taken 
on the basis of Article 35.  
 
As to the further issue of whether multistate interim infringement proceedings against several 
defendants (respondents) may be connected, national procedural law is decisive via Article 
35. In this respect, it is to be underlined that Article 8(1) does not cover this question,1446 with 
the consequence that the restrictive interpretation of the prerequisite of a “close connection” 
adopted by the ECJ in its Roche Nederland decision is not relevant in this context.     
 
 
                                                 
1442
 Cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 201 (while Schauwecker is of the opinion that jurisdiction according to Article 31 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is merely conferred on the courts of the 
State where the provisional measure shall be enforced, while, according to his opinion, courts of the protection 
State per se do not have jurisdiction pursuant to this provision). 
1443
 Heinze 2007, p. 252, there fn. 338; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25. 
1444
 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 17. 
1445
 Cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 203 (while Schauwecker generally interprets Article 31 of the Brussels I 
Regulation (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in a more restricted way than advocated in this thesis, cf. 
fn. 1375. 
1446
 Kur (2006)37(7) IIC 844, at p. 853; differently: Szychowska 2008, pp. 218-220. 
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2.5.2.2.3.2.5 Recognition and enforcement of measures according to Article 35 
 
Assuming that a “real connecting link” exists only between the provisional measure and the 
courts of the State where the measure is to be enforced (except from interim injunctions where 
it is arguable that a “real connecting link” is existent between the courts of the State where the 
measure is to be enforced and the courts of the protection State), measures respecting the 
requirement of such a “real connecting link” are by their nature generally unsuitable for being 
enforced abroad.1447 This idea is reflected in Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
which confines recognition and enforcement according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation of 
orders of provisional measures to orders rendered by a court which by virtue of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter (accessory jurisdiction): 
 
 




 (a) (...) For the purposes of Chapter III, ‘judgment’ includes provisional, including protective, measures 
 ordered by a court or tribunal which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
 the matter.  
 
 
The fact that provisional measures ordered on the basis of independent jurisdiction according 
to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in conjunction with national law are not 
enforceable in another Member State according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation – in contrast to 
provisional measures ordered on the basis of accessory jurisdiction – becomes even clearer in 
Recital 33 1st and 4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that provides: 
 
 
 Recital 33 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
  
 (33) Where provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to 
 the substance of the matter, their free circulation should be ensured under this Regulation. (...) Where 
 provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court of a Member State not having 
 jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter, the effect of such measures should be confined, under this 
 Regulation, to the territory of that Member State. 
 
 
On the basis of this clear legal situation, it seems impossible de lege lata to accept exceptions 
from this rule, i.e. to admit recognition and enforcement, pursuant to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, of provisional measures ordered by a court on the basis of independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures. In Chapter 3, I will consider however whether such 
exceptions should be admitted de lege ferenda in certain constellations. 
 
It may be concluded that the Brussels Ibis Regulation pursues the approach of determining the 
“real connecting link” as referring to the place of (prospective) enforcement, respectively does 
not start at the question of admissibility of the provisional measure but consequently chooses 
an approach focused on its enforcement notwithstanding if there was a “real connecting link” 
justifying the order of the concerned measure.1448  
 
                                                 
1447
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 621; Wolf (2000)11(1) EuZW 11, at p. 14. 
1448
 Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 543. 
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It is however to be underlined that Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not 
prohibit provisional measures, ordered on the basis of independent jurisdiction for interim 
relief, from having extraterritorial effect as long as these measures can be enforced 




2.5.2.3 Raise of the invalidity defence in provisional proceedings 
 
Having analysed the different variants of jurisdiction as to provisional measures, the question 
arises if, respectively to which extent the GAT decision of the ECJ becomes relevant in this 
respect. I shall analyse in the following paragraphs whether the raise of an invalidity defence 
in patent infringement proceedings has the effect that the court having jurisdiction with regard 
to provisional measures loses this jurisdiction in favour of the courts being competent 
according to Article 24(4). In contrast to some other authors as well as courts that do not 
undertake a differentiation between the different bases of jurisdiction for provisional 
measures, I shall pursue a split approach, because the result of the analysis might be different 
depending on the ground of jurisdiction.    
 
 
2.5.2.3.1 Raise of the invalidity defence in provisional proceedings before a court having 





According to prevailing case-law having been produced after the GAT decision of the ECJ, 
Article 24(4) is not applicable regarding provisional measures, thus not depriving the court of 
jurisdiction according to Article 4 to decide on such provisional measures. For instance, the 
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage decided in this way in Bettacare:  
 
“(…) Uit genoemd arrest [GAT] (…) volgt naar voorlopig oordeel niet dat bij het voeren van een 
nietigheidsverweer in kort geding ten aanzien van het octrooi in het buitenland, zoals door H3 [the 
defendant] in deze procedure gedaan, de krachtens art. 2 EEX Verordening bevoegde Nederlandse 
voorzieningenrechter bevoegdheid zou verliezen wegens het bepaalde in art. 22 lid 4 EEX Verordening 
[content in brackets added].”1450  
 
(“(…) For the time being, it does not follow from that [GAT] decision that, in the case where an 
invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings, regarding the foreign patent, as done by H3 [the 
defendant] in this case, the Dutch court having jurisdiction as to these measures pursuant Article 2 of 
the Brussels I Regulation would lose jurisdiction due to the content of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation [content in brackets added].”)1451     
  
                                                 
1449
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 614 et seq.; differently: Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 545. 
However, Domej who expressly refers to the wording of “confinement to the territory of that Member State” in 
Recital 33 4 th sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in order to argue that provisional measures, ordered on 
the basis of independent jurisdiction for interim relief, have no extraterritorial effect, overlooks that Recital 33 
4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation merely applies to provisional measures ordered “under this 
Regulation”. 
1450
 Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage 21 September 2006, Bettacare Limited (UK) v H3 Products BV (Netherlands) and 
Another, BIE 2006, 91, para. 4.20 – Bettacare. 
1451
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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In another decision, Fleuren, the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage chose an even broader 
formulation, not differentiating between provisional measures ordered on the basis of Article 
35 in conjunction with provisions of national law and provisional measures ordered on the 
basis of jurisdiction according to the principal proceedings. In this decision, the court held: 
 
“(…) Omdat Fleuren zich heeft beroepen op de nietigheid van EP 133, is de rechtbank, gelet op de 
uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Gemeenschappen van 3 juli 2006, zaak C-4/03, 
inzake GAT/LuK (…), niet bevoegd een grensoverschrijdend verbod toe te wijzen. Dit is anders voor 
zover een provisioneel inbreukverbod is gevraagd (…).”1452 
 
(“(…) As Fleuren [the defendant] raised the defence of invalidity of EP 133, the court is, by virtue of 
the judgment of the ECJ from 3 July 2006, case C-4/03 – GAT/LuK (…) deprived of jurisdiction as to a 
cross-border injunction. This is different inasfar as a provisional infringement injunction is claimed (…) 
[content in brackets added].”)1453  
 
This broad conception was later confirmed by the Gerechthof ‘s-Gravenhage in its decision in 
Yellow Pages where the court summarised: 
 
“(…) Tezamen genomen moet (…) worden aangenomen dat de bevoegdheid om een dergelijke 
maatregel te gelasten ter zake van inbreuk in een andere lidstaat (of deze bevoegdheid nu is gegrond, 
zoals in casu, op artikel 2 EEX-Verordening of, voor zover dat al mogelijk zou zijn, op artikel 31 EEX-
Verordening) niet wordt gedwarsboomd door de exclusievebevoegdheidsregel van artikel 22 sub 4 
EEX-Verordening (…).”1454 
 
(“(…) All in all, it must be held that (…) the jurisdiction to order such a measure for an infringement in 
another Member State (whether this jurisdiction is based on Article 2 or – if at all possible – on Article 
31) is not affected by the rule of exclusive jurisdiction in Article 22(4) Brussels I Regulation (…).”)1455 
 
 
2.5.2.3.1.2 Conception 1: Applicability of Article 24(4) 
 
In contrast, parts of legal doctrine have argued for the applicability of Article 24(4) 
(respectively its predecessors) in the case that the defence of invalidity is raised in provisional 
proceedings before a court having jurisdiction according to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 (respectively 
their predecessors). The argumentation employed to support this conception varies.  
 
First, it might be put forward that in case that a national court has jurisdiction according to 
Article 24(4) with regard to the principal proceeding, this implies that another court cannot 
have, regarding provisional measures, jurisdiction according to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 – in 
contrast to Article 35 in conjunction with provisions of national law – given it is characteristic 
for exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) to fully exclude recourse to general 
provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1456 Following this approach, it could also be put 
forth that Article 24(4) has a mandatory effect independently from the type of proceedings.  
 
                                                 
1452
 Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage 7 March 2007, Fleuren Presspack BV (Netherlands) v Vof Handelsonderneming Ruvo 
(Netherlands), and Ruvo BV (Netherlands) v Fleuren Presspack BV (Netherlands), BIE 2007, 125, para. 4.1 – 
Fleuren. 
1453
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1454
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.7.1 – Yellow Pages. 
1455
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis.  
1456
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 233. 
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Besides, one might argue that the defendant, if Article 24(4) was not applicable where the 
invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings – meaning that the infringement court 
is competent to decide on the validity issue as well – would gain more than he could gain in 
the principal proceeding where that issue could obviously not be decided by the infringement 
court. That could be considered an imminent conflict between Articles 24(4) and 35.1457 
With reference to the GAT decision of the ECJ, it has been stated that the ECJ held that the 
court before which infringement proceedings have been brought is generally barred from a 
decision on and even a treatment of the validity issue. In this respect, the relevant passage of 
the decision of the ECJ which has been referred to in literature1458 and which I have already 
discussed above, reads as follows:  
 
“In the light of the position of Article 16(4) within the scheme of the [Brussels] Convention and the 
objective pursued, the view must be taken that the exclusive jurisdiction provided for by that provision 
should apply whatever the form of proceedings in which the issue of a patent's validity is raised, be it by 
way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the case is brought or at a later stage in the 
proceedings [underscore and content in brackets added].”1459 
 
 
2.5.2.3.1.3 Conception 2: Inapplicability of Article 24(4) 
 
However, regarding the jurisprudence of the ECJ, another decision is of considerable interest 
in this respect. In the Solvay case on the interpretation of Articles 6(1), 22(4) and 31 of the 
Brussels I Regulation, the ECJ also made some worthwhile explications regarding the 
applicability of Article 24(4) to provisional proceedings. Although the specific case 
concerned provisional proceedings on the basis of Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the court chose such a general explanation and 
reasoning that it seems justified to draw conclusions from this judgment for the case discussed 
here, too.1460 In essence, the ECJ held: 
 
“According to the referring court, the court before which the interim proceedings have been brought 
does not make a final decision on the validity of the patent invoked but makes an assessment as to how 
the court having jurisdiction under Article 22(4) of the regulation would rule in that regard, and will 
refuse to adopt the provisional measure sought if it considers that there is a reasonable, non-negligible 
possibility that the patent invoked would be declared invalid by the competent court.  
 
In those circumstances, it is apparent that there is no risk of conflicting decisions (…), since the 
provisional decision taken by the court before which the interim proceedings have been brought will not 
in any way prejudice the decision to be taken on the substance by the court having jurisdiction under 
Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001. Thus, the reasons which led the Court to interpret widely the 
jurisdiction provided for in Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 do not require that, in a case such as 
that in the main proceedings, Article 31 of that regulation should be disapplied [underscores added].”1461 
 
The idea that the court invoked in provisional proceedings actually does not render a decision 
on the validity of the concerned patent, but is restricted to an examination of how the court 
deciding in principal proceedings will decide that issue has already been pursued by national 
                                                 
1457
 Bisschop (2007)98(6) Mitt. 247, at p. 249. 
1458
 For instance: Heinze 2007, p. 203. 
1459
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, para. 25 – GAT. 
1460
 This possibility is rashly, without any further analysis, denied by Schauwecker, cf. Schauwecker 2009, p. 
322.    
1461 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, paras. 49-
50, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> – Solvay. 
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courts. In particular Dutch courts have constantly decided in this way. For instance, the 
Gerechthof ‘s-Gravenhage stated in Yellow Pages: 
  
“(…) (D)e exclusieve-bevoegdheidsregel van artikel 22 sub 4 EEX-Verordening (vindt) geen toepassing 
omdat in het kader van een voorlopige maatregel geen beslissing over de geldigheid van het betrokken 
industriële-eigendomsrecht wordt gegeven. De Nederlandse rechter die oordeelt over een 
nietigheidsverweer in het kader van een voorlopige maatregel ter zake van inbreuk in het buitenland, 
geeft immers geen beslissing over de geldigheid van het buitenlandse industriëleeigendomsrecht. Hij 
geeft slechts een voorlopig oordeel in de vorm van een inschatting van de kans van slagen van het 
desbetreffende nietigheidsverweer onder de toepasselijke lex loci protectionis. Indien een redelijke, niet 
te verwaarlozen kans bestaat dat het betrokken industriële-eigendomsrecht door de buitenlandse rechter 
nietig zal worden geacht, wordt de voorlopige maatregel in de vorm van een inbreukverbod afgewezen 
[underscore added].”1462 
 
(“(…) (T)he rule of exclusive jurisdiction of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation does not apply 
because within the context of a provisional measure, no decision is rendered on the validity of the 
concerned industrial property right. After all, a Dutch court that judges on an invalidity defence in the 
context of a provisional measure regarding infringement of an industrial property right abroad, does not 
render a decision on the validity of the foreign industrial property right. It only renders a provisional 
decision in the form of an assessment of the chances of success of the invalidity defence under the 
applicable lex loci protectionis. If there is a reasonable, non-negligible chance that the industrial 
property right at issue will be found invalid by the foreign court, the provisional injunction will not be 
granted [underscore added].”)1463 
 
The Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage referred to this jurisprudence in its later Apple v Samsung 
decision and also underlined its view that Article 24(4) is not applicable in provisional 
proceedings regardless of whether these provisional proceedings are based on accessory or 
independent jurisdiction for interim relief. The court explicated: 
 
“(…) Voor zover de bevoegdheid om de voorlopige maatregel te treffen is gegrond op een 
bodembevoegdheidsbepaling, dwingt het arrest Solvay/Honeywell naar het voorlopig oordeel van dit 
hof niet tot herziening van de Yellow Pages-lijn. Dat geldt te meer gelet op de ratio van 
Solvay/Honeywell, neergelegd in rechtsoverwegingen 49 en 50 van dat arrest. Die ratio geldt immers in 
dit verband evenzeer. Dat betekent dat artikel 22 sub 4 EEX-verordening geen toepassing vindt in het 
geval dat de rechter op grond van bijvoorbeeld artikel 2 of 6 sub 1 bevoegd is om kennis te nemen van 
de vordering tot het treffen van een voorlopige maatregel ter zake van inbreuk in een andere lidstaat en 
deze vordering wordt begroet met een nietigheidsverweer. Daarbij geldt uiteraard wel dat het moet gaan 
om een procedure, waarin de rechter geen definitieve beslissing mag geven over de geldigheid van het 
ingeroepen octrooi, maar alleen mag evalueren hoe de op grond van artikel 22 sub 4 EEX-Verordening 
bevoegde rechter zich daarover zou uitspreken en de gevraagde voorlopige maatregel niet mag 
toekennen indien er naar zijn oordeel een redelijke en niet te verwaarlozen kans bestaat dat het 
ingeroepen octrooi door de bevoegde rechter nietig wordt verklaard (rechtsoverweging 49 
Solvay/Honeywell; rechtsoverweging 4.7.2 Yellow Pages) [underscore added].”1464 
 
(“(…) Provided that jurisdiction for provisional measures is based on jurisdiction on the merits, the 
Solvay/Honeywell decision does not require, according to the temporary assessment of this court, to 
alter the Yellow Pages-approach. This applies even more due to the ratio of Solvay/Honeywell, laid 
down in paragraphs 49 and 50 of that decision. For this ratio applies in this context as well. This means 
that Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation is not applicable in the case that the court has jurisdiction 
for instance according to Article 2 or 6(1) to decide on the claim to order a provisional measure with 
                                                 
1462
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.7.2 – Yellow Pages. 
1463
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1464
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 20 May 2014, Apple Inc. v Samsung Electronics Co. Limited and Others, IER 
2014, 47, available at WWW 
<http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2014:1727>, para. 20 – Apple v 
Samsung. 
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regard to an infringement in another Member State and a defence of invalidity is raised. This certainly 
applies only if the court is prevented from rendering a final decision with regard to the validity of the 
concerned patent, but may only evaluate how the court having jurisdiction according to Article 22(4) of 
the Brussels I Regulation would decide, and may not order the requested provisional measure if there is, 
according to its assessment, a reasonable, non-negligible possibility that the patent invoked would be 
declared invalid by the competent court (paragraph 49 Solvay/Honeywell; paragraph 4.7.2 Yellow 
Pages) [underscore added].”)1465  
 
Correspondingly, the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage already held in Bettacare: 
 
“(…) Zoals al eerder in kort geding is uitgemaakt door deze rechtbank voorafgaand aan het wijzen van 
bedoeld arrest GAT/LuK, kan de voorzieningenrechter naar Nederlands recht in een geval als dit slechts 
een voorlopig oordeel geven in de vorm van een inschatting van de kansen van het betreffende 
nietigheidsverweer – of dat nu Nederlands recht of buitenlands recht betreft maakt in die zin geen 
verschil – waarmee het exclusieve veld van art. 22 lid 4 EEX in kort geding voor wat betreft buitenlands 
recht in beginsel niet wordt betreden, omdat niets definitiefs omtrent de geldigheid naar buitenlands 
recht wordt vastgesteld [underscores added].”1466 
 
(“(…) As it has already been decided in provisional proceedings by this court before the cited 
GAT/LuK decision, the court having jurisdiction as to these measures may, according to Dutch law, 
merely render a provisional decision in the form of an assessment of the chances of success of the 
concerned invalidity defence – regardless in this sense whether Dutch or foreign law applies – whereby 
the field of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation is principally 
not affected regarding foreign law, because no definite decision on the validity according to foreign law 
is rendered [underscores added].”)1467   
 
Similarly, the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage decided in Fleuren: 
 
“(…) De rechtbank geeft bij de beoordeling van een provisionele vordering (…) slechts een voorlopig 
oordeel in de vorm van een inschatting van de kansen van het betreffende nietigheidsverweer. Daarmee 
wordt het exclusieve veld van art. 22, lid 4, EEXV wat buitenlands recht betreft in beginsel niet 
betreden, omdat geen definitieve vaststellingen omtrent de geldigheid naar buitenlands recht 
plaatsvinden [underscores added].”1468 
 
(“(…) When assessing a provisional request, the court (…) only renders a provisional decision in the 
form of an assessment of the chances of success of the concerned invalidity defence. Hereby, the field 
of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation is principally not 
affected regarding foreign law, because no definite decisions on the validity according to foreign law 
are rendered [underscores added].”)1469 
 
Apart from the limited scope of decision of the court which is invoked in provisional 
proceedings, further aspects also militate against the applicability of Article 24(4) in the case 
of provisional proceedings. Such aspects were, in remarkable clarity, underlined by the 
Gerechthof ‘s-Gravenhage in its cited Yellow Pages decision. First, the court emphasised the 
specific purpose and character of provisional measures and detected a certain incompatibility 
with the rule of exclusive jurisdiction of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) as such, holding:  
 
                                                 
1465
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1466
 Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage 21 September 2006, Bettacare Limited (UK) v H3 Products BV (Netherlands) and 
Another, BIE 2006, 91, para. 4.20 – Bettacare. 
1467
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1468
 Rb. ‘s-Gravenhage 7 March 2007, Fleuren Presspack BV (Netherlands) v Vof Handelsonderneming Ruvo 
(Netherlands), and Ruvo BV (Netherlands) v Fleuren Presspack BV (Netherlands), BIE 2007, 125, para. 4.1 – 
Fleuren. 
1469
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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“(…) (D)eze exclusieve-bevoegdheidsregel (is) immers niet goed verenigbaar met het doel en het 
karakter van de voorlopige maatregel. Voorlopige maatregelen hebben, volgens vaste jurisprudentie van 
het Hof van Justitie over het EEX-Verdrag/Verordening, ten doel ‘een feitelijke of juridische situatie te 
handhaven ter bewaring van rechten waarvan de erkenning langs andere weg wordt gevraagd voor de 
rechter die van het bodemgeschil kennis neemt’ (…) [underscore added].”1470 
 
(“(…) (T)his rule of exclusive jurisdiction is not fully compatible with the purpose and the character of 
the provisional measure. Provisional measures, according to settled case-law of the Court of Justice on 
the Brussels Convention/Regulation, have the aim of ‘preserving a factual or legal situation so as to 
safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the case’ (…) [underscore added].”)1471 
 
In order to substantiate its conception that Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is not applicable in provisional proceedings, the court 
then drew a comparison with the approach pursued regarding the Community trade mark and 
the Community design:  
 
“(…) Een soortgelijke benadering is ook terug te vinden in een andere context, namelijk die van het 
Gemeenschapsmerk en het Gemeenschapsmodel. Artikel 104 lid 3 Verordening (EG) nr. 207/2009 
inzake het Gemeenschapsmerk staat immers, met inachtneming van artikel 103 lid 2 van die 
verordening, kort gezegd toe om voorlopige en beschermende maatregelen ter zake van inbreuk in 
andere lidstaten te bevelen, ook al is bij een andere rechtbank voor het Gemeenschapsmerk de 
geldigheid van het Gemeenschapsmerk bij reconventionele vordering betwist. Zo ook artikel 91 lid 3 jo. 
90 lid 3 van Verordening (EG) nr. 6/2002 inzake het Gemeenschapsmodel (…).”1472 
 
(“(…) A similar approach is also reflected in a different context, namely the context of the Community 
trade mark and the Community design. After all, Article 104(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 on the 
Community trade mark allows, subject to Article 103(2) thereof, in short, to order provisional and 
protective measures for infringement in other Member States, although the validity of the Community 
trade mark is disputed by means of a counterclaim before another Community trade mark court. 
Similarly, see Article 91(3) in conjunction with Article 90(3) of Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 on the 
Community Design (…).”)1473 
 
Despite the structural difference between the Community trade mark and the Community 
design on the one hand, and the European patent on the other hand, the latter being merely a 
bundle of national patents while the Community trade mark and the Community design are 
unified intellectual property rights, it is indeed doubtful if that structural distinction ultimately 
justifies a different treatment as to the treatment of the validity issue of the concerned rights. 
 
Furthermore, the Gerechthof ‘s-Gravenhage pointed out that no effective, i.e. immediate, 
legal protection granted by one single court (and not multiple courts), could be received if 
Article 24(4) was applicable in provisional proceedings: 
 
“(…) Een beperktere benadering – in dier voege dat artikel 22 sub 4 EEX-Verordening wel toepassing 
kan vinden in het kader van een procedure tot het verkrijgen van een voorlopige maatregel ter zake van 
inbreuk in een andere lidstaat – zou betekenen dat naar aanleiding van een nietigheidsverweer eerst in 
een (bodem)procedure in het land van registratie moet worden geoordeeld over de geldigheid van het 
betrokken recht. Daarmee zou de rechthebbende feitelijk de mogelijkheid uit handen worden geslagen 
om zo een voorlopige maatregel te verkrijgen ter bewaring van zijn rechten. Die benadering zou tot het 
                                                 
1470
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.7.1 – Yellow Pages. 
1471
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1472
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.7.1 – Yellow Pages. 
1473
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
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voor de praktijk onwenselijke resultaat leiden dat de rechthebbende die zich geconfronteerd weet met 
inbreuken in meerdere landen, zich in al die landen tot de rechter moet wenden om evenzoveel 
voorlopige maatregelen te verkrijgen. Een dergelijke omslachtige gang van zaken verdraagt zich niet 
goed met het doel van voorlopige maatregelen, waarbij het er immers om gaat dat een feitelijke of 
juridische situatie snel kan worden gehandhaafd ter bewaring van rechten in afwachting van een 
beslissing ten gronde, zoals in de context van het intellectuele-eigendomsrecht ook wordt onderstreept 
door Richtlijn 2004/48/EG (…) [underscore added].”1474 
 
(“(…) A more limited approach – according to which Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation may be 
applied in the context of a procedure for obtaining a provisional measure for infringement in another 
Member State – would mean that, following an invalidity defence, first a ruling should be obtained 
about the validity in proceedings (on the substance) in the country of registration. Therewith the 
possibility would have in fact been beaten out of the hands of the right holder so as to obtain a 
provisional measure to preserve his rights. This approach would lead to the result, which is undesirable 
for practice, that the right holder who is confronted with infringements in several countries, has to 
adjudicate the courts in all those countries in order to obtain as many provisional measures. Such a 
time-consuming state of affairs is not well compatible with the purpose of provisional measures, which 
is indeed to ensure that a factual or legal situation can quickly be preserved so as to safeguard rights 
pending a decision on the substance, as is underlined, in the context of intellectual property law, by 
Directive 2004/48/EC (…) [underscore added].”)1475 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, it is to be concluded that a conception according to which 
Article 24(4) is not applicable in provisional proceedings, meaning that courts having 
jurisdiction according to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 may also treat the validity issue in provisional 
proceedings, if the validity issue has been raised by the defendant, is not in conflict with the 
GAT decision of the ECJ, as the Gerechthof ‘s-Gravenhage rightly confirmed in Yellow 
Pages, because paragraph 25 of the GAT decision cited by opponents of that conception 
simply does not refer to the differentiation between principal and provisional proceedings: 
 
“(…) Dat het Hof van Justitie in rov. 25 van het GAT/LuK-arrest spreekt over “ongeacht het 
procedurele kader waarin de kwestie van de geldigheid wordt opgeworpen” doet aan het voorgaande 
niet af. Deze zinsnede heeft immers betrekking op de daaropvolgende bijzin “of dit nu gebeurt bij wege 
van rechtsvordering of bij wege van exceptie, bij het aanhangig maken van het geschil of in een later 
stadium van de procedure”.”1476 
 
(“(…) The fact that the ECJ, in paragraph 25 of the GAT/LuK judgment, speaks of “whatever the form 
of proceedings in which the issue of the validity is raised” does not detract from this. Actually, this 
sentence refers to the subsequent clause “be it by way of an action or a plea in objection, at the time the 
case is brought or at a later stage in the proceedings”.”)1477 
 
The result that Article 24(4) is not applicable in provisional proceedings where jurisdiction is 
based on Article 4 et seq. might additionally be based on the assumption that cases of Article 
24 presume a decision in principal proceedings, to be understood in opposition to provisional 
proceedings.1478 To underline this thesis, one might be tempted at first glance to take 
reference to the Jenard Report, where, in the German text version, the following passage 
contains the word “Hauptsache” which can actually have the meaning of the opposite of 
“vorläufiger Rechtsschutz” (interim relief):  
                                                 
1474
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.7.1 – Yellow Pages. 
1475
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1476
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 12 July 2011, Yellow Page Marketing B.V. (YPM) v Yell Limited, IER 2011, 
61, available at WWW <http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR1364>, 
para. 4.8 – Yellow Pages. 
1477
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1478
 Pansch 2003, pp. 41-42 in particular in conjunction with there fn. 179. 
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“Dieser Artikel stellt einen Katalog ausschließlicher Zuständigkeiten auf, die in dem Rechtsverkehr der 
sechs Staaten gelten. Grundsätzlich begründen die in Artikel 16 aufgezählten Streitsachen einen 
ausschließlichen Gerichtsstand nur dann, wenn das Gericht über sie als Hauptsache zu entscheiden hat 
[underscore added].”1479 
 
However, in the given framework, it is more likely that the term “Hauptsache” in the cited 
passage is used as a differentiation vis-à-vis mere preliminary questions.1480 This 
interpretation is also confirmed by a comparison with other language versions of the 
respective passage in the Jenard Report, as shall be illustrated by the English, the Dutch and 
the French text versions. So, the English text version uses the term “principal subject-matter”, 
reading: 
 
“Article 16 lists the circumstances in which the six States recognize that the courts of one of them have 
exclusive jurisdiction. The matters referred to in this Article will normally be the subject of exclusive 
jurisdiction only if they constitute the principal subject-matter of the proceedings of which the court is 
to be seised [underscore added].”1481 
 
Similarly, the Dutch text version contains the following formulation: 
 
“Artikel 16 geeft een opsomming van de bevoegdheden welke in de betrekkingen tussen de zes landen 
als exclusief worden erkend. In beginsel vestigen de in artikel 16 opgesomde gevallen slechts 
exclusieve rechterlijke bevoegdheid wanneer het gerecht van het bodemgeschil kennis moet nemen 
[underscore added].“1482 
 
The French text version confirms this interpretation as well: 
 
“L'article 16 constitue un catalogue de compétences reconnues comme exclusives dans les rapports 
entre les six États. En principe, les matières énumérées à l'article 16 ne sont constitutives de compétence 
juridictionnelle exclusive que si le tribunal doit en connaître à titre principal [underscore added].”1483 
 
As a consequence, a reference to the cited passage of the Jenard Report does not help to 
further support the result that Article 24(4) is not applicable in provisional proceedings where 





Beside the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Solvay decision, the better reasons militate for the 
inapplicability of Article 24(4) if the invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings 




                                                 
1479
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 34, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:DE:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1480
 Heinze 2007, p. 202, there fn. 115; cf. also in this sense Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 22 EuGVO, para. 
1.  
1481
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 34, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
1482
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, at p. 34, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:NL:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
1483
 Jenard Report, OJ C59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 1-65, p. 34, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1979:059:FULL:FR:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015).  
 310 
2.5.2.3.2 Raise of the invalidity defence in provisional proceedings before a court having 





Concerning provisional proceedings before a court being competent according to Articles 4 or 
7 to 26, it has been discussed above that opinions vary with regard to the question of whether 
Article 24(4) is applicable. Opinions regarding this issue also varied as to the constellation 
that jurisdiction for provisional proceedings is based on independent jurisdiction (Article 35 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation respectively its predecessors), but, in contrast to the 
constellation of accessory jurisdiction, the Solvay decision of the ECJ which explicitly refers 
to that second constellation has brought a definitive statement of the ECJ concerning this 
issue. However, in order to embed the decision of the ECJ in the framework of existing 
opinions, differing conceptions shall be briefly discussed as well. 
 
 
2.5.2.3.2.2 Conception 1: Applicability of Article 24(4)1484 
 
It could be argued, in favour of the applicability of Article 24(4) in provisional proceedings in 
question, that Article 35 – in contrast to Articles 4 or 7 to 26 – is not based on specific 
evaluations of the European legislator, but is only an additional way to found jurisdiction, and 
therefore could be considered to have a weaker character than Articles 4 or 7 to 26. In light of 
this, one might argue that it would not be justified not to apply Article 24(4) when jurisdiction 
for provisional measures is “merely” based on Article 35 in conjunction with national law.1485  
 
Besides, as legal protection gained in provisional proceedings is often (or even regularly) 
more important than the principal proceeding in patent disputes, it would not make sense to 
preclude Article 35 from the rule of exclusive jurisdiction of Article 24(4).1486  
 
In addition, it has been put forward that legal protection in provisional proceedings may not 
go further than in principal proceedings, which is said to be the case if Article 24(4) would 
not be applicable in the framework of Article 35, because then the court having jurisdiction 
according to Article 35 would be allowed to decide on the validity issue.1487 Truly, there 
seems to be a certain contradiction insofar as a court being competent on the basis of Article 
35 is allowed to treat the validity issue, in contrast to the infringement court in the principal 
proceedings, although the latter would dispose of much better opportunities to do so because 
it could resort to a full and refined evidence procedure.1488 
 
However, to start with the latter idea, that position cannot be adhered to after the Solvay 
decision of the ECJ which has already been referred to above. The ECJ expressly formulated, 
with regard to Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation):  
 
                                                 
1484
 In favour of a differentiation of different legal situations affected by Article 16 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), but with regard to Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in favour of its applicability in the constellation in question: Merkt 1993, 
p. 119 et seq. 
1485
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 320. 
1486
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 320. 
1487
 Bisschop (2007)98(6) Mitt. 247, at p. 249. 
1488
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 320. 
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“In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that Article 22(4) 
of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances such as those at issue 
in the main proceedings, the application of Article 31 of that regulation [underscore added].”1489 
 
 
2.5.2.3.2.3 Conception 2: Temporary validity of provisional measures rendered by the 
infringement court 
 
In order to find a compromise between the conceptions of a clear applicability of Article 24(4) 
and its definite inapplicability, it has been proposed to assign the infringement court the 
competence to render provisional measures on the basis of Article 35, but to limit the validity 
of such measures in temporal respect until the defendant of the principal proceeding has 
started a nullity (counter-)claim in the State where the patent has been granted.1490 However, 




2.5.2.3.2.4 Conception 3: Inapplicability of Article 24(4) 
 
After a reference for a preliminary ruling, by the Dutch Hoge Raad by order of 2 March 2001 
in the case of A.T. van der Plas v W.H. Guis1492, searching to clarify that issue, had not been 
decided by the ECJ because the parties to the dispute had reached a settlement before the case 
came to a judgment, the ECJ ultimately clarified that issue in its Solvay decision. The court 
held that 
 
“(…) Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances 
such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the application of Article 31 of that regulation.”1493 
 
In Apple v Samsung, the Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage referred to this distinct statement of the 
ECJ in Solvay and clarified that its jurisprudence expressed in Yellow Pages where the 
Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage held inter alia that jurisdiction to order provisional measures in 
another Member State is not affected by Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), regardless of whether jurisdiction for provisional 
measures is based on Article 2(1) of the Brussels Brussels I Regulation (Article 4(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) or, “voor zover dat al mogelijk zou zijn” (provided that this should 
be possible), on Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), is to be modified in view of the Solvay decision of the ECJ: 
 
“(…) Voor zover het gaat om artikel 31 EEX-Verordening neemt het arrest Solvay/Honeywell de 
twijfel weg over de vraag of het mogelijk is om op grond van artikel 31 EEX-verordening een 
grensoverschrijdend voorlopig inbreukverbod te gelasten. Het Hof van Justitie EU oordeelde immers 
dat artikel 22 sub 4 EEX-Verordening, zoals uitgelegd in GAT/LuK, niet in de weg staat aan toepassing 
van artikel 31 EEX-Verordening in geval van een procedure als hiervoor omschreven. Dat oordeel heeft 
                                                 
1489
 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, para. 51, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> 
– Solvay. 
1490
 Joseph (2006)1(13) J.I.P.L.P. 850, at p. 857. 
1491
 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, para. 51, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> 
– Solvay. 
1492 HR 2 March 2001, C99/200HR, A.T. van der Plas v W.H. Guis, NJ 2003, 240, with case note P. Vlas. 
1493
 ECJ 12 July 2012, C-616/10, Solvay SA v Honeywell Fluorine Products Europe BV and Others, para. 51, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0616&rid=1> 
– Solvay. 
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alleen betekenis wanneer een grensoverschrijdend inbreukverbod op grond van artikel 31 EEX-
Verordening aan de orde is. Het arrest Solvay/Honeywell noopt dus in zoverre tot herziening van de 
Yellow Pages-lijn dat het desbetreffende voorbehoud in het Yellow Pages-arrest (‘voor zover dat al 
mogelijk zou zijn’) komt te vervallen [underscore added].”1494  
 
(“(…) With regard to Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation, the Solvay/Honeywell decision dispels the 
doubts concerning the issue if it is possible to order a cross-border provisional injunction. For the ECJ 
held that Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, according to the interpretation in GAT/LuK, does 
not exclude the applicability of Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation in the case of a proceeding as 
decribed. That decision is only significant when a cross-border injunction on the basis of Article 31 of 
the Brussels I Regulation is concerned. The Solvay/Honeywell decision thus requires to alter the Yellow 
Pages-approach in that the respective proviso in the Yellow Pages decision (‘provided that this should 
be possible’) becomes invalid [underscore added].”)1495 
 
Even before the definite statement of the ECJ in Solvay, this viewpoint could be derived from 
hints in earlier European case-law. In the Van Uden case, inter alia on the interpretation of 
Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), Advocate 
General Léger expressly explicated in his Opinion:    
 
“By allowing application to be made to the courts of a Contracting State, ‘even if, under this 
Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter’, 
Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] is intended to apply irrespective of which jurisdictional rule is 
laid down by the [Brussels] Convention for disposing of the substantive issues (…) [content in brackets 
added].”1496 
 
The Advocate General thereby underlined the overwhelming importance of Article 24 of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) which would be impaired if 
this provision was overruled by Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation). The ECJ itself held in its Van Uden decision: 
 
“It must therefore be concluded that where, as in the case in the main proceedings, the subject-matter of 
an application for provisional measures relates to a question falling within the scope ratione materiae of 
the [Brussels] Convention, the [Brussels] Convention is applicable and Article 24 thereof may confer 
jurisdiction on the court hearing that application even where proceedings have already been, or may be, 
commenced on the substance of the case and even where those proceedings are to be conducted before 
arbitrators [content in brackets added].”1497 
 
Deciding in this way, the ECJ ruled that Article 24 of the Brussels Convention (Article 35 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) confers jurisdiction to grant provisional measures even where 
parties have submitted the dispute on the merits to arbitration. Analogically, Article 35 is still 
applicable where the dispute on the merits falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court by 
virtue of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1498 
 
                                                 
1494
 Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 20 May 2014, Apple Inc. v Samsung Electronics Co. Limited and Others, IER 
2014, 47, available at WWW 
<http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2014:1727>, para. 21 – Apple v 
Samsung. 
1495
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1496
 Advocate General 10 June 1997, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 121 – Van Uden. 
1497
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 34 – Van Uden. 
1498
 Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 4.76; Borrás & Hausmann 2012 (unalex Kommentar), Art. 22 Brüssel I-VO, 
para. 77. 
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In its Mietz decision on the interpretation of, inter alia, Article 24 of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), the ECJ again emphasised the significance of this 
provision, holding: 
 
“It should, however, be noted that, even if Mr Mietz were allowed to prove that he ought to have been 
treated as a consumer within the meaning of Article 13 of the [Brussels] Convention, the court of origin 
could still have had jurisdiction to order provisional measures. Article 24 of the [Brussels] Convention 
expressly provides that a court has jurisdiction under its national law to grant an application for such 
measures, even if does not have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter (…) [underscore and 
content in brackets added].”1499 
 
Since the ECJ recognised the continuance1500 of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(respectively its predecessors) towards jurisdiction over consumer contracts in provisional 
proceedings, it could be concluded that the same evaluation should apply vis-à-vis exclusive 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4), due to the fact that Articles 17 and 18 on the one hand 
and Article 24 are comparable1501 insofar as in both cases a prorogation is not admissible1502 
according to Article 25(4) which provides: 
 
 




(4) Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if 
they are contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude 
have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24. 
 
 
Additionally, it is to be stated that both Articles 17 and 18 (belonging to Section 4 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) and Article 24 (located in Section 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
are covered by Article 45(1)(e) which provides:    
 
 
 Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
 
(...) 
 (e) if the judgment conflicts with: 
 
  (i) Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II where the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the 
  insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee was the defendant; or 
 
  (ii) Section 6 of Chapter II.  
 
 
Also, neither the disregard of jurisdiction over consumer contracts nor the disregard of 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 is relevant as to recognition, which can be 
derived from Article 45(3):   
                                                 
1499
 ECJ 27 April 1999, C-99/96, Hans-Hermann Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV, [1999] ECR I-02277, 
paras. 45-46 – Mietz.  
1500
 In legal doctrine, this phenomenon has appropriately been described as “Autonomie der zweiten Spur des 
Eilrechtsschutzes”, cf. Heinze 2007, p. 243. 
1501
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 212; Heinze 2007, p. 243. 
1502
 In favour of consumers, Article 19(2) provides for an exception from this rule. 
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Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(...) 
(3) Without prejudice to point (e) of paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the court of origin may not be 
reviewed. The test of public policy referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 may not be applied to the rules 
relating to jurisdiction. 
 
 
Besides the cited European case-law, the majority of legal commentators have agreed with the 
conception that Article 24(4) (respectively its predecessors) is not applicable in the case of 
provisional proceedings where jurisdiction is based on Article 35 (respectively its 
predecessors).1503 It is to be noticed that the national case-law which has been cited in 
conjunction with provisional proceedings before a court having jurisdiction according to 
Articles 4 or 7 to 26 actually does not distinguish between the different legal bases of 
provisional proceedings, effecting that the argumentation also applies in the constellation 
being discussed at this point.  
 
The insight that the rule of Article 24(4) is not applicable when the invalidity defence is raised 
in provisional proceedings according to Article 35 may be based on different ways of 
reasoning which shall be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
First of all, it is to be emphasised that the wording of Article 35 argues for the interpretation 
that jurisdiction on the basis of Article 35 is not affected by Article 24(4):1504  
 
 
 Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, 
measures as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if the courts of another Member 
State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 
By using the addition “even if”, the European legislator made clear that jurisdiction on the 
basis of Article 35 (in conjunction with national law) is independent from jurisdiction in the 
main proceeding. Interestingly, the wording “jurisdiction” does not differentiate between 
different kinds of jurisdiction. Due to this fact, it is to be concluded that “jurisdiction” in this 
sense also covers “exclusive jurisdiction” according to Article 24(4).1505 There is no reason to 
deviate from this rule for the case that exclusive jurisdiction is relevant in principal 
proceedings.1506  
 
                                                 
1503 Among many others (cf. also the following footnotes): Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 31 EuGVO, para. 
14; Pertegás Sender 2002, para. 4.76; Pertegás Sender 2007 (Magnus & Mankowski), Art 31 Brussels I 
Regulation, para. 16; Szychowska 2008, p. 221; Torremans 2008, p. 71: “Interim measures jurisdiction can 
therefore not be taken away by simply raising the validity issue.”; Stauder 2005, p. 927; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), 
Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 33; Gottwald 2013 (Münchener Kommentar zur ZPO), EuGVO Art. 31, para. 8; as to 
the parallel situation regarding Article 23: Carl 2007, p. 288; Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches 
Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 22 EuGVVO, para. 29; Pålsson 2000, p. 631. 
1504
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 211; Kur (2006)37(7) IIC 844, at p. 853.  
1505
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 211. 
1506
 Wannenmacher 2007, p. 211; cf. Geimer 2010 (Geimer & Schütze, Europäisches Zivilverfahrensrecht), Art. 
2 EuGVVO, para. 223, Art. 31 EuGVVO para. 21. 
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Apart from this argumentation, it is to be pointed out that the schematic position of Article 35 
following Article 27 – Article 35 not being included in Article 27 – militates for the 
inapplicability of Article 24(4) in provisional proceedings based on Article 35.1507   
 
Moreover, comparably to the argumentation concerning provisional proceedings before a 
court having jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 4 or 7 to 26, it is to be underlined that 
interim proceedings regarding provisional measures have temporary character, meaning that 
no definite decision is rendered on the validity of the concerned patent. The court before 
which provisional proceedings are brought will rather take a stand vis-à-vis the validity of the 
patent and will take into consideration the result with regard to the evaluation of the 
concerned interests. However, this “examination” is a mere prognosis of the outcome in 





In view of the foregoing argumentation, both with regard to literal, schematic and structural 
aspects, and especially in light of the clear Solvay decision of the ECJ, Conception 3 should 
be followed. Conception 1 and Conception 2 are neither predetermined nor compulsory 
through the Brussels Ibis Regulation. On the contrary, they are irreconcilable with the Solvay 
decision of the ECJ and not justified, since their main argument, that legal protection granted 
in provisional proceedings may not go further than legal protection to be gained in principal 
proceedings, actually goes astray, because a court deciding in provisional proceedings only 
undertakes an evaluation of the concerned interests rather than rendering a definite decision 
and thus restricts itself to a prognosis of what will be the outcome of the principal proceeding. 
As a result, Article 24(4) is not applicable in provisional proceedings on the basis of Article 
35. The court before which provisional proceedings are brought on the basis of Article 35 
keeps jurisdiction in the case that the defendant raises the defence of invalidity of the 
concerned patent. 
 
Besides the arguments discussed above, this insight argues even more for the result that the 
same should apply in the case that jurisdiction for provisional proceedings is based on 
Articles 4 or 7 to 26, because it would seem contradictory to grant courts being invoked on 
the basis of the “weaker” provision of Article 35 to deliver a prognosis of the outcome in 
principal proceedings, while courts acting on the basis of Articles 4 or 7 to 26 would be 
refused to do so.1509 Both types of jurisdiction for provisional proceedings should thus be 
treated equally in that Article 24(4) is generally not applicable in constellations of provisional 
proceedings, while it is obvious that at least the schematic argument regarding Article 35, 
emphasising the schematic position of Article 35 following Article 27 – due to which Article 
35 is not included in Article 27 – does not apply where jurisdiction for provisional 
proceedings is based on Articles 4 or 7 to 26.      
 
 
                                                 
1507
 Heinze 2007, p. 243. 
1508
 Bertrams (1995)44(3) GRUR Int. 193, at p. 198; Mäder 1999, pp. 86-87 and p. 99 there fn. 307; Brinkhof 
(1997)46(6) GRUR Int. 489, at p. 496; Von Meibom & Pitz (1996)87(7) Mitt. 181, at p. 185 (=Von Meibom & 
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3. Reform of international jurisdiction with regard to patent infringement actions 
 
In the foregoing chapter, problems which currently arise with regard to patent infringement 
proceedings, in the framework of Articles 7(2), 8(1), 24(4) and 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, have been identified and analysed. This chapter shall be dedicated to the 
consequential question in which way the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be amended in order 
to solve these problems. Besides, the additional issue shall be treated in which way the 
problems discussed with regard to the Brussels Ibis Regulation could respectively should be 
solved in an eventual Global Judgments Convention. 
 
 
3.1 Existing reform projects 
 
Apart from the Heidelberg Report which was created before the Brussels I Regulation was 
replaced by the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and the Commission Proposal 2010 which 
demonstrates the Commission’s position with regard to a reform of the Brussels I Regulation, 
I shall primarily treat the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles in this 
chapter. Before undertaking a deepened analysis of relevant provisions of these sets of rules, I 
shall first deliver a brief overview.   
 
 
3.1.1 The Hague Judgments Convention and the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) 
 
In order to prepare an International Convention on harmonised rules on international 
jurisdiction and the recognition of foreign judgments (Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters), the United States initiated the Hague Judgments 
project at the Hague Conference on Private International Law in early 1990.1510 However, 
after intense negotiations had been led for more than a decade, it became clear that no 
consensus could be reached, due to the inability – or lack of political will to achieve a 
compromise1511 – of the major negotiating parties, i.e. the United States and the European 
Union, to agree on fundamental concepts decisive for the content of the Convention. Some 
problems were based on the substantive differences between civil law and common law 
countries, like the European approach to establish predictable rules instead of the approach of 
the United States that may be characterised as more “tailored” to the circumstances of 
individual cases.1512 
 
In the context of this thesis, it is remarkable that one of the main reasons for disagreements of 
the negotiating parties was strongly related to the problems regarding international 
jurisdiction in IP disputes.1513 These issues which became of increasing interest were 
considered not be addressed in an adequate way.1514 Besides, the initial great interest of the 
United States in the creation of the Hague Judgments Convention changed as the United 
States became the situs of more and more assets, with the effect that most judgments could be 
                                                 
1510
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satisfied locally.1515 After all, another significant reason for the failure of the Convention 
project consisted in the fact that most parts of the Draft Convention(s) were completed before 
the advent of e-commerce, effecting that no sufficient solutions could be delivered for 
problems generated in conjunction with such new media.1516   
 
Although the envisaged Convention on harmonised rules on international jurisdiction and the 
recognition of foreign judgments could not be successfully finalised in the end, it is to be 
admitted that the discussions during the negotiations had a threefold positive effect. Apart 
from the consequence that the importance of matters related to jurisdiction in IP disputes was 
acknowledged as playing a significant role in the area of international commercial litigation, 
main problems related to IP litigation by different legal systems were carved out, and, last but 
not least, the Hague Judgments project facilitated further worldwide1517 research initiatives on 
this subject.1518 
 
In any event, two drafts of a convention were established. After a Preliminary Draft 
Convention had been published in 1999, the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
presented a refined version of a Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters in 2001. Although the latter Draft Convention never entered 
into force either,1519 it could (and still can) at least serve as a source of inspiration how (IP) 
issues addressed in the drafts could be solved.  
 
 
3.1.2 ALI Principles 
 
In light of this situation, the three legal scholars Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane Ginsburg and 
François Dessemontet established a working group in order to draft more specific provisions 
with regard to jurisdiction in intellectual property matters.1520 While the working group 
initially intended to submit such a draft proposal to the Hague Conference, the initiative was 
later successfully transformed into another, more sophisticated, initiative under the auspices 
of the American Law Institute (ALI), when it turned out that the project of a Hague 
Judgments Convention would fail.1521 The ALI Principles on Intellectual Property were 
finally adopted at the meeting of the ALI General Assembly in 2007. These Principles 
comprise a comprehensive set of rules with regard to various issues on international 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition of judgments in IP disputes. The ALI 
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Principles are intended to serve the courts as guidelines, meaning that courts can rely on the 
ALI Principles, wherever applicable, as long as their use is not against the law of the 
forum.1522 With regard to the subject of this thesis, it is significant that one of the main 
objectives of the ALI Principles consists in restricting possible jurisdictional grounds in cross-
border IP litigation, and facilitating coordination and consolidation of proceedings.1523 
 
 
3.1.3 CLIP Principles 
 
The CLIP project forms the European counterpart to the ALI initiative in the United States. 
Similar to the ALI Principles, but on an independent basis,1524 the Max Planck Institute in 
Munich initiated a project on draft principles on jurisdiction in intellectual property which 
were published in 2004.1525 The original objective of this initiative was to devise rules on 
jurisdiction in trans-border IP conflicts that would be inserted into the draft proposal for a 
Hague Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Draft Hague Judgments Convention).1526 Subsequently, that initiative 
developed into a joint project undertaken by the Max Planck Institute for Competition, 
Intellectual Property and Tax Law (Munich) and the Max Planck Institute for International 
and Foreign Law (Hamburg) in cooperation with foreign legal scholars, and was further 
conducted under the acronym “CLIP” (European Max Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Property).1527 Members of the CLIP working originated from six different 
countries on both sides of the Atlantic.1528 Noteworthily, the CLIP Principles which were 
finalised in 2011 comprise the entire field of international jurisdiction, applicable law as well 
as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in IP disputes.1529  
 
 
3.2 Should, with regard to patent infringement cases, general rules of jurisdiction be 
applicable, or should the courts of the protection State have exclusive jurisdiction also in 
patent infringement disputes?    
 
Before treating specific issues, one might raise the question of whether, due to their particular 
nature, patent infringement cases should fall within the scope of exclusive jurisdiction of the 





Although it is clear de lege lata, under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, that patent infringement 
proceedings cannot only be brought before the courts of the State where the concerned patent 
was granted, but also before courts of other States in case that these courts have jurisdiction 
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pursuant to the general rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,1530 this position has also been 
contested. This has become obvious during the negotiations on a Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) where the 
totality of the European States except Switzerland finally advocated to confer exclusive 
jurisdiction, also regarding patent infringements, to the courts of the protection State, and 
consequently denied to that extent the applicability of general rules of jurisdiction.1531 This 
opinion in favour of the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in the protection State for cases of 
patent infringement was also shared by the United States of America. Additionally, it is to be 
mentioned that English case-law and legal doctrine still deny jurisdiction of courts to decide 
on the infringement of foreign patents according to national procedural law, and at least partly 
argue in favour of a conception according to which exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation per se covers patent infringement disputes as well, 
which has become obvious in the submissions of the French and United Kingdom 
Governments in the GAT case.1532   
 
Having a look on the situation beyond the Atlantic, it is to be noted that the prevailing U.S. 
case-law generally holds that U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over infringement claims 
involving foreign registered rights.1533 In this respect, the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Voda v Cordis1534 may serve for illustration, 
which is consistent with previous U.S. case-law. In this decision, the court stated that it was 
an abuse of the district court's discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's claims for foreign patent infringement although the court was seised with an 
infringement claim involving the equivalent U.S. patent. The defendant had notified the court 
that he intended to raise the defence of invalidity with regard to the foreign patents in order. 
However, this was not essential to the court's reasoning.1535 In particular, the Federal Court 
held that the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign patent rights “would require us to define the 
legal boundaries of a property right granted by another sovereign and then determine whether 
there has been a trespass to that right.”1536 According to the Federal Court, this would be 
contrary to international IP treaties, comity, judicial economy, convenience and fairness.1537 
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At an academic level, it is interesting that there are however also tendencies in favour of an 
approach according to which extraterritorial jurisdiction as to cases of cross-border patent 
infringement should be existent. In this respect it is remarkable that, despite differences in 
structure and content, both reform projects in Europe (CLIP Principles) and the United States 
(ALI Principles) argue against exclusive jurisdiction for infringement proceedings of the 
courts of the protection State. On the contrary, both according to the ALI Principles and the 
CLIP Principles, courts should even have jurisdiction over invalidity questions raised in 
disputes concerning foreign rights provided the effects of the judgment are limited inter 
partes.1538 And even in U.S. case-law, the scepticism vis-à-vis a conception pursuant to which 
U.S. courts should have jurisdiction for infringement proceedings concerning foreign patents 
is not unanimous: While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Voda v. Cordis 
finally denied jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign patents concerning infringement 
actions, Judge Newman expressed her opposing attitude in a dissenting opinion.  
 
In light of these heterogeneous opinions, it seems worthwhile to undertake a closer analysis 
whether or not the general jurisdictional rules should be applicable with regard to patent 
infringement cases. As the applicability of special rules which vary from general rules should 
principally be considered justified only if specific considerations require such exception, the 
question to be answered is whether specific (procedural) needs of patent law necessitate that 
specific jurisdictional rules apply to patent infringement disputes. In this respect, the relevant 
principles which form the basis of the general rules of jurisdiction according to the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation – in particular the protection of the defendant by the actor sequitur forum rei-
principle (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and party autonomy (Articles 25 and 
26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – must be confronted with each other and balanced against 
eventual specific interests relevant in the field of patent law.  
 
  
3.2.2 Which specific interests relevant in the field of patent law are conceivable which 
would require to confer exclusive jurisdiction in patent infringement disputes to courts 
in the protection State?  
 
 
3.2.2.1 “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and the applicable substantive patent law 
 
Advocates of the conception according to which the courts of the granting State should also 
have exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement disputes, have underlined that the 
application of foreign patent law will, due to the particular difficulty and complexity of the 
matter, create severe problems for the deciding court, and that for this reason, the question of 
whether a patent has been infringed must be decided by the courts of the protection State, 
meaning that the courts apply the law of the forum State.1539 In this respect, it has been 
emphasised that these courts dispose of specific judges, ensuring special knowledge of the 
courts.1540 Due to that special knowledge, it could be concluded that these courts constitute 
the most competent courts to decide. This situation would eventually be even more grave if 
the trial were to take place in the United States, in case that a jury would have to determine 
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the validity of foreign patents. In this regard, it has been doubted whether the members of a 
jury would be able to understand the highly complex technical issues involved.1541   
 
However, considerable arguments militate against the latter conception. While it is true that, 
in cases of cross-border patent litigation, the court deciding on the infringement of a foreign 
patent will usually have to apply foreign patent law, because a patent is valid only in the 
granting State due to the principle of territoriality, the fact that a court has to apply foreign 
law per se constitutes no particularity of patent law, which would justify to deviate from 
general rules of jurisdiction. Rather, it is the very nature of private international law to 
provide for apt rules as to determine which law is applicable in cross-border cases, and to 
provide for adequate rules of jurisdiction for these constellations which are not specific to a 
certain area of law but generally occur in cross-border cases.1542 On the contrary, it has rightly 
been emphasised that requiring a “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and applicable 
substantive law would finally mean to “shake the foundations” of private international law.1543 
This goes in particular for the provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (as well as its 
predecessors) which are generally not based on the idea of legal proximity between 
jurisdiction and applicable law.1544 In this regard, the Schlosser Report already stated clearly 
with regard to the Brussels Convention: 
 
“Nowhere in the 1968 Convention is there recognition of a connection between the law applicable to a 
particular issue and the international jurisdiction of the courts over that issue (…).”1545  
 
The problems occurring when applying foreign law are accepted for the purpose of an 
effective international enforcement of rights.1546 Additionally, such problems are attenuated 
by establishing international conventions on the determination of the applicable law.1547  
 
In particular, several aspects can be mentioned for reasoning that the alleged existence of 
particular complexity and difficulty of patent law does not justify to submit patent 
infringement proceedings to different procedural rules than other civil disputes. First of all, it 
is to be stressed that even if one admits that patent law shows a certain complexity, such 
complexity is owed to the fact that technical issues play an important role when it comes to 
the crucial question of whether the allegedly infringing product (or process) falls within the 
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scope of protection of the concerned patent.1548 However, as this is not a legal but rather a 
technical issue,1549 the decisive question is in which way technical judges are to be involved 
in the proceeding, rather than demanding an indispensable “Gleichlauf” between the deciding 
court and the applicable law.1550 Apart from this, the existence of specialised courts militates 
against the need of exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the granting State, because a 
specialised judge should be expected to cope with questions of foreign patent law being 
similar to the matters which he is accustomed to in the law of the forum State.1551 
Additionally, it must be underlined that, besides the fact that the difficulty involved in 
determining the validity of a patent registered abroad should not be exaggerated,1552 the 
question of whether a subject matter is difficult and complex depends on the person that 
decides. Due to the relativity of such an evaluation, this criterion is not convincing.1553 It is 
not justified to deny a priori the ability of a court to apply foreign law in the right way.1554 
Besides, it does not make sense to assume that the courts in the State where the patent has 
been registered would regularly have better access to the knowledge required to evaluate 
whether a patent is valid or not, which depends on an evaluation of the technical state of the 
art at the relevant priority date, because this knowledge is universal by its nature.1555 Having a 
view on legal practice, it is to be borne in mind that courts constantly decide on foreign 
patents, for instance in validity proceedings because foreign patents must be considered when 
determining the state of the art; as a consequence, the existence of foreign patents is 
frequently put forth against the novelty of an invention1556 and also in license disputes. The 
courts fairly cope with this challenge.1557 Even if the courts of the granting State were 
generally conferred exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the infringement of a patent, this 
would not eliminate the constellation that foreign patents are put forth in validity proceedings 
in order to demonstrate that the patent that has allegedly been infringed lacks sufficient 
novelty.1558 
 
After all, it is to be noticed that, if there actually exists “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and 
the applicable law in a specific case, this occurs accidentally by way of a reflex, but not in a 
targeted way.1559 A conception of such an inevitable “Gleichlauf” would leave out of sight 
that the place of domicile of the defendant plays an overwhelming role as to international 
jurisdiction, while this criterion is less relevant with regard to the question which substantive 
law is applicable.1560 Besides, if the question of jurisdiction was necessarily linked with the 
issue of which substantive law is applicable, problems would occur in case that several 
substantive laws are applicable with regard to different parts of the dispute. Should the dispute 
then be split up between different States? Obviously, this approach would be far from 
effective, because it would be costly and time-consuming, and therefore not manageable in 
practice, although the Rome I and Rome II Regulations have actually led to a considerable 
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level of legal unification within Europe.1561 Moreover, the sole fact that the substantive law of 
one State is applicable cannot serve as justification for denying allocated jurisdiction of a 
court of another State.1562 In this respect, the Brussels Ibis Regulation clearly states that 
existing jurisdiction must be exerted.1563 This principle is also acknowledged by the ALI 
Principles which underline in § 103(2): 
 
  
§ 103(2) of the ALI Principles 
 
 A court shall not dismiss or suspend proceedings merely because the dispute raises questions of 
 foreign law. 
 
 
Moreover, it is to be underlined that it would be contradictory to pursue the approach of 
“Gleichlauf” only regarding patent infringement disputes, while refraining from doing so 
with regard to other civil and commercial disputes where the court applies foreign law.1564 For 
instance, the courts of an EU Member State are not precluded from trying actions for 
infringement of a foreign copyright1565 by the fact that the creation of the right is put in 
issue.1566 In case that there is jurisdiction in relation to validity, the court may examine this 
issue as well, despite the fact that a foreign copyright is affected.1567 Extending exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the State where a patent has been granted also to disputes 
regarding the infringement of this patent would thus considerably wide the gap between 
patents and copyright. While it would be certainly possible to have such different rules for 
patents from those for copyright, provided that this can be justified, there actually is no 
compelling reason, meaning that no such justification for a different treatment exists.1568 
Where one of the reasons for not conferring exclusive jurisdiction in copyright cases is that of 
avoiding the proliferation of litigation, in favour of a consolidation of all the claims against an 
infringer under different laws in one single court, the need to prevent the proliferation of 
actions also exists with regard to patents, in particular European patents.1569 Although an 
agreement on standards of patent law has not been achieved yet,1570 a significant degree of 
harmonisation of patent law has already been established.1571 Other areas of law which have 
been harmonised to a considerably less degree are not subject to discussions whether 
jurisdiction should be concentrated in one State.1572 After all, it has rightly been emphasised 
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that the differences in patent law today less concern questions of substantive law, but mostly 
affect the judicial system, for instance whether a jury applies, or whether courts comprise 
technical judges or not.1573  
 
Last but not least, as a matter of fact, patent litigation – comparably with litigation in other 
fields of IP – is becoming increasingly international. The awareness of courts with regard to 
foreign law will necessarily be raised, and their own decisions will be influenced accordingly, 
because courts simply cannot escape from dealing with infringement occurring in other States, 
whether in the same or in related proceedings.1574  
 
 
3.2.2.2 Sovereignty of the granting State 
 
Besides the argument to establish “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and the applicable 
substantive patent law, advocates of the conception that the courts of the protection State 
should also have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on patent infringement have reasoned this 
conception by referring to the sovereignty of the State that has granted the concerned patent. 
In this respect, recourse has been made to the Act of State-doctrine and the principle of 
comity. 
 
On the basis of the Act of State-doctrine it has been put forth that, since a patent is granted by 
national authorities, the grant forms a sovereign act of this State and therefore must be treated 
and acknowledged as such like other acts of public authority.1575 According to this principle, 
courts must not declare void patents which have been granted by authorities of another State.  
 
This conception is supplemented by the principle of comity. Due to fact that the effect of a 
patent is restricted to the territory of the granting State, it has been reasoned that the principle 
of comity1576 further enjoins the court from assuming the existence of the patent, because this 
issue is a mere internal affair of the granting State.1577 In this regard, it has been underlined 
that, in particular, the assumption of the validity of the patent would imply the increase of 
prices, on which only the granting State can decide. In this respect, the High Court of Justice 
(Justice Aldous) impressively explicated in Plastus Kreativ: 
 
“(…) Although patent actions appear on their face to be disputes between two parties, in reality they 
also concern the public. A finding of infringement is a finding that a monopoly granted by the State is to 
be enforced. The result is invariably that the public have to pay higher prices than if the monopoly did 
not exist. If that be the proper result, then that result should, I believe, come about from a decision of a 
court situated in the State where the public have to pay the higher prices (…) [underscore added].”1578 
 
Additionally, advocates of this conception have stressed that conferring exclusive jurisdiction 
to the courts of the granting State also with regard to infringement proceedings means to give 
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full effect to the exclusive jurisdiction rule in relation to validity and to the policy reasons 
which justify this rule. It has been assumed that the maintenance of these policies is so 
important that they should apply even where validity is merely one part of the litigation, the 
other part being a claim for infringement.1579 
 
However, this opinion is debated controversially.1580 Advocates of the opposite opinion have 
rightly underlined that the sovereignty of the granting State is not affected, let alone impaired, 
if the extraterritorial infringement court examines the preliminary question raised by an 
invalidity defence of the alleged infringer, if the concerned patent is valid or not.1581 The latter 
conception can be based on a number of arguments which shall be discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
 
First of all, as has already been suggested above in conjunction with the “Gleichlauf” 
argument, there is no real justification for treating patent law in a different way than other 
areas of law. So, the question arises why another allocation of jurisdiction should apply as to 
patents than with regard to other rights. Each property right, i.e. not only intellectual property 
rights, is based on national legal provisions created by the respective State according to its 
conception of a legal order. The creation and the discontinuance of a right are also governed 
by legal provisions with regard to other types of property. If a particular link between 
property rights with a certain State was considered a decisive criterion for determining 
jurisdiction, a multitude of disputes concerning property rights which are allocated to a person 
by the rules of a certain legal system would have to be subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts of the respective State that created that legal system. However, this is neither the case 
nor are there serious attempts to establish such a system. Rather, general rules of jurisdictions 
are applicable as to the infringement of such property rights, with the actor sequitur forum 
rei-rule as a guiding principle.1582 
 
While it might be true that a patent is more closely linked with the granting State than a non-
intellectual property right insofar as the creation of the patent depends on its grant by an 
administrative authority of the granting State,1583 this structural difference vis-à-vis other 
forms of property rights does not justify the application of different rules of jurisdiction. The 
relevant facts are not linked to any particular State but will entail a global evaluation of the 
technical state of the art at the relevant priority date.1584 The fact that formal, respectively (if 
any) substantive requirements of patentability are examined by an administrative authority is 
undertaken for purposes of publicity and complexity of the matter, but is not owed to further 
economic policy considerations.1585 This is illustrated by the fact that the applicant has a claim 
to gain a patent if the requirements for grant are fulfilled, the granting authority thus having 
no discretion whether or not to grant the patent applied for1586 which could eventually be 
interpreted as peculiarities of the sovereignty of the granting State.1587 Moreover, some States 
even do not undertake a substantive examination of a patent application but merely examine 
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formal aspects which could be interpreted.1588 In these circumstances, it seems even less 
convincing to qualify the grant of patents as a peculiarity (embodiment) of the sovereignty of 
the granting State.1589  
 
Moreover, it is to be underlined that the grant of a patent is less a governmental act than a 
governmental reaction,1590 for it is up to private parties to initiate the process of patent 
prosecution by filing an application.1591  
 
With regard to this nature of a patent, in particular Torremans has instructively pointed out 
that 
 
 “(...) patents have long lost the aura of acts of state and are increasingly instruments of commercial life, 
 irrespective of the granting procedure. The involvement of national administrative authorities in patent 
 law is therefore not necessarily more important than other form of state involvement in the economy 
 and there is hardly any suggestion around that such involvement should necessarily lead to exclusive 
 jurisdiction.”1592  
 
So, intellectual property rights in general, and patents in particular, are actually to be 
considered as private rights, although in case of registered rights like patents, they come into 
existence by way of an administrative act.1593 Admittedly, the court deciding on the 
infringement of a patent, by defining the scope of protection of the patent, will practically 
shape the patent. But this does not justify either to confer exclusive jurisdiction as to the 
evaluation whether or not a patent has been infringed to the courts of the granting State. In 
this respect, it is to be stressed that principles of private international law require that a court 
applying foreign law not only restricts itself to a literal application of that law, but also takes 
into consideration foreign case-law and methods of interpretation.1594 Thus, a court applying 
foreign law in order to determine a patent will idealiter not arrive at another result than a 
court of the State where the patent has been granted. Varying decisions based on different 
legal evaluations may also occur between courts of the same State, and even between different 
chambers of one court.1595 Consequently, the fact that conflicting decisions on the scope of a 
patent may occur between the courts of different States, does not justify to allocate 
jurisdiction in infringement matters merely to the courts of the granting State, because a 
decision on the infringement or non-infringement of a patent which does not create or extend 
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the patent does not constitute an intrusion into/infringement of the sovereignty of the granting 
State, because, after all, the fact that a patent is granted by an administrative authority does 
not influence respectively alter the fact that disputes between private parties are affected.1596 
After all, neither the principle of comity1597 nor the Act of State-doctrine are legally 
binding.1598 In particular in respect of U.S. American case-law, it must be pointed out that the 
CAFC generously granted the extraterritorial application of U.S. American patent law.1599 
Remarkably, this constitutes a more severe intrusion into/infringement of the sovereignty of 
foreign States and would therefore have to provoke much stronger concerns with respect to 
the comity principle.1600  
 
Additionally, it should be borne in mind that it is no particularity of patent law that a deciding 
judge will concretely define the exact scope of rights which have been vaguely formulated by 
the legislator in an abstract way.1601 Neither in patent law, nor in other fields of law this 
means that the court will create new rights (extension of rights), but the court will merely 
determine the scope of a right which has already existed or granted before.1602 This is owed to 
the fundamental principle of separation of powers.1603  
 
Last but not least, it is to be underlined that even if particular considerations of sovereignty 
were affected with regard to patent infringement disputes, the granting States would have the 
possibility to waive, by way of arrangements on the European or international level, the right 
to decide exclusively on the question if patents granted by them for their territories are being 
infringed or not, and to allow each other to take such decisions.1604   
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that the conception that the sovereignty of the granting State 
requires to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the granting State also with regard to 
patent infringement disputes is not convincing. Neither the Act of State-doctrine nor the 
comity principle require such allocation of exclusive jurisdiction. On the contrary, conferring 
jurisdiction to foreign courts may even be in line with the interests of the patent granting State 
and can thus constitute an act of comity between sovereign States,1605 for instance if assets of 
the alleged infringer are situated merely at his foreign domicile and the patent will be 
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immediately enforceable only at that place.1606 In this regard, it has rightly been underlined 
that, as a matter of fact, the possibility of recognition and execution in the State of domicile is 
not fully equal to the possibility to exert jurisdiction.1607 Jurisdiction regarding the 
infringement of patents should thus not be restricted to the courts in the granting State, but 
subject to the general rules.  
 
 
3.2.2.3 Interest of the courts of the granting State to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
in patent infringement disputes 
 
In particular in England, it has been feared that plaintiffs will take their patent litigation 
overseas, in particular to the Netherlands, encouraged by the fact that Dutch courts are 
prepared to grant cross-border injunctions in respect of foreign patents using the so-called kort 
geding-procedure, a shortened procedure reserved for provisional measures. In light of this, 
allocating exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the granting State means to protect the 
interest of the court in maintaining its business (such as the English Patents Court which has 
traditionally been considered a venue for patent litigation in cases where the patent is 
registered in England).1608 
 
Against the latter opinion, it is to be clearly emphasised that the interest of courts in one State 
in protecting their business from being lost to the courts in other States does not constitute an 
adequate interest in the framework of private international law.1609  
 
 
3.2.2.4 Party interests 
 
 
3.2.2.4.1 The plaintiff's perspective 
 
First of all, it is to be emphasised that, where the courts of the granting State have no 
exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement disputes, the plaintiff can sue an alleged patent 
infringer before the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled. In this scenario, 
there is a good chance that the judgment will not have to be recognised and enforced in the 
protection State, because the defendant's assets will usually be situated at his place of 
domicile.1610 Although cases are conceivable where enforcement abroad might be required 
(for instance as to the judgments to omit a specific acting), this fact does however not suffice 
as a justification for exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the granting State. For the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation explicitly provides for detailed rules with regard to recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, which demonstrates that the European legislator was 
aware of the problem of enforcement abroad. Even if enforcement abroad turns out, in an 
individual case, to be impossible, this principally should not lead to the result that general 
rules of jurisdiction according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not applied. Such a 
deviation from general rules would only be justified if enforcement abroad was generally 
impossible, i.e. not only in individual cases.1611  
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On the contrary, conferring exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement disputes to the 
courts of the granting State would lead to considerable problems. The plaintiff would first 
have to sue the alleged patent infringer(s) in the protection State, and then enforce the foreign 
judgment in the State of domicile of the defendant which is more costly and time-consuming 
(cumbersome and intricate) than immediately suing the alleged patent infringer in his State of 
domicile. The situation would be even more grave in case of several alleged patent infringers 
being resident in various States. Then enforcement of the gained judgments must be 
undertaken in each defendant's State of domicile. This might turn out considerably costly and 
time-consuming.  
 
After all, it falls within the plaintiff's sphere to choose the forum which he evaluates most 
suitable. If exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement proceedings was conferred to the 
courts of the granting State, the plaintiff would be deprived of this fundamental procedural 
right. The plaintiff then even would not have the opportunity of bringing an action in the State 
of the defendant's domicile, let alone the alternative under the tort rule of initiating 
proceedings in the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the 
damage occurred. The policies justifying this important rule of private international law thus 
would be ignored if the courts of the granting State were allocated exclusive jurisdiction for 
patent infringement actions.1612 And, as the plaintiff is generally interested in a fast 
enforcement of his patent right, he might also decide against suing an alleged patent infringer 
outside the protection State, because the invoked court will first have to determine and cope 
with the foreign law applicable.1613 In practice, the plaintiff who will usually be well-advised 
by patent law specialists, will be able to choose the forum most favourable for him. For this 
reason, the fact that it is admittedly not excluded that the application of general rules of 
jurisdiction to patent infringement proceedings might potentially lead, from the plaintiff's 
perspective, to a less favourable forum, also does not militate against the applicability of these 
general jurisdictional rules (in favour of the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the granting 
State).1614 
 
Consequently, taking into account the plaintiff's interests leads to the result that the courts of 




3.2.2.4.2 The defendant's perspective 
 
Like in other cross-border civil disputes, it is probable, also with regard to cases of cross-
border patent infringement, that the defendant is rather interested in having a case decided by 
a court of the State where he is domiciled, outside the protection State, than being obliged to 
defend himself before a foreign court in the State where the affected patent was granted.1616 
Likewise, the defendant will be rather interested in finding an arrangement with the plaintiff 
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on the place of jurisdiction, than having to accept, with regard to the infringement proceeding, 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the granting State.1617  
 
From the defendant's perspective, it thus seems also preferable that general rules of 
jurisdiction are applicable to patent infringement proceedings rather than allocating exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the granting State with regard to patent infringement disputes. 
 
 
3.2.2.4.3 Special case: Multistate delicts 
 
A special constellation to be considered is that of multistate delicts, meaning the case of 
alleged infringement of several patents granted in, respectively for various States. If 
infringement proceedings could only be initiated before the courts of the States where the 
patents have been granted, consolidation would not be possible, which would raise financial 
burdens, and would probably also effect a prolongation of litigation due to the necessity of 
parallel proceedings. This would neither be fair to the plaintiff, nor to the defendant who may 
well prefer to have trial of the infringement of all patents in one State.1618 If, on the contrary, 
the proceedings could be consolidated before the courts of the State of domicile of the 
defendant, this would bring along cost and time advantages both for the defendant and the 
plaintiff. In addition, the courts of the State of domicile of the defendant have comprehensive 
authority to decide, meaning that the dispute could be settled in one proceeding.1619  
 
Regarding the infringement of parallel European patents, it has been further put forth that the 
necessity of different (parallel) infringement proceedings is inconsistent with the protection 
given to persons who wish to register their rights, because European patents for a number of 
different States can be obtained by one single registration.1620 However, this evaluation does 
not go far enough in this respect, because it ignores the fact that, although one registration is 
sufficient for gaining protection in several EPC Contracting States, this protection consists in 
a bundle of national patents which, after grant, have their individual fate, being independent 
from each other.    
 
 
3.2.2.5 Judicial economy 
 
Advocates of the conception that exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement disputes 
should be allocated to the courts of the granting State have also referred to judicial economy. 
However, the question arises of whether judicial economy indeed militates for or against this 
conception, respectively whether this question can be answered in a general way.  
 
To begin, it has been put forth that conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the 
granting State for patent infringement disputes would effect a concentration of proceedings, 
because these courts also have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to validity actions and, 
accordingly, a one-stop solution would be available.1621 Indeed, a concentration of 
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proceedings may generally save time and money,1622 and could also favour legal certainty, 
because the risk of conflicting judgments produced by different courts, on the scope of the 
patent, would be avoided. This effect would correspond to the concept that a patent which 
grants a monopoly with respect to a certain product or process, can have only one scope, and 
not a different scope for validity than for infringement.1623 The more courts are involved, the 
higher is the risk of irreconcilable judgments. Additionally, militating for conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction regarding patent infringement proceedings to the courts of the granting State, it 
has been pointed out that the courts in the granting State would eventually lack jurisdiction 
concerning national patents otherwise.1624  
 
However, a closer look on the aspect of judicial economy reveals that things are less clear and 
a definite answer which solution serves the objective of judicial economy in a better way 
cannot be given so easily. 
 
First of all, the argument that the courts in the granting State would eventually lack 
jurisdiction concerning national patents if general rules of jurisdiction were applicable to 
patent infringement, is not convincing, because such jurisdiction exists pursuant to the general 
provision of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on jurisdiction regarding torts.1625 If 
considered necessary, a special provision on jurisdiction with regard to patent infringement 
could be established.1626  
  
Beyond that, although it is true that the concentration of proceedings on the validity and 
proceedings on the infringement of patents may1627 serve the goal of judicial economy, it is 
not convincing to conclude from this, without any alternative, that the concentration of both 
types of proceedings must be realised at the courts of the protection State.1628 While it shall 
not be doubted here whether the courts of the granting State shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
as to patent validity proceedings – Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation explicitly 
submits this type of actions under the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the protection 
State, and there are obviously no serious attempts to alter this allocation of jurisdiction – a 
crucial question is which effect the invalidity defence in cross-border patent infringement 
proceedings should have. De lege ferenda, other ways to reach an effective allocation of 
jurisdiction are conceivable. In this respect, it would be possible, too, to oblige the 
infringement court to stay the infringement proceeding as soon as the defence of invalidity 
has been raised. Additionally, a provision could be created according to which the 
infringement courts and the courts in the protection State must coordinate their proceedings. 
Judicial economy indeed seems more likely to be achieved by consolidating multinational 
patent disputes, rather than by multiplying the proceedings as required by rules of exclusive 
jurisdiction.1629 Alternatively, it is conceivable to grant the infringement court authority to 
decide on the validity of the concerned patent by way of a decision which has only inter 
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partes effect and not erga omnes effect.1630 In light of this, the question of which allocation of 
jurisdiction serves best judicial economy can only be answered after a decision on the exact 
scope of exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the protection State.1631 On the one hand, under 
the general jurisdiction rules in multistate delicts, the plaintiff could sue an alleged patent 
infringer for the infringement of all concerned patents at the general (as well as the agreed or 
accepted) place of jurisdiction, while, in case of exclusive jurisdiction for infringement 
matters of the courts of the granting State, he could then only sue the defendant for the 
infringement of the patent which was granted for the State where the respective court is 
situated (forum State). Consequently, in case of several (allegedly) infringed patents, several 
courts would have exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the infringement and validity of the 
respective patent. This would result in a fragmentation respectively a proliferation or even a 
multiplication rather than a concentration of proceedings.1632 On the other hand, conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the State where the concerned patent has been granted, 
and forcing the extraterritorial court, invoked in infringement proceedings, to stay 
proceedings, would effect a split between the infringement issue and the validity issue. As a 
consequence, regardless of the outcome of the decision on exclusive jurisdiction of the courts 
of the granting State for patent infringement disputes, it is obvious that neither conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction for patent infringement proceedings to the courts of the granting State, 
nor applying the general rules of jurisdiction in cases of patent infringement will provide a 
more effective system of jurisdiction in any possible circumstance.  
 
Besides, it is to be borne in mind that applying the general rules of jurisdiction would not 
mean that the courts of the granting State completely lose jurisdiction in infringement matters, 
but that further, additional options of jurisdiction would be created.1633  
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that it depends on the concrete constellation affected whether 
judicial economy can be achieved, respectively strengthened by conferring exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the granting State also for infringement proceedings, or by the 
application of the general jurisdiction rules with respect to cases of patent infringement. As a 
consequence, the aspect of judicial economy cannot serve as an argument why cases of patent 
infringement should be treated in a different way than other civil disputes according to which 
the general rules of jurisdiction undoubtedly apply. After all, due to the applicability of 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the application of the general rules of jurisdiction 




3.2.2.6 Indirect (mediate) solution of the torpedo problem 
 
Advocates of the conception according to which courts of the protection State should have 
exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement proceedings have further argued that by 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction to these courts, the problem of torpedo actions, i.e. (counter-) 
actions for a declaration of non-infringement, initiated by the defendant of an infringement 
action (raised in the protection State) before a court in another State, in order to impair the 
action in the protection State, could be solved. Strengthening thus judicial economy and 
effective legal protection would actually correspond to the purpose of intellectual property 
law – including international intellectual property law – to have a share in creating and 
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maintaining an economic system which stimulates dynamic competition between enterprises 
by offering them incentives to invest in innovation and new products.1634  
 
However, the latter opinion has been strongly criticised.1635 First of all, the possibility to raise 
an action for a declaration of non-infringement is per se a legitimate procedural means which 
is provided for by the rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1636 In this respect, the approach to 
fundamentally demonise this instrument is not reconcilable with the idea of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. While it is true that the possibility to initiate an action for a declaration of non-
infringement can be abused, this eventuality of abuse does not allow to deny any justification 
of this procedural means. In this respect, the approach of a direct (immediate) solution of the 
problem of abusively raised torpedo actions seems preferable vis-à-vis an indirect (mediate) 
solution accomplished by extending the rules of exclusive jurisdiction, because the latter 
approach would actually result in a mere circumvention of the problem.1637 Noteworthily, the 
reform proposals contained in Article 21(6) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), § 213(4) of the ALI 
Principles and Article 2:701(1) of the CLIP Principles – while it is not necessary to discuss 
these proposals in detail at this point – provide for rules in order to adequately cope with 
torpedo actions. Notwithstanding the divergence of the concrete solutions contained in the 
mentioned reform proposals, this demonstrates that such direct solutions are conceivable. 
 
Beyond that, even if the courts of the protection State were given exclusive jurisdiction as to 
patent infringement actions, the alleged infringer would still dispose of the possibility to delay 
(torpedo) proceedings raised against him, because the court invoked by that alleged infringer, 
before dismissing the action according to Article 27 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, would 
first have to examine the existence of exclusive jurisdiction. In this respect, the ECJ held in its 
Gasser decision which concerned the (parallel) constellation of an agreement conferring 
jurisdiction: 
 
 “(...) A court second seised whose jurisdiction has been claimed under an agreement conferring 
 jurisdiction must nevertheless stay proceedings until the court first seised has declared that it has no 
 jurisdiction.”1638 
 
This process may require some time.1639  
 
To conclude, the conception according to which the problem of abusively raised torpedo 
actions can, respectively should be solved by conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of 
the granting State with regard to patent infringement proceedings, is not convincing and is 
thus to be rejected.    
 
 
3.2.2.7 Further considerations  
 
In favour of conferring exclusive jurisdiction for patent infringement disputes to courts of the 
granting State, it has further been put forth that this would provide a level of certainty that is 
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lacking under the present law, because the initial question of whether an extraterritorial court 
invoked in patent infringement proceedings may examine the validity of the concerned patent 
when the invalidity defence has been raised, a priori could not become relevant in practice if 
the extraterritorial court lacked jurisdiction in patent litigation at all.1640 However, this 
argument will become obsolete as soon as specific rules regarding the effect of an invalidity 
defence in patent infringement proceedings will have been established.     
 
Besides, it has been suggested that the questions of validity and infringement are closely 
linked1641 and therefore should be tried in the same State. In most States, this means the same 
specialised court.1642 In this respect, one might consider the courts in the protection State as 
“best placed courts”, as the ECJ underlined in its GAT decision: 
 
 “Thus, the exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents 
 conferred upon the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied 
 for or made is justified by the fact that those courts are best placed to adjudicate upon cases in which the 
 dispute itself concerns the validity of the patent or the existence of the deposit or registration (Duijnstee, 
 paragraph 22) [underscore added].”1643 
 
However, it has rightly been put forth that this argument fails, because the aim of the best 
placed court approach is not to determine the best placed court in an abstract way, but rather 
by considering the concrete elements of the relevant cases on the basis of international 
jurisdiction rules according to which more than one court has jurisdiction, which implies that 
the court seised must have discretionary powers to establish jurisdiction if it is best placed to 
decide according to the concrete elements of the case.1644  
 
While the validity issue and the infringement issue are indeed closely linked with each other, 
it is to be stressed that this fact does not necessarily imply that both matters must be brought 
before the same court in the same State. Concentrating proceedings in the State with validity 
jurisdiction would effectively mean to elevate the validity issue in importance over 
infringement. Conversely, if proceedings were concentrated in the State with infringement 
jurisdiction, this would elevate infringement in importance over validity. The dilemma is that 
both solutions would not be in line with substantive law which does not consider one aspect 
more important than the other.1645 In light of this, it has been argued that just due to the 
correct insight that there is a close link between the questions of validity and infringement of 
a patent, infringement and validity proceedings should not be concentrated in a single State, 
but, instead, split up between the State with validity jurisdiction and the State with 
infringement jurisdiction,1646 with the possibility of a stay of infringement proceedings until 
the validity question has been decided.1647 
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Arguing in favour of exclusive jurisdiction for patent infringement disputes of the courts of 
the granting State, it has further been highlighted that, if jurisdiction for examining the 
validity issue and the infringement of a patent falls apart, two constellations are conceivable 
where practical problems may occur. These constellations referred to shall be illustrated by 
the following Cases 1 and 2.1648 
 
 
 Case 1:  
 
 P holds a patent granted in State A. P sues X before a court of State B which has 
 infringement jurisdiction, but does not have validity jurisdiction. The court orders the 
 infringement to cease in State A. P then tries to enforce this order in State A. 
 Problematically, a court of State A which has validity jurisdiction, has previously held 
 that the patent is void.   
 
 
 Case 2:  
 
 Again, P holds a patent granted in State A, and sues X before a court of State B which 
 has infringement jurisdiction. In contrast to Case 1, this invoked court also has validity 
 jurisdiction. The court rules that the patent is valid, and then orders the infringement to 
 cease in State A. P tries to enforce this order in State A. Problematically, a court of 
 State A which also has validity jurisdiction, has previously held that the patent is void.   
 
 
In both constellations, the problem arises that the courts of State A and State B produced 
judgments which are irreconcilable with each other. Obviously, allocating the examination of 
the validity and the infringement of a patent to the same courts would avoid such conflict. 
However, as has already been suggested, the risk of irreconcilable judgments can also be met 
by adequately coordinating the litigation. Infringement proceedings can be stayed pending a 
decision abroad on the issue of validity.1649   
 
Moreover, advocates of a regime of exclusive jurisdiction of courts of the protection State 
also regarding patent infringement actions have feared that, if foreign courts have jurisdiction 
to determine the validity of patents not registered in their State, this may lead to corruption, 
given that patents can be of enormous financial value. Additionally, it has been underlined 
that the wider the range of States in which the issue of validity can be tried the more likely it 
is that a person is able to bring an action in a State in respect of which there are concerns that 
the judges are open to bribery.1650 Regarding this argument, it is to be underlined that, in 
particular within the European area of justice, it is no legitimate consideration to deny 
jurisdiction to foreign courts for the sole reason of an undetermined, vague fear of corruption. 
Although the standard may be lower in the context of an international convention, the 
principal idea is the same:1651 Comity requires a respect for the ability of courts of other 
Contracting States.1652 
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As to the further eventual argument that, although the defendant in infringement proceedings 
is not obliged to raise the invalidity defence, he will frequently do so and this defence can 
always be raised in the future until the infringement dispute is finished, it is to be stated that 
such a view does not provide for an adequate solution for the case that infringement 
proceedings have been initiated, but no invalidity defence is raised by the defendant. Even if 
the invalidity defence is frequently raised, it remains the defendant's individual choice to raise 
it or not, which may not and should not be anticipated by assuming a priori that he will raise 
it.1653 Jurisdiction cannot be determined on the basis of mere suspicions as to what defence 
might run, because it might turn out that the defendant will not at all raise that defence.1654 
Although it may occur that the issue of validity is raised in the course of the infringement 
proceeding, this does not alter the fact that this is merely a theoretical possibility.1655  
 
Alternatively, English courts have adopted the opinion that it suffices as being equivalent to 
actually raising the defence, if the issue of validity has not actually been raised, that it is clear 
that it is going to be raised.1656 However, in case that the invalidity defence cannot be deemed 
to be meant seriously, illustrated by the fact that the arguments in favour of this are 
inadequate, jurisdiction has been considered to be determined on the basis that there is a claim 
for infringement which does not raise the issue of invalidity.1657 Besides, it has been stressed 
that, even if one accepted the mere possibility of the invalidity defence being raised for 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction for the infringement dispute to the courts of the granting 
State, the need to give effect to the validity rule and the policies underlying that rule would 
not be as strong if there was merely the possibility of the invalidity defence being raised, 
rather than a certainty.1658 Moreover, the interests of the court in managing its business in 
relation to validity – even if such interests were to be recognised at all, which is actually 
doubtful – would lose considerable importance if the defendant of the infringement 
proceedings will eventually raise the invalidity defence, but has not actually raised it (where it 
is uncertain whether this defence will be raised at all).1659 
 
Besides, it should be borne in mind that conferring exclusive jurisdiction for patent 
infringement proceedings to the courts of the State where the patent has been granted fully 
ignores the fact that patent infringement is a tort and under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 
normal position is that a plaintiff can bring a tort claim in the State in which the act or the 
injury occurred.1660 The underlying reason is the crucial requirement of a meaningful 
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connection1661 between the place of the harmful event (i.e. the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage respectively the place where the damage occurred) and the forum State. In light of 
this, it has rightly been doubted whether there is such a meaningful connection between the 
place of patent infringement and the State of registration.1662  
 
Furthermore, patent disputes can also be negotiated before an arbitral tribunal. In light of this, 
it seems inconsistent to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon State courts.1663 Admittedly, this 
argument is relativised by the fact that, in practice, infringement disputes do not go to 
arbitration.1664 
 
After all, it is remarkable that, within the system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the European 
legislator has limited the number and extent of the categories of exclusive jurisdiction. 
According to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, exclusive jurisdiction has been 
reserved for instances where exclusive jurisdiction has been evaluated indispensable. It is 
therefore necessary to draw these instances narrowly. Moreover, it is noteworthy that none of 
the grounds of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
encompass a claim in tort. In light of this, allocating exclusive jurisdiction for patent 
infringement disputes to the courts of the granting State would seem somewhat 
inconsistent.1665   
 
 
3.2.3  Conclusion 
 
To conclude, neither considerations concerning the “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and the 
applicable substantive law, sovereignty of the granting State, court or party interests, judicial 
economy, the attempt to find a mediate solution for the torpedo problem, nor any other 
aspects are apt to justify to confer exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the protection State 
for patent infringement proceedings.  
 
Without going into details at this point, it is to be underlined that the Heidelberg Report 
produced in view of a reform of the Brussels I Regulation does not advocate to alter the 
current system of the Brussels I Regulation in this respect, but is in favour of a narrow 
interpretation of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation. Similarly, both the European and 
the American reform projects – the CLIP Principles and the ALI Principles1666 – do not 
advocate to allocate exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the granting State with regard to 
patent infringement disputes. At least U.S. American jurisprudence partly agrees with this 
conception1667, while the opposite opinion must not be lost out of sight.1668 
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In light of the foregoing explications, it is to be concluded that patent infringement 
proceedings should be and remain subject to the general rules of jurisdiction. Besides 
rejecting any attempts to extend exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the granting State to 
infringement proceedings, this also means that approaches according to which the courts of 
the granting State should be given exclusive jurisdiction for validity and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction for infringement1669, or, conversely, pursuant to which the courts with jurisdiction 
over infringement should be conferred an additional jurisdiction over validity1670, should not 
be pursued, because they vary from those general rules of jurisdiction laid down in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. With regard to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, 
there is no reason for a deviation from this approach.    
 
 




3.3.1 Jurisdiction regarding torts 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Extraterritorial jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation 
 
As analysed in the foregoing chapter, the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not contain an explicit 
rule, particularly relevant in a case of patent infringement, whether the place where the 
damage occurred or may occur according to Article 7(2) can be situated outside the State 
where the concerned patent is protected or whether jurisdiction based on Article 7(2) is only 
conferred to courts of that protection State. While the jurisprudence of the ECJ does not 
provide for a clear solution of this issue either, it has been shown that good reasons strike for 
a differentiation, on the one hand, between jurisdiction of courts at the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and at the place where the damage occurred, and, on the other hand, 
between product patents and process patents insofar as the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage is concerned. It has been concluded that, according to the current legal situation, an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage in terms of Article 7(2) can exist 
with regard to European process patents. In contrast, regarding product patents, a place of the 
event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) can only be situated in the protection 
State. The place where the damage occurred concerning patent infringement actions must 
necessarily be located within the protection State, meaning that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2) is per se impossible in that constellation. 
 
This being so, one might wonder whether another solution would be desirable or at least 
manageable in light of a superior (global) jurisdiction policy. Besides, independently from the 
answer to this query, the question arises whether the text of Article 7(2) should be clarified in 
order to eliminate the existing uncertainty which has led to a multitude of legal conceptions 
both in legal doctrine and case-law rendered by the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. 
As to the idea of such a clear rule within the framework of Article 7(2), it will be necessary to 
decide whether respectively in which way particularities of patent rights justify and require 
such specific rules.    
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3.3.1.2 Existing reform proposals    
  
In the following, several reform proposals shall be referred to which contain divergent 
solutions regarding international jurisdiction as to torts. In 2001, the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law presented a refined version of a Draft Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters which represents a development of 
the Preliminary Draft Convention from 1999. However, the Draft Convention from 2001 has 
not entered into force either because the participants could not agree on its exact content. 
However, the Draft Convention is of interest anyway because it demonstrates an alternative 
how to solve the issue in discussion. Second, I shall turn to the ALI project which ended in 
the creation of the ALI Principles. Third, relevant passages of the European counter-part to 
the ALI Principles, the Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP 
Principles) established by the Max-Planck working group, shall be subject to closer analysis 
when considering how the issue of international jurisdiction as to torts could be solved. In 
addition, I shall treat the Heidelberg Proposal which was developed in view of the reform of 
the Brussels I Regulation, and finally take into consideration the Commission Proposal 2010 
for a revised version of the Brussels I Regulation which finally resulted in the present 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.1671 
 
 
3.3.1.2.1 The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) 
 
Article 10 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters elaborated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (2001) 
(hereinafter Draft Hague Convention) provides for the following rule in Article 10(1): 
 
 
 Article 10 of the Draft Hague Convention 
 
 A plaintiff may bring an action in tort in the courts of the State -  
 a) in which the act or omission that caused injury occurred, or 
 
 b) in which the injury arose, unless the defendant established that the person claimed to be responsible 




Remarkably, in contrast to the constant jurisprudence of the ECJ since its Mines de Potasse 
decision as to the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention (Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), according to which the place where the harmful event occurred or 
may occur covers both the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where 
the damage occurred, Article 10(1) of the Draft Hague Convention generally confers 
jurisdiction as to torts only to the courts at the place of the event giving rise to the damage (cf. 
Article 10(1)a).1672 The courts at the place where the damage occurred are only conferred 
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jurisdiction under the condition that the defendant does not establish that the alleged infringer 
could not reasonably recognise in advance that the infringing act or omission could lead to a 
comparable infringement in the court State. According to its formulation, Article 10 of the 
Draft Hague Convention does not provide for a specific rule as to patents respectively 
intellectual property on the whole, but generally covers tortious actions. Footnote 66 of the 
Draft Hague Convention concedes in this respect: 
 
 “(...) However, it was noted that the paragraph would have to remain under consideration in light of e-
 commerce and intellectual property issues, its relation to activity jurisdiction proposals and 
 constitutional issues in one State (...).”   
 
However, a problem which arose during the working process on the Draft Hague Convention 
consisted in the question of whether patent infringement cases should be covered by Article 
10 at all or whether Article 12 of the Draft Hague Convention on exclusive jurisdiction should 
apply. Indeed, the majority of the States participating in the project of the Draft Hague 
Convention advocated the application of Article 12(4), Alternative A1673 of the Draft Hague 
Convention to the constellation of patent infringement. Article 12(4), Alternative A of the 
Draft Hague Convention provides: 
 
 
 Article 12(4), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention 
 
 In proceedings in which the relief sought is a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, 
 abandonment, revocation or infringement of a patent or a mark, the courts of the Contracting State of 
 grant or registration shall have exclusive jurisdiction.     
 
 
Consequently, if Article 12(4), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention was applicable 
to the constellation of patent infringement, the general provision of Article 10 of the Draft 
Hague Convention would not apply according to the principle of lex specialis. Only a 
minority of the States which participated in the project of the Draft Hague Convention 
favoured a solution according to which the general rules of jurisdiction according to the Draft 
Hague Convention would be applicable in certain constellations. In this respect, Article 
12(5A), Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention has been formulated as follows:  
 
 
Article 12(5A), Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention 
 
In relation to proceedings which have as their object the infringement of patents, trademarks, designs or 
other similar rights, the courts of the Contracting State referred to in the preceding paragraph [or in the 
provisions of Articles [3 to 16]] have jurisdiction.    
 
 
Given that the provision of Article 12(5A), Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention was 
rejected by most of the participating States of the Convention project, apparently no specific 
considerations have been made as to the question if Article 10 of the Draft Hague Convention 
                                                                                                                                                        
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, are not fully adequate in the framework of the Draft Hague 
Convention, the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles. However, for reasons of clearness, readability and a 
better comparability with Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the cited expressions will be also used 
with regard to the addressed reform proposals, avoiding to replace the term “place” with the term “State”.    
1673
 Article 12 of the Draft Hague Convention contains several alternative formulations. The participating States 
could not agree on one solution which explains why the Convention has not entered into force. 
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could confer, without any restrictions, jurisdiction to courts to decide on the infringement of 
patents which have been granted for another State than the forum State. 
 
 
3.3.1.2.2 ALI Principles 
 
The ALI Principles imply, in § 204, general rules as to tortious jurisdiction in the case of 
infringement of intellectual property rights. The general character of § 204 of the ALI 
Principles is emphasised by the Reporters' Comment a. (Infringement actions generally) 
according to which  
 
 “(t)his provision seeks to restate the traditional criteria for jurisdiction over claims for the tort of 
 infringement (place from which the harmful conduct originated; place of impact of the injury), and to 
 adapt the traditional criteria to the digital environment. It does so without having the tests propounded 
 turn on technologically specific factors, such as the "interactivity" of a website. It applies to violations 
 of any intellectual property right covered by these Principles, including moral rights and claims of 
 secondary liability [underscore added].” 
 
The text of § 204 of the ALI Principles reads as follows: 
 
 
 § 204 of the ALI Principles 
 
(1) A person may be sued in any State in which that person has substantially acted, or taken substantial 
preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alleged infringement. The court’s jurisdiction extends to 
claims respecting all injuries arising out of the conduct within the State that initiates or furthers the 
alleged infringement, wherever the injuries occur. 
 
(2) A person may be sued in any State in which its activities give rise to an infringement claim, if it 
reasonably can be seen as having directed those activities to that State. The court’s jurisdiction extends 
to claims respecting injuries occurring in that State. 
 
(3) A person who cannot be sued in a WTO-member State through the application of §§ 201-204(1) 
may be sued in any State in which its activities give rise to an infringement claim if: 
 
(a) it reasonably can be seen as having directed those activities to that State, and 
 
(b) it solicits or maintains contacts, business, or an audience in that State on a regular basis, 
whether or not such activity initiates or furthers the infringing activity. 
 
The court’s jurisdiction extends to claims respecting injuries arising out of conduct outside the State that 
relates to the alleged infringement in the State, wherever the injuries occur. 
 
 
Similarly, at first glance, to Article 10(1) of the Draft Hague Convention, § 204(1) of the ALI 
Principles primarily confers jurisdiction to the courts at the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage. However, a closer look on § 204(1) of the ALI Principles reveals that this 
provision actually differs from Article 10(1) of the Draft Hague Convention in a considerable 
way: § 204(1) of the ALI Principles not only covers “substantial” acts to initiate or to further 
an alleged infringement which includes, according to the Reporters' Comment b. 
(“Substantially acted”), maintaining a manufacturing or distribution centre for patent-
infringing components, but also – contrary to the situation with regard to Article 10(1) of the 
Draft Hague Convention (and Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) – mere substantial 
preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alleged infringement.1674 The formulation of          
                                                 
1674
 Cf. Dessemontet 2010, p. 36. 
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§ 204(1) of the ALI Principles enables without any problem the existence of an extraterritorial 
place of the event giving rise to the damage which is, in particular,1675 explicitly confirmed by 
the Reporters' Comments a. (Infringement actions generally) and b. (“Substantially acted”) as 
follows: 
      
 “Section 204(1) addresses the case in which the forum is a staging area for the nonresident defendant's 
 activities. The provision creates authority to hear all claims arising out of these activities, without 
 geographic limitation [underscore added]."1676  
 
 "Section 204(1) recognizes that an infringement may originate in a State other than the one in which the 
 defendant resides or has its principal place of business (although such a State remains competent as 
 well) [underscore added].”1677 
 
Besides, § 204(2)1 of the ALI Principles provides for jurisdiction of the courts at the place 
where the damage occurred. However, it is to be noted that such jurisdiction only exists under 
the condition that the alleged infringer has directed his infringing activities to the forum State. 
Remarkably, in contrast to the situation of jurisdiction according to § 204(1) of the ALI 
Principles, the authority to decide of a court having jurisdiction according to § 204(2)1 of the 
ALI Principles is territorially limited to claims regarding infringements occurring in the forum 
State (cf. § 204(2)2 of the ALI Principles). In light of this, the existence of an extraterritorial 
place where the damage occurred – and thus extraterritorial jurisdiction on this basis – would 
be excluded.   
 
 
3.3.1.2.3 Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP Principles) 
 
Like the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles as their European counter-part contain general 
rules on conflict of laws as to intellectual property. With regard to the infringement of 
intellectual property rights, the CLIP Principles provide for detailed rules in Article 2:202 
(Infringement) and Article 2:203 (Extent of jurisdiction over infringement claims). The 
provisions read as follows: 
 
 
Article 2:202: Infringement  
 
In disputes concerned with infringement of an intellectual property right, a person may be sued in the 
courts of the State where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur, unless the alleged infringer has 
not acted in that State to initiate or further the infringement and her/his activity cannot reasonably be 
seen as having been directed to that State. 
 
 
Article 2:203: Extent of jurisdiction over infringement claims1678 
 
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, a court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is 
situated. 
                                                 
1675
 Additionally cf. The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 204, Illustration 2. and Reporters' 
Notes 3. on § 204(1).  
1676
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 204, Comment a. on § 204(1).  
1677
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 204, Comment b. on § 204(1).  
1678
 Noteworthily, the clear wording of Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles already indicates that the provision 
complements Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, but does not determine the extent of jurisdiction under Article 
2:206 of the CLIP Principles. In contrast, Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles also limits jurisdiction based on 
Article 2:204, and, indirectly, jurisdiction according to Article 2:208 and Article 2:209 of the CLIP Principles, 
which relate to infringement claims.   
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(2) In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall also have jurisdiction in respect of 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, provided that the activities 
giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the 
infringer is habitually resident and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
 
 
At least at first glance, the CLIP Principles might be considered to pursue a completely 
different approach than the ALI Principles. In contrast to the ALI Principles which principally 
confer jurisdiction to the courts in the State where the alleged infringer has substantially acted 
(or taken substantial preparatory acts), Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles confers 
jurisdiction to the courts of the State where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur 
(while the alleged infringer may prove1679 that he has not acted in that State to initiate or 
further the infringement and1680 his activity cannot be reasonably seen as having been directed 
to that State). However, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles underlines that Article 2:202 
of the CLIP Principles does not only focus on the effects of an infringing activity, but is based 
on a uniform concept of “infringement” according to which, as to intellectual property matters 
unlike general tort law, it is not appropriate to distinguish between physical actions taken in 
one State, such as manufacturing of infringing goods, and their effects, such as distribution of 
those goods to the public in a foreign market.1681 Moreover, the Commentary emphasises that 
jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 shall be regularly vested in the courts where the 
alleged infringer has substantially acted as well as in those where the effect accrues.1682  
 
As already suggested, Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles contains an “escape clause” 
(“unless...”) in order to avoid that jurisdiction is established in countries where the 
infringement only occurs accidentally, and has only minimal effect, a result which could be 
grossly disproportional to the kind and effect of the alleged infringement. Jurisdiction 
according to Article 2:202 thus does not exist if the defendant has not acted in the forum State 
in initiation or furtherance of the infringement, and if the activities causing the infringement 
cannot reasonably be considered as having been directed to that State.1683   
   
According to Article 2:203(1) of the CLIP Principles, a court having jurisdiction with 
accordance to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles shall, in principle, have jurisdiction only 
regarding infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which the 
forum is situated. As a consequence, extraterritorial jurisdiction in torts would a priori be 
impossible.  
 
Remarkably, taking into account infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as 
the internet, Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles provides for another solution in certain 
                                                 
1679
 The wording of Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles indicates that the burden for establishing the relevant 
elements lies on the defendant contesting jurisdiction. 
1680
 The elements contained in the “escape clause” must exist cumulatively. In case that one element is missing, 
the escape clause does not produce any effect, meaning that infringement jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 
of the CLIP Principles is existent. 
1681
 Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, para. 2:202.C04. 
1682
 Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, para. 2:202.C04. 
1683
 Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, para. 2:202.C13. As the “escape clause” gains particular 
importance with regard to multistate delicts, it shall be subject to further discussion in that framework. 
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circumstances: (1) If such infringement activities have no substantial effect in the State, or 
any of the States, where the infringer is habitually resident and substantial activities in 
furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out within the territory of the 
forum State or (2) if such infringement activities have no substantial effect in the State, or any 
of the States, where the infringer is habitually resident and the harm caused by the 
infringement in the forum State is substantial in relation to the infringement in its entirety, 
then the court having jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 shall also have jurisdiction as to 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State. In the mentioned 
restricted circumstances, Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles thus establishes the possibility 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in torts.         
  
 
3.3.1.2.4 The Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 
 
In light of the foregoing explications in particular with regard to § 204 of the ALI Principles 
and Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles which intend to adequately take into consideration 
the constellation of infringement of intellectual property rights, it is astonishing that the 
Heidelberg Report on the Application of the Brussels I Regulation does not contain any 
proposal as to an amendment of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation in order to clarify 
the described uncertainties. Although, regarding general principles as to jurisdiction according 
to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation developed by the ECJ (autonomous interpretation; 
principle of ubiquity; meaning of the term “damages”), the Report admits that  
 
 “(t)here are some references to aspects where national courts have to look for a further concretisation of 
 these principles”,1684 
 
it does not doubt, based on a survey,1685 that 
 
 “(...) national courts can and actually do work on the above mentioned principles developed in the case 
 law of the ECJ”.1686  
 
Actually, the reporters clearly hold: 
 
 “Based on this survey, it seems fair to state that the principles for an interpretation of Article 5(3) JR as 
 developed in the ECJ case law may, of course, need some further concretisation if applied in national 
 practice. However, there is no indication that such concretisation raises insurmountable problems or that 
 the results reached do not adequately serve the needs of legal practice. Especially in internet cases, the 
 courts seem to be on their way to develop reliable criteria for a localisation of torts, e. g. by asking 
 which country a certain website is directed to.”1687 
 
While the Report at least recognises that 
 
 “(w)hereas the above mentioned general aspects do not raise any fundamental problems, the situation is, 
 to some extent, more complicated as far as multi-State cases are concerned”1688 
 
the Report still concludes that 
 
 “(...) the reporters see no sufficient basis for recommending any amendments of Article 5(3) JR.”1689 
                                                 
1684
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 194. 
1685
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), paras. 195-198. 
1686
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 194. 
1687
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 199. 
1688
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 200. 
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The Heidelberg Report thus obviously does not recognise the jurisdictional problems detected 
and discussed above which arise in the tension between Article 5(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation and intellectual property rights as such, respectively does not recognise any need 
for an adequate solution of these problems by way of an amendment of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation. This is confirmed by the fact that Chapter D. VII. 6. of the Heidelberg 
Report1690 which explicitly delivers concluding recommendations concerning intellectual 




3.3.1.2.5 The Commission Proposal 2010 for Reform of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The Commission Proposal 2010 provides in its Article 5(2) (which thematically corresponds 
to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation): 
 
 
 Article 5 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The following courts shall have jurisdiction: 
 
 (...) 
 (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, the courts for the place where the harmful event 
 occurred or may occur. 
 
 
It is remarkable that Article 5(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010 is characterised by the 
approach of the European Commission to extend the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I 
Regulation to defendants domiciled in a third State.1691 For the Commission's intent was to 
generally extend the possibilities of companies and citizens to sue such third State defendants 
in the European Union because the special rules of jurisdiction would become available in 
these cases.1692 In this respect, the Commission underlined its view that access to justice in the 
European Union was overall unsatisfactory in disputes involving defendants from outside the 
EU, jurisdiction then being covered by national law, while the Brussels I Regulation 
principally applied where the defendant is domiciled inside the EU. Further, the Commission 
stressed that the diversity of national law lead to unequal access to justice for EU companies 
in transactions with partners from third States because some could easily litigate in the EU, 
while others could not, even in situations where no other court guaranteeing a fair trial had 
jurisdiction.1693 Besides, it was stressed that the application of the jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels I Regulation to defendants domiciled in third States eliminates – in favour of EU 
defendants and third State defendants – existing legal uncertainties and injustice resulting 
from the co-existence of different sets of jurisdiction rules (the Brussels I Regulation and 
provisions of national law).1694 Last but not least, the argument was put forth that a 
universalisation1695 of grounds of jurisdiction by constructing the jurisdiction rules of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
1689
 Pfeiffer 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 204. 
1690
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 692. 
1691
 Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 521; with regard to the competence of the European Union for an 
extension of the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Regulation to third State defendants cf. Weber (2011)75 
RabelsZ 619, at p. 622 et seq. 
1692
 European Commission 2010 (Commission Proposal 2010), p. 8. 
1693
 European Commission 2010 (Commission Proposal 2010), p. 3. 
1694
 Bach (2011)44(4) ZRP 97, at p. 100. 
1695
 Weller (2012)9(6) GPR 328, at p. 329. 
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Brussels I Regulation as lois unifomes1696 would be consistent in light of parallel 
constructions of the Rome I Regulation1697 and the Rome II Regulation1698. Others have 
evaluated the Commission's approach as going too far1699, and the Commission Proposal 2010 
has even provoked fierce opposition by parts of legal doctrine.1700  
 
In light of this approach, Article 4(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010 underlines: 
 
 
 Article 4 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 (...)  
 (2) Persons not domiciled in any of the Member States may be sued in the courts of a Member State 
 only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 8 of this Chapter. 
 
 
Accordingly, the wording structure of Article 5 of the Commission Proposal 2010 is different 
from Article 5 of the Brussels I Regulation insofar as Article 5 of the Commission Proposal 
2010 does not begin with the phrase “a person domiciled in a Member State” (the following 
text of the paragraphs being adapted accordingly). However, like the Heidelberg Report, 
Article 5(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010 does not deliver any clarification let alone 
solution with regard to the uncertainties existing under the Brussels Convention/Brussels I 
Regulation in the context with the infringement of intellectual property rights which have 
been described and analysed above by reference to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
Obviously, the Commission's approach to extend the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I 
Regulation to defendants domiciled in a third State has not been implemented within the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.1701 That final change is based on the insight that jurisdiction rules 
are defined in a context of mutual trust between the EU Member States. While reciprocity 
between the Member States is ensured because the Regulation is directly applicable in the 
European Union, such trust and reciprocity does not exist vis-à-vis third States of which most 
apply discriminatory rules towards defendants located in the EU. Thus, realising the 
Commission’s approach to widely grant special protection to defendants coming from third 
                                                 
1696
 Cf. Bach (2011)44(4) ZRP 97. 
1697 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L177 of 4 July 2008, pp. 6-16, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R0593&from=en> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). Article 2 (Universal application) of this Regulation provides: “Any law specified by this Regulation shall 
be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.” 
1698
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L199 of 31 July 2007, pp. 40-49, available at WWW 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864&from=EN> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015). Article 3 (Universal application) of this Regulation provides: “Any law specified by this 
Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Member State.” 
1699
 For instance: Mansel, Thorn & Wagner (2013)33(1) IPRax 1, at p. 8. 
1700
 For instance, Briggs clearly expressed his disaffirmation towards the Commission's approach: “It cannot be 
said that the total effect will be to widen or narrow jurisdiction over such [third State] defendants; but it can be 
said that the unbending [i.e. unmoderated by any element of judicial discretion (cf. Briggs ibid.)] application of 
rules, which were designed for defendants with a European home, to defendants defined by the fact that they do 
not, is irrational.” (cf. Briggs (2011)2 L.M.C.L.Q. 157, at p. 160). 
1701 Noteworthily, Article 79 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that the Commission, by 11 January 2022, 
shall represent a report on the application of this Regulation, and that that report shall include an evaluation of 
the possible need for a further extension of the rules on jurisdiction to defendants not domiciled in a Member 
State, taking into account the operation of this Regulation and possible developments at international level. 
Where appropriate, the report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendment of this Regulation. 
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States would have meant to unilaterally favour such third State defendants, while defendants 
located in the EU would not necessarily enjoy such protection from third States.1702 
  
Article 5(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010 does not clarify let alone solve the 
uncertainties in the context with the infringement of intellectual property rights described and 
analysed above which already existed under the Brussels I Regulation and are still existing 
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
 
 
3.3.1.3 Clarification through an amendment of Article 7(2) 
 
In light of the current legal uncertainty and disagreement in legal doctrine and jurisprudence 
with regard to the issue of the existence or non-existence of an extraterritorial place of the 
event where the harmful event occurred in terms of Article 7(2) – i.e. the place of the event 
giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred – the question however 
arises whether the text of Article 7(2) should be amended to deliver a definitive solution to 
this issue.   
 
It has been shown in the foregoing chapter that the principle of territoriality, a principle of 
substantive law, has neither a direct nor an indirect effect on the issue of jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2). Further, it has been reasoned that general considerations and 
principles militate for the result that Article 7(2) de lege lata establishes the possibility of an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage with regard to European process 
patents, while militating both against the possibility of an extraterritorial place of the event 
giving rise to the damage regarding product patents and, generally, against the existence of an 
extraterritorial place where the damage occurred, notwithstanding if product patents or 
process patents are concerned.  
 
It is due to this reference to general ideas – the ratio legis of jurisdiction regarding torts – that 
it seems preferable not to create a totally separate tortious rule for the constellation of 
infringement of a patent, but, inasmuch as possible, to submit this constellation to Article 
7(2). However, as both legal theory and, even more, legal practice have shown, it seems 
desirable and manageable to supplement Article 7(2) in terms of a clarification with regard to 
the infringement of intellectual property rights.1703 As it is not sure that the ECJ and the 
European legislator would follow the “subtle differentiation” between product patents and 
process patents in this respect1704 – although this differentiation is justified as has been 
reasoned above – it would seem more realistic and realisable in practical respect to treat 
product patents and process patents in an equal way. On this basis, it seems most convincing 
to fully deny the existence of an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage, 
because, at least as to product patents, extraterritorial jurisdiction is not justified. As 
illustrated above, the infringing acts of bringing into circulation, using, offering, importing 
and possessing such products for those purposes constitute acts of patent infringement that are 
independent from the manufacture of the concerned object.1705 The pure fact of manufacture 
                                                 
1702 Cadet (2013)24(6) EuZW 218, at p. 219. 
1703
 Contrary to this conception, others have denied the necessity of such a clarification of Article 5(3) because, 
as proponents of such a perspective have suggested, the ECJ would probably not support the idea of an 
extraterritorial place where the harmful event occurred according to Article 5(3) (cf. Schauwecker 2009, pp. 405, 
407). However, in the absence of a clarifying decision of the ECJ on this issue, an amendment of Article 5(3) 
seems strongly desirable unless necessary in order to create and ensure legal certainty. 
1704 This fear has been expressed by Heinze, cf. Heinze (2007)56(7) GRUR Int. 634, at p. 636 (“feinsinnige 
Differenzierung”). 
1705
 Reichardt 2006, p. 130 et seq. 
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of a product does not establish such a particularly close connection that would be necessary to 
consider an extraterritorial place of manufacture as a place of the event giving rise to the 
damage in the sense of Article 7(2) concerning a patent infringement in the protection 
State.1706  
 
In light of the foregoing considerations according to which the place of the event giving rise 
to the damage, with regard to the infringement of a patent, is to be considered necessarily 
situated in the forum State, this place would necessarily be identical with the place where the 
damage occurred which can only be located in the State where the patent is protected. For this 
reason, the need for a differentiation between “place of the event giving rise to the damage” 
and “place where the damage occurred” would fall away with regard to cross-border patent 
infringements. 
 
A clarification of Article 7(2) which takes into account the foregoing criteria could be realised 
by way of adding the following sentence within Article 7(2): 
 
 “As to the infringement of a patent, the harmful event solely occurs or may occur in the State where the 
 patent is protected.”  
 
 
3.3.1.4 Extraterritorial jurisdiction according to a future Global Judgments Convention 
 
In view of an envisaged Global Judgments Convention, it is to be borne in mind that a 
compromise between somewhat diverging conceptions would have to be found. On the one 
hand, the United States, besides Europe the most important potential Contracting State, 
favours a conception which is influenced by the constitutional due process principle and 
emphasises the aspects of direction of the acting and the existence of factual points of contact 
to the forum (minimum contacts doctrine). As has been shown above, § 204 of the ALI 
Principles clearly emphasises, in first line, the significance of the State of substantial acting 
respectively even taking substantial preparatory acts. Such a conception would seem hardly 
reconcilable with a wide provision such as Article 7(2). On the other hand, the CLIP Proposal 
in its final version also takes into account, in Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, the 
direction of the alleged infringer's activity, but insofar refers to the State where the alleged 
infringement occurred and, in contrast to § 204 of the ALI Principles, constructs the direction 
to that State as an exceptio to be raised by the alleged infringer.1707  
 
When thinking about the concrete shape of a potential compromise, it is to be underlined that 
the majority of the States participating in the project of the Draft Hague Convention 
advocated a solution according to which the courts of the Contracting State where, 
respectively for whose territory a patent has been granted would have exclusive jurisdiction as 
to patent infringement proceedings.1708 In light of this, and because § 204 of the ALI 
Principles – in particular due to the fact that even substantial preparatory acts shall be 
sufficient to found jurisdiction – would probably lead to legal uncertainty,1709 it would seem 
desirable and also manageable to adopt Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, which clarifies 
that the place where the harmful event occurred can only be situated in the protection State. 
                                                 
1706
 Reichardt 2006, p. 131. 
1707
 Kur (2012)61(10) GRUR Int. 857, at p. 860. However, this allegedly insuperable difference is attenuated by 
the fact that Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles is based on the premise that the notion of “acting” as opposed 
to “directing activities to” shall be understood broadly according to the Commentary on the CLIP Principles. 
1708
 Cf. Article 12(4), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention. 
1709
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 407. 
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Additionally, similarly to the proposed amendment of Article 7(2), Article 2:202 of the CLIP 
Principles should be completed by the following sentence: 
 
 “As to the infringement of a patent, the infringement solely occurs or may occur in the State where the 
 patent is protected.”  
 
 
3.3.1.5 Particular problem: Tortious jurisdiction regarding multistate delicts  
 
 
3.3.1.5.1 Localisation of the places where the harmful event occurred 
 
As has been discussed in the foregoing chapter, multistate delicts, i.e. cases where parallel 
patents granted in different States are (potentially) infringed through the same act by one 
(alleged) infringer, raise the question of whether, respectively in how far invoked courts at the 
place where the harmful event occurred which therefore have jurisdiction according to Article 
7(2) are also authorised to decide on the infringement of such parallel (national respectively 
European) patents. One might argue that a restriction of the authority to decide at the level of 
jurisdiction is not justified, and that a restriction at the level of private international law 
respectively substantive law would be preferable in schematic respect. Furthermore, the latter 
approach would bring along the advantage that a judgment on the merits – other than a 
judgment on the admissibility relevant in terms of jurisdiction – would be rendered, which 
would prevent another court to decide on the same infringement which would consequently 
avoid conflicting decisions.1710 However, the latter opinion presupposes that the legal system 
of the invoked court actually undertakes such a restriction at the level of private international 
law respectively substantive law. If it does not, the situation could arise that no restriction at 
all would be respected, potentially leading to the result that the invoked court could decide on 
any parallel infringements without any need of a link to the forum State, a result which cannot 
seriously be intended by anyone.1711 Besides, there is the realistic danger that, if jurisdiction 
was widely allocated to the invoked courts, this would go along with the presumption of the 
alleged infringement, meaning that the levels of recognition and enforcement would be the 
only possible correcting factors.1712 That result could only be avoided by not only unifying 
rules on jurisdiction, but simultaneously rules on private international law. While the Hague 
Convention project only established rules on jurisdiction, the ALI Principles as well as the 
CLIP Principles actually comprise both rules on jurisdiction and private international law. In 
this respect, it is also to be borne in mind that other legal systems do not undertake a clear 
differentiation between rules of jurisdiction on the one hand and the applicable law on the 
other hand. For instance, U.S. American courts extensively undertake the examination of 
substantive law in the framework of jurisdiction when analysing if there are sufficient 
miminum contacts between the case and the invoked court.1713 
 
Generally, it must be borne in mind that tortious jurisdiction is to be considered as an 
exception to the general rule that jurisdiction is conferred to the courts at the place of domicile 
of the defendant, and must therefore be interpreted in a restrictive way, in order to avoid 
establishing a jurisdiction of choice of the plaintiff at his domicile. Furthermore, as has 
already been explicated in the foregoing chapter, there would not be a particularly close 
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connection between the alleged infringement and the forum – and thus no sufficient proximity 
to facts and evidence – in case that the court had jurisdiction to decide on any parallel 
infringement concerning foreign patent rights. 
 
In practical regard, it is to be taken into account that the United States would presumably only 
accept a rule on jurisdiction regarding torts which requires a particular direction of the acting 
to the forum State, due to the due process principle and the minimum contacts doctrine 
addressed above.1714 It is for this reason that § 204(2)1 of the ALI Principles provides: 
 
 “A person may be sued in any State in which its activities give rise to an infringement claim, if it 
 reasonably can be seen as having directed those activities to that State.” 
 
It has already been pointed out that Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, although constructed 
differently, also recognises, by way of an “escape clause”, the significance of the direction of 
an activity to a State regarding the issue of jurisdiction, when conceding the alleged infringer 
the possibility to argue, against jurisdiction of the courts at the State where the alleged 
infringement occurs or may occur, that  
 
“(...) (he) has not acted in that State to initiate or further the infringement and her/his activity cannot 
reasonably be seen as having been directed to that State.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles starts from the idea of a 
uniform concept of “infringement” for intellectual property matters.1715 Consequently, the 
distinction made in the “escape clause” between the defendant “acting in”, or “directing 
activities to” the forum State, which is similar to that between “act” and “effect” used in tort 
law, is said to have no relevance for intellectual property claims in general, because the sole 
decisive aspect of determining jurisdiction lies in the question of whether there is an 
infringement – by way of an activity or by way of the effect of such an activity.1716 This being 
so, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles points out that the distinction undertaken in the 
“escape clause” gains however significance insofar as it allows jurisdiction to be restricted in 
certain cases of “overspill”. Restrictions of that kind may be called for in case that an alleged 
infringer has no or only limited control over the territorial impact of the allegedly harmful 
activity, so that the effects of the initiating act are “dispersed” over different countries (a 
constellation which is known as “Streudelikt” in German law). Not exclusively, but typically, 
this is the case with regard to the divulgation of infringing content through analogue mass 
media like journals, newspapers and broadcasting, and digital mass media like the internet.1717 
Given the “escape clause”, according to the Commentary on the CLIP Principles, is merely 
meant to offer relief in the case of uncontrollable “dispersed effects”, i.e. as an exception to 
the rule,1718 the notion of “acting” as opposed to “directing activities to” shall be understood 
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in a broad sense. Therefore, if physical items are found in commerce that are claimed to 
infringe a right existing in the forum State, it shall regularly be assumed that the defendant has 
“acted” there, without the requirement of a certain level or number of such infringing items, 
meaning that jurisdiction shall be denied only if the defendant establishes that he has nothing 
to do with their proliferation.1719 Besides, as to transit cases, where goods allegedly infringing 
intellectual property rights are transported though the territory of the forum State without 
being destined for importation, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles suggests that 
jurisdiction should be denied if it is clear enough that no infringement will be found under 
substantive law. Additionally, apart from the situation under substantive law, it has been 
pointed out that the wording of Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles leaves some discretion 
for judges to deny jurisdiction under exceptional circumstances. In this regard, a court may 
deny jurisdiction based on the argument that the connecting factors are insufficient, if the 
transit routes could not be controlled or anticipated in detail by the alleged infringer, and if the 
effect remains minimal.1720     
 
As a consequence, taking into account the findings with regard to § 204(2)1 of the ALI 
Principles and Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, tortious jurisdiction should be merely 
conferred on courts of States to which the alleged infringing activity has actually been 
directed. As to the question in which way the direction should be taken into consideration, the 
above explications as to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles contain valuable ideas which 
should be picked up.  
 
 
3.3.1.5.2 Territorial scope of the authority to decide  
 
It has been shown above that the current regime of Article 7(2) establishes the possibility that 
a court at the place of manufacture is also authorised to decide on the infringement of parallel 
patents granted in respectively for the territory of another State than the forum State in the 
case of European process patents. In contrast, such an extended authority to decide as to the 
infringement of parallel patents is to be denied regarding product patents and generally in 
cases of jurisdiction on the basis of the place where the damage occurred. 
 
Both the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles contain rules according to which the 
authority to decide is extended. As to the ALI Principles, § 204(1)2 generally – i.e. without 
any limitation to specific constellations – provides for a comprehensive authority to decide of 
the invoked court at the place where the alleged infringer has substantially acted, or taken 
substantial preparatory acts (place of the event giving rise to the damage): 
  
 
§ 204(1) of the ALI Principles 
 
(1) A person may be sued in any State in which that person has substantially acted, or taken substantial 
preparatory acts, to initiate or to further an alleged infringement. The court’s jurisdiction extends to 
claims respecting all injuries arising out of the conduct within the State that initiates or furthers the 
alleged infringement, wherever the injuries occur.1721 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerning activities taken by the alleged infringer in the forum State, and by reversing the burden of pleading. It 
was thus made clear that jurisdiction of courts in a State where an infringement is found to occur can only be 
contested under exceptional circumstances (cf. Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, paras. 2:202.N14 and 
2:202.N15 with further references).  
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 Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, para. 2:202.C15. 
1720
 Kur 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:202, para. 2:202.C20. 
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 Cf. also The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 204, Comment a. on § 204(1). 
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In contrast, the authority to decide of courts in the State where the damage occurred according 
to § 204(2)1 of the ALI Principles is territorially limited to claims regarding infringements 
occurring in the forum State (cf. § 204(2)2 of the ALI Principles): 
 
 
 § 204(2) of the ALI Principles 
 
(2) A person may be sued in any State in which its activities give rise to an infringement claim, if it 
reasonably can be seen as having directed those activities to that State. The court’s jurisdiction extends 
to claims respecting injuries occurring in that State. 
 
 
However, courts in the State where the damage occurred are conferred comprehensive 
authority to decide1722 as well if the infringer cannot be sued in a WTO-member State for the 
total damage (cf. § 204(3) of the ALI Principles): 
 
 
 § 204(3) of the ALI Principles 
 
(3) A person who cannot be sued in a WTO-member State through the application of §§ 201-204(1) 
may be sued in any State in which its activities give rise to an infringement claim if: 
 
(c) it reasonably can be seen as having directed those activities to that State, and 
 
(d) it solicits or maintains contacts, business, or an audience in that State on a regular basis, 
whether or not such activity initiates or furthers the infringing activity. 
 
The court’s jurisdiction extends to claims respecting injuries arising out of conduct outside the State that 
relates to the alleged infringement in the State, wherever the injuries occur. 
 
 
§ 204(3) of the ALI Principles thus furnishes the plaintiff who would otherwise have no fair 
forum in which to assert worldwide claims other places where it may be able to sue.1723   
 
Interestingly, the approach chosen in § 204 of the ALI Principles, making a general 
differentiation between the scope of authority to decide at the place of the event giving rise to 
the damage on the one hand, and, on the other hand, at the place where the damage occurred, 
resembles, respectively corresponds to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Shevill decision.    
 
In comparison with the ALI Principles, the CLIP Proposal provides, in some way, for a 
comprehensive authority to decide, which is however considerably more restricted than 
comprehensive authority to decide according to § 204 of the ALI Principles. In general, a 
court having jurisdiction with accordance to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles shall have 
jurisdiction only regarding infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the 
State in which the forum is situated (cf. Article 2:203(1) of the CLIP Principles). Otherwise, 
general jurisdiction should prevail, meaning that claims concerning infringements occurring 
in other States should only be brought before the courts of general jurisdiction.1724 
Alternatively, such claims must be brought separately before the courts in those other 
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 Dessemontet 2010, p. 36 
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 Article 2:101 of the CLIP Principles provides, with regard to general jurisdiction, that subject to the CLIP 
Principles, a person may be sued in the courts of any State in which the person is habitually resident (Article 
2:601). 
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States.1725 It has rightly been emphasised that it is indeed one of the very objectives of Article 
2:203 of the CLIP Principles to ensure that cross-border claims are not raised too easily in the 
forum of the plaintiff who already benefits from the strategic advantage of the first mover. 
While it might be argued that a grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the courts in the State 
from which the impugned activities originate is the most efficient way to stop the 
infringement in its entirety, it is to be stressed that there is always the possibility to bring such 
claims in the courts of general jurisdiction. In general, there is no pertinent reason why the 
plaintiff should be granted an additional choice in that regard.1726 This corresponds to the 
principle of balance between the interests of all parties involved (as also emphasised in the 
Preamble).1727 While the Commentary on the CLIP Principles acknowledges that it would 
have been an alternative solution to allow consolidation of judgments at the place from which 
the infringement in its entirety emanated (such as the State of manufacture of the infringing 
product), the Commentary clearly states that this potential solution has not been chosen for 
several reasons. First of all, it has rightly been underlined that, where it is not doubtful 
whether the prerequisites exist for assuming that the source of the infringement in its entirety 
can actually be located in that State, the place where the infringement in its entirety emanated 
will, in the majority of cases, be identical with the forum of general jurisdiction, in particular 
because the definition of habitual residence according to Article 2:101 of the CLIP Principles 
is rather broad.1728 Besides, it is indeed questionable whether the fact that the defendant has 
set a cause in the forum State for the infringement which happened abroad does provide a 
sufficient nexus with the infringement in its entirety, given that the underlying reasons for 
establishing infringement jurisdiction outside the forum rei are the easy access to factual 
evidence and the fact that the courts will regularly be in a position to apply their own law, and 
both aspects are lacking in the constellation in question: The fact that a product is 
manufactured in one State is no evidence for an infringement occurring in other States, and, 
with regard to the infringements occurring abroad, the court will have to apply foreign 
law.1729   
 
The foregoing explications applying in general, Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles 
provides for a modified rule regarding disputes concerned with infringement carried out 
through ubiquitous media such as the internet, in order to adapt the addressed aspect of 
balance between the interests of all parties involved to that particular constellation. According 
to Article 2:203(2), a comprehensive authority of the court to decide shall exist in 
constellations of infringements through ubiquitous media such as the internet, given that the 
(allegedly) infringing acting has no substantial effect in the State(s) where the (alleged) 
infringer is domiciled, and that there is a sufficiently close connection between the 
infringement and the State where the court is situated: 
 
 
Article 2:203: Extent of jurisdiction over infringement claims 
 
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, a court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is 
situated. 
 
(2) In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall also have jurisdiction in respect of 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, provided that the activities 
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giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the 
infringer is habitually resident and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
 
 
The risk of widespread infringement being highly pertinent in such cases of infringement 
carried out through ubiquitous media such as the internet, the efficient enforcement of claims 
may be seriously hampered, for instance in case that the infringer does not have any 
production sites or a sizeable business establishment of any permanence where his habitual 
residence can be located. Moreover, whatever is needed for carrying out the infringement (in 
particular the server) can be swiftly moved, and can be set up without much difficulty in 
States that either do not provide for an adequate level of legal protection, or where the law 
remains on paper only and is not enforced in practice (“infringers’ havens”).1730  
 
While it would have been possible to establish a provision according to which relief is granted 
in cases of infringement carried out through ubiquitous media by conferring jurisdiction on 
the courts at the place where the injured party has its habitual residence or its centre of 
interests,1731 Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles pursues a different approach in order to 
provide for a solution that adequately meets the requirements of intellectual property rights.  
 
In this respect, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles distinctively points out that it would 
be inappropriate in the context of intellectual property litigation to grant extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to such courts: First, intellectual property cases regularly do not involve an 
element of personal harm or injury1732, and, second, in contrast to the typical situation in 
defamation cases and similar lawsuits with a private party claiming remedies from a media 
company, the relative strength of the parties involved in intellectual property disputes is 
usually equal on both sides, because the victim of the alleged patent infringement normally is 
a company or other commercial actor for which it does not per se constitute an unacceptable 
burden to litigate abroad in order to be able to claim extraterritorial relief.1733 Besides, it must 
be borne in mind that the injured party's centre of interests will regularly be identical with the 
plaintiff's forum, which in the context of international jurisdiction is regarded as an exorbitant 
venue – another reason for the CLIP Principles to reject the solution to confer, with regard to 
cases concerning the infringement of intellectual property rights, jurisdiction on the courts at 
the place where the injured party has its habitual residence or its centre of interests.1734         
 
Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles rather pursues the approach to extend the jurisdiction 
according to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles, i.e. jurisdiction of the courts of the State 
where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur, under certain circumstances in order to 
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avoid an abusive conduct of the alleged infringer.1735 In this respect, three qualifications must 
be fulfilled for such an extension of jurisdiction. First, Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles 
solely applies in case of an infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the 
internet. Second, the impugned activities must not have substantial effect in the State or 
States, where the infringer is habitually resident. According to the Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles, this requirement is meant to address the core of what can typically be characterised 
as abuse: If the alleged infringer does not direct his business to the market in the State where 
he has taken up residence, this could be based on his attempt to evade an efficient pursuit of 
justice or to evade taxation.1736 Third, even in case that an alternative forum can principally be 
established, the venue chosen by the plaintiff must conform to the positive requirement that it 
must be established that either substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement have 
been carried out in the forum State, or that the harm accruing in that State is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its territory. This requirement has been added to ensure that the 
alternative forum has not been chosen arbitrarily.1737   
 
Against Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Proposal, more precisely against the possibility of 
extension of jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles under certain 
conditions, it could be argued that, on the basis of the above proposal regarding an 
amendment of Article 7(2) according to which “as to the infringement of a patent, the harmful 
event solely occurs or may occur in the State where the patent is protected"”, a central 
extraterritorial place of acting would per se lack a particularly close connection to facts and 
evidence with regard to a patent infringement which occurs in another State, and that this 
would apply both concerning singlestate delicts and multistate delicts.1738 In this light, one 
might doubt both the necessity and justification of a provision according to which a court is 
conferred, under whatever conditions, jurisdiction with regard to infringements occurring 
within the territory of another State.    
 
Besides, it has partly been doubted whether, in case that the central activity is undertaken in a 
State where the right is protected and infringed, courts should be conferred a comprehensive 
authority to decide. In this respect, it has been underlined that the infringer could easily 
manipulate jurisdiction by not directing his activity to this State and producing a noticeable 
effect in this State, or even by localising the central place of activity where no patent 
protection exists.1739  
 
Furthermore, one might raise the question why, in the case of patent infringement actions – in 
contrast to other civil and commercial actions regarding torts – such a comprehensive 
authority to decide should be given to the courts.1740 In this regard, it has been underlined that 
in most cases, the central place of acting will be identical with the place where the infringer is 
domiciled, and where courts already have comprehensive jurisdiction, without reference to 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation being necessary. Alternatively, comprehensive 
jurisdiction will exist according to Article 7(5) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1741 
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After all, it has been pointed out that Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not 
pursue the goal to consolidate several actions,1742 in contrast to provisions such as Article 8(1) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which clearly express this objective.1743  
 
However, it is to be emphasised that the aggrieved party at least cannot be expected to sue the 
alleged infringer before the courts in the State of the alleged infringer's domicile, if the latter 
intendedly has resiled to a State where he aimed to escape from efficient litigation.1744 In light 
of this, a provision such as Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles is necessary to adequately 
take into consideration the interest of the allegedly aggrieved party. At the same time, thus 
achieving a balance between the interests of all parties involved,1745 the interests of the 
alleged infringer are adequately respected, too, because Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP 
Principles confers such extended jurisdiction only in a limited number and only under well-
defined circumstances (infringement carried out through ubiquitous media and existence of 
the infringer's domicile and substantial infringing activities in the forum State (a); 
infringement carried out through ubiquitous media and existence of the infringer's domicile 
and proportionally substantial harm in the forum State (b)). By these sophisticated criteria and 
relatively strict prerequisites1746, it should be manageable to prevent procedural abuse of the 
provision which could inadequately disadvantage one party. Actually, the solution laid down 
in Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles takes into account the fundamental actor sequitur 
forum rei principle, which is codified in Article 4(1), in a considerably more distinctive way 
than the ECJ did in its eDate Advertising and Martinez decision. In this decision, the ECJ, by 
reference to Shevill1747, confirmed that 
 
 “(...) the plaintiff always has the option of bringing his entire claim before the courts either of the 
 defendant's domicile or of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established 
 (Shevill and Others, paragraph 32)”1748 
 
and thus formally strengthened the significance of jurisdiction of courts situated at the 
defendant's domicile. However, as this place and the place where the publisher of the 
defamatory publication is established, i.e. the place where the publication has been 
undertaken, will usually be identical, it has rightly been concluded that the factual extension 
of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which goes along with this jurisprudence gains 
only limited practical relevance.1749 On the contrary, the ECJ further relativised the 
importance of the defendant's domicile as a place of jurisdiction when stating that 
 
 “(i)t (...) appears that the internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion relating to distribution, in so far 
 as the scope of the distribution of content placed online is in principle universal. Moreover, it is not 
 always possible, on a technical level, to quantify that distribution with certainty and accuracy in relation 
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 to a particular Member State or, therefore, to assess the damage caused exclusively within that Member 
 State.”1750 
 
On this basis, the ECJ held that  
 
 “(...) given that the impact which material placed online is liable to have on an individual's personality 
 rights might best be assessed by the court of the place where the alleged victim has his centre of 
 interests, the attribution of jurisdiction to that court corresponds to the objective of the sound 
 administration of justice (...). 
 
 The place where a person has his centre of interests corresponds in general to his habitual residence 
 (...).”1751 
 
The ECJ thus accepted a place of jurisdiction at the plaintiff's domicile.1752 This is particularly 
problematic in view of Article 76(1)(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation1753 in conjunction with 
Articles 5(2) and 6(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which exclude the domicile of the 
plaintiff as an element which establishes jurisdiction. However, the ECJ itself – following the 
Advocate General1754 – held in its later Wintersteiger decision that the extension of 
jurisdiction in favour of the place of the plaintiff's domicile (and for this reason problematic in 
view of Article 4(1)) shall not be relevant with regard to intellectual property rights: 
 
 “(...) (A)s the Advocate General pointed out (...), that assessment, made in the particular context of 
 infringements of personality rights, does not apply also to the determination of jurisdiction in respect of 
 intellectual property rights (...) [underscore added].”1755 
 
Besides, it is to be stressed in particular that, in contrast to the situation with regard to 
personality rights, intellectual property rights such as patents generally concern economic 
conflicts between enterprises and other commercial actors.1756 In this respect, there is 
principally no particular need for protection in favour of one party which might justify to set 
aside basic principles of the division of procedural risks.1757 Moreover, the principle of 
predictability which is in particular referred to by the ECJ regarding the infringement of 
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personality rights, cannot serve as an argument in favour of establishing jurisdiction at the 
place of the plaintiff's domicile, because the place of domicile of the alleged infringer is 
equally predicable.1758  
 
While it might be true that Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles, while principally 
balancing the interests of all parties involved, has, as an undesirable side-effect, a tendency to 
privilege such plaintiffs who are resident in large and economically strong States and who 
will frequently be in a position to show that substantial harm was caused on the domestic 
market, a fact that might give them an advantage over plaintiffs who reside in countries where 
the size of market, and accordingly the harm produced, is regularly smaller,1759 it should be 
taken into consideration that this effect is necessarily immanent in any solution attributing a 
certain relevance to the size of the market impact produced by the infringement in its 
entirety.1760 After all, the basic adequacy of the solution chosen in Article 2:203(2) of the 
CLIP Principles cannot be put into question by the latter counterargument.1761     
 
As to the argument of opponents of a rule such as Article 2:203(2) of the CLIP Principles, that 
the infringement of patents through ubiquitous media such as the internet merely concerns 
few particular cases,1762 and that therefore no complex provision should be established for 
those cases,1763 it is to be stated that this argument is not convincing. First of all, in view of a 
constant evolution of information technology, such cases of patent infringement through 
ubiquitous media such as the internet will probably gain more and more importance. Second, 
even if patent infringement through ubiquitous media represented only the minority of patent 
infringement cases, this does not a priori strike against the creation of a rule how to treat such 
cases.  
 
When applied to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it seems preferable to employ the wording of 
the Regulation and therefore replace the notion “habitually resident” with “domiciled” (cf. 
underscores) which, in practice, should not lead to different results. So, in addition to the 
amendment already proposed above, Article 7(2) should be supplemented by the following 
sentences according to the content of Article 2:203 of the CLIP Principles: 
 
 “(...) A court shall have jurisdiction in respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the 
 territory of the State in which that court is situated. In disputes concerned with infringement carried out 
 through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court shall also have jurisdiction in respect of 
 infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, provided that the activities 
 giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the 
 infringer is domiciled and 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety.” 
 
A future Global Judgments Convention should contain a similar provision. 
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3.3.1.6 Final comment and formulation proposal 
 
To conclude and summarise, Article 7(2) should be formulated as follows: 
 
 
 Article 7(2) 
 
 A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 
 
 (...) 
 (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
 occurred or may occur. As to the infringement of a patent, the harmful event solely occurs or may occur 
 in the State where the patent is protected. A court shall have jurisdiction in respect of infringements that 
 occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is situated. In disputes concerned 
 with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court shall also have 
 jurisdiction in respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, 
 provided that the activities giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any 
 of the States, where the infringer is domiciled and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
 
 
A future Global Judgments Convention should be considerably oriented towards Articles 
2:202 (also supplemented by another sentence, written in italics) and 2:203 of the CLIP 
Principles. It would remain to be decided whether the wording “habitually resident” (cf. CLIP 
Principles) or “domiciled” (cf. Brussels Ibis Regulation) would be chosen. The provisions 
could be formulated as follows: 
 
 
Article 2:202: Infringement  
 
In disputes concerned with infringement of an intellectual property right, a person may be sued in the 
courts of the State where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur, unless the alleged infringer has 
not acted in that State to initiate or further the infringement and her/his activity cannot reasonably be 
seen as having been directed to that State. As to the infringement of a patent, the infringement solely 
occurs or may occur in the State where the patent is protected. 
 
 
Article 2:203: Extent of jurisdiction over infringement claims 
 
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, a court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is 
situated. 
 
(2) In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall also have jurisdiction in respect of 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, provided that the activities 
giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the 
infringer is habitually resident [domiciled] and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
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(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
 
 
3.3.2 Extension of jurisdiction at the place of domicile of one of several (alleged) 
infringers due to close connection of the claims 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Identifying the crucial issue 
 
As it has been discussed above, the ECJ adopted a narrow interpretation of Article 6(1) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in its Roche Nederland 
decision and ruled that this provision would not be applicable with respect to the infringement 
of parallel European patents in/for different Member States by different potential infringers, 
even where all potential infringers were part of the same group and acted pursuant to a 
groupwide policy formulated by one member of the group. The ECJ expressly denied the 
existence of a close connection between such infringement actions. Besides, it has been 
mentioned that the ECJ held in its Solvay decision, with regard to the constellation of 
infringement, by several companies from different Member States being sued before a court 
of one of those Member States, of the same national part of a European patent which is in 
force in yet another Member State, that Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is applicable, which may be interpreted as an attenuation of 
the quite restrictive interpretation chosen in Roche Nederland.  
 
Although it has been shown in the foregoing chapter that the restrictive interpretation taken by 
the ECJ in Roche Nederland as to the infringement of parallel European patents was not 
inevitable, i.e. another interpretation would have been possible de lege scripta,1764 it must be 
recognised as a matter of fact, since the ECJ delivered its decision in Roche Nederland in this 
restrictive way, that an amendment of Article 8(1) (respectively its predecessors) as generally 
covering parallel patent infringement actions would require a reformulation of Article 
8(1).1765 Therefore the crucial question which shall be dealt with in the following paragraphs 
is the following: How should an amended version of Article 8(1) be constructed? 
 
In particular, such a provision should make clear without any doubt in which circumstances 
infringement actions concerning the alleged infringement of different parts of a European 
patent (i.e. parallel European patents) are sufficiently closely connected so that the courts at 
the place of domicile of one infringer also have jurisdiction with regard to the other action(s) 
which concern patents granted within respectively for the territory of other States, where the 
patents are being infringed by different infringers. To put it in a nutshell, the criterion of the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments which is addressed in Article 8(1) should be formed more 
precisely, because it is exactly the fact that this criterion can currently be interpreted in 
various ways what produces legal uncertainty (respectively eventual misinterpretations which 
has become obvious in Roche Nederland).   
   
                                                 
1764
 In particular, the spider-in-the-web theory has been illustrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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would make clear that the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Roche Nederland shall be abandoned. It may therefore be 
assumed that the European legislator accepted the interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention and 
did not favour another interpretation. Otherwise it would have been possible to formulate Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation in a different, respectively clarifying way.   
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Likewise, a future Global Judgments Convention should contain a similar provision which 
clearly covers parallel patent infringement actions. The clearer the formulation of such rules 
will be, the smaller will be the risk that inconsistent court decisions, eventually originating 
from different legal backgrounds and traditions, will ultimately thwart the clarifying effect of 
such a rule.   
 
 
3.3.2.2 Existing reform proposals 
 
 
3.3.2.2.1 The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) 
 
Originally, the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (1999) contained, in Article 14, a general provision which resembled to a 
certain extent Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and did not imply specific rules 
with regard to intellectual property: 
 
 “(1) A plaintiff bringing an action against a defendant in a court of the State in which that defendant is 
 habitually resident may also proceed in that court against other defendants not habitually resident in that 
 State if 
 
 (a) the claims against the defendants habitually resident in that State and the other defendants are so 
 closely connected that they should be adjudicated together to avoid the risk of inconsistent 
 judgments (...).” 
 
However, Article 14 was deleted in the Draft Hague Convention on the Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001). The Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) thus does not 




3.3.2.2.2 ALI Principles 
 
Contrary to Article 14 of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters (1999), § 206 (Personal Jurisdiction over Multiple 
Defendants) of the ALI Principles contains rules particularly dealing with intellectual property 
rights. § 206 reads: 
 
 “(1) A plaintiff bringing an action against a person in a State in which that person is resident may also 
 proceed in that State against one or more nonresident defendants if the claims against the resident 
 defendant and such other defendants are so closely connected that they should be adjudicated together 
 to avoid a risk of inconsistent judgments, and if: 
 
 (a) there is a substantial, direct, and foreseeable connection between the forum's intellectual  
 property rights at issue and each nonresident defendant; or   
 (b) as between the forum and the States in which the added defendants are resident, there is no 
 forum that is more closely related to the entire dispute. 
  
 (2) There is a risk of inconsistent judgments if it appears that the ensuing judgments: 
 
 (a) would impose redundant liability; 
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 (b) would conflict in that the judgment in one case would undermine the judgment in another case; 
 or 
 
 (c) would conflict in that a party would not be able to conform its behavior to both judgments. 
 
 (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to any defendant invoking an exclusive choice-of-court agreement 
 with the plaintiff that conforms with § 202. 
 
 (4) If an action is brought in a State on the basis of this Section, then that court has jurisdiction with 
 respect to injuries, wherever occurring, that arise out of the activities that allegedly create the risk of 
 inconsistent judgments.” 
 
Remarkably, the beginning of the text of § 206(1) of the ALI Principles is constructed very 
similarly to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, in that § 206(1) of the ALI Principles 
aims to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments, and the purpose of Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation is to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments, which should be 
considered a rather linguistic subtlety which does not necessitate another legal consideration.  
 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, § 206(1) additionally 
implies, in (a) and (b), two requirements which must be fulfilled alternatively for a 
consolidation of proceedings against multiple defendants. While § 206(1)(a) concerns 
singlestate-delicts, i.e. the infringement of one or more intellectual property rights in one State 
by multiple infringers (defendants), § 206(1)(b) covers the constellation of multistate delicts 
where multiple infringers commit infringements of intellectual property rights in several 
States. Otherwise, § 206(1)(b) would lack an own scope of application besides § 206(1)(a).1766 
In the context of this work, it is thus § 206(1)(b) which is of particular interest.    
 
Due to the both open and negative formulation of § 206(1)(b) of the ALI Principles which 
refers to the inexistence of another forum being more closely connected to the entire dispute 
than the forum in question, the provision covers diverse constellations. According to the 
Comments and Reporters' Notes on § 206 of the ALI Principles, § 206(1)(b) is, on the one 
hand, applicable to the so-called “hub and spoke” respectively “spider in the web” situation 
where multiple defendants agree among themselves to commit acts having infringing effects 
around the world, and are thus involved in conjoined activity. On the other hand, § 206(1)(b) 
of the ALI Principles covers instances where a patent holder is faced with parallel infringing 
activities where no particular actor is dominant and therefore no particular territory can be 
identified as the “hub” of the activity.1767   
 
With accordance to the above addressed need for a clarification in which circumstances there 
is a risk of irreconcilable (inconsistent) judgments, § 206(2) of the ALI Principles contains an 
enumeration of three situations. While this attempt of a definition is to be welcomed at first 
glance, a second sight on § 206(2) of the ALI Principles reveals that exactly the constellation 
of interest here – the parallel infringement of European patents – is not covered by § 206(2) of 
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 P is the holder of parallel European patents on a certain machine for Germany and the 
 Netherlands. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a German company, infringes the German part of the 
 patent and Infringer 2 (INF 2), a Dutch company, commits an infringement of the 
 Dutch part. INF 1 and INF 2 are part of the same group and act pursuant to a 
 groupwide policy formulated by INF 2, the head of the group.  
  
 Case 2: 
 
 P is the holder of parallel European patents on a certain machine for Germany and the 
 Netherlands. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a German company, infringes the German part of the 
 patent and Infringer 2 (INF 2), a Dutch company, commits an infringement of the 
 Dutch part. Although INF 1 and INF 2 are part of the same group, they do not act on 
 the basis of a groupwide policy, but independently from each other. 
 
 
According to § 206(2)(a) of the ALI Principles, there is a risk of inconsistent judgments if it 
appears that the ensuing judgments would impose redundant liability. According to the 
Reporters' Notes on § 206 of the ALI Principles, the purpose of that rule is to convey 
unjustified cumulative liability, sometimes called “multiple liability” or “overlapping 
liability”.1769 In Case 1, there is no risk of such redundant liability because INF 1 is liable only 
for the infringement of the German part of the patent, while the liability of INF 2 merely 
concerns the infringement of the Dutch part of the patent. As the issue of whether INF 1 and 
INF 2 are part of the same group and act on the basis of a groupwide policy, is not relevant in 
this respect, the same result applies to Case 2. 
 
Further, there would be a risk of inconsistent judgments if the ensuing judgments conflicted in 
that the judgment in one case would undermine the judgment in another case (§ 206(2)(b) of 
the ALI Principles). Since, both concerning Case 1 and Case 2, the judgments against INF 1 
and INF 2 deal with different infringements – as to INF 1 the infringement of the German part 
of the patent, and regarding INF 2 the infringement of the Dutch part of the patent – there is a 
priori no danger that the judgments could undermine each other. Besides, the Reporters' 
Notes suggest that § 206(2)(b) of the ALI Principles only applies to singlestate 
infringements1770 when explicating:     
 
 “In the United States, principles of nonmutual issue preclusion and privity are often used to protect 
 litigants from a second suit that undermines the resolution of an earlier dispute (...).”1771 
 
Last but not least there would be a risk of inconsistent judgments if the ensuing judgments 
conflicted in that a party would not be able to conform its behaviour to both judgments         
(§ 206(2)(c) of the ALI Principles). According to the wording (“both judgments”), § 206(2)(c) 
of the ALI Principles presupposes that at least one of the concerned defendants is faced with 
two judgments. In this respect it is not clear in which way this provision is applicable in the 
sample cases, because INF 1 and INF 2 are merely faced with one action each. As a 
consequence, it is logically impossible that the ensuing judgments (against INF 1 and INF 2) 
conflict in that INF 1 or INF 2 would not be able to conform their behaviour to both 
judgments. Although this interpretation has rightly been characterised as “most contradictory” 
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(“äußerst widersprüchlich”)1772, in particular because the Comments and the Reporters' Notes 
on § 206 of the ALI Principles explicitly refer to the constellation of parallel patent 
infringement proceedings and the Roche Nederland decision of the ECJ, the clear wording of 
§ 206(2) of the ALI Principles does not allow another interpretation. As a consequence, it 
must be stated that, although it is to be appreciated that § 206 of the ALI Principles attempts 
to clarify the central issue in which circumstances there is a risk of irreconcilable 
(inconsistent) judgments, the chosen wording does not cover the constellation of the 
infringement of parallel patents through several infringers. Therefore, this approach should be 
rejected.     
 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP Principles) 
 
Like the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, in Article 2:206, provide for a specific rule on 
joint proceedings against multiple defendants. Similarly to § 206 of the ALI Principles (and 
Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles refers to a 
particularly close connection between multiple claims against a number of defendants and the 
avoidance of the risk of “inconsistent”1773 judgments as decisive criteria for the possibility of 
the extension of jurisdiction at the place of domicile of one of several (alleged) infringers to 
claims against other infringers.  
 
Article 2:206 (Multiple defendants) of the CLIP Principles provides: 
  
 
Article 2:206: Multiple defendants 
  
 (1) A person who is one of a number of defendants may also be sued in the courts of the State where 
 any of the defendants is habitually resident, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is 
 appropriate to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of incompatible judgments resulting 
 from separate proceedings. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, a risk of incompatible judgments requires a risk of divergence in 
 the outcome of the actions against the different defendants which arises in the context of essentially the 
 same situation of law and fact. In particular in infringement disputes and subject to the individual 
 circumstances of the case, 
 
 (a) disputes involve essentially the same factual situation if the defendants have, even if in different 
 States, acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy; 
 (b) disputes may involve essentially the same legal situation even if different national laws are 
 applicable to the claims against the different defendants, provided that the relevant national laws 
 are harmonised to a significant degree by rules of a regional economic integration organisation or 
 by international conventions which are applicable to the disputes in question. 
 
 (3) If it is manifest from the facts that one defendant has coordinated the relevant activities or is 
 otherwise most closely connected with the dispute in its entirety, jurisdiction according to paragraph 1 
 is only conferred on the courts in the State where that defendant is habitually resident. In other cases, 
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 jurisdiction is conferred on the courts in the State or States of habitual residence of any of the 
 defendants, unless 
 
 (a) the contribution of the defendant who is habitually resident in the State where the court is 
 located is insubstantial in relation to the dispute in its entirety or 
 
 (b) the claim against the resident defendant is manifestly inadmissible.  
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.1 Avoidance of the risk of incompatible judgments 
 
Similarly to § 206(2) of the ALI Principles, Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles undertakes 
the approach to give an answer to the key question in which circumstances there is a risk of 
incompatible judgments which would be the prerequisite for the consolidation of proceedings 
against multiple defendants. According to Article 2:206(2)1 of the CLIP Principles, such a 
consolidation is only possible if a risk of divergence in the outcome of the actions against 
different defendants exists. This already implies that a joint hearing would help to save time 
or cost or otherwise foster judicial economy.1774 Additionally, Article 2:206(2)1 of the CLIP 
Principles requires that the divergence in outcome must arise “in the context of essentially the 
same situation of law and fact.” The latter formulation has been chosen in reaction to the 
restrictive jurisprudence of the ECJ in Roche Nederland, where the ECJ, following Advocate 
General Léger, held: 
 
 “As the Advocate General observed, in point 113 of his Opinion, in order that decisions may be 
 regarded as contradictory it is not sufficient that there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but 
 that divergence must also arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact [underscore 
 added].”1775 
 
Besides, the formulation chosen in Article 2:206(2)1 of the CLIP Principles adequately takes 
into consideration the Painer decision of the ECJ where the court, deviating from its 
restrictive jurisprudence in Roche Nederland without mentioning this decision,1776 conceded 
by reference to its Freeport decision that  
 
 “(...) in assessing whether there is a connection between different claims, that is to say a risk of 
 irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately, the identical legal bases of the 
 actions brought is only one relevant factor among others. It is not an indispensable requirement for the 
 application of Article 6(1) of Regulation No. 44/2001 (...) [underscore added].”1777   
 
It is in light of this jurisprudence of the ECJ in Painer which is clearly more liberal than the 
court's attitude expressed in Roche Nederland that it is to be considered that Article 2:206(2)2 
of the CLIP Principles further contains, in (a) and (b), certain guidelines as to the 
interpretation of the chosen wording “essentially the same situation of law and fact”. In this 
regard, the official Commentary on the CLIP Principles emphasises the fact that, as the terms 
“in particular” and “subject to the individual circumstances of the case” suggest, Article 
2:206(2)2(a) and (b) of the CLIP Principles does not deliver an exhaustive definition of the 
same factual and legal situation.1778 Moreover, general principles of international jurisdiction, 
in particular the fundamental requirement of foreseeability of jurisdiction for any non-resident 
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co-defendants who are joined to the action (which has again been underlined by the ECJ in 
Painer)1779, must be taken into consideration.1780 This approach is completely in line with the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in Painer where the ECJ stated: 
 
 “It is (...) for the referring court to assess, in the light of all the elements of the case, whether there is a 
 connection between the different claims brought before it, that is to say a risk of irreconcilable 
 judgments if those claims were determined separately [underscore added].”1781  
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.2 The same factual situation 
 
With regard to the requirement of the same factual situation, the ECJ held in Roche Nederland 
that  
 
 “(...) in the case of European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of companies 
 established in various Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States, the 
 existence of the same situation of fact cannot be inferred, since the defendants are different and the 
 infringements they are accused of, committed in different Contracting States, are not the same.”1782 
 
It is noteworthy that the court admitted in Roche Nederland by way of obiter dictum that 
concerning 
 
 “(...) defendant companies, which belong to the same group (and) have acted in an identical or similar 
 manner in accordance with a common policy elaborated by one of them, (...) the factual situation would 
 be the same.”1783 
 
Taking into account this jurisprudence, Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles provides 
that “essentially the same factual situation” shall be existent if the defendants have acted in an 
identical or similar manner, be it in the same State or in different States, and in accordance 
with a common policy. 
 
The prerequisite of identical or at least similar behaviour is based on the fact that, in case of 
different behaviour, it will be doubtful whether infringement can be ascertained. While the co-
defendants may undertake different acts, the infringement must be “identical or similar” in 
that it concerns the same use of the invention which is protected by the same or parallel patent 
right. In contrast, in case of a different use of an invention, a consolidation of actions will not 
be justified because already minor differences may mean that the behaviour of one of the co-
defendants is non-infringing.1784 Besides, in case of a different use of an invention, a 
consolidation of actions would not be foreseeable for the co-defendant who would be sued at 
the other defendant's place of domicile, which would disregard fundamental principles of 
procedural law. It is this need for legal certainty and predictability as to the jurisdiction of the 
courts which is the reason for the additional requirement stated in Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the 
CLIP Principles that the defendants must have acted in accordance with a common policy. If, 
otherwise, jurisdiction could be founded on mere parallel but unconcerted behaviour, a co-
                                                 
1779
 ECJ 1 December 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] ECR I-
12533, paras. 75, 81 – Painer. 
1780
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C07. 
1781
 ECJ 1 December 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] ECR I-
12533, para. 83 – Painer. 
1782
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, para. 27 – Roche Nederland. 
1783
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, para. 34 – Roche Nederland. 
1784
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C09 with further references. 
 368 
defendant could be sued in the courts of another State where someone else, eventually by 
coincidence, may have committed the same act of infringement.1785 The criterion of 
foreseeability must be fulfilled for each non-resident co-defendant, meaning that each of them 
must have known of the behaviour of the resident co-defendant and was in some way linked 
to his activities.1786 While it could be put forth that it will be difficult or almost impossible for 
the plaintiff to prove the existence of such a common policy in order to assert jurisdiction,1787 
this objection might be alleviated by a presumption of a common policy in certain defined 
scenarios, such as corporate groups, joint infringement or an integrated chain of infringers (cf. 
below).1788 In contrast to the ECJ who refers, in Roche Nederland, to a common policy 
elaborated by one of the co-defendants, the CLIP Principles pursue a less restricted approach: 
According to Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles, it shall not be necessary that the 
common policy must have been elaborated by one of the co-defendants. In fact, there is no 
reason why constellations of parallel infringements committed according to a common policy 
should be excluded for the sole reason that no single directing entity has imposed such 
common policy, but rather all participants have consensually agreed to act in this way.1789 
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.2.1 Corporate groups 
 
Even according to the restrictive interpretation of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
chosen by the ECJ in its Roche Nederland decision, the constellation of corporate groups 
where a parent company and its subsidiaries have in different countries infringed the same 
patent or parallel patents that protect the same object would be accepted as the same factual 
situation. As all co-defendants in this constellation form part of the same corporate group, the 
directors of these companies will usually act under the direction of a central managing 
authority and be aware of the parallel behaviour of their sister companies so that a “common 
policy” within the corporate group can be presumed.1790 Due to the mentioned requirements 
of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles, the sister companies must have further acted in 
an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy. The actions of all those 
companies must thus be directed at a certain outcome.1791   
 
The following sample cases (Case 3 and Case 4) may serve for illustration when consolidation 
of actions against co-defendants will be justified due to the fact that the defendants belong to 
a corporate group. 
 
 
 Case 3:  
 
 P holds a European product patent for the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. 
 Infringer 1 (INF 1), a Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, Infringer 2 
 (INF 2), a German company being domiciled in Germany, and Infringer 3 (INF 3), a 
 Belgian company being domiciled in Belgium, being all subsidiaries of the English 
 company A, belong to the same corporate group. Acting according to a common 
                                                 
1785
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C10. 
1786
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C10. 
1787
 This possible objection is admitted by Heinze, cf. Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 
2:206.C10. 
1788
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C10 with references to such presumptions 
developed by the ECJ as to different areas of substantive law. 
1789
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C10. 
1790
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C11. 
1791
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C11. 
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 policy determined by A, INF 1 manufactures a product which infringes the patent right 
 of P, and delivers it to INF 2 and INF 3 who sell the product on the German and 
 Belgian markets. 
 
 
In this constellation the infringements undertaken by INF 1, INF 2 and INF 3 are “identical or 
similar” in that the same use of the invention is concerned which is protected by the same 
patent right. Additionally, INF 1, INF 2 and INF 3 acted in accordance with a common policy. 
The requirements of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles would thus be fulfilled. 
 
 
 Case 4: 
  
 As in Case 1, P holds a European product patent for the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, 
Infringer 2 (INF 2), a German company being domiciled in Germany, and Infringer 3 
(INF 3), a Belgian company being domiciled in Belgium, being all subsidiaries of the 
English company A, belong to the same corporate group. Acting according to a 
common policy determined by A, INF 1 manufactures a product which infringes the 
patent right of P, and delivers it to INF 2 and INF 3 in order to have the product sold 
by INF 2 and INF 3 on the German and Belgian markets. In contrast to the initial 
agreement among the corporate group, INF 2 and INF 3 do not sell the product 
delivered by INF 1, but replace it by another product acquired from the Chinese 
company C and sell this other product on the German and Belgian markets. This 
product infringes the patent right of P, too. Neither A nor INF 1 were aware of these 
activities of INF 2 and INF 3. Can actions against INF 1, INF 2 and INF 3 be 
consolidated at the seat of INF 1? 
 
 
In this constellation, the infringements undertaken by INF 1 on the one hand, and INF 2 and 
INF 3 on the other hand, are not “identical or similar” in that a different use of the invention is 
concerned regardless of the fact that the same patent right is affected. Despite the existence of 
a common policy among the corporate group, a consolidation of actions against INF 1, INF 2 
and INF 3 at the seat of INF 1 would not be possible on the basis of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of 
the CLIP Principles, because the infringing activities of INF 2 and INF 3 deviate from the 
agreement among the corporate group. 
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.2.2 Joint infringement 
 
As has been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, the constellation in which several parties 
have collaborated in carrying out a joint infringement is another example of “essentially the 
same factual situation”.1792 In that constellation, it can be presumed that the co-defendants 
will be aware of the behaviour of the other co-defendants that form part of a common plan. 
Unlike the situation with regard to the scenario of corporate groups, such a formally legal 
connection is not required, but the existence of the common plan to infringe another one's 
patent is sufficient. As a consequence, the mere participation in such a plan already justifies 
                                                 
1792
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C12; Heinze 2007, p. 239; Franzosi (2009)4(4) 
J.I.P.L.P. 247, at p. 254; Fawcett & Torremans 2011, para. 5.143: “joint tortfeasors” infringing the same 
intellectual property right. 
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the consolidation of the actions against the co-defendants in the place where one of them is 
domiciled.1793 The following sample case may serve for illustration of this scenario. 
 
 
 Case 5: 
 
P holds a European product patent for the Netherlands and Germany. Infringer 1   
(INF 1), a Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, manufactures a product 
 which infringes the patent right of P, and sells it in Germany with the support of 
 Infringer 2 (INF 2), a German company domiciled in Germany. 
 
 
In this constellation, the infringements undertaken by INF 1 and INF 2 are “identical or 
similar” in that the same use of the invention is concerned which is protected by the same 
patent right.  
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.2.3 Chain of infringers 
 
The third scenario of patent infringement cases mentioned in the foregoing chapter in which 
“essentially the same factual situation” is existent consists in the constellation of a successive 
chain of infringers. While each party may have a specific role in the chain and, as a 
consequence, undertakes a specific infringing activity, they all act “in an identical or similar 
manner” in that another one's patent right is used by the infringers at different levels of the 
same infringement chain.1794 However, due to the clear wording of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the 
CLIP Principles, a consolidation of actions against the infringers which form part of such an 
infringement chain, requires that the respective infringers have acted in accordance with a 
common policy. In this respect, it has rightly been pointed out in the Commentary on the 
CLIP Principles that the connection by a common policy must exist between the resident 




 Case 6: 
 
 P holds a product patent for the Netherlands and Germany. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a 
 Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, manufactures a product which 
 infringes the patent right of P. Infringer 2 (INF 2), a German company being 
 domiciled in Germany, imports the product into Germany. Infringer 3 (INF 3), a 
 German wholesaler domiciled in Germany, acquires the product from INF 2 in order 
 to sell it to a German  retailer. Infringer 4 (INF 4), a German retailer domiciled in 
 Germany, acquires the product from INF 3 and sells it to a German end-user.  
 
 While INF 1, INF 2, and INF 3 are fully aware of all steps of the respective 
 distribution chain and agree with it, INF 4 only knows INF 3 and does not dispose of 
 any further information, because INF 3 refuses to inform INF 4 about the distribution 
 chain as he fears that INF 4 could directly acquire such products from INF 2 for a 
                                                 
1793
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C12; Grabinski (2001)50(3) GRUR Int. 199, at p. 
207. 
1794
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C13. 
1795
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C13. 
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 lower price than INF 4 has to pay to INF 3. INF 1 and INF 2 do not know INF 4 and 
 his business activities either. 
 
 
Could infringement proceedings initiated by P against INF 1, INF 2, INF 3 and INF 4 be 
consolidated at the place of domicile of one of the infringers?  
 
To answer this question, it is relevant whether INF 1, INF 2, INF 3 and INF 4 have acted in 
accordance with a common policy. The activities of INF 1, INF 2 and INF 3 who are fully 
aware of all steps of the distribution chain and agree with it, complement each other in setting 
up a distribution system. In such circumstances, it has been rightly underlined that a “common 
policy” may be assumed,1796 in particular where two participants in the chain directly interact, 
with the result that they can be sued at the place of each other’s domicile.1797 On this basis, 
infringement actions initiated by P against INF 1, INF 2 and INF 3 could be consolidated at 
the place of domicile of one of these co-defendants. In contrast to this, in case that one co-
defendant has no information or control regarding the chain of supply beyond his immediate 
partner, holding him accountable in the courts where other participants in the distribution 
chain have their domicile would disregard the requirement of foreseeability.1798 Therefore, 
INF 4 may not be sued at the place of domicile of INF 1 or INF 2. Reversely, INF 1 and INF 
2 may not be sued at INF 4’s place of domicile either, because the presumption of a common 
policy between INF 1 and INF 2 on the one hand, and INF 4 on the other hand, fails due to the 
fact that both sides do not know each other and each other’s activities. In contrast, INF 4 and 
INF 3 know each other and each other's activities. Therefore a consolidation of infringement 
actions against INF 3 and INF 4 at the place of domicile of INF 3 or INF 4 would be possible.     
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.2.4 Unconcerted parallel infringements 
 
Besides, it is to be considered that it is conceivable that there are several chains of infringers 
which act independently from each other. Inasmuch as such different chains of infringers are 
concerned, a consolidation of actions against several defendants is not possible due to the 
absence of any activity in accordance with a common policy. Accounting the infringing acts 
of infringers who have acted in the framework of another chain of infringers would mean to 
clearly disregard the principle of foreseeability of jurisdiction in favour of each co-defendant 
who must be enabled to foresee that he can be sued in the forum where the anchor defendant’s 
domicile is situated.1799 In this respect, recourse may be had to the above cited jurisprudence 
of the ECJ in Roche Nederland where the court suggested that 
  
“(...) in the case of European patent infringement proceedings involving a number of companies 
 established in various Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States, the 
 existence of the same situation of fact cannot be inferred, since the defendants are different and the 
 infringements they are accused of, committed in different Contracting States, are not the same 
[underscore added].”1800 
 
                                                 
1796
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C13; Rößler (2007)38(4) IIC 380, at pp. 393-394. 
1797
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C13; Lüthi 2011, para. 899. 
1798
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C13, referring to Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage 23 
August 2007, Bacardi & Company Limited v Food Brokers B.V. and Others, available at WWW 
<http://oami.europa.eu/pdf/natcourt/Bacardi-Bat_Beverage.pdf>, para. 13 – Bacardi.  
1799
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C14. 
1800
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, para. 27 – Roche Nederland. 
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Further, Advocate General Trstenjak insistently explicated in her Opinion in the Painer case: 
 
“(…) A minimum requirement for a single factual situation must (…) be that it is at least clear to a 
defendant that he may be sued, as the co-defendant of an anchor defendant, under Article 6(1) of the 
[Brussels I] Regulation, at a court in the place where that anchor defendant is domiciled.  
 
That minimum requirement is not satisfied where the facts on which the applicant bases its anchor claim 
and the other claim are such that the conduct of the anchor defendant and of the other defendant 
concerns the same or similar legal interests of the applicant and is similar in nature, but occurs 
independently and without knowledge of one another. In such a case of unconcerted parallel conduct, it 
is not sufficiently predictable for the other defendant that he can also be sued, under Article 6(1) of the 
[Brussels I] Regulation, at a court in the place where the anchor defendant is domiciled [underscore and 
content in brackets added].”1801  
 
According to the principle of predictability, the existence of “essentially the same factual 
situation” thus requires that the infringements by the anchor defendant and the co-defendant 
do not occur independently and without any knowledge of one another.1802  
 
The following sample case may serve for illustration.         
 
 
 Case 7: 
 
 P holds a product patent for the Netherlands and Germany. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a 
 Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, manufactures a product which 
 infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the Dutch market. Infringer 2 (INF 2), a 
 German company being domiciled in Germany, also manufactures such a product that 
 infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the German market. INF 1 and INF 2 do 
 not know each other and act completely independently from each other. 
 
 
In this constellation, it would certainly be contrary to the principle of predictability of 
jurisdiction and thus irreconcilable with the principle of legal certainty if INF 1 could be sued 
together with INF 2 at INF 2's place of domicile or vice versa.  
  
 
3.3.2.2.3.2.5 Further constellations of “essentially the same situation of fact” 
 
According to the Commentary on the CLIP Principles, there shall additionally be room left for 
other constellations of “essentially the same situation of fact”. In this regard, the Commentary 
on the CLIP Principles explicitly mentions the scenario that a potential infringer of a patent 
right who plans a market entry in a specific market initiates an action for a declaration of non-
infringement against both the patent holder and its exclusive licensee. The strict wording of 
Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles would not effect that these actions can be 
consolidated, because the sued patent holder and his exclusive licensee have not acted in an 
identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy. However, one should 
consider that the criteria of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles which focus on the 
                                                 
1801
 Advocate General 12 April 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer – Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] 
ECR I-12540, paras. 91-92 – Painer. 
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 Cf. also Rößler (2007)38(4) IIC 380, at p. 393; Lüthi 2011, para. 864. The Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles adds that a (limited) consolidation for unconcerted parallel conduct is possible via infringement 
jurisdiction (Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles) if both co-defendants have infringed the same national 
intellectual property right, cf. Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C14, there fn. 30. 
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activity of the co-defendants (as alleged infringers) are per se not suitable in the constellation 
of an action for a declaration of non-infringement, because in case of such an action brought 
by the alleged infringer, the focus of the dispute will lie on the activity of the plaintiff. 
Nonetheless, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles is to be confirmed in as much as one 
should recognise that the actions against the patent holder and the exclusive licensee concern 
(essentially) the same situation of fact: both actions deal with the central question of whether 
the plaintiff infringed the concerned patent.1803 Such a broad interpretation can be founded on 
the broad and open wording of Article 2:206(2)2 of the CLIP Principles, according to which 
“the individual circumstances of the case” are to be taken into consideration. This formulation 
will enable the constellation of actions for a declaration of non-infringement to be covered by 
Article 2:206(2) of the CLIP Principles. 
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.3 The same legal situation 
 
To recall, Article 2:206(2)1 of the CLIP Principles provides that a risk of incompatible 
judgments the avoidance of which is the purpose of a consolidation of actions against multiple 
defendants according to Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles, requires a risk of divergence in 
the outcome of the actions against different defendants arising in the context not only of 
essentially the same factual situation, but also essentially the same situation of law. Article 
2:206(2)2(b) of the CLIP Principles deals with the issue in which circumstances there is 
(essentially) the same legal situation.  
 
First of all, it is to be underlined that two different constellations can be distinguished in 
which the existence of the same situation of law can be excluded so that a consolidation of 
actions will not be possible. On the one hand, the divergence of applicable laws may exclude 
the same legal situation. On the other hand, it is conceivable that a divergence of the legal 
bases of the concerned actions may lead to this result. 
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.3.1 Divergence of applicable laws 
 
Obviously in reaction to the different jurisprudence of the ECJ in Roche Nederland (but, 
remarkably, in line with the court's finding in Painer), Article 2:206(2)(b) of the CLIP 
Principles states that the fact that different national laws are applicable to the claims against 
the different defendants, does not per se mean that disputes do not involve “essentially the 
same legal situation”.  
 
In its Roche Nederland decision, the ECJ restrictively held that 
 
 “(...) any action for infringement of a European patent must be examined in the light of the relevant 
 national law in force in each of the States for which it has been granted. 
 
 It follows that, where infringement proceedings are brought before a number of courts in different 
 Contracting States in respect of a European patent granted in each of those States, against defendants 
 domiciled in those States in respect of acts allegedly committed in their territory, any divergences 
 between the decisions given by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of the same legal 
 situation [underscores added].”1804 
 
                                                 
1803
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C15.  
1804
 ECJ 13 July 2006, C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, 
[2006] ECR I-06535, paras. 30-31 – Roche Nederland. 
 374 
In contrast (without mentioning its finding in Roche Nederland, but referring to its Freeport 
decision), the ECJ stated in Painer in a remarkably more liberal way: 
 
 “(...) (I)n assessing whether there is a connection between two different claims, that is to say a risk of 
 irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately, the identical legal bases of the 
 actions brought is only one relevant factor among others. It is not an indispensable requirement for the 
 application of Article 6(1) of Regulation 44/2001 (...).  
 
 Thus, a difference in legal basis between the actions brought against the various defendants, does not, in 
 itself, preclude the application of Article 6(1) of Regulation 44/2001, provided however that it was 
 foreseeable by the defendants that they might be sued in the Member State where at least one of them is 
 domiciled (...) [underscores added].”1805 
 
This finding is in line with the Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak who underlined that 
inconsistencies between two judgments based on different substantive laws do not necessarily 
result from the applicable substantive law, but that 
 
 “(...) there may also be differences which can be attributed to the fact that two courts, which are 
 applying an essentially comparable legal criterion, reach different conclusions because they appraise the 
 facts differently [underscore added].”1806    
 
Furthermore, the Advocate General emphasised the fact that  
 
 “(...) even in a field which is not fully harmonised, certain minimum requirements may nevertheless 
 have been harmonised. Even with actions to which different national laws are applicable, such a case 
 may ultimately be governed by the same law in substance, the common requirements of Union law.”1807  
 
Besides, Advocate General Trstenjak referred to the constellation of contingent liability when 
arguing against the need of the applicability of the same law to the anchor claim and the other 
claim. She reasoned: 
 
 “(...) In a case of contingent liability (alternative liability) in which one of the defendants is liable only 
 where the other defendant is not liable, there is (...) a clear interest that the case is decided by the same 
 court in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments. In such a case, the legal connection between 
 both claims is not dependent on whether the same law is applicable to both claims.”1808 
 
In line with the latter part of the Opinion, it is to be recognised that, in the constellation of 
alternative liability, there is indeed – regardless whether or not the same law applies to the 
concerned claims – a clear interest in having such a case decided by one court, because 
irreconcilable judgments would be rendered if one court decides that the defendant who is the 
primary liable party is not liable for whatever reason, while the other court decides that the 
second defendant, who is the secondary liable party, is not liable because, in its view, the 
primary liable party should have been held liable.1809 Interestingly, the Commentary on the 
CLIP Principles refers to this passage of the Advocate General’s Opinion merely in 
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 ECJ 1 December 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] ECR I-
12533, paras. 80-81 – Painer. 
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 Advocate General 12 April 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer – Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] 
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ECR I-12540, para. 83 – Painer. 
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 Advocate General 12 April 2011, C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer – Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, [2011] 
ECR I-12540, para. 83, there fn. 33 – Painer. 
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conjunction with the discussion of the second constellation where essentially the same legal 
situation may lack, the constellation where several actions are founded on different legal 
bases (governed by the same law or different laws).      
 
The formulation of Article 2:206(2)2(b) of the CLIP Principles according to which disputes 
may involve essentially the same legal situation even if different national laws are applicable 
to the claims against the different defendants, provided that the relevant national laws are 
harmonised to a significant degree by rules of a regional economic integration organisation or 
by international conventions which are applicable to the disputes in question, must not be 
misunderstood as to prescribe that as soon as significant harmonisation has taken place the 
criterion of “essentially the same legal situation” has to be affirmatively found. Article 
2:206(2)2(b) of the CLIP Principles rather aims to clarify that the existence of different 
national laws being applicable to the claims is not per se an obstacle for consolidation under 
Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles.1810 Whether or not an achieved harmonisation is 
sufficient to overcome legal differences resulting from different national laws, will generally 
have to be evaluated on a case-to-case basis. However, in order to avoid courts having to 
undergo an extensive comparative law analysis in each case, and to strengthen legal certainty, 
the Commentary on the CLIP Principles proposes to presume that certain scenarios involve 
“essentially the same legal situations”.1811 With regard to intellectual property rights, the 
Commentary on the CLIP Principles particularly mentions the constellations that the action 
concerns a uniform Community right1812 or harmonisation has been reached under the 
European Patent Convention (EPC), provided that the case concerns parallel patents and 
focuses on issues which are intended to be interpreted uniformly, which is the case with 
regard to the scope of a European patent according to Article 69 of the EPC.1813      
 
The following sample case may serve for illustration.         
 
 
 Case 8: 
 
 P holds a European product patent which is designated for the Netherlands and 
 Germany. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, 
 manufactures a product which infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the Dutch 
 market. Infringer 2 (INF 2), a German company being domiciled in Germany, also 
 manufactures such a product that infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the 
 German market. P sues INF 1 and INF 2 for the infringement of his patent. In both 
 actions, the scope of the patent is contested.  
 
Independently of the question of whether both actions concern essentially the same factual 
situation – with regard to this issue cf. the explications made above – it is, in any case, to be 
stated that both actions affect essentially the same legal situation inasmuch as the issue of the 
scope of the European patent is concerned.   
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C18. 
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 More sceptical, enumerating a multitude of aspects which have not been harmonised (yet), which results in 
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3.3.2.2.3.3.2 Divergence of legal bases of actions 
 
As mentioned earlier, a second constellation where the existence of essentially the same legal 
situation can be excluded is the constellation that the actions against several defendants are 
founded on different legal bases, for instance contract and tort, be it that the same law is 
applicable, be it that the actions are governed by different laws.1814 
In its Freeport decision, the ECJ made clear that the assessment whether there is a close 
connection between the claims against the anchor defendant and the co-defendant, will be 
undertaken, if appropriate, by taking into account on which legal bases the concerned actions 
are founded: 
 
 “It is for the national court to assess whether there is a connection between the different claims brought 
 before it, that is to say, a risk of irreconcilable judgments if those claims were determined separately 
 and, in that regard, to take account of all the necessary factors in the case-file, which may, if appropriate 
 yet without its being necessary for the assessment, lead it to take into consideration the legal bases of 
 the actions brought before that court [underscores added].”1815  
 
The Commentary on the CLIP Principles rightly mentions, as an example of a constellation in 
which the legal connection between two claims is so close that the requirement of “essentially 
the same legal situation” is likely to be fulfilled, the situation that the outcome of one claim 
depends on the outcome of another claim.1816 In this respect, recourse shall be had again to 
Advocate General Trstenjak's Opinion in Painer where she explicated with regard to the 
constellation of contingent liability (alternative liability):  
 
 “(...) In a case of contingent liability (alternative liability) in which one of the defendants is liable only 
 where the other defendant is not liable, there is (...) a clear interest that the case is decided by the same 
 court in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments. In such a case, the legal connection between 
 both claims is not dependent on whether the same law is applicable to both claims [underscore 
 added].”1817 
 
As has been stressed above, it is evident, in the constellation of alternative liability, that there 
is a strong interest of having such a case decided by one court, in order to avoid irreconcilable 
judgments which could arise if a court decides that the defendant who is the primary liable 
party is not liable for whatever reason, while another court decides that the other defendant, 
who is the secondary liable party, is not liable because, in its view, the primary liable party 
should have been held liable.1818  
 
The following sample case may serve for illustration.         
 
 
 Case 9: 
 
P holds a European product patent for the Netherlands. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a Dutch 
company being domiciled in the Netherlands, manufactures a product which allegedly 
infringes P’s patent, and sells it to Infringer 2 (INF 2), an English wholesaler being 
domiciled in England. INF 2 sells the product on the English market. P sues INF 1 for 
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infringement of his patent before a Dutch court. Additionally, P sues INF 2 for 
infringement of his patent, too, before an English court. 
 
 
In this constellation, the Dutch and the English court deciding independently from each other, 
it might happen that the invoked Dutch court decides that INF 1 is not liable for patent 
infringement, while the English court finds that INF 2 is not liable for infringement of P’s 
patent either, because, according to the evaluation of the English court, INF 1 should have 
been held fully liable. The judgments are irreconcilable insofar as P will not be compensated 
at all, although the liability of INF 2 was denied on the only reason that solely INF 1 should 
have been held liable. 
 
Besides cases of alternative liability, Advocate General Trstenjak explicated, in her Opinion 
in Painer, that  
 
 “(...) a sufficiently close legal connection exists in particular where the defendants are jointly and 
 severally liable, [or where] co-owners or a community of rights [are affected] [underscore and content 
 in brackets added].”1819   
 
The Commentary on the CLIP Principles rightly mentions the further case that defendants in 
two different countries participate in a single form of infringement.1820 In this respect, it is to 
be pointed out that Advocate General Trstenjak rightly emphasised that further constellations 
are conceivable in which a close connection between several actions exists: 
 
“(…) It should be pointed out, finally, that the abovementioned examples of a sufficiently close 




3.3.2.2.3.4 The competent court according to Article 2:206(3) of the CLIP Principles 
 
According to the main rule in Article 2:206(1) of the CLIP Principles, multiple co-defendants 
can be sued at the place of domicile of any co-defendant if the claims are sufficiently closely 
connected. Despite the positive aspects of that rule and its justification as described above, its 
strict application without any restriction would lead to overly broad jurisdiction over non-
resident co-defendants in cases where the action against the anchor defendant would be 
manifestly inadmissible or where the action against the anchor defendant would concern only 
an insignificant part of the dispute.1822 In this respect, it is to be borne in mind that 
consolidating several actions at the place of domicile of one defendant is an exception to the 
rule of forum defensoris (actor sequitur forum rei principle) according to which the courts at 
each defendant's domicile have jurisdiction as to the action concerning the defendant being 
domiciled in the forum State. Suing a defendant at another place than his domicile needs a 
particular justification. The consolidation of actions is therefore only justified in case that 
there is a sufficiently close connection between the actions.  
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On the other hand, it seems appropriate to confer jurisdiction with regard to several concerned 
actions on that court where one of several defendants has coordinated infringement activities 
in which other co-defendants are involved as well. Accordingly, a concentration should (only) 
be possible where the action against the anchor defendant is so strong and significant for the 
dispute in its entirety that it justifies pulling the non-resident defendants into that forum.1823 
 
Article 2:206(3) of the CLIP Principles thus pursues the approach of combining these ideas in 
a twofold approach aiming to restrict the consolidation of proceedings and balancing the 
concerned interests.    
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.4.1 First restriction: Predominant role of one of the co-defendants 
 
According to Article 2:206(3)1 of the CLIP Principles, the courts of the State of domicile of 
one of several co-defendants who has manifestly coordinated the relevant (infringement) 
activities or is otherwise most closely connected with the dispute in its entirety shall be 
conferred jurisdiction. This restriction has obviously been inspired by the spider-in-the-web 
doctrine which has initially been developed by Dutch courts.1824 However, in contrast to the 
original spider-in-the-web rule, Article 2:206(3)1 of the CLIP Principles is constructed in a 
more moderate and balanced way in that jurisdiction is only vested in the courts of the State 
where the coordinator of the activities is resident if it is manifest from the facts that he has 
coordinated the concerned (infringement) activities.1825 In case of doubt whether there is a 
defendant who played such a predominant, coordinating role, a consolidation of actions will 
not be possible, meaning that each defendant will have to be sued before the courts of the 
State where he is domiciled.1826 The chosen formulation takes into account a potentially 
sceptical and reluctant attitude of the ECJ towards the spider-in-the-web concept which could 
be based on the fact that legal uncertainty might be created as to whether, respectively by 
whom such activities are coordinated.1827   
 
 
3.3.2.2.3.4.2 Second restriction: No consolidation of actions in certain constellations 
where a connection is deemed not to be strong enough 
 
On the other hand, consolidation of proceedings against several defendants at the place of 
domicile of one co-defendant is not justified in case that the action against the anchor 
defendant is not strong and important enough in relation to the dispute in its entirety or if the 
claim against the resident defendant is obviously inadmissible. Therefore, Article 
2:206(3)2(a) and (b) of the CLIP Principles contains a restriction of a consolidation on a 
second level, providing that jurisdiction by way of a consolidation of proceedings will not be 
conferred on courts in a State where only insubstantial contributions in relation to the dispute 
in its entirety have been made or where the claim against the resident defendant is manifestly 
inadmissible. In the first case, the undesirable effects of actual incompatible judgments are 
restricted because the contribution of the anchor defendant is insignificant.1828 In the case of 
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procedural inadmissibility of the action against the anchor defendant, a risk of incompatible 
judgments is excluded because the action against the anchor defendant will be held 
inadmissible, and therefore will be rejected for procedural reasons, meaning that no judgment 
on the merits will be rendered and thus no conflicting judgments can be produced.1829 The 
objective of the provision of Article 2:206(3)2(a) and (b) of the CLIP Principles is to exclude 
such cases from consolidation in which consolidation of actions serves the purpose to deprive 
one of the defendants of the jurisdiction of the courts of his State of domicile.1830    
 
However, it has been discussed controversially by legal commentators – starting from the 
Reisch Montage decision of the ECJ – whether the admissibility of an action may be 
considered a prerequisite for a consolidation of several actions before the court where this 
action has been brought.  
 
In its Reisch Montage decision, the ECJ stated that 
 
 “(...) Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 may be relied on in the context of an action brought in a 
 Member State against a defendant domiciled in that State and a co-defendant domiciled in another 
 Member State even when that action is regarded under a national provision as inadmissible from the 
 time it is brought in relation to the first defendant.”1831  
 
In order to reason its point of view, the ECJ in particular referred to the aspect of legal 
certainty by predictability 
 
 “(...) as to enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts other 
 than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued (...)”1832 
 
and to the doctrine of an autonomous interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), which does not allow having recourse to national law: 
 
 “It is settled case-law that the provisions of the regulation must be interpreted independently, by 
 reference to its scheme and purpose (...).”1833  
 
However, as to the argumentation used by the ECJ based on the idea of legal certainty by 
predictability, it is to be stressed that the basic principle of legal certainty respectively 
predictability has been established in favour of the defendant. Consequently, it does not seem 
justified to apply this principle to found such jurisdiction of a court which is prejudicial for 
the defendant, because it concerns the jurisdiction of courts other than those at the place of 
domicile of the defendant.1834  
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Besides, as to the second argument of the ECJ (no recourse to national law due to the doctrine 
of an autonomous interpretation), it should be borne in mind that the ECJ already decided in 
Kalfelis that national law will be relevant to examine whether, in the individual 
circumstances, there is a (real) risk of irreconcilable judgments, i.e. a (real) risk of 
contradiction, which is to be avoided:1835 
 
 “The rule laid down in Article 6(1) [of the Brussels Convention] therefore applies where the actions 
 brought against the various defendants are related when the proceedings are instituted, that is to say 
 where it is expedient to hear and determine them together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable 
 judgments resulting from separate proceedings. It is for the national court to verify in each individual 
 case whether that condition is satisfied [content in brackets added].”1836 
 
Additionally, the ECJ admitted, in Réunion Européenne, by reference to its earlier decision in 
Kongress Agentur Hagen1837, to have recourse to the lex fori as far as the effet utile of the 
Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation) will not be impaired: 
 
“(…) As regards procedural rules, reference must be made to the national rules applicable by the 
national court (Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR I-1845, paragraphs 18 and 19).  
 
However, the application of national procedural rules may not impair the effectiveness of the [Brussels] 
Convention. A court may not apply conditions of admissibility laid down by national law which would 
have the effect of restricting the application of the rules of jurisdiction laid down in the [Brussels] 
Convention (Hagen, paragraph 20) [content in brackets added].”1838  
 
After all, it must be considered that the distinct separation between the inadmissibility of an 
action pursuant to provisions of national law, and the issue of jurisdiction which is determined 
by the Brussels Ibis Regulation, has been set aside in the framework of Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation by the requirement of a close connection. The question of whether 
there is the risk of incompatible judgments can actually only be answered by having at least 
complementary recourse to provisions of national procedural and substantive law.1839 This has 
also been recognised by the ECJ in its Roche Nederland decision when the court denied the 
existence of a connection between actions concerning the infringement of different parts of a 
European patent (as a bundle of national patents), because the potential infringement of each 
part of the European patent in the protection States must be examined by the respective 
national law of these States. In this respect, the court clearly explicated:    
 
 “In particular, it is apparent from Article 64(3) of the Munich Convention that any action for 
 infringement of a European patent must be examined in the light of the relevant national law in force in 
 each of the States for which it has been granted.  
 
 It follows that, where infringement proceedings are brought before a number of courts in different 
 Contracting States in respect of a European patent granted in each of those States, against defendants 
 domiciled in those States in respect of acts allegedly committed in their territory, any divergences 
 between the decisions given by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of the same legal 
 situation.  
  
 Any diverging decisions could not, therefore, be treated as contradictory. 
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 In those circumstances, even if the broadest interpretation of ‘irreconcilable’ judgments, in the sense of 
 contradictory, were accepted as the criterion for the existence of the connection required for the 
 application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention, it is clear that such a connection could not be 
 established between actions for infringement of the same European patent where each action was 
 brought against a company established in a different Contracting State in respect of acts which it had 
 committed in that State [underscores added].”1840  
 
Parts of legal doctrine have put forth, starting from the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Reisch 
Montage, that a consolidation of actions generally does not depend on the admissibility of the 
anchor action, however apart from the constellation that the anchor action is inadmissible for 
the very reason that the invoked court has no local or international jurisdiction with respect to 
the defendant allegedly being domiciled at the forum.1841 This restriction is based on the 
consideration that Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation premises that one of several co-
defendants is domiciled at the place where the invoked court is situated, whereas the 
plaintiff’s mere assertion that the defendant is domiciled at the forum is not sufficient.1842 In 
this respect, it is to be emphasised that Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not 
only concern the international, but also the local jurisdiction with regard to an action raised 
against defendants not domiciled in the forum State, and also determines this jurisdiction 
synchronously with the local jurisdiction, to be determined by the lex fori, with regard to 
actions against defendants who have their domiciles at the place where the deciding court is 
located. Consequently, it would be contradictory to the goals of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
of the sound administration of justice and local proximity between the deciding court and the 
facts (which has also been codified in Recital 16 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation)1843 if another 
court was competent with accordance to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation than the 
court at the place of domicile of the defendant domiciled in the forum State.1844 
 
Other legal commentators have, in a more or less resolute way,1845 rejected such a restrictive 
point of view, and have pointed out that it would go too far to generally apply Article 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) regardless of the inadmissibility of 
the anchor action. In regard of this, it is indeed to be recognised that the plaintiff could 
otherwise, by arbitrarily initiating proceedings before a court in a State where one defendant 
has his domicile, deprive the other defendants of the jurisdiction of the courts at their domicile 
and thus force them to be judged before a foreign court, while the plaintiff knows right from 
the start that no decision on the merits will be rendered against the anchor defendant because 
the action against him will be found inadmissible. In this constellation, it is to be underlined 
that actually no conflicting judgments can be produced.1846 On the basis of the foregoing, it 
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has rightly been postulated that Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its 
predecessors) should not be applicable if the anchor action is ipso iure obviously 
inadmissible.1847 In light of these different positions, it seems that Article 2:206(3)2(b) of the 
CLIP Principles represents a reasonable compromise, when excluding a consolidation of 
proceedings (only) if the claim against the anchor defendant is manifestly inadmissible.  
 
In general, Article 2:206(3)2(a) and (b) of the CLIP Principles have been constructed in a way 
to limit the potential for forum shopping in that these provisions contain strict requirements: 
consolidation of proceedings in a State is excluded only if the contribution of the resident 
defendant is insubstantial in relation to the dispute in its entirety, respectively if it is manifest 
that the claim against the resident defendant is inadmissible. Although it could be put forth 
that the introduction of vague terms such as “insubstantial in relation to the dispute in its 
entirety” and “manifestly inadmissible” entails the danger of legal uncertainty because they 
establish, in theory, the possibility of multiple interpretations which might lead to the result 
that any adept wording merely provides a pretended legal certainty and predictability, such 
criticism ultimately goes astray for several reasons. First of all, any wording finally 
establishes the possibility of an interpretation by the ECJ which means the chance of ultimate 
clarification. Further, as the Commentary on the CLIP Principles has rightly mentioned, a 
concept such as “manifestly inadmissible” has already been established in other areas of 
European law, such as Articles 92(1) and 119 of the ECJ's own rules of procedure, where it 
seems to be applied on a regular basis.1848 Moreover, it is to be underlined that the problems 
which are currently hidden in Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are equally virulent 
today.1849 Last but not least, the expressions “manifestly inadmissible” and “insubstantial in 
relation to the dispute in its entirety” which admittedly need further interpretation bear the 
advantage of being objective criteria, in contrast to the subjective and therefore even more 
uncertain concept of “abuse of jurisdiction”.  
 
 
3.3.2.2.4 The Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 
 
Like the CLIP Principles, the Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 
advocates the amendment of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), taking into consideration the ECJ’s jurisprudence, especially its 
Roche Nederland decision. The creators of the Heidelberg Report proposed to redraft Article 
6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) by including a 
special provision relating to intellectual property matters as follows: 
 
 “(1a) where he is one of a number of defendants engaging in coordinated activities resulting, or 
 threatening to result, in infringement of intellectual property rights whose contents are determined by 
 the same rule of law enshrined in secondary Community legislation or in international conventions to 
 which all EU Member States have adhered, in the courts of the country where the defendant 
 coordinating the activities or otherwise having the closest connection with the infringement in its 
 entirety is domiciled.”1850 
 
In formal respect, it has rightly been annotated in legal doctrine that it would have been  
preferable to name this proposed amendment of the text of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation as “Article 6(1b)”, while renaming the original provision of Article 6(1) of the 
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Brussels I Regulation as “Article 6(1a)”.1851 Nonetheless, such justified criticism should not 
be conceded too much importance.1852    
 
The creators of the Heidelberg Report explicitly refer to the CLIP Proposal, explicating that  
 
 “(t)he proposal of the CLIP is to adopt, by explicit terms, the Dutch “spider in the web” theory and to 
 include into Article 6 JR a special provision relating to intellectual property matters”,1853 
 
whereas it is not true that the Heidelberg Report pleads for an explicit adoption of the CLIP 
Proposal.1854 In any case, the proposal made by the Heidelberg Report differs significantly 
from the CLIP Proposal. This shall be subject to the following discussion.  
 
In contrast to Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles, the proposed amendment of Article 6(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation contained in the Heidelberg Report does not imply any hints, let 
alone clarification, as to the question in which circumstances there is a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments resulting from separate proceedings which shall be avoided by a consolidation of 
proceedings. Rather, the amendment proposed in the Heidelberg Report consists in the 
creation of a special provision for constellations of infringement of intellectual property 
rights. While it is comprehensible to create a rule which (also) covers these constellations, this 
approach seems not to go far enough, because, also beyond intellectual property infringement 
proceedings, the question arises in which circumstances several actions can be consolidated at 
the place of domicile of one defendant, this being no specific issue of intellectual property 
law.1855 Principally, it is to be underlined that special jurisdictional provisions are necessary 
and justified, with regard to specific constellations, only if applying the general rules in these 
constellations would lead to inadequate results, or if specific considerations regarding 
jurisdiction militate for the application of such special provisions.1856 As the aspect of 
consolidating proceedings in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from 
separate proceedings is generally relevant regardless of the field of law concerned, it does not 
seem necessary, and therefore neither reasonable nor justified, to create a special provision 
with regard to intellectual property infringement proceedings. Furthermore, establishing a 
special provision concerning the constellation of proceedings with regard to the infringement 
of intellectual property rights, while not mentioning the criterion of the need for the avoidance 
of the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings, the proposal 
would have resulted in the existence of a fundamentally different structure of Article 6(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (respectively Article 6(1a) of the Brussels I Regulation in an 
adapted system) and the proposed provision of Article 6(1a) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(respectively Article 6(1b) of the Brussels I Regulation in an adapted system).1857 The danger 
of such a schematic divergence consists in a newly created risk of an inconsistent 
interpretation of these provisions.  
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Another weakness of the proposal made in the Heidelberg Report consists in the fact that the 
term “contents” of intellectual property rights being infringed is unclear and thus needs to be 
interpreted. This establishes room for divergent interpretations as to the question which 
provisions are decisive for determining that “contents” and thus must be harmonised for a 
consolidation of proceedings.1858 
    
In contrast to Article 2:206(2) of the CLIP Principles which employs an open wording that 
leaves room for exceptions and a consideration of the individual circumstances of the case1859, 
the corresponding amendment proposal made by the expert group of the Heidelberg Report 
strictly provides that a consolidation shall be possible if the same rule of law enshrined in 
secondary Community legislation or in international conventions is applicable with regard to 
the infringing activities concerned under the conditions described in the text proposal. Thus, 
the proposal contained in the Heidelberg Report is much less flexible than Article 
2:206(2)2(b) of the CLIP Principles which provides for the possibility of a differentiated 
outcome of the decision on the consolidation of proceedings, using the negative formulation 
that disputes may involve essentially the same legal situation even if different national laws 
are applicable to the claims against the different defendants, provided that the relevant 
national laws are harmonised to a significant degree by rules of a regional economic 
integration organisation or by international conventions which are applicable to the disputes 
in question. The structure of the proposal contained in the Heidelberg Report is thus 
disadvantageous in comparison with Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles in twofold respect: 
First, it does not take into account that the risk of irreconcilable judgments produced by 
different courts can also be existent where contents of intellectual property rights are 
determined by the same legal rule enshrined in secondary Community legislation or in 
international conventions. Second, the proposal of the Heidelberg Report does not take into 
consideration that, also in constellations where intellectual property rights have been 
harmonised by secondary Community legislation or by way of international conventions, the 
invoked court may find that the concerned actions should be decided differently because the 
underlying facts and legal considerations differ from each other.1860    
 
Unlike Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles which provides that disputes involve 
essentially the same factual situation – to be understood as one precondition for the existence 
of the risk of incompatible judgments as the prerequisite for a consolidation of proceedings 
against several defendants – if the defendants have acted in an identical or similar manner in 
accordance with a common policy,1861 the amendment proposal contained in the Heidelberg 
Report is much more narrow and less flexible. While the spider-in-the-web constellation is 
also covered by the broad formulation of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles, the 
Heidelberg Report only covers this constellation which becomes obvious by the following 
wording:  
 
 “(...) where he is one of a number of defendants engaging in coordinated activities (...).” 
 
As a consequence, the solution implied in Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles brings 
along the advantage, in comparison with the proposal of the Heidelberg Report, to better cope 
with the ratio of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
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Regulation) which is to ensure that consolidating proceedings will merely take place in 
exceptional circumstances which requires a certain flexibility with regard to the 
circumstances. Otherwise, the basic rule of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (forum 
defensoris; actor sequitur forum rei) would be disregarded. Although it is true that parallel 
patent infringements will frequently be based on the policy and strategy of a mother company 
of a multinational corporate group while the single acts are carried out by the daughter 
companies in the States where they are situated,1862 it is not convincing to consolidate actions 
only if the co-defendants belong to the same corporate group. In case of such a differentiation 
between defendants belonging to a corporate group, and those defendants who act without any 
corporate bond, strong incentives would be created to disguise intentional multiterritorial 
conduct in an effort to avoid jurisdiction. In this context, General Advocate Léger explicated 
distinctly in his Opinion in the Roche Nederland case: 
 
“On the supposition that the defendant companies belong to the same group and that the infringements 
of which they are accused are identical or similar, it is not easy, either for the applicant or for the court, 
to establish whether such acts are the result of collusion between the companies in question or of a 
common policy defined within the group.  
 
It is no different when it comes to determining the respective roles that the companies in question 
played in defining an alleged common policy with a view to identifying ‘the spider in the web’. That 
question may well prove to be a breeding ground for disputes among the parties, even among the 
defendants themselves (…) [underscores added].”1863  
 
Besides, invoked courts would have to undertake an extensive and complex examination 
which would produce additional costs and prolong the term of proceedings. In this respect, the 
ECJ held in its Roche Nederland decision: 
 
“It must be observed that the determination as to whether the criteria concerned are satisfied, which is 
for the applicant to prove, would require the court seised to adjudicate on the substance of the case 
before it could establish its jurisdiction. Such a preliminary examination could give rise to additional 
costs and could prolong procedural time-limits where that court, being unable to establish the existence 
of the same factual situation and, therefore, a sufficient connection between the actions, would have to 
decline jurisdiction and where a fresh action would have to be brought before a court of another State 
[underscore added].”1864 
 
But also the requirement of coordinated activities as such, contained in the Heidelberg 
proposal, even if not realised by a corporate bond, seems to be unjustified. There is no reason 
for establishing such a special rule for matters of intellectual property rights in contrast to 
other legal matters.1865 In contrast to the proposal in the Heidelberg Report, Article 
2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles mentions the acting “in an identical or similar manner in 
accordance with a common policy” as a case in which, regularly, disputes involve essentially 
the same factual situation (to be understood as one precondition for a risk of incompatible 
judgments as a prerequisite for the consolidation of several proceedings). However, this 
provision does not contain an irrebuttable presumption that such acting “in an identical or 
similar manner in accordance with a common policy” inevitably results in the existence of 
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(essentially) the same factual situation,1866 which becomes particularly obvious by the 
formulation “subject to the individual circumstances of the case” in Article 2:206(2)2 of the 
CLIP Principles, which leaves room for an individual consideration of the specific case 
concerned. For instance, it is conceivable that defendants acting in a coordinated way infringe 
parallel national patents in completely different ways without there being a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments if different courts decide on the respective infringement brought 
before them.   
 
 
3.3.2.2.5 The Commission Proposal 2010 for Reform of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
In order to amend Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 6(1) of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 provides: 
 
 
 Article 6 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 A person may also be sued: 
 
 (1) where he is domiciled in a Member State and is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the 
 place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is 
 expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
 from separate proceedings. 
 
 
As has already been suggested with regard to Article 5(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010, 
Article 6(1) of the Commission Proposal 2010 again reveals the conception pursued by the 
European Commission to extend the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I Regulation to 
defendants domiciled in a third State in order to improve the functioning of the Regulation in 
the international legal order. Comparably to the change of formulation between the beginning 
of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (“A person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued”) and the beginning of Article 5(2) of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 (“The following courts shall have jurisdiction”), there is a change in the 
wording between the beginning of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (“A person 
domiciled in a Member State may also be sued”) and the beginning of Article 6(1) of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 (“A person may also be sued”). However, in contrast to Article 
5(2) of the Commission Proposal 2010, Article 6(1) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
ultimately does not effect any substantial change vis-à-vis Article 6(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, because Article 6(1) of the Commission Proposal 2010 – in some way 
inconsistent1867 in light of the general approach to extend the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels 
I Regulation to defendants domiciled in a third State – also adds the phrase “is domiciled in a 
Member State and” to the wording of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation.1868 Hence, the 
prerequisite that the defendant be domiciled in a Member State is merely formulated in 
another way respectively at another place within the provision.1869 Thus, the unfavourable 
unequal treatment of, on the one hand, defendants domiciled in a Member State who may be 
sued at the place of domicile of one co-defendant in case of a close connection according to 
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 In contrast, the predecessor provision of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles provided for an 
irrebuttable presumption of the existence of (essentially) the same factual situation.   
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 Cf. Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 38. 
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 Cf. Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 38. 
1869
 Noteworthily, this is different from the situation in Article 6(2), (3) and (4) of the Commission Proposal 
2010, where the changed beginning of the text (deletion of the phrase “domiciled in a Member State”) effects a 
change vis-à-vis Article 6(2), (3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
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Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) (forum 
connexitatis) vis-à-vis, on the other hand, defendants domiciled in a third State which are not 
subject to this extensive jurisdiction, is maintained.1870 
  
Beyond that, Article 6(1) of the Commission Proposal 2010 does not contain any clarification 
let alone solution of the problems discussed in the context of intellectual property rights, in 
particular patents.   
 
 
3.3.2.3 Further considerations 
 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Consolidation of proceedings in the case of infringement of national patents  
 
While both the Roche Nederland decision and the Solvay decision of the ECJ concerned the 
constellations of several European patents, the issue under which circumstances patent 
infringement actions against several defendants can be consolidated at the place of one of the 
defendants can also arise if several national patents are affected. With regard to the latter 
constellation, the open wording of Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles proves once 
again preferable vis-à-vis the amendment proposal of the Heidelberg Report, because the 
latter proposal merely covers the situation of  
 
 “(...) infringement of intellectual property rights whose contents are determined by the same rule of law 
 enshrined in secondary Community legislation or in international conventions to which all EU Member 
 States have adhered (...) [underscore added].” 
 
However, in the case of infringement of several national patents of EU Member States which 
have not been granted by the European Patent Organisation, but by national authorities, it is 
conceivable that a consolidation of actions against the respective infringers is justified as well, 
given that certain key issues of patent law like the issue of patentability of biotechnological 
inventions have been harmonised, and some countries have harmonised their national law to 
the EPC.1871 The CLIP Proposal, expressly due to its open formulation, also covers this 
constellation and thus seems preferable in comparison with the Heidelberg Proposal. Even 
more, it seems adequate to treat the infringement of patents by several infringers as if several 
European patents were affected, where the laws of the States for which national patents have 
been granted are based on a common law providing guidelines.1872 In contrast, the mere 
existence of a uniform PCT application does not suffice as to establish the same situation of 
law, because the international application with accordance to the PCT, while creating a certain 
uniformity of the patent as such,1873 does not result in the applicability of the same national 
legal provisions.1874   
 
 
3.3.2.3.2 Restricting the places of jurisdiction where actions may be consolidated 
 
On the one hand, § 206(1)(b) of the ALI Principles provides that a consolidation of actions 
against several defendants requires that “between the forum and the States in which the added 
defendants are resident, there is no forum that is more closely related to the entire dispute”, 
                                                 
1870
 Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 38 with further references. 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 386. 
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meaning that a consolidation of actions is only possible at the place which is most closely 
connected with the entire dispute. Despite that restrictive content, the provision is still 
formulated in an open way which leaves room for a flexible application, which is also 
accomplished by its negative formulation.  
 
On the other hand, the amendment proposal as to Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) contained in the Heidelberg Report lacks any 
flexibility, providing that consolidation of actions is merely possible “in the courts of the State 
where the defendant coordinating the activities or otherwise having the closest connection 
with the infringement in its entirety is domiciled.”  
 
As already discussed above, this formulation reveals a misconception of the underlying reason 
for the consolidation of actions against several co-defendants, because it is not a specific 
factual proximity that justifies consolidation, but the connection that exists between the 
claims/actions. As a consequence, all places of domicile of concerned defendants are equally 
suitable for consolidation of actions, because all of these places of jurisdiction are based on 
the actor sequitur forum rei principle.1875 Besides, it is to be considered that such a restriction 
of the places of jurisdiction where actions may be consolidated would solely take place in 
favour of one defendant without any justification for such a privilege vis-à-vis the other 
defendants who would not be additionally protected. Besides, if there is indeed one defendant 
who has coordinated the infringing activities of the co-defendants, for instance a corporate 
group of several companies, this defendant will potentially dispose of the best financial 
resources and legal advice. In light of this, it would seem absurd to grant this very defendant 
the privilege to be sued at his place of domicile.1876  
 
After all, it might be far from easy, and not possible without reference to rules of substantive 
law, to determine which defendant has actually coordinated the infringement activities, which 
might overburden the examination of jurisdiction. In this respect, Advocate General Léger 
shall be cited again who explicated in Roche Nederland:  
 
“(…) (I)t is not easy, either for the applicant or for the court, to establish whether such acts are the result 
of collusion between the companies in question or of a common policy defined within the group.  
 
It is no different when it comes to determining the respective roles that the companies in question 
played in defining an alleged common policy with a view to identifying ‘the spider in the web’. That 
question may well prove to be a breeding ground for disputes among the parties, even among the 
defendants themselves. To base the application of Article 6(1) of the Brussels Convention on the 
principle that the courts with jurisdiction are those in the State where the company that played a central 
role in defining the common policy at the root of the alleged infringements is established would, in my 
opinion, run counter to the requirements of predictability or certainty laid down by the Court for 
interpreting the jurisdictional rules established by the Convention [underscore added].”1877  
 
Therefore, restricting the places of jurisdiction where actions may be consolidated to the 
courts of the State where the defendant coordinating the activities or otherwise having the 
closest connection with the infringement in its entirety is domiciled, results, at best, in a 
higher degree of knowledge before which courts proceedings could be negotiated, but not 
before which court proceedings will actually take place.1878  
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As a consequence, a restriction of the places where actions may be consolidated in the case of 
actions against several co-defendants, to the place where the defendant coordinating the 
activities or otherwise having the closest connection with the infringement in its entirety is 
domiciled, as does the Heidelberg Report, is to be rejected.  
 
In light of the foregoing, Article 2:206(3)1 of the CLIP Principles adopts a balancing position 
when providing that the consolidation of actions against several co-defendants at the courts of 
the State of domicile of one defendant who has coordinated the relevant infringement 
activities or is otherwise most closely connected with the dispute in its entirety, shall only be 
effected if these facts are manifest. Otherwise, i.e. if doubts remain whether there is a 
defendant who played such a predominant, coordinating role, Article 2:206(3)1 of the CLIP 
Principles does not apply, meaning that no consolidation of actions at the place of domicile of 
this defendant will take place.  
 
 
3.3.2.3.3 The concept of “abuse of jurisdiction” 
 
As to the concept of “abuse of jurisdiction” addressed above when discussing Article 2:206(3) 
of the CLIP Principles, it is to be underlined that, while the ECJ employed that concept in its 
Reisch Montage decision, where the court held, by reference to its decisions in Kalfelis and 
Réunion Européenne, that 
 
 “(...) the special rule on jurisdiction provided for in Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 cannot be 
 interpreted in such a way as to allow a plaintiff to make a claim against a number of defendants for the 
 sole purpose of removing one of them from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in which 
 the defendant is domiciled (...)”,1879 
 
the ECJ later rejected1880 that concept of “abuse of jurisdiction” (or eventually integrated it in 
the concept of close connection)1881 in its Freeport decision. In this decision, the court stated 
that 
 
 “Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 applies where claims brought against different defendants are 
 connected when the proceedings are instituted, that is to say, where it is expedient to hear and determine 
 them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings, without 
 there being any further need to establish separately that the claims were not brought with the sole object 
 of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State where one of the defendants is 
 domiciled [underscore added].”1882 
 
As to the question raised in Freeport whether the proviso contained in Article 6(2) of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), according to which a 
consolidation of actions on a warranty or guarantee or concerning any other third party 
proceedings be precluded in case that the original proceedings are instituted solely with the 
object of removing a defendant from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent 
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in his case, should be applicable to Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) as well, Advocate General Mengozzi took an approving attitude 
in his Opinion. He argued for an analogous application of that proviso with regard to Article 
6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), also referring 
to (implications within) the jurisprudence of the ECJ: 
 
 “(...) (A)lthough the prohibition to which the applicability of the linking factor is subject under Article 
 6(2) of Regulation No 44/2001 is worded in such a way as to catch both instances of fraud and abuse of 
 the right to select the court, I see no reason – linked in particular to the need for a uniform application 
 and independent interpretation of the regulation's provisions – that would prevent it from applying to the 
 cases regulated by Article 6(1) as well.  
  
 Extending the prohibition under Article 6(2) by analogy in that way – and this has, moreover, already 
 been approved by implication by the Court [in Reisch Montage] – makes it possible, in particular, to 
 preclude Article 6(1) being applied to situations which do not fall within its natural scope as well as to 
 prevent the basis for jurisdiction which it lays down being relied on if that is designed to serve interests 
 which do not merit protection [content in brackets added].”1883  
 
However, in contrast to the Opinion of the Advocate General, the ECJ clearly held, by 
reference to the Commission: 
 
 “As the national court rightly pointed out, Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001, unlike Article 6(2), 
 does not expressly make provision for a case in which an action is brought solely in order to remove the 
 party sued from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case. The Commission 
 stated on that point that, when amending the Brussels Convention, the Member States had refused to 
 include the proviso contained in Article 6(2) in Article 6(1), taking the view that the general condition 
 that the claims be connected was more objective [underscore added].”1884 
 
It is noteworthy that Article 2:206(3)2 of the CLIP Principles does not mention, as to further 
curtail a too broad extension of the possibility to consolidate proceedings, that the action 
against the anchor defendant is (obviously) unfounded respectively without any prospect of 
success. This issue was also raised in the Freeport case. Beside the question of whether 
Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) applies 
only provided it is established that the action against a defendant domiciled in the Member 
State of the court seised has not been brought solely with the object of removing another 
defendant from the jurisdiction of the court which could be competent in this case, the 
Swedish Högsta domstolen (Swedish Supreme Court) had raised, inter alia, the question to 
the ECJ, given the answer to the foregoing question was answered in the negative, whether 
the fact that the claimant is pursuing an objective of that nature affects the assessment of the 
likelihood of that action succeeding in the context of the analysis of the risk of irreconcilable 
judgments for which Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation) provides.1885 Concerning this third question, Advocate General Mengozzi 
held in his Opinion: 
 
“As regards the third question, since it was submitted in the event that the second question was 
answered in the negative and I am proposing that the Court reply to that question in the affirmative, I 
shall merely point out that the assessment of the risk of irreconcilable judgments, which Article 6(1) of 
Regulation No 44/2001 requires of the court seised, must be made taking account of all the relevant 
factors.  
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Like the Commission, I consider that that assessment may also include an evaluation of the likelihood 
that the claim brought against the defendant who is domiciled in the forum Member State will succeed. 
However, that evaluation will be of real practical relevance for the purpose of excluding the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments only if that claim proves to be manifestly inadmissible or unfounded in all 
respects [underscore added].”1886 
 
The Advocate General thus not only recognised, as does Article 2:206(3)2(a) and (b) of the 
CLIP Principles, the scenario that the action against the anchor defendant is “manifestly 
inadmissible” as to exclude the consolidation of actions, but also the scenario that the anchor 
action is (manifestly) “unfounded in all respects”.  
 
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not deliver a substantial answer to this question, because in the 
court's view, the question was referred on the premise that, for there to be connection between 
a number of claims, those claims should have the same legal basis, which did not apply in the 
concrete case. The court thus merely held laconically:    
 
“As has been stated in answer to the first question, Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 may apply 
where actions brought against different defendants have different legal bases.  
 
In view of that answer, there is no need to give a reply to the third question.”1887  
 
As to this issue, diverse legal commentators have endorsed the conception that the 
applicability of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) should be considered independent from the question of whether the anchor action 
is founded or not, because this examination in the framework of the examination of the 
admissibility of the action would mean to considerably restrict the effet utile of Article 6(1) of 
the Brussels I Regulation (Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).1888  
 
Other parts of legal doctrine have taken a different view and argued in favour of a conception 
according to which the consolidation of actions should (also) be excluded in further 
constellations beyond the (manifest) inadmissibility of the anchor action. In this respect, it has 
rightly been emphasised that it would not seem reasonable to preclude the consolidation of 
actions where the anchor action is obviously inadmissible – as the ECJ held in Reisch 
Montage – while allowing the consolidation of proceedings where the action against the 
anchor defendant is obviously unfounded.1889 In fact, an action which is inadmissible or 
unfounded right from the beginning seems to form a quite weak basis for anchor jurisdiction 
according to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which constitutes an exception vis-à-
vis jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.1890  
 
However, as it is not sufficient that the anchor action simply turns out to be unfounded, 
different proposals have been brought forward in legal doctrine how to reach the result that an 
obviously unfounded action cannot serve as an anchor action.  
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To begin, it has been argued that the consolidation of several actions shall be possible if, on 
the basis of a limited scope of examination, the anchor actions is held founded, i.e. if the 
plaintiff succeeds in asserting conclusively that there is a claim against the defendant at the 
place where the action is brought which is connected with the plaintiff's claims against the 
other defendants.1891 In German law, the anticipated examination of (elements of) the 
foundedness of an action in the framework of the examination of its admissibility is known 
under the term “Lehre von den doppelrelevanten Tatsachen”. According to this doctrine, 
establishing jurisdiction merely requires the conclusive assertion of the relevant facts if these 
facts are also relevant for the foundedness of the action. This doctrine was acknowledged 
early by the ECJ, in its Effer decision, where the court held, with regard to Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels Convention (Article 7(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), that 
 
“(…) the national court’s jurisdiction to determine questions relating to a contract includes the power to 
consider the existence of the constituent parts of the contract itself, since that is indispensable in order to 
enable the national court in which proceedings are brought to examine whether it has jurisdiction under 
the Convention. If that were not the case, Article 5(1) of the Convention would be in danger of being 
deprived of its legal effect, since it would be accepted that, in order to defeat the rule contained in that 
provision it is sufficient for one of the parties to claim that the contract does not exist. On the contrary, 
respect for the aims and spirit of the Convention demands that that provision should be construed as 
meaning that the court called upon to decide a dispute arising out of a contract may examine, of its own 
motion even, the essential preconditions for its jurisdiction, having regard to conclusive and relevant 
evidence adduced by the party concerned, establishing the existence or the inexistence of the contract 
(…) [underscore added].”1892  
 
This approach of a (limited) examination of elements of substantive law within the framework 
of the examination of the admissibility of an action was also confirmed by Advocate General 
Darmon in his Opinion in Shevill were the Advocate General clearly explicated: 
 
“(…) (A) dispute as to the existence of a contract does not preclude jurisdiction under Article 5(1) [of 
the Brussels Convention], even if the court is prompted, for the purposes of determining its own 
jurisdiction, to examine substantive issues.  
 
What is involved here is the application of the hallowed rule that it is for each court to determine its 
own jurisdiction.  
 
The outcome is necessarily the same where a court before which proceedings are brought pursuant to 
Article 5(3) [of the Brussels Convention] has to give a ruling on an objection of lack of competence 
raised by a defendant denying the existence of the tort. In order to be able to rule on that objection, the 
court has to verify, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, whether the defendant did or 
did not commit an act which might render him liable and giving rise to damage within the judicial 
district of the court [underscores and content in brackets added].”1893  
 
Problematically, there is the high risk that a plaintiff, by an apt and clever reasoning, 
abusively claims the existence of facts which would result in the foundedness of the anchor 
action, in order to reach a consolidation of the actions concerned. Due to this evident potential 
of abuse1894, a certain restriction of consolidation should be provided. In this respect, it has 
partly been proposed that the plaintiff should be obliged to prove a degree of likeliness which 
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exceeds an examination of the conclusiveness, i.e. to prove the preponderant likeliness of the 
foundedness of the anchor action.1895  
 
Slightly more moderate than the foregoing opinion, others have denied a connection between 
several actions in the case that the anchor action, when being brought, manifestly lacks any 
chance of success (meaning that the action is manifestly unfounded1896) and therefore appears 
to be initiated wantonly.1897 In such a constellation, when it is relatively clear right from the 
start of the proceedings that the action will be held unfounded, there is principally no risk of 
another conflicting judgment rendered by a court in another forum State. 
 
As to the raised objection that the latter conception goes too far because the greater proportion 
of the examination of the foundedness of an action should not be anticipated when examining 
the admissibility of the action,1898 it is to be admitted that the proposed examination whether 
the anchor action manifestly lacks any chance of success may create, in a way, some legal 
uncertainty because the existence respectively non-existence of the manifest absence of any 
chance of success will have to be evaluated by the invoked court. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the principle of prohibition of abusive behaviour is a general principle of 
Community law. Additionally, it is to be stressed that the ECJ has continuously underlined the 
necessity of a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of special jurisdiction contained in 
the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation (Brussels Ibis Regulation).1899 
 
 
3.3.2.3.4 “Concerted parallel infringements” 
 
Several proposals have been made to ensure that the consolidation of actions will only be 
undertaken in case that the defendants are in some way connected with each other, 
respectively with the defendant where consolidation of actions shall be accomplished, be it, 
besides the spider-in-the-web constellation, by acting as co-perpetrators (“Mittäter”)1900, be it 
by acting as independent perpetrators (“Nebentäter”)1901. 
 
It has been mentioned above that the Heidelberg Report only covers the spider-in-the-web 
constellation, while Article 2:206(2)2(a) of the CLIP Principles is constructed in a broader 
way which becomes obvious by the formulation that “disputes involve essentially the same 
factual situation if the defendants have, even if in different States, acted in an identical 
manner in accordance with a common policy”. But what if defendants have acted in an 
identical manner, which is however not based on a common policy, although being 
coordinated in some way, a constellation which could be described as “concerted parallel 
infringements”? With regard to the constellation of unconcerted parallel infringements, it has 
already been concluded above that a consolidation of actions will not be possible due to the 
                                                 
1895
 Althammer (2006)26(6) IPRax 558, at p. 562. 
1896
 Cf. Schmaranzer 2014 (Burgstaller, Neumayr, Geroldinger & Schmaranzer), Art 6 EuGVO, para. 7; M. 
Würdinger (case note) ECJ 11 October 2007, C-98/06, Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson, (2007)12 ZZPInt 221, at 
p. 227. Würdinger emphasises that, according to his interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, 
the manifest unfoundedness of the anchor action is to be determined objectively, whereas subjective elements (as 
an abusive intend of the plaintiff) should not be considered.  
1897
 Althammer (2008)28(3) IPRax 228, at p. 232; Thole (2009)122(4) ZZP 423, at pp. 440, 442. Noteworthily, 
opinions vary as to the question of whether respectively to which extent subjective elements should be taken into 
consideration when considering the unfoundedness of the anchor action. 
1898
 M. Würdinger (case note) ECJ 11 October 2007, C-98/06, Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson, (2008)54(1-2) 
RIW 71, at p. 72. 
1899
 Thole (2009)122(4) ZZP 423, at pp. 440, 443. 
1900
 Grabinski (2001)50(3) GRUR Int. 199, at p. 207. 
1901
 Neuhaus (1996)87(9) Mitt. 257, at pp. 266-267. 
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principle of foreseeability of jurisdiction in favour of each co-defendant who must be enabled 
to foresee that he can be sued in the forum where the anchor defendant’s domicile is 
situated.1902 Should the same apply to “concerted parallel infringements”? 
 
The following sample case shall serve for illustration of this constellation. 
 
 
 Case 10: 
 
 P holds a product patent for the Netherlands and Germany. Infringer 1 (INF 1), a 
 Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, manufactures a product which 
 infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the Dutch market. Infringer 2 (INF 2), a 
 German company being domiciled in Germany, also manufactures such a product that 
 infringes the patent right of P and sells it on the German market. INF 1 and INF 2 act 
 independently from each other, but know each other's infringements and coordinate 
 them by not competing with each other in the States where they sell their products.  
 
 
In comparison with the constellation in Case 7 presented above, INF 1 and INF 2, while 
committing patent infringements independently from each other, are nonetheless more closely 
connected in the constellation discussed here, in that INF 1 and INF 2 know each other, and 
their actings have been undertaken in a coordinated way. On this basis, it is clear to INF 1 and 
INF 2 that they may be sued, as co-defendants of the respective other defendant as anchor 
defendant, before a court at the place where the anchor defendant is domiciled. In this 
constellation, it is sufficiently predictable and foreseeable for INF 1 (respectively for INF 2) 
that he can also be sued before a court at the place where the other defendant as anchor 
defendant is domiciled. As a consequence, it would not be irreconcilable with the principle of 
legal certainty if INF 1 could be sued together with INF 2 at INF 2's place of domicile or vice 
versa.  
 
In this context, it has been rightly emphasised that the underlying reason for consolidating 
actions at the place of domicile of one of several (alleged) infringers consists in the close 
connection between the claims rather than between the defendants.1903 This interpretation was 
already adopted by Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion in Glaxosmithkline where the 
Advocate General declared that  
 
“(…) the connection to which the application of Article 6(1) [of the Brussels I Regulation] is subject 
requires a finding of a link between the claims. That link must exist in order to ensure, regardless of the 
court seised, that it has a close relationship to the case, to ensure that that special jurisdiction is properly 
used for its intended purpose [content in brackets added].”1904 
 
Although the aspects of a close connection between the claims/actions and between the 
defendants can be linked with each other – and will often be in line – in particular the 
constellation of “concerted parallel infringements” reveals that such a synchronisation is not 
necessarily existent. The sample case illustrates that a close connection between actions can 
exist where there is no close connection between the defendants, because a close connection 
between the actions merely requires the existence of essentially the same factual and legal 
                                                 
1902
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:206, para. 2:206.C14. 
1903
 Hölder 2004, p. 152; Schauwecker 2009, p. 389. 
1904
 Advocate General 17 January 2008, C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glaxosmithkline v Jean-
Pierre Rouard, [2008] ECR I-03965, para. 31 – Glaxosmithkline. 
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situation.1905 In light of this, the open wording of Article 2:206(2) of the CLIP Principles 




3.3.2.4 Final comment and formulation proposal 
 
To conclude, the detailed approach of Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles principally 
provides for a workable solution of the constellation(s) of consolidation of actions against 
multiple defendants. In comparison with the less clear solution of § 206 of the ALI Principles, 
it therefore seems preferable.    
 
Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should thus be extended by using the more precise 
wording of Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles, supplemented by another sentence (written 
in italics). For convenience, the wording should be adapted to the traditional wording of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, meaning that the notions “incompatible” and “habitually resident” 
should be replaced with the notions “irreconcilable” and “domiciled” (cf. underscores) which 
should not change their content. In order not to overburden Article 8, a new Article should be 
created in a recast of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (hereinafter Article 8bis). 
 
 
 Article 8bis 
 
 (1) A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued, where he is one of a number of 
 defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so 
 closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
 irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, a risk of irreconcilable judgments requires a risk of divergence in 
 the outcome of the actions against the different defendants which arises in the context of essentially the 
 same situation of law and fact. In particular in infringement disputes and subject to the individual 
 circumstances of the case, 
 (a) disputes involve essentially the same factual situation if the defendants have, even if in different 
 States, acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy; 
 
 (b) disputes may involve essentially the same legal situation even if different national laws are 
 applicable to the claims against the different defendants, provided that the relevant national laws 
 are harmonised to a significant degree by rules of a regional economic integration organisation or 
 by international conventions which are applicable to the disputes in question. 
 
 (3) If it is manifest from the facts that one defendant has coordinated the relevant activities or is 
 otherwise most closely connected with the dispute in its entirety, jurisdiction according to paragraph 1 
 is only conferred on the courts in the State where that defendant is domiciled. In other cases, 
 jurisdiction is conferred on the courts in the State or States of domicile of any of the defendants, unless 
 
 (a) the contribution of the defendant who is domiciled in the State where the court is 
 located is insubstantial in relation to the dispute in its entirety or 
 
 (b) the claim against the domiciled defendant is manifestly inadmissible. 
 
 (c) the claim against the domiciled defendant is manifestly unfounded.  
 
With regard to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, the content of § 206 of the 
CLIP Principles should be adopted. 
                                                 
1905
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 389. 
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3.3.3 Exclusive jurisdiction  
 
It has been pointed out in the foregoing chapter that the clear jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
particular in its GAT decision, which has unfortunately been confirmed and codified in Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, requires an amendment of this provision, also because 
further relevant problems which already existed under Article 16(4) of the Brussels 
Convention, respectively Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, have not been solved by 
the European legislator when formulating Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
After briefly restating the crucial issues that should be subject of such an amendment, I shall 
discuss existing reform proposals with regard to the matters concerned. Finally, I shall make 




3.3.3.1 Identifying the crucial issues 
 
 
3.3.3.1.1 Reflexive application of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
As has been analysed in the foregoing chapter, it has been subject to controversial discussion 
whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) should be 
applied by way of a reflexive application regarding a patent granted in respectively for a State 
which is no Member State of the European Union. It has been reasoned that such a reflexive 
application of Article 24(4) is to be denied, be it by way of an indirect, be it by way of a 
direct application of this provision. 
 
As there are good reasons why Article 24(4) does not cover cases concerning patents granted 
in respectively for third States, any reform of Article 24(4) should not extend this provision 
accordingly. Likewise, a future Global Judgments Convention should not contain such a 
provision either.  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Effect on jurisdiction of an invalidity defence raised before an extraterritorial 
infringement court  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, it has been shown that the courts of the protection State 
should not be conferred exclusive jurisdiction as to patent infringement proceedings, but that 
general rules of jurisdiction should be applicable as to patent infringement actions. In light of 
this, it would be contradictory if an extraterritorial infringement court lost jurisdiction in toto, 
once a defence of nullity/invalidity has been raised by the alleged infringer. 
 
However, it has been carved out above in Chapter 2 that, according to the interpretation of 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation) by the 
ECJ in its GAT decision and the clear wording of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
which confirms and codifies this jurisprudence of the ECJ, the infringement court must stay 
proceedings, once a nullity/invalidity defence has been raised in patent infringement 
proceedings.1906 It has however been elaborated, too, that, upon request of the claimant of the 
                                                 
1906
 Noteworthily, the ECJ held in its Solvay decision, that Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) must be interpreted as not precluding the application of Article 31 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). 
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infringement action, proceedings are to be completely transferred to the courts being 
competent pursuant to Article 24(4), while the defendant cannot influence the place of 
jurisdiction by raising the invalidity defence. 
 
Still, while the latter solution applies to the current legal situation under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, it is to be questioned, regardless of the existing legal framework, whether this 
solution is the best solution conceivable, taking adequately into consideration all concerned 
interests. If another solution turned out more appropriate, Article 24(4) could and should be 
amended accordingly. The following paragraphs shall therefore deal with the admissibility of 
an incidental decision on the validity of a patent, rendered by the extraterritorial infringement 




3.3.3.1.2.1 Admissibility of an incidental decision, rendered by the extraterritorial 
infringement court, on the validity of a patent once an invalidity defence has been raised 
 
With regard to the constellation that an invalidity defence is raised before an extraterritorial 
infringement court during patent infringement proceedings, it might be argued that the 
sovereignty of the granting State is opposed to incidental decisions on the validity of the 
patent rendered by that court. Advocates of such a view might refer to the Act of State-
doctrine and the principle of comity. However, it is to be underlined that the granting State 
cannot claim the wordwide unconditional recognition of the patent. It is noteworthy that the 
infringement courts of the granting State can also decide on the validity of the patent granted 
by the competent authority.1907 In this respect, it is to be borne in mind that the ECJ has 
constantly emphasised the equivalence and equality of the national courts within the European 
area of justice. So, the ECJ already held in its Gasser decision by reference to its decision in 
Overseas Union Insurance, that    
  
“(...) the court second seised is never in a better position than the court first seised to determine 
 whether the latter has jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is determined directly by the rules of the Brussels 
 Convention, which are common to both courts and may be interpreted and applied with the same 
 authority by each of them (see, to that effect, Overseas Union Insurance, paragraph 23) [underscore 
 added].”1908 
 
As to the further aspect of mutual trust, which is also embodied in Recital 26 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation,1909 the ECJ explicated that 
 
 “(...) the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States accord to 
 each other's legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which has enabled a 
 compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts within the purview of the 
 Convention are required to respect, and as a corollary the waiver by those States of the right to apply 
                                                 
1907
 Heinze & Roffael (2006)55(10) GRUR Int. 787, at p. 795 
1908
 ECJ 9 December 2003, C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, [2003] ECR I-14693, para. 48 – 
Gasser; referred to in: ECJ 27 April 2004, C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and 
Others, [2004] ECR I-03565, para. 25 – Turner. 
1909
 Recital 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: 
“(26) Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifies the principle that judgments given in a 
Member State should be recognised in all Member States without the need for any special procedure. In addition, 
the aim of making cross-border litigation less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition of the declaration 
of enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State addressed. As a result, a judgment given by the courts 
of a Member State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member State addressed.” 
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 their internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified 
 mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments (...) [underscore added].”1910 
 
Beyond that, in registration systems (“Registrierungssysteme”), patents are even granted 
without being examined in substantive respect.1911 
 
After all, the opposite opinion would disregard that the sovereignty of the State where a patent 
has been granted does not constitute any obstacle against incidental decisions by the 
extraterritorial infringement court, because the act of granting a patent is no act of public 
authority. Neither the Act of State-doctrine nor the comity principle can therefore serve as 
arguments against jurisdiction of the extraterritorial infringement court. This applies in 
particular if the extraterritorial infringement court is merely given authority to render an 
incidental decision which has only inter partes effect, and not erga omnes effect. With regard 
to such a decision inter partes, the finding on the validity of the concerned patent does not 
become res iudicata and the existence of the patent is not impaired erga omnes. As a 
consequence, even if the court holds the patent to be void, this does not mean that the granting 
State must alter the patent register; therefore, the participation of an authority of the granting 
State is not required.1912 
 
Generally, rules on exclusive jurisdiction are to be interpreted in a restrictive way.1913 As a 
consequence, exclusive jurisdiction in patent disputes must be constructed and interpreted in a 
way that does not impair the general rules of jurisdiction more than necessary. The plaintiff 
respectively the parties (in the case of a prorogation of jurisdiction according to Article 25 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation or in the case of entering an appearance (“rügelose Einlassung”) 
pursuant to Article 26(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), is/are usually to be granted the 
possibility to choose among a certain amount of fora.1914 In this respect, it is to be borne in 
mind that both parties can be interested in reaching a decision on the validity question in one 
single proceeding before the infringement court.1915 Further, the courts in the protection State 
remain competent according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As a result, 
exclusive jurisdiction in patent disputes must be constructed and interpreted in a way that 
does not impair the general rules of jurisdiction more than necessary, which would however 
be the case if extraterritorial courts were prevented from rendering incidental decisions on the 
validity of a foreign patent.  
 
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement and Article 3 of the Enforcement Directive1916 
particularly emphasise the obligation to ensure the availability of effective and procedurally 
                                                 
1910
 ECJ 9 December 2003, C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT Srl, [2003] ECR I-14693, para. 72 – 
Gasser; referred to in: ECJ 27 April 2004, C-159/02, Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit and 
Others, [2004] ECR I-03565, para. 24 – Turner. 
1911
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 418. 
1912
 Ebner 2004, p. 166. 
1913
 This corresponds to the constant jurisprudence of the ECJ. Cf. Fawcett 2002, p. 164; Torremans 2008, p. 75. 
However, the ECJ started from this principle in its GAT decision when the court interpreted exclusive 
jurisdiction according to Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation in a rather broad way. 
1914
 Fawcett 2002, p. 165. 
1915
 Wadlow 1998, para. 3–92. 
1916
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (Corrigendum), OJ L195 of 2 June 2004, pp. 16-25, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:195:0016:0025:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015).  
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economic enforcement of intellectual property rights.1917 In this regard, it is to be highlighted 
that the requirement of a (partly) proceeding in the respective protection State is more 
cumbersome, complicated and costly than having the case decided before one court in a 
consolidated proceeding.1918   
 
At the national level, it is to be stressed that, besides the United States, the majority of the 
Member States of the European Union use a “Verbundsystem”, where (at least also) 
infringement courts have authority to examine the validity of a patent.1919 Among the EU 
Member States, a “Trennungssystem”, meaning that the validity issue may only be examined 
by special authorities and courts, to be distinguished from the infringement courts, has been 
introduced merely in Germany and Austria, and has even been subject to criticism in these 
States.1920 Besides, the exclusion of the invalidity defence before the infringement court 
according to German law lacks a statutory basis, and is only legitimated by the court 
practice.1921 In light of the foregoing, it would seem contradictory to establish a 
“Trennungssystem” at the Community level.1922 
 
As an argument against the admissibility of an incidental decision on the validity of a patent 
rendered by an extraterritorial court, one might put forward that the granting State is 
interested, based on a targeted promotion of innovation, in a comprehensive annulment (ex 
tunc and with erga omnes effect and not only inter partes effect) of a patent that does not 
fulfil the requirements for patentability.1923 First of all, it has rightly been stressed that the 
latter argument would at the most argue against an incidental decision with inter partes effect, 
but not against an incidental decision with erga omnes effect1924. Beyond that, this argument 
would not sufficiently take into consideration that, in application/registration systems 
(“Anmeldesysteme”/“Registrierungssysteme”), the impairment of the freedom of competition 
by the existence of patents which actually do not fulfil the granting requirements is attributed 
only minor importance, and the patent is examined only in the case of an eventual 
infringement proceeding.1925 As a consequence, it cannot be assumed that only partly non-
recognition of such patents would be contrary to the interests of the granting State.1926 In 
examination systems (“Prüfsysteme”), also as to validity proceedings with erga omnes effect, 
the focus does not lie on the public interest in the comprehensive annulment of patents which 
do not fulfil the granting requirements, but on the individual interests of the parties concerned. 
This understanding of an emphasis of individual interests is underlined by the fact that an 
individual person can be prevented from launching an invalidity action by an agreed no-
challenge obligation which is particularly important in the framework of license contracts.1927 
                                                 
1917
 De Miguel Asensio (2007)16 AIDA 105, at pp. 118-119; P. Schlosser (case note) ECJ 13 July 2006, C-
539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, (2007)62(6) JZ 305, at p. 
307. 
1918
 Cf. Ebner 2004, p. 209; Luginbühl & Stauder (2006)10(12) sic! 876, at p. 878; Luginbühl 2005, p. 404 et 
seq. 
1919
 Schneider 2005, p. 126 et seq., in particular p. 178 et seq. 
1920
 Hölder 2004, pp. 181-184; Tilmann (2005)107(11) GRUR 904, at p. 907; as to the issue of coordination 
between validity proceedings and infringement proceedings pursuant to German national law cf. Ahrens 
(2009)111(3-4) GRUR 196, at pp. 196-200.     
1921
 Cf. Tilmann (2005)107(11) GRUR 904, at p. 907. 
1922
 Luginbühl & Stauder (2006)10(12) sic! 876, at p. 878. 
1923
 Cf. Stauder & Kur 2001, p. 161. 
1924
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 418.  
1925
 Stauder (1975)24(3) GRUR Int. 86, at p. 87. 
1926
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 418. 
1927
 Kraßer 2009, p. 613 et seq. 
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Public interests are merely affected mediately (indirectly).1928 On the basis of the foregoing, 
an extraterritorial infringement court cannot be banned from an examination of the validity of 
a patent with mere inter partes effect by reference to an imaginary public interest which even 
would not be the primary basis of a decision on the validity of that patent rendered in the 
protection State with erga omnes effect.1929   
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is to be concluded that the extraterritorial infringement 
court should have authority to render an incidental decision on the validity of a patent 
concerned in patent infringement proceedings brought before that court.  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.2 Definition of the term “preliminary question”  
 
When an invalidity defence is raised in infringement proceedings, the (extraterritorial) 
infringement court deals with the validity issue as a “preliminary question” that must be 
answered as a prerequisite for being able to render a decision on the alleged infringement 
(because a void patent cannot be infringed). In particular English courts have expressed the 
view that infringement and validity are actually different sides of the same coin, and that it 
therefore cannot be said that the latter question arises incidentally.1930 In light of this, it seems 
indispensable to integrate a definition of the constellation in which circumstances the validity 
issue is raised as an incidental matter, i.e. by way of a preliminary question.1931 Thus, in order 
to avoid the risk of inconsistent interpretations in the EU Member States (respectively third 
States), the term “preliminary question” should be expressly defined in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively an eventual future Global Judgments Convention).  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.3 Which effect (if any) should an incidental decision have?   
 
Since the extent of what becomes res iudicata with regard to incidental decisions on the 
validity of a patent differs among the Member States (no res iudicata at all, inter partes 
effect, or erga omnes effect), this aspect cannot be used when determining and defining the 
effect of incidental decisions according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation (and also concerning 
an eventual future Global Judgments Convention). 
 
Four ways seem conceivable how the effect of incidental decisions on the validity of a patent, 




3.3.3.1.2.3.1 Conception 1: Incidental decisions with erga omnes effect 
 
Arguing in favour of assigning erga omnes effect to incidental decisions on the validity of a 
patent, it could be put forth that the fact that private interests are concerned does not 
necessarily require that decisions with erga omnes effect are rendered in the granting 
State.1932  
 
                                                 
1928
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 419; Kraßer 2009, p. 611; similar: Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 51-52. 
1929
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 419. 
1930
 Cf. Fawcett 2002, p. 161 with further references. 
1931
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 441. 
1932
 In detail: Hye-Knudsen 2005, pp. 57-58. 
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Furthermore, also with regard to decisions with inter partes effect, there is the risk that the 
concerned patent is factually completely devalued in economic respect, because competitors 
will consider it void and disregard it, or at least could be willing to pay less license fees.1933 
And if the incidental decision of the extraterritorial court had only inter partes effect, this 
could have negative consequences for competition in general, because then merely one party 
does not have to pay a license fee and is thus privileged towards competitors who have to pay 
license fees. As a consequence, competitors could be pushed out of the market and barriers to 
market entry could be raised for new competitors.1934 
 
Additionally, assigning erga omnes effect to the incidental decision of an extraterritorial 
infringement court would bring along the advantage of legal certainty, because it would avoid 
the risk of irreconcilable judgments.  
 
Beyond that, it has been shown above that assigning erga omnes effect to incidental decisions 
on the validity of a patent rendered by an extraterritorial infringement court would also be 
reconcilable with the aspect of the sovereignty of the granting State.  
  
 
3.3.3.1.2.3.2 Conception 2: Absence of res iudicata of incidental decisions 
 
Alternatively, it could be argued that incidental decisions on the validity of a patent rendered 
by the extraterritorial infringement court should not become res iudicata at all.1935 In this 
respect, it has been put forth that, even if the incidental decision had inter partes effect, the 
unsuccessful party would be deprived of the possibility to bring an invalidity action before the 
courts of the granting State, because the prior decision of the infringement court according to 
which the patent is not infringed, would have to be recognised by the courts of the protection 
State. The final decision on the validity of a patent shall however be reserved to the courts of 
the granting State.1936 Furthermore, it has been stressed that a decision of the infringement 
court on the invalidity of the concerned patent, even if only having inter partes effect, 
factually limits the protection of the patent to a considerably higher extent than a decision1937 
by which the court merely denies infringement of the patent. 
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.3.3 Conception 3: Incidental decisions with inter partes effect 
 
However, better arguments militate for a limitation of res iudicata of the incidental decision 
to inter partes effect1938 and only with regard to the respective infringement action in which 
the validity issue was brought up.1939 
 
First of all, not allowing the unsuccessful party to initiate invalidity proceedings before the 
courts of the granting State, after the infringement court first seised has made a decision (with 
inter partes effect), does not constitute an inadequate result. In this respect, it is to be taken 
into consideration that, at least between the parties, conflicting decisions on the issue of 
validity of the patent are avoided (in the absence of an erga omnes effect of the decision on 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 421; Dreyfuss (2001) U. Ill. L. Rev. 421, at p. 445 
1934
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 421; Dreyfuss (2001) U. Ill. L. Rev. 421, at p. 445 
1935
 This approach has been pursued in Article 12(6) Alternatives A and B of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001). 
1936
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 441 (differently: Bukow 2003, p. 215, there fn. 52).  
1937
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 441. 
1938
 Cf. Schack 2009, p. 331; cf. also Metzger 2009, pp. 252-253. 
1939
 This approach is also pursued in the ALI Principles and in the CLIP Principles.  
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the validity of the patent, conflicting decisions remain possible if another plaintiff brings an 
action). Further, both the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant are sufficiently taken into 
account. On the one hand, the plaintiff bringing an infringement action will, for the sake of 
safety, prefer an infringement decision with inter partes effect, because, in the case of a 
decision with erga omnes effect, there is a high risk that the patent is held void vis-à-vis 
everybody which can mean a considerable impairment of the patentee's position. Besides, the 
plaintiff usually could have brought, by his own choice, infringement proceedings before the 
courts of the granting State because jurisdiction in tort will (also) be existent there. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that the court certainly could not allow amendment of a foreign patent, which 
would have eventually been possible if the plaintiff had brought an infringement action before 
the courts of the protection State.1940 On the other hand, the defendant of the infringement 
action could have brought an invalidity action before the courts of the granting State in due 
time, having the consequence that the infringement court would have stayed the infringement 
proceeding until the decision of the court first seised. Proceeding in this way, the defendant 
could have even reached a decision with erga omnes effect in the granting State. The 
infringement court would then have made its decision on the basis of the invalidity of the 
patent held by the invalidity court. Moreover, if the infringement court, by way of a 
preliminary question, incidentally, with inter partes effect, decides that the concerned patent 
is void, and consequentially dismisses the infringement action, the alleged infringer will not 
be interested in additionally gaining a decision by the courts in the granting State having the 
same content, namely that the patent is void (although the latter decision would have erga 
omnes effect).1941  
 
Besides, it is to be considered that res iudicata of the incidental decision on the vality of a 
patent rendered by an extraterritorial infringement court actually does not avoid a later 
decision on the validity of the patent by a court in the protection State between the same 
parties as in the infringement proceeding.1942  
 
Numerous States, including States with a “Verbundsystem” where infringement courts may 
decide on the validity of patents, provide for specialised courts or administrative authorities 
for proceedings on the validity of patents with erga omnes effect.1943 Thus, even national 
courts which are no specialised courts are not allowed to render such decisions with erga 
omnes effect.1944 In light of this, it is noteworthy that not all States provide for specialised 
courts for proceedings on the validity of patents. It could thus happen that an ordinary civil 
court, inexperienced in patent matters, decides, with erga omnes effect, on the validity of a 
foreign patent. This seems contradictory, because (non-specialised) extraterritorial 
infringement courts could thus be privileged vis-à-vis non-specialised courts in the protection 
State.1945    
 
Probably, the approach of assigning erga omnes effect to incidental decisions on the validity 
of a patent, rendered by extraterritorial infringement courts, could not be realised, because it is 
a commonly accepted principle that decisions on the validity of a patent with erga omnes 
effect can only be rendered by the courts of the granting State.1946 This became also clear in 
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 Cf. Bukow 2003, p. 215, there fn. 52; cf. Wadlow 1998, para. 3–145. 
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 Cf. Bukow 2003, p. 215, there fn. 52. 
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 Bukow 2003, p. 215, there fn. 52. 
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 Schneider 2005, p. 126  et seq. 
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 Dreyfuss (2001) U. Ill. L. Rev. 421, at p. 443 
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 Schauwecker 2009, p. 422. 
1946
 Fawcett & Torremans 2011, para. 1.69; referring to the Jenard Report: Wadlow 1998, para. 2–108; Bukow 
2003, p. 224. 
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the framework of the negotiations on the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.  
 
On the contrary, both the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles advocate to restrict the 
incidental decision of an extraterritorial infringement court on the validity of the concerned 
patent to an inter partes effect. 
 
The necessity of an exclusion of erga omnes effect of incidental decisions on the validity of a 
patent, rendered by the (extraterritorial) infringement court,1947 also results from the fact that 
the extent of res iudicata of incidental questions significantly differs among the national laws 
of different States. First of all, two aspects with regard to res iudicata are to be differentiated: 
the aspect of what is concerned (which is in German law referred to as “objektive Grenzen 
der Rechtskraft”) and the aspect of who is concerned (in German law named “subjektive 
Grenzen der Rechtskraft”). As to the first question of what becomes res iudicata, most 
European States (as for instance Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland) provide that incidental decisions do not 
become res iudicata at all, but res iudicata only affects the decision on the claim raised.1948 
Differently, for instance in France1949, Belgium, Greece and the United Kingdom1950, also an 
incidental decision can become res iudicata with inter partes effect. Whereas in the United 
Kingdom this rule of “issue estoppel” is dogmatically considered a rule of evidence, its effect 
actually corresponds to res iudicata.1951 Regarding the second question of who is concerned 
by res iudicata, it is a common principle in European States that an incidental decision, if 
admissible on the validity of a patent, decided by the infringement court, has only inter partes 
effect,1952 while such an incidental decision has no effect vis-à-vis third parties. Apparently, 
France seems to be an exception to this rule. In the course of the creation of the Brussels 
Convention, one of the most significant changes of the 1978 Patent Act concerned the extent 
of a declaration of invalidity that prior to that date only took effect between the parties and 
has then be extended to take erga omnes effect.1953 Although it has partly been put forward in 
French legal doctrine that in the case of a raised invalidity defence (défense au fond or 
exception de nullité) – in contrast to an invalidity counterclaim (demande 
reconventionnelle) – a decision rendered by the infringement court according to which the 
patent is held void only has inter partes effect as before the reform of patent law in 1978,1954 
several arguments militate against this conception. So, it has been stressed that both the 
demande reconventionnelle, the défense au fond and the exception de nullité are in fact of 
similar type, which results in the fact that the court's decision on either of these procedural 
means has erga omnes effect.1955 In this respect, it is to be taken into consideration that 
Articles 63 and 64 of the French Code of Civil Procedure expressly provide that also the 
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Article 63 
Les demandes incidentes sont : la demande reconventionnelle, (…). 
   
Article 64 
Constitue une demande reconventionnelle la demande par laquelle le défendeur originaire prétend 




Incidental actions are: the demande reconventionnelle, (…). 
 
Article 64 
A demande reconventionnelle constitutes the action by which the original defendant claims to gain a 
benefit other than a simple defence against the claim of his opponent.)1956 
 
 
Where, before a French infringement court, nullity is alleged as a mere defence rather than a 
counterclaim, the court might however also simply dismiss the action for lack of infringement 
without expressly pronouncing nullity of the patent.1957 
 
In the United States, in contrast, an incidental decision on the validity of the concerned patent 
rendered by the infringement court can have, under certain circumstances, erga omnes effect 
(“collateral estoppel”).1958  
 
In light of the foregoing, a provision should be established according to which incidental 
decisions on the validity of the concerned patent shall have inter partes effect. Otherwise, 
there seems a priori no chance for an agreement on a solution embedded in an amended 
version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, let alone in the framework of an eventual future 
Global Judgments Convention.   
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.3.4 Conception 4: No definition of the effect of incidental decisions 
 
Apart from the conceptions presented before, another approach could be to merely exclude 
recognition and enforcement of the incidental decision on the validity of a patent, without 
establishing any rule as to the effect of this incidental decision.1959 
 
Problematically, this approach does not avoid that an incidental decision on the validity 
rendered by the extraterritorial infringement court gains erga omnes effect in the forum State. 
Such a far-reaching decision should however be reserved to the courts of the granting State. 
Besides, regarding the risk that incidental decisions on the validity of a patent could be 
conferred erga omnes effect, this approach will not be realisable in practice neither at the 
European level, embedded in an amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, nor in the 




                                                 
1956
 Translation provided by the author of this thesis. 
1957
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An analysis of the conceivable possibilities regarding the effect of an incidental decision of an 
extraterritorial infringement court on the validity of a patent, reveals that, realistically, solely 
a conception according to which such an incidental decision on the validity of a patent has 
inter partes effect, and not erga omnes, seems to be justified and feasible in practice, and 
should therefore be envisaged and pursued.  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.4 Stay of infringement proceedings as an alternative to an incidental decision?   
 
Having arrived at the conclusion that an extraterritorial infringement court should have 
jurisdiction to render an incidental decision on the validity of the patent with inter partes 
effect, once the defendant has raised a defence of invalidity of the patent concerned, a 
consequential question is whether the deciding court should be given the possibility, 
alternatively, to stay the infringement proceeding until the validity issue has been decided by 
the courts of the protection State.  
 
On the one hand, one might argue that the mere fact that the defence of invalidity has been 
raised justifies the stay of infringement proceedings, because the admissibility of an incidental 
question would not be impaired and there might be good reasons why a stay of infringement 
proceedings would be more appropriate.1960 So, one might think of the advantages of a 
consolidation of proceedings.  
 
However, the better arguments militate for the opposite opinion. To begin, it is to be 
underlined that the parties' interests do not militate for the need of the possibility of staying 
infringement proceedings for the sole reason that an invalidity defence has been raised, 
without a court vested with exclusive jurisdiction on the validity issue having been invoked 
yet, because the plaintiff has the initial choice of bringing the infringement action before the 
courts of the granting State, and the defendant should not be given the opportunity to delay 
the infringement proceeding (torpedo tactic).1961  
 
Furthermore, the possibility of staying infringement proceedings once a defence of invalidity 
is raised might, in practice, effect a complete devaluation of the solution that infringement 
courts render an incidental decision on the validity of the patent, because extraterritorial 
infringement courts might then always be tempted to stay proceedings due to the effort 
produced by the examination of the validity of a foreign patent, and due to a mistaken, 
misunderstood consideration of the interests of the granting State.1962 
 
Beyond that, the possibility of staying infringement proceedings once a defence of invalidity 
has been raised would effect legal uncertainty.1963 This result would be opposed to significant 
ideas of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which considers legal certainty and predictability as 
fundamental principles. 
 
To conclude, the extraterritorial infringement court should not be given the possibility to stay 
the infringement proceeding, as an alternative for rendering an incidental decision, for the sole 
reason that a defence of invalidity of the concerned patent has been raised. However, a stay of 
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the infringement proceeding should be possible according to and in the framework of the 
general rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. With accordance to 
the national procedural rules as to the stay of proceedings applicable in EU Member 
States1964, it would be necessary that a proceeding on the validity of the patent has already 
been initiated, and that there is a sufficient chance that that proceeding will be successful 
which must be evaluated by the infringement court which stays the infringement 
proceeding.1965  
 
However, while national procedural laws may imply, as a prerequisite of a stay of 
proceedings, formal requirements such as “serious doubts” as to the validity of the patent,1966 
such formal restrictions should not be integrated in an amended version of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, respectively an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. For it is 
conceivable that an extraterritorial, unspecialised infringement court does not have any 
“serious doubts” regarding the validity of the patent, but wants to stay the infringement 
proceeding because of the complexity and difficulty of the matter.1967 The criteria for a stay 
thus cannot be defined a priori but should be in the discretion of the infringement court.1968 
Moreover, it could also be argued, although such “serious doubts” can be the reason for 
staying the infringement proceeding, that the infringement court then is convinced of the 
invalidity of the patent and should therefore render a decision, because it is highly probable 
that the patent will be declared void in a subsequent invalidity proceeding with ex tunc 
effect.1969  
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 Cf. Dagg (2003)94(1) Mitt. 1, at p. 1 et seq.; with regard to a stay of proceedings according to German law 
cf. Reimann & Kreye 2003, pp. 587-597. 
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initiated within this term, the invalidity defence will not be taken into consideration in the infringement 
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Handelsgericht Zürich 16 October 2006, (2007)56(3) GRUR Int. 258, at p. 259) and the Dutch Hoge Raad (cf. 
HR 30 November 2007, C02/228HR and C02/280HR, Roche Nederland BV (Netherlands) and Others v Dr. F.J. 
Primus and Dr. M.D. Goldenberg, NJ 2008, 77 – Roche Nederland), and has partly been advocated in the 
literature, too, cf. McGuire (2011)57(8) WRP 983, at pp. 989-993. In any event, this solution would at least 
ensure that an invalidity defence will only be effective if the competent court in the protection State is invoked 
within the time limit determined by the infringement court, which may prevent – at least to some extent – the 
abusive raise of the invalidity defence. However, despite certain advantages of this approach (ensuring the 
supremacy of the court at the place of registration concerning all issues of validity and effectiveness while 
simultaneously allowing for cross-border litigation in infringement disputes, cf. Magnus & Mankowski 
(2010)109 ZVglRWiss 1, at p. 18), good reasons militate against this solution. There would be no guarantee that 
there is a sufficient chance that the invalidity proceeding will be successful, and it is doubtful whether the 
infringement court will be able to evaluate the outcome of foreign invalidity proceedings. As a consequence, the 
defendant in infringement proceedings may – in order to delay these infringement proceedings – raise the 
invalidity defence although he actually does not intend to initiate invalidity proceedings afterwards. Although, 
according to this proposal, infringement proceedings continue after the time limit determined by the 
infringement court has expired, and additional costs have been produced, the defendant might accept this for 
economic reasons while the plaintiff might be severely harmed. Another problem might consist in the fact that, 
according to McGuire's proposal, the infringement court would have discretion with regard to the term within 
which invalidity proceedings must be initiated after the raise of the invalidity defence in the infringement 
proceeding. This would potentially result in considerable legal uncertainty, also because different infringement 
courts may determine different terms.   
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3.3.3.1.2.5 Additional rules as to related proceedings 
 
Article 30(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides that, where related actions are pending 
in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised may stay 
its proceedings. According to Article 30(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, actions are 
deemed to be related for the purpose of Article 30 where they are so closely connected that it 
is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments 
resulting from separate proceedings. With regard to infringement proceedings and validity 
proceedings, Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may become relevant in case that 
validity proceedings have been initiated before infringement proceedings. In particular, it 
seems important to complement Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by an additional 
rule which clarifies which factors should be taken into consideration by the court which has to 
determine whether to stay proceedings, in order to ensure legal certainty and conformity of 
legal practice within the EU Member States.      
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.6 Stay of infringement proceedings in case of a later brought invalidity action  
 
Besides, the question arises of whether a stay of infringement proceedings should also be 
enabled if an invalidity action is brought subsequently, i.e. at a point in time when 
infringement proceedings have already been initiated. Again, such a provision could be either 
integrated in the provision on exclusive jurisdiction in patent litigation (Article 24(4) of the 




3.3.3.1.2.7 Providing additional rules (besides the rules on the stay of infringement 
proceedings) with regard to the cooperation between the (extraterritorial) infringement 
court and the invalidity court 
 
In the case of patent infringement proceedings pending before an extraterritorial infringement 
court, and invalidity proceedings, concerning the same patent, pending before the courts of 
the granting State, be it that those validity proceedings have been brought before or after the 
infringement action has been initiated, it appears that the sole existence of rules as to a stay of 
proceedings does not suffice in order to take into adequate consideration the parties' interests 
and also the general aspect of judicial economy. Rather, rules are required as to establish in 
which way involved courts shall cooperate with each other in such simultaneously pending 
multistate proceedings. An amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation – and also an 
eventual future Global Judgments Convention – should therefore imply such rules. 
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.8 Exclusion of recognition and enforcement of an incidental validity decision 
rendered by the infringement court if the patent has already been declared void by the 
courts of the granting State 
 
Regarding the exclusion of recognition of infringement decisions respectively non-
infringement decisions, if, in the meanwhile, a court or an authority in the granting State 
declared the patent to be void, this decision having erga omnes and ex tunc effect, it is to be 
noticed that Article 45(1)(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable, because the 
infringement decision and the invalidity decision do not involve the same cause of action. 
Article 45(1)(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides: 
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 Article 45(1)(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
 
(1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
  
 (...) 
 (d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a 
 third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the 
 earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed. 
 
 
However, Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies.1970 The provision provides:   
 
 
 Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
(1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
  
 (...) 
 (c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the Member 
 State addressed. 
 
 
It should not be considered indispensable that the decision of the court or authority is rendered 
in the course of a separate invalidity proceeding. In States where incidental decisions on the 
validity of a patent do not only have inter partes effect, but erga omnes effect,1971 such 
decisions should also be recognised to be irreconcilable judgments in order to avoid a 
contradiction between internal and cross-border cases in these States.1972  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.9 Contradiction between the incidental decision on the validity of a patent 
rendered by the extraterritorial infringement court (with inter partes effect), and a later 
decision on the validity of this patent produced by a court in the granting State (with 
erga omnes effect) 
 
Conferring jurisdiction to an extraterritorial infringement court to decide, by way of an 
incidental decision with inter partes effect, on the validity of a patent, bears the risk that, after 
the infringement court has made such a decision on the validity of the patent, a court of the 
granting State subsequently renders a contrary decision, which is in principle possible due to 
the inter partes effect of the infringement decision. This problem can occur in two 
constellations. First, it is conceivable that the infringement court convicts an alleged infringer 
for patent infringement, but this patent is declared void in a later proceeding by a court of the 
granting State.1973 On the other hand, it is possible that the infringement court dismisses the 
infringement action because it holds the patent to be void, while a court of the granting State 
subsequently decides that the concerned patent is valid.1974 In both constellations, res iudicata 
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of the incidental decision of the infringement court seised first would not be opposed to a later 
decision on the validity of the patent, with erga omnes effect, rendered by the courts of the 
granting State. 
 
Noteworthily, the risk of contradictory decisions does not only exist with regard to cross-
border patent infringement proceedings, aroused by the possibility of incidental decisions on 
the validity of a patent rendered by an extraterritorial infringement court, but also exists at the 
national level both in States which have established  a “Trennungssystem” (where the validity 
and the infringement of a patent are principally examined by different courts), and those 
which employ a “Verbundsystem” (where the courts having jurisdiction to decide on the 
infringement of a patent may also decide on its validity).1975 In light of the fact that national 
law also admits the risk of irreconcilable judgments, it has rightly been underlined that it is 
not the specific task of international procedural law (as according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) to avoid such dissonant decisions,1976 but that this problem is to be solved 
according to the applicable provisions of national law. Consequently, a potential provision on 
the possibility of bringing an action for restitution respectively damages in case that the 
decision of the extraterritorial infringement court on the validity of the patent (with inter 
partes effect) is overruled as to the validity issue by a later decision on the validity of the 
patent, rendered by the courts of the granting State (with erga omnes effect), should not be 
integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Likewise, such a provision should not become part 
of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
However, the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation can at least contribute to avoid 
opposing judgments in the sense of a general goal. In this respect, the infringement court 
should have the possibility to stay the infringement proceeding in case that a proceeding on 
the validity of the concerned patent has already been initiated before a court of the granting 
State. Besides, international procedural law is affected if an infringement decision shall be 
recognised and enforced in another State, while the patent has been declared void in the 
meanwhile with erga omnes and ex tunc effect. It is at least a general goal of international 
procedural law to avoid the circulation of such opposing decisions in the protection State, and 
also in other States, because the underlying reason is not the protection of the sovereignty of 
the granting State, but the consideration of the defendant’s interests who has been wrongly 
convicted.  
 
To conclude, it is to be stated that, while the defendant's interests are adequately taken into 
consideration and protected by the possibility that the infringement court may stay the 
infringement proceeding if a invalidity proceeding has been initiated before the courts of the 
protection State, it would go too far to confer to the defendant the possibility to wait for the 
result of the infringement proceeding and, if he is convicted by the infringement court, to 
initiate an invalidity proceeding in the protection State. As far as the infringement court does 
not stay the infringement proceeding and, after enforcement has already been undertaken, the 
patent is declared void by the courts of the protecting State, this situation does not differ from 
comparable situations occurring in pure national cases without any cross-border context. 
Accordingly, the Brussels Ibis Recognition does not and should not contain respective rules, 
but eventual chances of restitution are and should be governed by provisions of national 
                                                                                                                                                        
because only few States provide for the possibility that the patent holder has the validity of a patent positively 
declared in a court decision.  
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law.1977 The same should apply with regard to the creation of an eventual future Global 
Judgments Convention.  
 
 
3.3.3.1.2.10 Conclusion: How should exclusive jurisdiction as to the issue of validity of a 
patent be constructed? 
 
To conclude, exclusive jurisdiction regarding the issue of validity of a patent should be 
constructed in a way which does not exclude extraterritorial courts invoked in patent 
infringement proceedings from examining the validity of the concerned patent by way of an 
incidental decision which has inter partes effect. The mere fact that a defence of invalidity 
has been raised should not establish the possibility for the infringement court to stay the 
infringement proceeding, whereas a stay according to general rules of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation should be possible in case that a validity proceeding has already been initiated in 
the granting State. 
 
Both the possibility to defend against the enforcement of a decision on the infringement of a 
patent which is subsequently declared void with erga omnes and ex tunc effect, and the 
possibility to gain restitution after enforcement, are governed by the rules of national 
procedural law, if only one State is affected. The Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable to 
solve this issue. In contrast, the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies to the avoidance of cross-
border recognition and enforcement of (non-)infringement decisions which subsequently 
become unjustified because the concerned patent is held valid/void with erga omnes and ex 
tunc effect by a court of the granting State.  
 
 
3.3.3.2 Existing reform proposals 
 
Having identified the crucial issues to be solved with regard to Article 24(4) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, and having analysed which requirements must be fulfilled, I shall now turn to 
a discussion and analysis of existing reform proposals in order to find out whether, 
respectively in which way and in how far these reform proposals deliver answers and 
solutions with regard to the addressed problematic issues. Besides giving an evaluation of the 
proposed solutions, I shall finally make an own proposal with regard to an amendment of 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and corresponding rules on exclusive jurisdiction 
in patent matters in the framework of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. 
 
Remarkably, all presented reform proposals contain several provisions as to exclusive 
jurisdiction in patent disputes. This illustrates both the significance and the complexity of the 
topic. 
   
 
3.3.3.2.1 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) 
 
According to Article 1(1) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005), 
this Convention applies in international cases to exclusive choice of court agreements 
concluded in civil or commercial matters. With regard to patent infringement, this means that 
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) would merely cover 
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contractual infringement actions. Besides, Article 2(2)(n) of the Hague Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements (2005)1978 clearly provides: 
 
 
 Article 2(2)(n) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) 
 
 This convention shall not apply to the following matters - 
  
 (…) 
 (n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights. 
 
 
However, although the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) thus 
excludes the matter of validity of a patent from its scope, a look on the Convention is still 
worthwhile when it comes to the question how to deal with incidental decisions. For the 
Convention, despite the exclusion of the issue of validity of patents from its scope, allows for 
the possibility to render an incidental decision on this matter. In this respect, Article 10 of the 
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005)1979 only restricts (under certain 
conditions) the recognition and enforcement of the ruling on a preliminary question 
concerning this excluded matter, respectively of a judgment based on such a ruling: 
 
 
 Article 10 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) 
 
(1) Where a matter excluded under Article 2, paragraph 2, (…), arose as a preliminary question, the 
ruling on that question shall not be recognised or enforced under this Convention. 
 
(2) Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment 
was based on a ruling on a matter excluded under Article 2, paragraph 2. 
 
(3) However, in the case of a ruling on the validity of an intellectual property right other than copyright 
or a related right, recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused or postponed under the 
preceding paragraph only where – 
 
 (a) that ruling is inconsistent with a judgment or a decision of a competent authority on that 
 matter given in the State under the law of which the intellectual property right arose; or  
 
 (b) proceedings concerning the validity of the intellectual property right are pending in that 





3.3.3.2.2 The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) 
 
Article 12(4) to (6) of the Draft Hague Convention implies three alternatives as to exclusive 
jurisdiction in the context of intellectual property (Alternative A, Alternative B and  
Alternative A and B). This indicates that, obviously, there was no consensus on the inclusion 
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 For a detailed analysis of Article 2(2)(n) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) cf. 
Luginbühl & Wollgast (2006)55(3) GRUR Int. 208, at pp. 210-212; cf. also Luginbühl & Wollgast 2006, pp. 
327-331. 
1979
 For a detailed analysis of Article 10 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005) cf. 
Luginbühl & Wollgast (2006)55(3) GRUR Int. 208, at pp. 215-216; cf. also Luginbühl & Wollgast 2006, pp. 
338-340. 
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of intellectual property within the scope of the Convention or in respect of each of the 
proposals themselves.1980 The three alternative solutions read as follows: 
  
 
 Article 12(4) to (6) of the Draft Hague Convention 
  
 [Alternative A 
 
 (4) In proceedings in which the relief sought is a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, 
 abandonment, revocation or infringement of a patent or a mark, the courts of the Contracting State 
 of grant or registration shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
 (5) In proceedings in which the relief sought is a judgment on the validity, abandonment, or 
 infringement of an unregistered mark [or design], the courts of the Contracting State in which 
 rights in the mark [or design] arose shall have exclusive jurisdiction.] 
 
 
 [Alternative B 
 
 (5A) In relation to proceedings which have as their object the infringement of patents, trademarks, 
 designs or other similar rights, the courts of the Contracting State referred to in the precedings 
 paragraph [or in provisions of Articles [3 to16]] have jurisdiction.] 
 
 
 Alternatives A and B 
 
 [(6) Paragraphs (4) and (5) shall not apply where one of the above matters arises as an incidental 
 question in proceedings before a court not having exclusive jurisdiction under those paragraphs. 
 However, the ruling in that matter shall have no binding effect in subsequent proceedings, even if 
 they are between the same parties. A matter arises as an incidental question if the court is not 
 requested to give a judgment on that matter, even if a ruling on it is necessary in arriving at a 
 decision.]   
 
 
Alternative A and Alternative B differ from each other with regard to the question of whether 
proceedings concerning the infringement of registered IP rights should fall within the scope of 
exclusive jurisdiction rules.1981 As to the constellation of a patent infringement dispute, the 
courts of the Contracting State where the patent has been granted would have exclusive 
jurisdiction for infringement proceedings pursuant to Alternative A. According to Alternative 
B, courts which have jurisdiction according to Articles 3 to 16 of the Draft Hague Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) can also hear 
claims concerning infringement of registered IP rights, i.e. including patents.1982  
 
Regardless of whether patent infringement claims fall within the scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision or not, such exclusive jurisdiction rules would not be applicable in case 
that one of the matters mentioned in Alternatives A or B arises as an incidental question in the 
proceedings of a court having no exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 12 of the Draft 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(2001).1983 It is noteworthy that Article 12(6) Alternatives A and B of the Draft Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) 
provides that an incidental decision on the validity of a patent does not become res iudicata at 
all, i.e. does not even have inter partes effect. By this provision, the extent of exclusive 
                                                 
1980
 Cf. footnote 80 to Article 12 of the Draft Hague Convention; cf. also Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 34. 
1981
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 34. 
1982
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 34. 
1983
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 34. 
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jurisdiction should be limited to the cases where the validity issue arises as the main issue of 
the proceedings.1984 Beyond that, Article 12(6) Alternatives A and B of the Draft Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) 
comprises a definition of an incidental question.  
 
However, no agreement could be achieved at all between the delegations that tried to establish 
the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001). As a consequence, the Convention did not enter into force but remained in the 
stadium of a draft. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.3 ALI Principles  
 
 
3.3.3.2.3.1 General orientation – Solution via subject-matter jurisdiction instead of 
possibility of incidental decisions 
 
The ALI Principles contain several rules as to the relationship between exclusive jurisdiction 
in patent matters when the validity of the patent is concerned, and patent infringement 
proceedings. These rules are in particular embodied in § 211(2), § 212(4) and § 213(2) and (3) 
of Part II. Jurisdiction, Chapter 2. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter, of the ALI Principles.  
 
The localisation of these provisions under the heading of “Jurisdiction over the Subject 
Matter” reveals that the ALI Principles approach the issue indirectly from the angle of 
subject-matter jurisdiction,1985 rather than providing for the possibility of the infringement 
court to render an incidental decision on the validity of the concerned patent. Accordingly, the 
ALI Principles contain no definition of such incidental decisions, let alone rules as to the 
above raised questions in conjunction with such incidental decisions rendered by the 
infringement court.  
 
The fundamental conception of the ALI Principles is that each State controls the reach of 
authority of its courts over the subject-matter of disputes. However, for the sake of 
efficiency1986, the rules on adjudicatory authority are broad enough to encompass foreign 
claims. In cases where such authority is unavailable, the ALI Principles provide a mechanism 
for cooperative adjudication.1987 Such provisions are contained in § 221, § 222 and § 223 of 
Part II. Jurisdiction, Chapter 3. Jurisdiction over Simplification: Coordinating Multiterritorial 
Actions, of the ALI Principles. The latter rules on coordination of proceedings shall be 
discussed at a later point.  
 
I shall start my analysis of the ALI Principles with the relevant rules contained in § 211(2),    
§ 212(4) and § 213(2) and (3) of the ALI Principles. § 211 of the ALI Principles provides: 
 
 
 § 211. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Claims 
 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a court is competent to adjudicate claims arising under foreign 
 laws pertaining to the subject-matter of these Principles. However, with respect to each asserted claim, 
                                                 
1984
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 34; Nygh/Pocar Report, p. 70. 
1985
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.N14; Kono & Jurčys 2012, pp. 36-37. 
1986
 The approach of the ALI Principles is strongly influenced by efficiency considerations. Cf. in detail: Kono & 
Jurčys 2012, pp. 36-37. 
1987
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 211, Comment a. on § 211. 
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 the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction under its local law and personal jurisdiction under        
§§ 201-207. 
 
 (2) A judgment holding registered rights granted under the laws of another State invalid is effective 
 only to resolve the dispute between or among the parties to the action.  
 
 
While § 211 of the ALI Principles is based on the conception that issues regarding the validity 
of a patent should in principle be adjudicated in the courts of the State in which the patent was 
granted, the ALI Principles still admit, in § 211(2), an exception as to the adjudication of 
matters involving patents of a foreign State, because separating adjudication of validity from 
infringement may have substantive ramifications.1988 Accordingly, it has been underlined that 
separate resolutions can prevent a court from hearing all of the evidence relevant to the action 
and from using its understanding of how a technology is utilised to inform its decision on the 
scope of the right. Besides, bifurcating validity and infringement can increase the parties' 
costs. In light of this, the ALI Principles permit adjudication, while confining its effect to the 
parties to that litigation (cf. § 211(2) of the ALI Principles).1989 Noteworthily, the ALI 
Principles do not start from the general rule of preclusion law that decisions holding a patent 
valid cannot bind third parties. Thus, when the validity of a patent is upheld, an exclusion 
equivalent to that of § 211(2) is not required.1990 
 
The limit on jurisdiction implied in § 211(2) of the ALI Principles (inter partes effect) is 
enforced by § 413(2) of the ALI Principles on the level of recognition and enforcement. § 413 
of the ALI Principles provides: 
 
 
 § 413. Declarations of Validity, Invalidity, Infringement, and Ownership of Rights 
 
  (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), declarations by a foreign court of validity, invalidity, 
 infringement, or ownership of intellectual property rights shall be recognized and enforced by the 
 enforcement court.   
(2) If a court in one State declares that a right registered in another State is invalid, the declaration is 
effective only to resolve the dispute between or among the parties to the litigation. 
 
 
Another provision, being of particular interest with regard to an (invalidity) defence, is           
§ 212(1) and (4) of the ALI Principles:  
 
 
 § 212. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Counterclaims. Supplemental Claims and Defenses 
 
 (1) A court may determine all claims and defenses among the parties arising out of the transaction, 
 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences on which the original claim is based, regardless of 
 the territorial source of the rights at issue or of the party that asserts them. However, with respect to 
 each asserted claim, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction under its local law and personal 
 jurisdiction under §§ 201-207. 
 
 (...) 
 (4) A court has authority to consider defenses related to the invalidity of registered rights. In a dispute in 
 which a court in one State has determined that a right registered in another State is invalid, the judgment 
 is effective only to resolve the dispute between or among the parties to that action. 
 
                                                 
1988
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 211, Comment b. on § 211. 
1989
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 211, Comment b. on § 211. 
1990
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 211, Reporters' Notes 1. on § 211. 
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Noteworthily, § 212(1) of the ALI Principles adopts a transactional approach to determine the 
appropriate scope of litigation. This approach will be subject to a closer analysis below. 
 
§ 212(4) of the ALI Principles contains a special rule on the authority of a court to consider an 
invalidity defence raised in a patent infringement proceeding.1991 As to the situation that the 
court of one State declares a patent granted in respectively for another State invalid, § 212(4) 
of the ALI Principles clearly states that that decision has only inter partes effect and merely 
concerns the dispute in which the validity issue was raised. This rule in § 212(4) of the CLIP 
Principles is similar to the rule set out in § 211(2) of the CLIP Principles, when the claim is 
raised in the first instance by the plaintiff.  
 
Another provision of considerable interest in this context is § 213(2) and (3) of the ALI 
Principles which provides: 
 
 




 (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), an action to obtain a declaration of the invalidity of a 
 registered right may be brought only in the State of registration. 
 
 (3) An action to declare the invalidity of the rights registered in two or more States may be brought in 
 the State or States in which the defendant is resident, but the judgment will be effective only to resolve 
 the dispute between or among the parties to the action. 
 
 
§ 213(2) of the ALI Principles reflects the general conception that issues concerning the 
validity of a patent should be adjudicated in the courts in the granting State. While the ALI 
Principles do not generally prohibit the adjudication of matters involving a foreign State’s 
patent, these adjudications receive special treatment.1992 In case that the sole objective of the 
litigation is a declaration of invalidity of a patent under the law of a particular State, § 213(2) 
of the ALI Principles requires adjudication of the case in the courts in that State. On the other 
hand, where patents under the laws of multiple States are involved, § 213(3) of the ALI 
Principles permits the suit only in the right holder's residence(s), but provides that the 
decision has only inter partes effect.1993 In this respect, § 213(3) of the ALI Principles 
resembles the provision of § 212(4) of the ALI Principles.1994 In light of the foregoing 
explications as to § 211(2), § 212(4) and § 213(3) of the ALI Principles, it becomes obvious 
that the ALI Principles apply this solution to any determination of invalidity. This rule has 
rightly been characterised as a compromise: While courts are reluctant to second-guess the 
acts of foreign public authorities, the rule brings along efficiency gains. Moreover, separating 
adjudication of validity from infringement may have substantive ramifications because it 
prevents a court from hearing all of the evidence relevant to the action and from using its 
understanding of how a technology is utilised to inform its decision on the scope of the patent. 
Moreover, bifurcating validity and infringement can also increase parties' costs.1995 Therefore, 
                                                 
1991
 In contrast to an invalidity defence, a counterclaim for invalidity appears not to fall within the scope of          
§ 212(4) of the ALI Principles. As a consequence, counterclaims must principally be brought in the courts of the 
State where the patent has been granted (§ 213(2) of the ALI Principles), cf. Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), 
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1992
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 213, Comment b. on § 213(2) and (3). 
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 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 212, Comment h. on § 212(4). 
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 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 213, Comment c. on § 213(3). 
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§ 213(3) of the ALI Principles provides for the possibility that a court in one State may 
adjudicate the validity of a patent granted in, respectively for another State, but only to clarify 
the rights of the parties between or among themselves.   
 
 
3.3.3.2.3.2 Additional rules as to related proceedings  
 
The ALI Principles contain, in § 221, § 222 and § 223 of Part II. Jurisdiction, Chapter 3. 
Jurisdiction over Simplification: Coordinating Multiterritorial Actions, rules with regard to 
the coordination of actions brought before different courts.  
 
To get an idea of the structure of this approach, it is worthwhile having a look on § 221(1) and 
(2) of the ALI Principles in particular which provides: 
 
 
 § 221. Coordination Authority of the Court First Seized with an Action Involving the Party 
  Seeking Coordination 
 
 (1) Any party engaged in actions involving the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
 occurrences in the courts in different States may move to have the actions coordinated through 
 cooperation or consolidation under these Principles. The motion shall be timely submitted and specify 
 the actions to be coordinated. 
 
  (a) If the parties in all the actions are the same, the motion should be made in the court first 
  seized. 
 
  (b) If the parties in all the actions are not the same, the motion should be made in the court first 
  seized with an action involving the moving party. 
 
  (c) Where permitted by local law, the court first seized may consider coordination on its own 
  motion,  while affording the parties an opportunity to be heard in the matter. 
 
 (2) If the court designated by subsection (1) finds that some or all of the claims in the specified actions 
 in other courts arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as 
 the claims before the court, the court shall assert coordination authority over those actions and decide, 
 in accordance with § 222, whether the actions will proceed through cooperation or consolidation or a 
 combination of the two.  
 
 
In contrast to the system used in the Brussels Ibis Regulation which differentiates between 
“actions involving the same cause of action and between the same parties” (cf. Article 29 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) and “related actions” (cf. Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation),1996 the ALI Principles adopt a rather broad concept of actions arising from the 
“same transaction” to determine the appropriate scope of litigation.1997 Slightly varying in the 
formulation, this transactional approach refers to “actions involving the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”.1998 As the Commentary on the ALI 
Principles has stressed, this transactional approach is to be understood in light of the goals of 
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 This system has been adopted by the CLIP Principles. 
1997
 Interestingly, the ALI Principles anyway use the term “related actions”, in particular in § 222 and § 223, but 
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2:702 and 2:703 of the CLIP Principles), the latter also covering the relationship between patent infringement 
proceedings and patent invalidity proceedings.  
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the ALI Principles to ensure efficiency and fairness. A narrow scope of authority would 
require parties pursuing claims and enforcing judgments to proceed before several courts 
simultaneously, which would undermine both objectives. The question of whether there is the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, depends on the 
relationship between the operative facts and the relatedness of the issues in the dispute in 
time, space, origin, and motivation. However, the ultimate question affects the convenience of 
trial and the expectations of the parties in light of evolving practices in transnational 
litigation.1999 § 221 of the ALI Principles avoids the “cause of action”-terminology – as 
employed by the Brussels Ibis Regulation – because the “cause of action”-terminology can be 
confusing and has been considered having proved ambiguous in the United States.2000 
Notably, the “same transaction”-concept goes beyond pure parallelism in order to bring before 
the court first seised all actions that, from efficiency and fairness perspectives, should be tried 
in a coordinated way.2001  
 
§ 221(1)1 of the ALI Principles gives the parties of actions brought before the courts in 
different States the opportunity to move to have actions coordinated or consolidated, if the 
actions involve the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences (cf. 
§ 221(1)1 of the ALI Principles). Besides, provided that local law so admits, the court first 
seised has authority to consider coordination on its own motion (ex officio) (cf. § 221(1)2(c) 
of the ALI Principles). This is due to the insight that the efficiencies that can be achieved are 
as much in the interest of the parties as they are an interest of the judicial system.2002  
 
As to the question of when a court is seised, § 221(4) of the ALI Principles, actually being 




 § 221. Coordination Authority of the Court First Seized with an Action Involving the Party 
  Seeking Coordination 
 
 (...)  
 (4) A court is “seized”: 
 
(a) when the document instituting the action, or an equivalent document, is filed with the court, 
provided that the plaintiff subsequently takes the required steps to provide notice to the 
defendant; or 
 
(b) if the document has to be served before being filed with the court, when it is served or 
received by the authority responsible for service, whichever is earlier, provided that the 
plaintiff subsequently files the document with the court. 
 
 
Both with regard to cooperation and consolidation, the parties must be heard (cf. § 221(1)2(c) 
of the ALI Principles). As a consequence, the main role of the court is to sensibilise the 
parties of the possibilities meaning to make them aware that these possibilities exist.2004  
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The other court or courts seised must stay actions brought before them which are within the 
consolidation (cf. § 223 of the ALI Principles). But things may be different if actions for a 
declaratory relief come into play. In this respect, § 213(4) and § 221(5)(b) of the ALI 
Principles are to be taken into consideration. These provisions read as follows: 
 
  
§ 213. Declaratory judgments 
  
 ... 
(4) A court exercising jurisdiction under this Section may not exercise coordination authority under       
§ 221.  
 
 
 § 221. Coordination Authority of the Court First Seized with an Action Involving the Party 
  Seeking Coordination 
  
 ... 
 (5) A court seised with a coercive action seeking substantive relief is “first seized” when: 
 
  ... 
  (b) no other court had previously been seized with a coercive action seeking substantive relief 
  (...). 
 
 
Thus, in case that the action before the first court is for declaratory relief which includes a 
declaration of non-infringement of a patent, this court has no authority to consolidate. Rather, 
the court seised with the coercive action is considered as “first seised” and therefore has 
authority to coordinate. As a consequence, an action for a declaration of non-infringement of 
a patent does not take priority over a subsequent action aimed at enforcing the patent.2005 
However, it is to be noticed that declarations on the invalidity of a patent are not covered by 




3.3.3.2.3.3 The ALI Principles' response to the stated need for a provision about the 
possibility of staying infringement proceedings in case of a later brought invalidity 
action 
 
Like the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the ALI Principles do not address the constellation of 
subsequent invalidity proceedings when an infringement action concerning the same patent 
has already been initiated before another court. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.3.4 The ALI Principles' response to the stated need for additional rules (besides 
the rules on the stay of infringement proceedings) with regard to the cooperation 
between the (extraterritorial) infringement court and the invalidity court 
 
According to § 221(2) of the ALI Principles, the court shall assert coordination authority over 
the concerned actions and decide, in accordance with § 222, whether the actions will proceed 
through cooperation or consolidation or a combination of the two. If the court chooses 
cooperation, then each court involved decides on the respective action which has been 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 2:702.N04. 
2006
 Cf. Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 2:702.N04. 
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brought before it. If consolidation is chosen as adequate mode of coordination, the designated 
court has discretion – informed by the parties – to find a court well suited to resolve the entire 
dispute.2007 According to the distinct wording of § 221(2) of the ALI Principles (“cooperation 
or consolidation or a combination of the two”) which is picked up in § 222(1)1 of the ALI 
Principles, it is also possible to combine the two approaches of cooperation and consolidation. 
As becomes clear with regard to the wording of § 221(2) of the ALI Principles (“in 
accordance with § 222”), § 221(2) must be read in conjunction with § 222 of the ALI 
Principles which contains further rules as to cooperation among courts. In this respect, it is 




 § 222. Coordination Among Courts and Consolidation of Territorial Claims by the Court First 
  Seized 
  
 (...) 
 (3) If the court determines that cooperative resolution of all or of part of the dispute is appropriate, the 
 court shall so inform all courts involved in the coordination and order the parties to draw up a plan for 
 resolving the dispute in a just and expeditious manner. 
 
 
The reason for providing for the possibility of cooperation between courts is the insight that 
this instrument is an effective way to move towards global dispute resolution, the involved 
courts having a strong interest in saving resources, avoiding inconsistent adjudication and 
judgments that will not be fully enforced in practice.2008 It has rightly been suggested in the 
Reporters' Notes on § 222 of the ALI Principles that the parties in patent disputes have 
substantial incentives to cooperate, where foreign courts (and in some cases, domestic courts) 
have no authority to render a decision on the validity of the patent. In such cases, litigation 
may actually best be situated in each State in which the patents have been granted. 
Simultaneously, substantial benefits could however be achieved if, before any trial 
commences, the parties agree to take the inventor's testimony a single time, choose to focus 
their disputes on the same embodiments of the accused device, and stipulate to the documents 
and practices that constitute the prior art, or agree to be bound by that single court's factual 
determinations.2009 Patent judges are considered to already dispose of a longstanding practice 
of meeting to share expertise in patent adjudication. Besides, while courts could still arrive at 
different decisions on validity or infringement, there is in fact no real inconsistency because 
the laws applied are different, and, frequently, exploitation in one territory is unaffected by 
exploitation in another State.2010       
 
Another provision to be taken into consideration as to cooperation between involved courts is 
§ 223(2) of the ALI Principles which reads: 
 
 
 § 223. Disposition of the Dispute by Other Court or Courts Seized with the Action 
  
 (...) 
 (2) If the court designated determines that the dispute should be adjudicated cooperatively, courts in 
 which related actions are pending shall consult with the parties, the court first seized, and other courts in 
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2008
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 222, Reporters' Notes 1. on § 222. 
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 which related actions are pending, to determine the scope of each court's authority and the timing of 
 each court's proceedings.  
 
 
If the dispute is coordinated through cooperation, § 223(2) of the ALI Principles instructs the 
courts to facilitate that approach,2011 which also provides for the active exchange of 
information between courts.2012  
 
 
3.3.3.2.4 Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP Principles) 
 
The CLIP Principles provide, in Article 2:401 (Registration and invalidity) and Article 2:402 
(Obligation of other courts) for detailed jurisdiction rules with regard to exclusive jurisdiction. 
Being of significant meaning also for the constellation that an invalidity defence is raised in 
patent infringement proceedings, the CLIP Principles contain further provisions with regard to 
the coordination of proceedings, and recognition and enforcement. These additional rules, as 
far as being relevant in the given context, shall be presented and discussed later. First, Articles 
2:401 and 2:402 of the CLIP Principles shall be subject to a closer analysis.     
 
Articles 2:401 and 2:402 of the CLIP Principles read as follows: 
 
   
Article 2:401: Registration and invalidity  
 
(1) In disputes having as their object a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, abandonment or 
revocation of a patent, a mark, an industrial design or any other intellectual property right protected on 
the basis of registration, the courts in the State where the right has been registered or is deemed to have 
been registered under the terms of an international Convention shall have exclusive jurisdiction. 
 
(2) Paragraph 1 does not apply where validity or registration arises in a context other than by principal 
claim or counterclaim. The decisions resulting from such disputes do not affect the validity or 
registration of those rights as against third parties. 
 
 
Article 2:402: Obligation of other courts 
 
Where a court of a State is seised of a claim which has as its object a matter over which the courts of 
another State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 2:401, it shall declare of its own motion 
that it has no jurisdiction. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.1 Admissibility and definition of the circumstances of an incidental decision, 
rendered by the extraterritorial infringement court, on the validity of a patent once an 
invalidity defence has been raised 
 
Article 2:401(1) of the CLIP Principles implies a confirmation of the rule that, in principle, 
exclusive jurisdiction with regard to a decision on the validity of a patent, is assigned to the 
courts of the State where the patent has been granted.2013 However, in contrast to Article 24(4) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, according to which this provision is applicable “in 
proceedings concerned with the (...) validity of patents”, Article 2:401(1) of the CLIP 
Principles restricts the scope of exclusive jurisdiction to “disputes having as their object a 
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judgment on the (...) validity (...) of a patent”. The background of this wording in Article 
2:401(1) of the CLIP Principles is to make clear that exclusive jurisdiction is justified (only) 
in those scenarios that are essentially concerned with validity etc., where the validity issue etc. 
is at the heart of the case and constitutes the real object of the litigation, i.e. where the 
decision on validity made by a foreign court jeopardises the validity of the patent which is at 
stake in the proceedings.2014 Consequently, Article 2:401(1) of the CLIP Principles does not 
cover cases that only marginally touch on the validity issue etc., the real object of the 
litigation being in fact different.2015 As has been emphasised by the Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles, it already follows from this interpretation of the wording of Article 2:401(1) of the 
CLIP Principles that exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 2:401(1) does not exist as long 
as the decision only deals with validity as an incidental matter, to the effect that the ruling – in 
its final outcome – only resolves the actual dispute between the parties, in contrast to a 
decision having erga omnes effect, which would be the case with regard to proceedings 
brought before the competent authorities in the granting State.2016 Beyond that, Article 
2:401(2)1 of the CLIP Principles sets out explicitly – and thus explicitly provides for the 
possibility of an incidental decision on this matter and defines the circumstances when such 
an incidental decision is made – that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 
2:401(1) does not apply in case that the validity issue is raised in a context other than by 
principal claim or counterclaim. As a consequence, exclusivity does not prevail in cases 
where the validity issue is brought by way of a defence in infringement proceedings.2017 In 
establishing such a legal regime, Article 2:401 of the CLIP Principles aims to reconcile the 
need to facilitate efficient cross-border litigation with the principle of territoriality of IP 
rights.2018   
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.2 Definition of the effect of an incidental decision  
 
As to the effect of an incidental decision on the validity of the concerned patent, Article 
2:401(2)2 of the CLIP Principles explicitly precludes that incidental decisions have erga 
omnes effect: such decisions do not affect the validity of the concerned patent as against third 
parties, meaning that the decision on validity of the patent will not become res iudicata for 
third parties or for the registry. Rather, such incidental decisions are limited to resolving the 
infringement dispute as between the parties. The decision does not even have a binding effect 
between the parties for other purposes beyond the scope of the respective infringement 
proceeding in which the validity issue was raised.2019 However, Article 2:401(2) of the CLIP 
Principles does not imply that the seised court must render such an incidental decision on the 
validity of the concerned patent. In contrast, if validity proceedings have already been 
brought in the granting State in the meanwhile, the court also has discretion not to make a 
decision on the validity at all, but to stay the infringement proceedings according to Article 
2:703(1) of the CLIP Principles if this seems to be the better alternative in view of the 
                                                 
2014
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C07; cf. Hof van Cassatie 1 October 2010, X v 
Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht and Others, [2011] 1 Tijdschrift@ipr.be (http:/www.ipr.be), 73. 
2015
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C07. 
2016
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C07. 
2017
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C09, and there fn. 13: The Commentary on the 
CLIP Principles suggests that the somehow repetitive formulation of Article 2:401(1) and (2) of the CLIP 
Principles might be owed to the fact that the ECJ, as to the interpretation of a corresponding formulation in 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention, interpreted the applicability of exclusive jurisdiction in a rather broad 
way, cf. ECJ 13 July 2006, C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. KG v Lamellen und 
Kupplungsbau Beteiligungs KG, [2006] ECR I-06509, paras. 18-19 – GAT.   
2018
 Kono & Jurčys 2012, p. 43. 
2019
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C10. 
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cooperation of proceedings.2020 In exercising this discretion, the infringement court may, inter 
alia, consider whether the invalidity actions are well founded.2021 
 
Noteworthily, Article 2:401 of the CLIP Principles also applies in case of an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement, because Article 2: 602 of the CLIP Principles provides: 
 
 
Article 2:602: Declaratory actions 
 
 Subject to Article 2:401, an action for a declaratory judgment may be based on the same ground on 
 jurisdiction as a corresponding action seeking substantive relief. 
 
 
As a consequence, the seised court has authority to render an incidental decision on the 
validity of the concerned patent with inter partes effect. 
 
Article 2:402 of the CLIP Principles2022 supplements Article 2:401 of the CLIP Principles in 
order to give effect to the exclusive jurisdiction clause. As one or more parties may 
accidentally – or even deliberately – ignore the exclusive jurisdiction clause, Article 2:402 of 
the CLIP Principles provides that the infringement court will declare of its own motion (ex 




3.3.3.2.4.3 Stay of infringement proceedings as an alternative to an incidental decision?  
 
Section 7 of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles, which deals with the coordination of proceedings, 
starts from the situation that at least two proceedings have to be coordinated. This logically 
requires that the rules contained in Section 7 (Articles 2:701 to 2:706 of the CLIP Principles) 
prerequisite that at least two proceedings have already come into play, while it does not 
suffice that a second (or further) proceeding will eventually be initiated. Rather, the decisive 
element for a stay of proceedings according to the rules of the CLIP Principles2024 is that 
another court has actually been seised. The rules of Section 7 of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles 
are applicable to parallel proceedings that are pending simultaneously without a judgment 
having been given in either of the proceedings yet (lis pendens), but also apply if one of the 
proceedings has already resulted in a judgment, irrespective of whether this judgment is final 
or subject to appeal (cf. Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles: “are or have been 
pending”).2025    
 
In light of this, the mere fact that an invalidity defence is raised does not suffice for staying 
infringement proceedings. Rather, the infringement court has authority to decide on the 
invalidity of the concerned patent by way of an incidental decision having inter partes effect 
and only for the scope of the respective infringement proceeding in which the validity issue 
was raised (cf. Article 2:401(2)2 of the CLIP Principles). A stay requires that two (or more) 
                                                 
2020
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C10. 
2021
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:401, para. 2:401.C11. 
2022
 It is noteworthy that the ALI Principles do not contain any provision corresponding to Article 2:402 of the 
CLIP Principles.  
2023
 Torremans 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:402, para. 2:402.C01. 
2024
 The relevant provisions (which will be discussed in detail later, as far as being relevant in the given context) 
are, in particular, Articles 2:702, 2:703 and 2:704 of the CLIP Principles.  
2025
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:700, para. 2:700.C04. 
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proceedings before different courts have actually come into play. This is not accomplished by 
the mere raise of an invalidity defence, but only when the courts are actually seised. 
 




Article 2:706: Time when a court is deemed to be seised 
 
 For the purposes of the Principles, a court shall be deemed to be seised: 
 
 (1) at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with 
 the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps she/he was required to 
 take to have service effected on the defendant, or 
 
 (2) if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, at the time when it is received 
 by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take 
 the steps she/he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court. 
 
 
By providing for the two alternatives (1) and (2) for determining when a court is deemed to be 
seised, Article 2:706 of the CLIP Principles takes into account that domestic laws of 
procedure – already within the European Union, let alone worldwide – differ from each other 
as to this issue. While in some jurisdictions, for instance the Netherlands, the defendant must 
first be served before a case can be lodged, there are other States, for instance England, where 
a case must be lodged prior to service on the defendant. In each case, the exact time when a 
court is deemed to be seised is to be determined by the lex fori.2026  
 
Noteworthily, both alternatives (1) and (2) require that the plaintiff takes further steps. 
Otherwise, the respective court will not be deemed to be seised. This construction is meant to 
avoid that actions are brought early for sole tactical reasons, in the way that a party proceeds 
to lodge a case in a court (without subsequent service) just to make sure that, in case that 
eventually pending negotiations fail, he benefits in a parties’ race to the courts.2027    
 
As to multistate proceedings which are of particular importance in the context of this work, it 
is to be underlined that such proceedings start to exist in the moment when two courts of 
different States are definitively seised of an action. This does not require that the defendants 
have already been able to put forth their arguments.2028  
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.4 Additional rules as to related proceedings 
 
Noteworthily, the constellation that an invalidity defence is raised in infringement 
proceedings is not covered by Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles which contains rules as to 
congruent proceedings (situation of lis alibi pendens). This becomes clear when having a look 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:706, para. 2:706.C02. 
2027
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:706, para. 2:706.C02. 
2028
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:706, para. 2:706.C01. 
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Article 2:701: Congruent proceedings 
 
 (1) Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in 
 the courts of different States, any court other than the court first seised shall stay its proceedings unless 
 
  (a) the court later seised has exclusive jurisdiction under these Principles, or 
 
  (b) it is manifest that the judgment from the court first seised will not be recognised under 
  these Principles. 
 
 (2) Any court other than the court first seised may terminate the stay of its proceedings if 
 
  (a) the proceedings in the court first seised do not proceed within a reasonable time, or 
 
  (b) the court first seised has decided not to hear the case. 
 
 (3) Provisional and protective measures do not involve in the same cause of action as main proceedings. 
 
 
Article 2:701(1) of the CLIP Principles makes clear that this provision which aims at 
preventing recognition problems arising if two (or more) judgments are irreconcilable, that is: 
have binding legal effects which are mutually exclusive,2029 is only applicable if two or more 
proceedings involve the same subject-matter, and if there is an identity of parties.2030 While 
the same parties may be involved with regard to the constellation of an infringement action 
and an invalidity action brought before the courts of the granting State, infringement and 
validity proceedings do not involve the same subject-matter. Even in the case that the same 
patent is affected, a dispute concerned with an infringement of that patent and disputes having 
as their object a judgment in the grant, registration, validity, abandonment or revocation of 
that patent do not involve the same cause of action. Rather, infringement and validity 
proceedings regarding one patent are related proceedings pursuant to Article 2:702 of the 
CLIP Principles (if validity proceedings are initiated first) or Article 2:703 (in the case of 
subsequent validity proceedings).2031 
 




Article 2:702: Related proceedings 
 
 (1) Where related proceedings are pending in the courts of different States, any court other than the 
 court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
 
 (2) In determining whether to stay proceedings according to paragraph 1, the court or the courts later 
 seised shall take all relevant factors into account, in particular 
 
  (a) which court seised is best placed to adjudicate the fullest scope of the related proceedings 
  under these Principles; 
 
  (b) which State has the closest connection to the dispute; 
 
  (c) the procedural efficiency of centralised adjudication versus procedural efficiency of  
  cooperation in multistate proceedings. 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:701, para. 2:701.C01. 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:701, para. 2:701.C03. 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:701, paras. 2:701.C09 and 2:701.C19. 
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 (3) For the purposes of this Section, proceedings are deemed to be related where they are so closely 
 connected that it is appropriate to hear and determine them together in order to avoid the risk of 
 inconsistent holdings or judgments. 
 
 
Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles2032 must be construed in conjunction with Article 2:704 
of the CLIP Principles which will be discussed below. 
 
Interestingly, Article 2:702(3) of the CLIP Principles defines the circumstances in which 
(infringement and invalidity) proceedings are related: according to this provision, the relevant 
factor is a connection between the proceedings that is so close that “it is appropriate to hear 
and determine them together in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent holdings or judgments.” 
This objective may be achieved by way of cooperation only, or by way of cooperation 
combined with consolidation of actions. The court second seised will first have to determine 
whether the case before it is related to the case brought before the first court. Then it will have 
to assess how to exercise its discretion to stay. This implies an assessment of the degree of 
connection between the proceedings on the basis of claim documents in particular, but may 
also involve defences raised.2033  
 
It has been emphasised that the concept of “inconsistent holdings or judgments” employed in 
Article 2:702(3) of the CLIP Principles differs from the concept of “irreconcilable judgments” 
used in Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles in two respects: First of all, Article 2:702 of the 
CLIP Principles is not restricted to mutually exclusive judgments, i.e. judgments competing 
for recognition or enforcement. It is indeed sufficient that the judgments are inconsistent, 
rather than even irreconcilable as in Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles. The concerned 
proceedings neither have to involve the same parties, nor must the subject-matter of the 
proceedings coincide.2034 Second, Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles covers not only 
judgments, i.e. final judicial decrees or decisions,2035 but also the reasoning leading to orders 
(conclusions of law and findings of fact).2036 
 
In addition, it is noteworthy that the concept of “inconsistent holdings or judgments” 
according to Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles is broader than the concept of “incompatible 
judgments” deployed in Article 2:206 of the CLIP Principles, meaning that the application of 
Article 2:702 requires a lesser degree of closeness between the proceedings than Article 
2:206. This is justified by the differing effects of those provisions: while Article 2:206 
provides for a special head of jurisdiction and enables the consolidation of several 
proceedings, Article 2:702 gives the court discretionary power, not to consolidate proceedings 
                                                 
2032
 Article 2:704 of the CLIP Principles likewise concerns Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles (“congruent 
proceedings”) and Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles (“a special case of related proceedings”). However, as 
Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles does not cover the constellation of infringement and validity proceedings 
regarding one patent, because those are related proceedings, in contrast to congruent proceedings pursuant to 
Article 2:701 of the CLIP Principles, and Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles actually constitutes a specific 
form of related proceedings, it appears reasonable to introduce Article 2:704 of the CLIP Principle at this point. 
2033
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:701, para. 2:701.C09; Court of Appeal 6 March 
2008, Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corp, [2008] EWCA Civ 153, at para. 37, [2008] F.S.R. 20, at para. 
37 – Research in Motion. 
2034
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 2:702.C03. 
2035
 Article 4:101 of the CLIP Principles contains a detailed definition of the term “judgment”. The provision 
reads as follows: “For the purposes of these Principles, judgment means any judgment given by a court or 
tribunal of any State, irrespective of the name given by that State to the proceedings which gave rise to the 
judgment or of the name given to the judgment itself, such as decree, order, decision or writ of execution. It also 
includes provisional, including protective, measures and the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of 
the court.” 
2036
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 2:702.C03. 
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ex ante, but, ex post, to stay proceedings brought before it when closely connected 
proceedings have already been initiated before another court.2037  
 
In the context of this thesis, it is remarkable that the Commentary on the CLIP Principles 
explicitly considers the constellation that an action for infringement of a patent is brought in 
one court while (an action for revocation or) a declaration of invalidity of the same patent is 
already pending before another court, to fall within the scope of Article 2:702 of the CLIP 
Principles as actions that do not have the same subject-matter but are sufficiently closely 
connected to be regarded as “related actions”.2038  
 
As has been suggested above, Article 2:702(1) of the CLIP Principles – in contrast to the lis 
alibi pendens rule of Article 2:701(1) of the CLIP Principles – gives any court other than the 
court first seised discretion to stay its proceedings. Accordingly, a court other than the court 
first seised which finds that proceedings are related does not have to stay its proceedings. It 
can rather decide whether to stay, either of its own motion or upon application by parties, 
depending on what the lex fori is.2039 On the whole, the court second seised can choose among 
three options: First, the court can stay its proceedings in order to enable a consolidation of the 
proceedings. In this respect, it is to be taken into consideration that parties could be motivated 
to consolidate the proceedings before the court first seised. Second, the court later seised has 
the possibility to temporarily stay its proceedings and consider the other findings in its own 
decision subsequently (cf. Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles).2040 Third, the court second 
seised can continue its proceedings in order to actively cooperate with the court first seised 
(cf. Article 2:704(2) and (3) of the CLIP Principles). All three options are means to hear and 
determine the proceedings together – by whatever court – since this is appropriate (cf. Article 
2:702(3) of the CLIP Principles).2041 Coordinating the proceedings, the court must take into 
account to prejudice neither the interest of a party to effectively enforce its rights, nor the 
interest of its opponent to defend against raised claims. If the court first seised has no 
jurisdiction to hear the action pending in the second court, a stay of proceedings by the second 
court would prejudice the plaintiff in the second proceeding.2042  
 
Article 2:702(2) of the CLIP Principles provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of factors 
that the court or the courts later seised shall take into consideration in determining whether to 
stay proceedings. In this respect, in particular the factors “fullest scope”, “closest connection” 
and “procedural efficiency” are to be taken into account.2043 As to the constellation of a 
coincidence of an infringement proceeding and an validity proceeding that is already pending, 
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 With regard to a detailed comment on the three factors enumerated in Article 2:702(2)(a)-(c) of the CLIP 




A validity proceeding with regard to a patent is pending before a court in State A. An 
infringement proceeding is then initiated before a court in State B. Under the 
applicable law the validity can only be challenged by counterclaim.  
 
 
Case 2:  
 
A validity proceeding with regard to a patent is pending before a court in State A. An 
infringement proceeding is then initiated before a court in State B. Under the 




What should the court second seised do?  
 
In Case 1, the court should stay the infringement proceeding unless there are special grounds 
for continuing the hearing, because the counterclaim would be congruent with the invalidity 
proceeding. As this invalidity proceeding was brought first, the infringement court would 
have to stay the counterclaim proceeding with accordance to Article 2:701(1) of the CLIP 
Principles.2044  
 
In contrast to Case 1, the foregoing argumentation does not (fully) apply to Case 2. As far as 
the possibility of raising a counterclaim is concerned, one might tend to employ the same 
reasoning as in Case 1 and conclude that the court second seised should stay the infringement 
proceedings because an eventually raised counterclaim would be congruent with the invalidity 
proceeding. On the other hand, it is to be taken into consideration that in Case 2 the 
counterclaim is not the only way to challenge the validity of the concerned patent, but there is 
also the possibility to raise an invalidity defence. As has been discussed above, the 
infringement court would then have authority to decide on the validity of the concerned patent 
by way of an incidental decision with inter partes effect. While a stay of infringement 
proceedings is possible according to Article 2:702(1) of the CLIP Principles – being subject to 
the discretion of the infringement court that takes all relevant factors into account, in 
particular those mentioned in Article 2:702(2)(a)-(c) of the CLIP Principles – it would go too 
far to conclude that the infringement proceeding should usually be stayed, also in this 
constellation, when there is a validity proceeding pending. For there is no need for depriving 
the infringement court of exercising its jurisdiction where there is the possibility that the 
infringement court renders an incidental decision on the validity of the concerned patent, even 
though this only has inter partes effect. Only if either party seeks to have the validity issue 
decided by way of a decision with erga omnes effect, the infringement court may stay its 
proceedings on parties' application.    
 
It goes without saying that Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles does not intend to enable 
courts to simply avoid hearing a case over which they have jurisdiction in principle.2045 
Another interpretation would disregard the elaborate system of jurisdiction, and coordination 
of proceedings according to Section 7 of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles in general, and Article 
2:702 of the CLIP Principles in particular. If a court was free not to deal with the case without 
                                                 
2044
 Case 1 constructed according to: Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 
2:702.C15. 
2045
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:702, para. 2:702.C10. 
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any further considerations, there would actually be no need to create detailed rules (as 
embodied in Article 2:702(2)(a)-(c) of the CLIP Principles) to be taken into account in 
particular when the court decides on a stay of its proceeding. Staying the proceeding simply 
because the court avoids hearing it, would mean not to exercise any discretion at all, and 
would therefore be contrary to the idea of Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles.  
 
The subsequent question of how a stay may be terminated, is determined by the lex fori. The 
plaintiff can in any case withdraw the action, for instance in order to consolidate all 
proceedings in the court first seised.2046   
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.5 Stay of infringement proceedings in case of a later brought invalidity action 
 
As to the raised issue that an extraterritorial infringement court before which infringement 
proceedings have been brought should have the possibility to stay these infringement 
proceeding if an invalidity action is brought subsequently before the courts of the State of 
protection, Article 2:703(1) of the CLIP Principles provides that the infringement court is 
enabled to stay the infringement proceeding, while it can still order provisional and protective 
measures as long as the infringement proceeding is stayed (cf. Article 2:703(2) of the CLIP 
Principles). Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles reads: 
 
 
Article 2:703: Subsequent validity proceedings 
 
 (1) If proceedings having as their object the grant, registration, validity, abandonment or revocation of a 
 patent, a mark, an industrial design or any other intellectual property right protected on the basis of 
 registration are brought in the State of registration after related proceedings in a court of another State 
 concerned with that intellectual property right, the court first seised may stay its proceedings. 
 
 (2) Where the court first seised stays the proceedings, it may order provisional and protective measures 
 for the duration of the stay according to Article 2:501. 
 
 
In contrast to the provision of Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles that is applicable to the 
constellation that invalidity proceedings have been initiated before the courts of the granting 
State and an infringement action is brought subsequently before another (extraterritorial) 
court, Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles affects the converse constellation that an 
infringement proceeding has already been brought when, subsequently, an invalidity action is 
initiated before the courts of the granting State. However, it would not be appropriate to 
consider Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles as a provision completely different from Article 
2:702 of the CLIP Principles. As both Article 2:702 and Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles 
concern related proceedings, Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles could (and should) rather be 
characterised as “a special case of related proceedings”.2047 Therefore, it is possible – and 
necessary in order to ensure the internal harmony and parallel interpretation of the provisions 
of the CLIP Principles, respectively the provisions to be employed in an amended version of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation and an eventual future Global Judgments Convention – to have 
recourse to the definition of “related proceedings” contained in Article 2:702(3) of the CLIP 
Principles also in the framework of Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles. As a consequence, 
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Article 2:703 of the CLIP Principles also requires a risk of inconsistent holdings or 
judgments.2048 
 
Further, like Article 2:702(1) of the CLIP Principles, Article 2:703(1) of the CLIP Principles 
gives discretion to the infringement court to decide whether or not to stay its proceeding. The 
“mere” difference between both provisions is whether the infringement court has been seised 
second (then Article 2:702 of the CLIP Principles applies) or first (then Article 2:703 of the 
CLIP Principles is applicable). Where, in the case of subsequent invalidity proceedings when 
an infringement proceeding is already pending, the infringement court being first seised has 
discretion to stay the infringement proceeding,2049 the court may choose this way in order to 
wait for a decision on the validity of the concerned patent, before finally rendering a decision 
on infringement.2050 Due to the specific relationship between Article 2:702 and Article 2:703 
of the CLIP Principles, it may be referred, with regard to the discretion the court has to 
exercise when deciding whether or not to stay the infringement proceeding, to the explications 
made regarding 2:702(2) of the CLIP Principles. The lex fori is decisive as to the question of 
whether the court stays on its own motion or the stay requires an application by the parties.2051  
 
In case that the invalidity proceeding appears to be wholly frivolous, the infringement court 
before which infringement proceedings are pending may decide against staying its 
proceedings.2052 Another aspect which may be taken into account is that of procedural 
efficiency of a stay (cf. Article 2:702(c) of the CLIP Principles), including an adequate 
consideration of parties' interests in the first action. In this respect, particular consideration 
should be given to the interest of the plaintiff to have the dispute decided in a reasonable 
time.2053    
 
According to Case 1 and Case 2 presented above, concerning the constellation of a 
coincidence of an infringement proceeding and an invalidity proceeding that is already 
pending, two further sample cases shall be discussed with regard to the discretion of the 
infringement court in the constellation of a coincidence of an infringement proceeding and an 





An infringement proceeding with regard to a patent is pending before a court in State 
A. An invalidity proceeding is then initiated before a court in State B. Under the 
applicable law the validity can only be challenged by counterclaim.  
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Case 4:  
 
An infringement proceeding with regard to a patent is pending before a court in State 
A. An invalidity proceeding is then initiated before a court in State B. Under the 




What should the infringement court, being first seised, do? In parallel to Case 1, the 
infringement court should stay the infringement proceeding in Case 3, unless there are special 
grounds for continuing the hearing, because the counterclaim would be congruent with the 
invalidity proceeding. The invalidity proceeding would in this respect be the first one seised, 
because a counterclaim has not been raised (yet) in the infringement proceeding. If a 
counterclaim proceeding was initiated then, the infringement court would have to stay the 
counterclaim proceeding with accordance to Article 2:701(1) of the CLIP Principles.2054 With 
regard to Case 4 (constructed in parallel to Case 2), it is to be pointed out that the foregoing 
argumentation does not (fully) apply. As far as the possibility of raising a counterclaim is 
concerned, one might again take recourse to the solution of Case 3 that the infringement court 
should stay the infringement proceedings because an eventually raised counterclaim would be 
congruent with the invalidity proceeding. But, as has been analysed with regard to Case 2, it 
must be considered that in Case 4 the counterclaim does not constitute the only procedural 
means to challenge the validity of the concerned patent, but that there is also the possibility to 
raise an invalidity defence. As has been discussed above, the infringement court would then 
have authority to decide on the validity of the concerned patent by way of an incidental 
decision with inter partes effect. A stay of the infringement proceeding being possible 
according to Article 2:702(1) of the CLIP Principles – subject to the discretion of the 
infringement court that takes all relevant factors into account, in particular those mentioned in 
Article 2:702(2)(a)-(c) of the CLIP Principles – it is to be emphasised again that it would go 
too far to conclude that the infringement proceeding should usually be stayed also in this 
constellation. As has already been underlined, there is no need for depriving the infringement 
court of exercising its jurisdiction where there is the possibility that the infringement court 
renders an incidental decision on the validity of the concerned patent, even though this only 
has inter partes effect.   
 
It is to be noticed that the discretion to stay proceedings according to Article 2:703(1) of the 
CLIP Principles comprises the possibility of the staying court to resume proceedings. After 
the court before which the invalidity action is brought has held that the patent is void, a 
continuation of the stayed infringement proceeding may be appropriate, even if the validity 
decision may be subject to further appeal.2055 According to Article 2:704(1)(b) of the CLIP 
Principles, the finding on the validity respectively invalidity of the patent should be taken into 
account by the infringement court.2056 According to the idea of Article 2:701(2) of the CLIP 
Principles, the stay of proceedings might also be terminated if the validity proceedings do not 
proceed within reasonable time (cf. Article 2:701(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles), or if the 
validity court has decided not to hear the case (cf. Article 2:701(2)(b) of the CLIP 
Principles).2057 
 
                                                 
2054
 Case 3 constructed according to: Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:703, para. 
2:703.C04. 
2055
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:703, para. 2:703.C06. 
2056
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:703, para. 2:703.C06. 
2057
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:703, para. 2:703.C06. 
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3.3.3.2.4.6 The CLIP Principles' response to the stated need for additional rules (besides 
the rules on the stay of infringement proceedings) with regard to the cooperation 
between the (extraterritorial) infringement court and the invalidity court 
 
It has been pointed out above that there is a need, besides the existence of provisions as to the 
stay of proceedings, for rules establishing in which way the (extraterritorial) infringement 
court and the invalidity court shall cooperate with each other. 
  
Indeed, the CLIP Principles contain a provision regarding this subject, Article 2:704 of the 
CLIP Principles, which reads: 
 
 
Article 2:704: Cooperation in multistate proceedings 
 
 (1) If congruent or related proceedings are or have been pending in different States, the courts seised 
 may, subject to applicable procedural law, take into account 
 
  (a) evidence produced in another proceeding, 
 
  (b) a finding of another court on the validity or invalidity of an intellectual property right, 
 
  (c) any other finding of another court relevant for the pending proceeding. 
 
 (2) In order to facilitate cooperation, prevent inconsistent holdings and judgments and promote 
 efficiency in multistate proceedings, the courts seised should cooperate with each other. In particular, 
 they should take all appropriate measures to provide information to the courts seised as to the status of 
 their proceeding and their findings. The courts concerned may proceed to an exchange of views. 
 
 (3) These means of cooperation must not be carried out in a way as to prejudice the rights of the parties 
 to the proceedings. The courts should clearly inform the parties as to their intention to cooperate and 
 keep them informed of each step they intend to take. 
 
 
It has been discussed above that, if an infringement action is brought before an 
(extraterritorial) infringement court when an invalidity proceeding is already pending, the 
infringement court has discretion to stay its proceedings (cf. Article 2:702(1) of the CLIP 
Principles). If it stays its proceedings temporarily, it may however take evidence or other 
findings of the invalidity court (first seised) into account in its final judgment (cf. Article 
2:704 (1) of the CLIP Principles). It is to be underlined that, as the wording of Article 
2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles (“are or have been pending”) reveals, this option does not 
depend on the procedural status of the invalidity proceeding.2058 According to Article 2:704(2) 
of the CLIP Principles, the infringement court staying its proceedings should inform the 
invalidity court as to the status of the infringement proceeding, i.e. about its decision to stay 
(suspend) infringement proceedings.2059   
 
Instead of staying infringement proceedings, the infringement court may also continue, or 
resume the proceedings. Also regarding this constellation, Article 2:704(2) of the CLIP 
Principles applies, providing that the courts seised should cooperate with each other, 
including the provision of information to the other court seised regarding the status of the 
respective proceeding and the finding, and the exchange of views before reaching a 
decision.2060 In schematic respect, it is to be noticed that Article 2:704(1) and Article 2:704(2) 
                                                 
2058
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C03. 
2059
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C03. 
2060
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C04. 
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of the CLIP Principles provide for a graded system of cooperation between the courts 
involved in multistate proceedings.2061 On a first grade, Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP 
Principles determines that all courts, i.e. including the court first seised, have discretion (cf. 
the wording of Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles: “may take into account”) to take into 
consideration any finding of law and fact of another court, provided the respective court 
considers it relevant for its pending proceeding. Although this does not imply that foreign 
findings or judgments have binding force, it has been rightly emphasised that equal persuasive 
power should generally be assigned to all courts hearing (congruent or) related actions on the 
basis of the CLIP Principles.2062 As a consequence, the courts seised should discuss relevant 
foreign findings and reason why they decide in a different way.2063 
 
Whereas Article 2:704(1)(c) of the CLIP Principles contains a general clause (“any (other) 
finding of another court relevant for the pending proceeding”), Article 2:704(1)(a) and (b) of 
the CLIP Principles names two significant examples of such findings of another court that 
may be considered. Article 2:704(1)(a) of the CLIP Principles allows a court to take into 
account evidence produced in another proceeding. This may comprise substantial and well-
documented expert opinions produced in another proceeding, which can mean a considerable 
advantage for the parties saving costs and time.2064 According to Article 2:704(1)(b) of the 
CLIP Principles, the courts involved may take into account a finding of another court on the 
validity or invalidity of a patent. In this respect, it is to be noticed that this provision does not 
contain a restriction as to the type or effect of that finding on the validity or invalidity of the 
concerned patent. As a consequence, Article 2:704(1)(b) of the CLIP Principles applies both 
with regard to incidental decisions on the validity of the concerned patent, with inter partes 
effect, rendered by the infringement court, and with regard to validity decisions of the courts 
of the granting State which have erga omnes effect. However, a final decision of the latter 
courts will probably have greater persuasive authority than an incidental holding of a court in 
a third State.2065 
 
Article 2:704(2) of the CLIP Principles, going beyond Article 2:704(1), provides for an 
“active cooperation” between the courts, meaning that the courts actually communicate with 
each other.2066 According to Article 2:704(2) 2nd sentence of the CLIP Principles, the courts 
involved should, on a second grade, take all appropriate measures to provide information to 
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 All sections of Article 2:704 of the CLIP Principles, i.e. Article 2:704(1), Article 2:704(2) and Article 
2:704(3), contain rules as to cooperation in multistate proceedings. The difference between Article 2:704(1) and 
Article 2:704(2) (merely) consists in the intensity of such cooperation. In this respect, the wording of Article 
2:704(2) (1st sentence) of the CLIP Principles (“(...) the courts should cooperate with each other”) is misleading 
and mistakable, because the fact that this formulation is contained only in Article 2:704(2) and not in Article 
2:704(1) might suggest that Article 2:704(1) does not deal with cooperation. However, this is obviously not the 
case. The latter conception is also in line with the heading of Article 2:704 (“Cooperation in multistate 
proceedings”) which is without any doubt assigned to the whole article. 
2062
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C05. 
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 The Commentary on the CLIP Principles uses the term “active cooperation” with regard to cooperation 
according to Article 2:704(2) of the CLIP Principles (cf. Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), 
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2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles. For schematic reasons, and as it would obviously appear rather bizarre to denote 
cooperation according to Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles as “passive”, another term could be chosen. In 
order to express the different degrees of intensity of cooperation, I propose to qualify cooperation with 
accordance to Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles as “indirect cooperation”, cooperation according to Article 
2:704(2) 2nd sentence of the CLIP Principles as “direct cooperation” and cooperation according to Article 
2:704(2) 3rd sentence as “enhanced cooperation”. Besides, the term “active cooperation” could remain as a 
general term for “direct cooperation” and “enhanced cooperation”. 
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the courts seised as to the status of their proceeding and their findings. This provision is based 
on the insight that courts will only be able to take appropriate steps to coordinate proceedings 
if they know about the status of other (congruent and) related proceedings, and findings of 
other courts can only be taken into account if they are known to the deciding court.2067  
 
On a third grade, Article 2:704(2) 3rd sentence of the CLIP Principles provides for a real two-
way communication between the courts involved, by stating that the courts may proceed to a 
non-binding exchange of views. While preserving the autonomous power of each court, 
because such an exchange of views is discretionary, direct contact between the courts seised 
would be accomplished.2068     
 
Noteworthily, Article 2:704 of the CLIP Principles contains several limits as to avoid that 
concerned interests are impaired. First of all, the possibility of the courts to take into account 
findings of another court relevant for the pending proceeding exists only subject to applicable 
procedural law (cf. Article 2:704(1) of the CLIP Principles). As a consequence, any 
communication between courts must be undertaken in accordance with the locally applicable 
procedural law.2069 In general, Article 2:704(3) 1st sentence of the CLIP Principles further 
provides that the means of cooperation must not be carried out in a way that would prejudice 
the procedural and other rights of the parties to the proceeding. Therefore, cooperation of the 
courts must also be in accordance with other relevant norms such as contained in the law of 
protection of personal data and business secrets.2070 The involved courts must also clearly 
inform the parties as to their intention to cooperate and keep them informed of each step they 
intend to take (cf. Article 2:704(3) 2nd sentence of the CLIP Principles).  
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.7 Exclusion of recognition and enforcement of an incidental validity decision 
rendered by the infringement court if the patent has already been declared void by the 
courts of the granting State 
 
Article 4:501(3) of the CLIP Principles basically coincides with Article 34(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation (and thus at least roughly corresponds to Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation). The provision reads as follows: 
 
  
Article 4:501: Other grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments 
 
 A judgment shall not be recognised or enforced if: 
  
 (...) 
 (3) it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in the requested State between the same parties. 
 
 
Besides this provision, the CLIP Principles do not imply any other Article that definitively 
excludes the recognition and enforcement of an incidental decision of the infringement court 
on the validity of a patent, if this patent has already been declared void in the granting State. 
Obviously, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles however starts from the idea that 
irreconcilability in the sense of Article 4:501(3) of the CLIP Principles exists between the 
incidental decision of the extraterritorial infringement court according to which the patent is 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C11. 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C12. 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:704, para. 2:704.C13. 
2070
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valid, and the decision in the granting State holding that the patent is void, because exactly 
this constellation has been chosen as an example for irreconcilability according to Article 
4:501(3) of the CLIP Principles: “A situation of irreconcilable judgments for the purposes of 
Article 4:501(3) may arise if the successful plaintiff in an infringement action seeks to enforce 
the judgment in the State of registration of the intellectual property right where the other party 
has obtained a judgment revoking the right.”2071  
 
 
3.3.3.2.4.8 Contradiction between the incidental decision on the validity of a patent 
rendered by the extraterritorial infringement court (inter partes effect), and a 
subsequent decision on the validity of this patent produced by a court in the granting 
State (erga omnes effect) 
 
In accordance with the opinion advocated in this thesis, the CLIP Principles do not contain 
any rules with regard to this issue, but leave it to the national procedural law of the lex fori to 
provide for respective rules. 
 
 
3.3.3.2.5 The Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 
 
As to the question which consequences should be assigned to the raise of an invalidity 
defence in patent infringement proceedings, the Heidelberg Report on the Application of 
Regulation Brussels I restricts itself to “suggest four possible solutions”:2072 1.) limiting the 
res iudicata effect of an infringement decision;2073 2.) taking a patent for valid as long as it 
has not been annulled by the competent court;2074 3.) vesting the courts seised with 
infringement proceedings with proper power to monitor the interdependence of infringement 
proceedings and proceedings aimed at the declaration of invalidity of patents;2075 4.) vesting 
the courts seised with proper power to grant provisional relief independently of any invalidity 
objection.2076 
 
However, the Heidelberg Report finally refrains from focusing on one definitive approach 
regarding an amendment of Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, but restricts itself to 
the following vague proposal: “Article 22(4) of the Brussels I Regulation should be amended 
to the result that in infringement proceedings, a defence based on the alleged invalidity of the 
registered right vests the court only with the discretionary power to stay the proceedings for a 
limited period of time, which may be extended.”2077 
 
 
3.3.3.2.6 The Commission Proposal 2010 for Reform of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
According to Article 22(4) of the Commission Proposal 2010, Article 22(4) of the Brussels I 
Regulation should be reformulated as follows: 
  
                                                 
2071
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:501, para. 4:501.C20, with reference to Fawcett & 
Torremans 2011, para. 19.30.  
2072
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 669; in fact, the enumerated solutions partly contain several “sub-
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 Article 22(4) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction: 
 
 (...) 
 (4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or similar 
 rights required to be deposited or registered, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an 
 action or as a defence, the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration has been 
 applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an international 
 convention deemed to have taken place. 
 
 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on the Grant 
 of European Patents, signed in Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall have 
 exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile, in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity 
 of any European patent granted for that State. 
 
  
In line with the Commission’s general approach to extend the jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels I Regulation to defendants domiciled in a third State – and taking into account that 
the applicability of exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
already under current law, is not dependent on the parties' domiciles2078 – the words 
“regardless of domicile” in the first sentence of Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation have 
been deleted in Article 22 of the Commission Proposal 2010. 
 
As to the controversial issue of whether Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 24 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation) has an reflexive effect (effet réflexe), it is noteworthy that 
neither Article 22 nor the Recitals of the Commission Proposal 2010 address this topic.2079 
Legal commentators who support the conception of such a reflexive effect, referring to the 
arguments discussed in the foregoing chapter,2080 have put forth that the European Union 
would lose a chance to regulate legal transactions with third States in a more adequate way 
than today.2081 However, others have rightly argued by way of a conclusio a contrario that 
“(i)f the EU legislature does not seize upon an opportunity where Third State relations are one 
of the issues at the forefront to establish such an effet réflexe, such effet is unwarranted for and 
not intended to exist.”2082  
 
Obviously, Article 22(4) of the Commission Proposal 2010 incorporates the essence of the 
GAT decision of the ECJ when confirming that Article 22(4) is applicable regardless of the 
fact if the validity issue is raised as an action or as a defence. Besides, both wording and 
content of Article 22(4) of the Commission Proposal 2010 widely correspond to Article 22(4) 
of the Brussels I Regulation (apart from formal changes like a change in wording from 
“Community instrument” to “instrument of the Union”). 
 
Beyond that, Article 22(4) of the Commission Proposal 2010 does not establish any 
clarification let alone solution of the problems discussed in the context of intellectual property 
rights, in particular patents.  
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 Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 38. 
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 Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 38. 
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 Weber (2011)75 RabelsZ 619, at pp. 632 et seq., 644. 
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 Hau 2011, p. 631. 
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 Cf. Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at pp. 270-271. Impressively, the authors consider 
the Commission Proposal 2010 respectively the non-mentioning of a reflexive effect as the “final nail in the 
coffin” (Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 271). 
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3.3.3.3 Final comment and formulation proposal 
 
Any reform proposal must be evaluated in light of the extent to which it achieves to solve 
existing problematic issues. Although the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles may often 
lead to comparable solutions, one disadvantage of the ALI Principles – in the European 
framework – is the approach of the ALI Principles via subject-matter jurisdiction which does 
not correspond to the legal traditions of most European States. On the other hand, an 
evaluation of the presented reform proposals regarding a reform of Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation leads to the result that the CLIP Principles deliver adequate solutions 
for the raised problems that seem, at the same time, balanced, realisable and workable in 
practice.2083 In particular, Articles 2:401 and 2:402 of the CLIP Principles manage to provide 
for a balanced solution that respects the need for a ground of exclusive jurisdiction when 
validity and registration issues are to be decided with erga omnes effect, as well as the need 
for consolidation and avoiding unwarranted disruption of infringement cases which have 
merely inter partes effect so as to resolve the actual dispute between the parties.2084 In 
particular, giving the infringement court first seised the possibility to stay its proceedings is an 
adequate and effective means to cope with, respectively eliminate the current problem of a 
parties’ race to court. An amendment of the provisions of exclusive jurisdiction in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation should therefore pick up the solutions contained in Articles 2:401 
and 2:402 of  the CLIP Principles. Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should 
therefore be supplemented according to the latter provisions of the CLIP Principles, 
completed by a further sentence (written in italics in the formulation proposal below), as 
follows: 




 Article 24 
 
 The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of 
 the parties: 
 
 (...) 
 (4) in proceedings having as their object a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, abandonment or 
 revocation of a patent, a mark, an industrial design or any other intellectual property right protected on 
 the basis of deposit or registration, the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration 
 has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an 
 international convention deemed to have taken place.  
 
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on the Grant 
of European Patents, signed at Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings having as their object a judgment on the grant, registration, 
validity, abandonment or revocation of any European patent granted for that Member State.  
 
Sentences 1 and 2 do not apply where validity or registration arises in a context other than by principal 
claim or counterclaim. The decisions resulting from such proceedings do not affect the validity or 
registration of those rights as against third parties.2085  
 
Where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which has as its object a matter over which the 
 courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of sentences 1 and 2, it shall 
 declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.2086 
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 Corresponding to Article 2:401(2) of the CLIP Principles. 
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The content of Article 2:702(2) of the CLIP Principles should be integrated in Article 30 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. With regard to Articles 2:703 and 2:704 of the CLIP Principles 
which have been discussed above, equally clear provisions should be integrated in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation.2087 In this respect, one should integrate the content of the complete 
Section 7 of the CLIP Principles in Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which would 
also ensure the internal balance of these provisions. As Article 4:501(3) of the CLIP 
Principles corresponds to Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the latter provision 
should be left untouched. 
 
With regard to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, the content of all provisions 
of the CLIP Principles discussed in the framework of this Chapter should be adopted.2088 
 
 
3.3.4 Cross-border interim relief 
 
 
3.3.4.1 Identifying the crucial issues 
 
 
3.3.4.1.1 Should the courts of the granting State have exclusive jurisdiction regarding 
provisional measures?  
 
Before treating several academic proposals which have been made with regard to an 
amendment of the provisions on cross-border interim relief, the question arises whether, in 
particular in such matters of interim relief, a patent-specific provision should be established 
that excludes extraterritorial jurisdiction regarding provisional measures. For, due to a certain 
complexity and difficulty of patent law, one might prefer to localise both accessory and 
independent jurisdiction for provisional measures in the granting State.2089 However, the 
better arguments militate against the latter conception. First, as has already been shown 
above, it is simply not justified to qualify patent law as extraordinarily complex and difficult, 
because this is merely a relative evaluation. It is admitted that the specific conditions of 
provisional proceedings – there is a need for a quick decision, while there are limited means 
to reach a decision – effect that this argument is stronger with regard to provisional 
proceedings than regarding proceedings on the merits. But this also goes for other fields of 
law where there is no discussion about conferring exclusive jurisdiction for provisional 
measures to the courts of a specific State.2090 Further, limiting jurisdiction for the grant of 
provisional measures to the courts of the protection State would in the majority of cases 
require the recognition and enforcement in the defendant's State of domicile or in another 
State where the defendant disposes of enforceable assets; as a consequence, quick interim 
relief would be considerably hampered or even be made impossible.2091 Additionally, it is to 
be highlighted that, if extraterritorial jurisdiction regarding provisional measures was 
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 Corresponding to Article 2:402 of the CLIP Principles. 
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excluded, legal protection against patent infringements would be considerably impaired, 
because frequently only measures of interim relief enable an effective proceeding against the 
infringer.2092 After all, the fact that courts outside the protection State may grant provisional 
measures does not inevitably mean that those courts will necessarily order provisional 
measures in view of a foreign patent. The invoked court will rather decide on the basis of a 
comprehensive balancing of interests whether or not it orders such provisional measures.2093 
 
To conclude, a conception according to which jurisdiction to grant interim relief should be 
reserved to the courts of the State where the concerned patent has been granted is to be 
rejected. On the contrary, like regarding provisional proceedings in other fields of law, 
provisional proceedings in patent matters should be subject to the jurisdiction rules 
concerning interim relief of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively a future Global 
Judgments Convention), and there should be no specific rule with regard to interim relief in 
patent matters which determines that only the courts of the protection State have jurisdiction 
for provisional measures in patent disputes.  
 
 
3.3.4.1.2 Explicit codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and 
independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
The current system under the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to which jurisdiction for 
provisional measures can either be grounded on jurisdiction as to the substance of a case 
pursuant to Articles 4 and 7 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (accessory jurisdiction), or 
on Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in conjunction with the different national rules 
on jurisdiction for provisional measures (independent jurisdiction), seems sound in principle 
and should therefore be preserved.2094 For this scheme builds on the concept of procedural 
justice which is enshrined in the jurisdiction rules of Articles 4 and 7 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, complemented by the idea of quick and effective interim relief under the national 
rules where the measure is to be enforced.2095 
 
However, for reasons of clarity and legal certainty, the current system under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation providing for both accessory and independent jurisdiction for provisional 
measures should be expressly codified within the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2096 




3.3.4.1.3 Clarification of the requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction  
 
Under the current regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the requirements for accessory 
jurisdiction for the grant of provisional measures have partly been defined by the ECJ in 
several decisions. In order to strengthen legal certainty and clarity, it seems desirable to 
integrate these judicial findings in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (as well as an 
eventual future Global Judgments Convention). 
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3.3.4.1.4 Definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
 
As has been mentioned above, courts which lack jurisdiction as to the substance of the case 
may grant provisional measures based on Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as an 
independent ground of jurisdiction. However, in order to prevent a proliferation of 
jurisdiction, the ECJ developed the criterion of a “real connecting link” between the subject-
matter of the interim measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State.2097 There is a 
need for such a restriction of jurisdiction in view of ensuring that the courts having 
jurisdiction under Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are best able to assess the 
circumstances under which a measure is granted and which conditions are required in order to 
guarantee the provisional character of the measures authorised.2098 Additionally, there is a 
need for quick enforcement of provisional measures.2099 However, it turned out difficult in 
practice to determine in which circumstances such a “real connecting link” is existent. As has 
been discussed in the foregoing chapter, several conceptions have been developed to answer 
this question. I have concluded that jurisdiction for provisional measures according to Article 
35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is generally conferred to the courts situated in a State where 
the provisional measure shall be enforced. In case of interim injunctions, jurisdiction for 
provisional measures pursuant to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is additionally 
conferred to the courts of the protection State.  
 
In comparable respect, it is interesting that the Pocar Report on the Convention on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in 
Lugano on 30 October 2007, although ultimately denying the need for a clarifying provision, 
at least confirmed, in the context of the 2007 Lugano Convention, that the criterion of a “real 
connecting link” requires “further clarification”: 
 
“In consideration of that judgment by the Court of Justice [in the Van Uden case], the ad hoc working 
party discussed whether it was necessary for Article 31 [of the 2007 Lugano Convention] to codify the 
principles set out there, and concluded that it was not, among other things because of the further 
clarification that they might require if incorporated into a legislative text, particularly with respect to the 
nature of the factor connecting the subject-matter of the measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court, which in the judgment was defined exclusively with reference to the specific case at issue 
[underscore and content in brackets added]”.2100 
 
For reasons of clarity and thus legal certainty, a definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
should be included in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The same goes for an eventual 
future Global Judgments Convention. 
 
 
3.3.4.1.5 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Under the current regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation mentions “provisional, including protective, measures”, but does not contain a 
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 ECJ 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v S.N.C. Couchet Frères, [1980] ECR 01553, para. 16 – 
Denilauler; ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 39 – Van Uden. 
2099
 Cf. ECJ 28 April 2005, C-104/03, St. Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel Exser BVBA, [2005] ECR I-03481, 
para. 12 – St. Paul Dairy. 
2100
 Pocar Report, OJ C319 of 23 December 2009, pp. 1-56, para. 127, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:319:0001:0056:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
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clear definition of which measures are comprised. Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
merely outlines the term “provisional, including protective, measures” in a vague way. As a 
consequence, legal practitioners are forced to have recourse to the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
when trying to find out whether the kind of measure envisaged in a specific case falls within 
the scope of application of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect, in order 
to strengthen legal certainty and predictability, it seems preferable to codify within the 
Articles of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (for instance in Article 35), which measures are to be 
considered “provisional, including protective, measures” according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. Likewise, an eventual future Global Judgments Convention should explicitly 
define provisional measures. 
 
 
3.3.4.1.6 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
 
As has been discussed in the foregoing chapter, the ECJ explicitly held in its Denilauler 
decision2101 that provisional measures rendered in favour of a patent holder could only be 
recognised and enforced in another Member State if the alleged infringer has been granted the 
right to a hearing. As a consequence, ex parte-decisions could neither be recognised nor be 
enforced, even if the alleged infringer subsequently disposed of the opportunity of legal 
remedies, as the ECJ clarified in its Minalmet decision.2102 As illustrated in the foregoing 
chapter, too, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Denilauler has in the meanwhile been codified 
(and modified) in the framework of Articles 2(a) and 42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. For reasons of legal certainty and clarity, a comparable set of rules (i.e. rules 
excluding ex parte-decisions from being recognised and enforced, unless the judgment 
containing the measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement) should also form part 
of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
 
3.3.4.1.7 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings  
 
In order to mitigate the danger of irreconcilable decisions in preliminary proceedings, an 
amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should further imply definite rules with 
regard to the coordination of several, including preliminary, proceedings. The same goes for 
an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
 
3.3.4.1.8 Refusal of recognition of provisional measures when irreconcilable with other 
judgments  
 
In its Italian Leather decision, the ECJ held that Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention 
(Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation) is applicable in the case of interim proceedings, 
meaning that a judgment on interim relief shall not be recognised if it is irreconcilable with a 
judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State in which 
recognition is sought. It has been made clear above that, by establishing Article 45(1)(c) and 
(d) and Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the European legislator codified (and 
                                                 
2101
 ECJ 21 May 1980, C-125/79, Bernard Denilauler v S.N.C. Couchet Frères, [1980] ECR 01553, para. 17 – 
Denilauler. 
2102
 ECJ 12 November 1992, C-123/91, Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd, [1992] ECR I-05661, paras. 19-21 – 
Minalmet. 
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restrictively modified) the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Italian Leather, clarifying that Article 
45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is (only) applicable to such provisional 
measures ordered by a court which has accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures. As a 
consequence, provisional measures ordered by a court on the basis of independent, i.e. non-
accessory, jurisdiction do not constitute “judgments” within the meaning of Article 45 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (cf. Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), meaning that 
Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable in the latter constellation. Such a 




3.3.4.1.9 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
It has been stated in the foregoing chapter that measures granted under Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, on the basis of a “real connecting link”, are by their very nature 
generally unsuitable for being enforced abroad, this insight being codified in Article 2(a) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (in conjunction with Recital 33 4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation).2103 While it has been concluded that, on the basis of this clear legal situation, it 
seems impossible de lege lata to accept exceptions to this rule, i.e. to admit recognition and 
enforcement of provisional measures ordered by a court on the basis of independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures in another Member State, I shall now turn to the question 
of whether such exceptions should be admitted de lege ferenda in certain constellations.2104 
 
On the assumption that the enforceability of provisional measures is the decisive criterion as 
to the question of whether provisional measures shall have effect in another Member State, 
and that also provisional measures granted on the basis of independent jurisdiction shall 
therefore have effect in another Member State if there is a “real connecting link” between the 
forum State and the State where the measure is to be enforced, one might demand to abolish, 
respectively amend, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to which only such 
provisional measures are considered as judgments within the meaning of the rules of 
recognition and enforcement of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which have been ordered by a 
court on the basis of accessory jurisdiction pursuant to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. On this 
basis, one might admit two exceptions to the rule that measures granted under Article 35 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, on the basis of a “real connecting link”, are by their very nature 
generally unsuitable for being enforced abroad.2105 First, one might assume that there is no 
territorial limitation of provisional measures ordered on the basis of independent jurisdiction 
to be enforced in another Member State if assets have been transferred across the border after 
                                                 
2103
 To summarise, these exceptions are as follows: First, the constellation where assets have been transferred 
across the border after the provisional measure has been issued (restriction: violation of public policy (ordre 
public), in particular in case of disregard of essential principles of procedural law). Second, it should be regarded 
sufficient for a foreign court to have jurisdiction according to Article 35 that there is, at the time of the 
application for the provisional measure, a prognosis that the object in which enforcement shall be undertaken is 
probably located in the State of the deciding court. 
2104
 Noteworthily, this question is to be distinguished from the aspect that, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, 
Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not prohibit provisional measures, ordered on the basis of 
independent jurisdiction for interim relief, from having extraterritorial effect as long as these measures can be 
enforced domestically, which is indirectly confirmed by Recital 33 4th sentence (“under this Regulation”). 
2105
 Similar, with regard to the legal situation under the Brussels I Regulation: Schauwecker 2009, p. 199 et seq. 
However, Schauwecker interprets the term “real connecting link” in a slightly different way than interpreted in 
this thesis, by solely referring to the enforcement criterion for all kinds of provisional measures, i.e. including 
interim injunctions. 
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the provisional measure has been issued.2106 However, this would not mean that evidence 
gained by a court competent on the basis of Article 35 may not be used in principal 
proceedings initiated before a court of another Member State.2107 The only restriction to 
introduce evidence gained abroad, into domestic civil proceedings, would be a violation of 
public policy (ordre public), in particular in case of disregard of essential principles of 
procedural law. In this respect, Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides:  
 
 
 Article 45 
 
(1) On the application of any interested party the recognition of a judgment shall be refused: 
 




As a consequence, evidence which has been gained in such circumstances may not be used in 
domestic civil proceedings (prohibition of exploitation). However, as Article 45 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation constitutes an exception to the rule of mutual recognition of 
judgments and is thus to be interpreted in a restrictive way,2108 it is to be underlined that the 
mere fact that the foreign law on evidence differs from domestic law does not suffice for the 
application of Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2109 Besides, Article 45(3) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation must be taken into account, according to which public policy is not 
violated if a foreign court has decided (on a provisional measure to obtain or secure evidence) 
without having jurisdiction: 
 
 
 Article 45(3) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
  
 (...) 
(3) Without prejudice to point (e) of paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the cout of origin may not be 
reviewed. The test of public policy referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1 may not be applied to the rules 
relating to jurisdiction. 
 
 
Besides, it may be put forth, since provisional measures have been harmonised to some extent 
by Articles 7 and 9 of the Enforcement Directive, that a prohibition of exploitation of such 
evidence in another State will only be justified in extremely exceptional cases.2110 Second, it 
could be assumed that it is sufficient for a foreign court to have jurisdiction according to 
Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that there is, at the time of the application for the 
provisional measure, a prognosis that the object in which enforcement shall be undertaken is 
probably located in the forum State.2111 Due to the principle of perpetuatio fori which is 
inherent to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the subsequent shortfall of the possibility of 
enforcement would neither affect the jurisdiction of the invoked court, nor would it influence 
the cross-border recognition and enforcement of the provisional measure.2112 However, the 
foregoing considerations actually do not take into account that it is not merely the fact of 
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 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 621.   
2107
 Cf. Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 610: “Once the information is legally acquired, it can be used 
anywhere subject only to restrictions made by the court which ordered the information to be provided.” 
2108
 Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 22 EuGVO, para. 7. 
2109
 Geimer 2015, para. 2962. 
2110
 Schauwecker 2009, p. 200 et seq. 
2111
 Heinze 2007, p. 249; Willeitner 2003, p. 130 et seq.; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25a. 
2112
 Heinze 2007, p. 249; Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25a. 
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whether a provisional measure is enforceable abroad or not which is decisive for the question 
of whether a provisional measure shall be enforced abroad or not. For it is actually the idea of 
mutual trust in the administration of justice that forms the basis for the mutual recognition of 
judgments throughout the European Union. This idea is reflected by Recital 26 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation which provides: 
 
 
 Recital 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifies the principle that judgments given in a 
 Member State should be recognised in all Member States without the need for any special procedure. In 
 addition, the aim of making cross-border litigation less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition 
 of the declaration of enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State addressed. As a result, a 
 judgment given by the courts of a Member State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member 
 State addressed.  
 
 
In particular with regard to provisional measures, the laws of the Member States however 
differ to a considerable extent.2113 This fact seems to be the actual reason why only orders of 
provisional measures based on accessory jurisdiction, i.e. excluding provisional measures 
based on independent jurisdiction, are considered as judgments within the meaning of the 
Regulation's provisions of recognition and enforcement, and are consequently attributed effect 
also in other Member States. In light of this, a conception which is merely based on the 
enforcement criterion with the consequence that provisional measures should have a priori 
effect in another Member State given that such measures are enforceable in that State is not 
convincing. Therefore, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be maintained.  
 
 
3.3.4.1.10 Creation of a clarifying provision of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is applicable where an invalidity defence is raised in provisional 
proceedings?  
 
With regard to the issue of which effect should be attributed to an invalidity defence in 
provisional proceedings, i.e. in which way, if any, Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is considered applicable, I have inter alia explicated in the framework of a 
proposal for a reformulation of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation:  
 
Sentences 1 and 2 do not apply where validity or registration arises in a context other than by principal 
claim or counterclaim. The decisions resulting from such disputes do not affect the validity or 
registration of those rights as against third parties.  
 
This formulation also comprises the situation where an invalidity defence is raised in 
provisional proceedings, having the equal effect that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction do not 
apply. Therefore, if Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation was amended in this way, a 
further mentioning in the framework of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation would not 






                                                 
2113
 Cf. Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 8. 
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3.3.4.2 Existing reform proposals  
 
 
3.3.4.2.1 The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) 
 
The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) treats provisional and protective measures in its Article 13. The provision 
reads as follows: 
  
 
 Article 13   Provisional and protective measures 
 
  
 [Alternative A 
 
 (1) A court seised and having jurisdiction under Articles [in the white list] to determine the merits of the 
 case has jurisdiction to order provisional and protective measures. 
 
 (2) A court of a Contracting State [may] [has jurisdiction to], even where it does not have jurisdiction to 
 determine the merits of a claim, order a provisional and protective measure in respect of property in that 
 State or the enforcement of which is limited to the territory of that State, to protect on an interim basis a 
 claim on the merits which is pending or to be brought by the requesting party in a Contracting State 
 which has jurisdiction to determine that claim under Articles [in the white list]. 
 
 (3) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a court in a Contracting State from ordering a provisional 
 and protective measure for the purpose of protecting on an interim basis a claim on the merits which is 
 pending or to be brought by the requesting party in another State. 
 
 (4) In paragraph 3, a reference to a provisional and protective measure means 
 
  (a) a measure to maintain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or 
 
  (b) a measure providing a preliminary means of securing assets out of which an ultimate 
  judgment may be satisfied; or 
 
  (c) a measure to restrain conduct by a defendant to prevent current or imminent future harm.] 
 
 
 [Alternative B 
 
 A court which is or is about to be seised of a claim and which has jurisdiction under Articles [3 to 15] to 
 determine the merits may order provisional and protective measures, intended to preserve the suject-
 matter of the claim.] 
 
 
It is to be noticed that Article 13 of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) provides for two alternative solutions, and 
even within Alternative A and Alternative B, the existence of alternative text in brackets 
reveals that the delegations working on the formulation of the convention could not agree on a 
final wording. 
 
In addition, a third and a fourth variant with further sub-variants are implied in Article 1(2) of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) which mentions a number of areas which shall not be subject to the 
Convention. So, Article 1(2)(k) of the Draft Hague Convention provides: 
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 Article 1   Substantive scope 
 
 (...) 
 (2) The Convention does not apply to – 
 
 (...) 
 (k) Alternative A  
 
 [provisional and protective measures other than interim payment orders;] 
 
      Alternative B 
 
 [provisional or protective measures [other than those mentioned in Articles 13 and 23A];]. 
 
 
First of all, it is to be noticed that, for logical reasons, Article 1(2)(k) of the Draft Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) 
would be deleted if Article 13, Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) was adopted.2114 Advocates 
of the solution according to Article 1(2)(k), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) intend to exclude 
provisional and protective measures from the scope of the Convention but to ensure that 
jurisdiction for interim payment orders remains subject to the list of prohibited jurisdictions. 
This conception involves the inclusion of a provision in the chapter on recognition and 
enforcement to clarify that interim payment orders will not be recognised or enforced under 
the Convention.2115 In contrast, the conception embodied in Article 1(2)(k), Alternative B of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) is primarily inspired by the idea of generally excluding provisional and 
protective measures from the scope of the Convention which is expressed clearly by the 
wording “provisional or protective measures” and by refraining from a reference to interim 
payments, or at least by the idea of limiting jurisdiction as to provisional measures. In this 
respect, Article 13, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) is linked with Article 1(2)(k), Alternative 
B of the Draft Hague Convention, because Article 13(3) of the Draft Hague Convention 
provides for such a limited jurisdiction.2116 In Article 1(2)(k), Alternative B of the Draft 
Hague Convention, the words in brackets (“other than those mentioned in Article 13 and 
23A”) constitute a further sub-variant for those who favour a restricted provision for 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement in respect of provisional and protective 
measures.2117  
 
The multitude of alternative text versions illustrates the fact that no consensus could be 
reached, and explains why the convention has remained in the state of a draft convention. 
While not having entered into force, a look on Article 13 of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) may still be 
worthwhile in view of a final formulation of a provision on provisional measures in an 
                                                 
2114
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 1, fn. 8. Vice 
versa, Article 13 would be deleted in case that Article 1(2)(k), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention was 
adopted. Moreover, it would be deleted if Article 1(2)(k), Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention was 
adopted without the reference to Articles 13 and 23A, cf. Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 
(Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 13, fn. 89. 
2115
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 1, fn. 9. 
2116
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 13, fn. 97.  
2117
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 1, fn. 10. 
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amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation respectively an eventual future Global 
Judgments Convention.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.1 Codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Article 13(1) and (2), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) explicitly provides that 
jurisdiction to grant provisional measures is vested, on the one hand, with the courts which 
have jurisdiction on the merits of the matter (Article 13(1)) and, on the other hand, under 
certain, defined conditions, with the courts of other States (Article 13(2), (3)). In particular, 
Article 13(3) is intended to overcome any restrictions imposed on the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the courts of Contracting States by the list of prohibited jurisdictions (cf. Article 18 of the 
Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001)). According to Article 13(3), Alternative A of the  Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), provisional and 
protective measures could also be granted under national law without the restrictions imposed 
by the said list of prohibited jurisdictions.2118  
 
Noteworthily, one major difference between Alternative A and Alternative B of the Draft 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(2001) is that Alternative B which is substantially shorter than Alternative A merely 
determines that a court which is or is about to be seised of a claim and which has jurisdiction 
under the relevant provisions to detemine the merits thereof may order provisional measures.  
 
Already at this point, it is to be stated that Alternative B seems to be too restrictive as it does 
not provide for a legal basis for jurisdiction to grant provisional measures which is 
independent from jurisdiction on the merits. In this respect, Alternative B does not cope with 




3.3.4.2.1.2 The Draft Hague Convention’s response to the stated need for a clarification 
of the requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures  
 
Interestingly, Article 13(1), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) refers to a court “seised and 
having jurisdiction” for the merits. This implies that the respective court must have already 
been seised.2119 In contrast, Article 13, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) uses the 
formulation “a court which is or is about to be seised of  a claim” which suggests that the 
concerned court does not need to have (already) been seised, meaning that potential 
(fictitious) jurisdiction is also covered and sufficient.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.3 Limitation of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
                                                 
2118
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 13, fn. 95. 
2119
 Norrgård 2005, p. 39.  
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Consistently with the conception that jurisdiction for provisional measures is merely vested in 
the courts which are competent for the substance of a matter, Article 13, Alternative B of the 
Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) does not contain any definition of a “real connecting link”, with regard to 
independent jurisdiction for provisional measures, between the subject-matter of the interim 
measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State. In contrast, Article 13(2), 
Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) indeed requires a certain “connecting link” between the 
subject-matter of the interim measure and the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State, by 
restricting jurisdiction to order a provisional and protective measure (a) in respect of property 
in that State or (b) the enforcement of which is limited to the territory of that State.2120 In both 
cases, the purpose of the measure must be to protect, on an interim basis, a claim on the merits 
that is pending or is to be brought by the requesting party in a Contracting State having 
jurisdiction to determine that claim.2121 Article 13(2), Alternative B of the Draft Hague 
Convention, in favour of foreign plaintiffs who seek to “freeze” assets within the jurisdiction 
in aid of litigation pending elsewhere, is intended to provide such States with jurisdiction to 
grant interim relief based on the existence of property in the forum State and limited to the 
territory of the forum State which, according to their national laws, do not provide for 
jurisdiction to grant provisional and protective measures unless the court was seised of 
jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.2122 To summarise, Article 13, Alternative A of 
the Draft Hague Convention pursues a broad twofold approach which does not merely focus 
on the enforcement criterion.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.4 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Article 13(4), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) contains a list of measures which shall be 
considered “provisional and protective” measures in the sense of Article 13, Alternative A of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001). Noteworthily, the description “provisional and protective” is meant to be 
cumulative, meaning that both criteria must be fulfilled.2123 These are measures to maintain 
the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial, measures providing a preliminary 
means of securing assets out of which an ultimate judgment may be satisfied, and measures to 
restrain conduct by a defendant to prevent current or imminent future harm. In contrast, 
Article 13, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) does not imply such a detailed list of 
measures covered by this Article. However, it at least states that only such “provisional and 
protective measures” shall be covered which are “intended to preserve the subject-matter of 
the claim”. As a consequence, measures whose purpose is not the preservation of the subject-
matter of the claim are excluded.2124 In this respect, it has rightly been suggested that it is 
uncertain whether preliminary injunctions fall within the requirement of preservation of the 
subject-matter, because it could be argued that preliminary injunctions enjoining infringement 
enforce rights and thus do not preserve rights.2125 Due to that uncertainty, the vague, indirect 
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 Norrgård 2005, p. 39. 
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 Norrgård 2005, p. 39. 
2122
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 13, fn. 94. 
2123
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 13, fn. 92. 
2124
 Norrgård 2005, p. 40. 
2125
 Norrgård 2005, p. 40. 
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definition of Article 13, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) is not convincing.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.5 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another State 
 
As has been shown above, the Brussels Ibis Regulation – in contrast to the Brussels 
Convention and the Brussels I Regulation – contains explicit provisions (Articles 2(a), 
42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) according to which the right to a 
hearing of the defendant is ensured, by providing that provisional measures rendered in favour 
of a patent holder can only be recognised and enforced in another Member State if the alleged 
infringer has been granted the right to a hearing, unless the judgment containing the measure 
is served on the defendant prior to enforcement. Nonetheless, I shall also take into 
consideration whether respectively in which way the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) deals with this issue, because 
a future reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation might also choose another solution.    
 
Article 23A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) provides with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
provisional and protective measures: 
 
 
 [Article 23A   Recognition and enforcement of provisional and protective measures 
 
 
 [Alternative A 
 
(1) A decision ordering a provisional and protective measure, which has been taken by a court seised 
with the claim on the merits, shall be recognised and enforced in Contracting States in accordance with 
Articles [25, 27-34]. 
 
(2) In this article a reference to a provisional or protective measure means –  
 
 (a) a measure to maintain the status quo pending determination of the issues at trial; or 
 
(b) a measure providing a preliminary means of securing assets out of which an ultimate 
judgment may be satisfied; or 
 
 (c) a measure to restrain conduct by a defendant to prevent current or imminent future harm.]  
 
  
 [Alternative B 
 
Orders for provisional and protective measures issued in accordance with Article 13 shall be recognised 
and enforced in the other Contracting States in accordance with Articles [25, 27-34].]] 
 
 
Article 23A, Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) is to be read in conjunction with Article 
13, Alternative A. Article 23A, Alternative B refers to Article 13, Alternative B. It is to be 
underlined that both Article 23A, Alternative A and Article 23A, Alternative B of the Draft 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(2001) premise that the court which has rendered a decision on a provisional measure has 
done so on the basis of jurisdiction being accessory to jurisdiction on the merits, while the 
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recognition or enforcement of decisions on provisional measures delivered on the basis of 
independent jurisdiction is a priori excluded also according to Article 23A, Alternative A of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001).2126   
 
While the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (2001) does not imply a specific provision according to which a decision 
on the grant of provisional measures shall not be recognised or enforced in another State in 
case that the defendant was not given the right to a hearing, it is to be noticed that the 
recognition or enforcement of such an ex parte decision would certainly be refused according 
to Article 28 of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001) which provides for certain procedural guarantees (cf. Article 
28(1)(c) to (e) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001):  
 
 
 Article 28   Grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement 
 
 (1) Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused [only] if – 
 
  (…) 
 
[(c) the [judgment results from] proceedings [in the State of origin were] incompatible with 
fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed, [including the right of each party to 
be heard by an impartial and independent court];] 
 
(d) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document, including the 
essential elements of the claim, was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such 
a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence [, or was not notified in accordance with [an 
applicable international convention] [the domestic rules of law of the State where such 
notification took place]], unless the defendant entered an appearance and presented his case 
without contesting the matter of notification in the court of origin, provided that the law of that 
court permits objection to the matter of notification and the defendant did not object; 
 





In particular on the basis of Article 28(1)(c) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), it may be assumed that the 
decision on the grant of provisional measures while depriving the defendant of his right to a 
hearing will mean to disregard fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed, 
even if the right to a hearing was not explicitly mentioned.2127  
 
                                                 
2126
 As to Article 23A, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), it is to be stressed again that this provision refers to Article 13, 
Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) which already excludes independent jurisdiction for provisional measures. Accordingly, the issue 
of recognition and enforcement does not arise. 
2127
 Noteworthily, the text “including the right of each party to be heard by an impartial and independent court” 
in Article 28(1)(c) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (2001) is placed into brackets, meaning that no consensus on this formulation could be 
reached.  
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In light of the foregoing, it is remarkable that no consensus could be reached on the continued 
inclusion of Article 28(1)(c) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), and the deletion of this sub-paragraph 
has been proposed due to several reasons. It has been put forth that this sub-paragraph would 
encourage attacks on the impartiality and independence of the court by the losing party in an 
attempt to delay enforcement. Besides, it has been suggested that it would be contrary to the 
need for mutual trust and confidence among the courts of Contracting States.2128    
 
Compared with Articles 2(a), 42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is to be 
assumed that according to both alternatives contained in Article 23A in conjunction with 
Article 28(1)(c) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), recognition and enforcement of provisional measures 
requires inter alia that the defendant was granted he right to a hearing. However, the approach 
chosen in the Brussels Ibis Regulation is more refined and better takes into consideration the 
interests of the parties concerned. For instance, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
rightly restricts the ambit of this provision (“unless the judgment containing the measure is 
served on the defendant prior to enforcement”). 
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.6 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings  
 
While the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (2001) does not contain a specific provision on the coordination of 
several preliminary proceedings, Article 13(3), Alternative A of the Draft Hague Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) at least makes 
clear that the fact that principal proceedings regarding the same claim on the merits which 
shall be protected by provisional measures, have already been initiated or shall be initiated 
before the court of a certain State, does not prevent a court of another State from ordering 
such provisional measures as well. In other words, there is no lis pendens effect in this 
constellation, given that provisional measures according to Article 13(4) of the Draft Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) 
are affected. In case of a measure which does not fall within the scope of application of 
Article 13(4) of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (2001), e.g. in the case of interim payment, there might be lis 
pendens effect.2129 Article 13, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), in contrast to Alternative A, 
does not contain a comparable provision. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.7 The Draft Hague Convention’s approach of refusal of recognition of 
provisional measures when irreconcilable with other judgments  
 
It has been stated above that Articles 2(a) and 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
codifying the Italian Leather decision of the ECJ, clarify that the recognition of an order of 
provisional measures can be refused for irreconcilability with a judgment given between the 
same parties in the Member State addressed (cf. Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation), or for irreconcilability with an earlier judgment given in another Member State 
or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided 
                                                 
2128
 Hague Conference on Private International Law 2001 (Draft Hague Convention 2001), Article 28, fn. 157. 
2129
 Norrgård 2005, p. 40. 
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that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member 
State addressed (cf. Article 45(1)(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), if the deciding court 
acted on the basis of accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures.  
 
In a way similar to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 28(1)(b) of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) provides: 
 
 
 Article 28   Grounds for refusal of recognition or enforcement 
 
 (1) Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused [only] if – 
 
(a) proceedings between the same parties and having the same subject matter are pending 
before a court of the State addressed, if first seised in accordance with Article 21;  
 
(b) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment rendered, either in the State addressed or in 
another State, provided that in the latter case the judgment is capable of being recognised or 





It has already been mentioned above that, according to the explicit rule in Article 23A(1), 
Alternative A and Article 23A, Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), a decision ordering a 
provisional and protective measure shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting 
States if the court which has rendered the decision on the provisional measure has done so on 
the basis of jurisdiction being accessory to jurisdiction on the merits. The latter restriction 
corresponds to the approach of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Compared with Article 45(1)(c) 
and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is to be stated that Article 28(1)(a) of the Draft 
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(2001) concerns a different situation because its prerequisites that proceedings between the 
same parties and having the same subject-matter are pending, while Article 45 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulations concerns the constellation where a decision has already been rendered. 
Consequently, a comparison between Article 28(1)(a) of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) on the one hand, 
and Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the other hand, would be a 
comparison of “apples to oranges”.  
 
The question then arises whether Article 28(1)(b) of the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) is more 
worthwhile. However, in opposition to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
which contains specific requirements (in particular the following: Article 45(1)(c): “judgment 
given between the same parties”; Article 45(1)(d): “earlier judgment given involving the same 
cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the 
conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed”), Article 28(1)(b) of 
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) is constructed in a considerably less differentiated way (“judgment rendered, 
either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that in the latter case the judgment 
is capable of being recognised or enforced in the State addressed”). For this reason, the 
approach chosen in Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in conjunction 
with Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is preferable, also because it distinguishes 
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between “the Member State addressed”, “another Member State” and “a third State” (which is 
not possible in the framework of a Convention which has no “Member States”).    
 
The elaborate differentiation chosen in Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
should also be applied in the framework of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. 
However, as Contracting States (i.e. not Member States) would be concerned, the wording 
would have to be adapted (“Contracting State” in place of “Member State”). 
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.8 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures  
 
Article 23A, Alternative A and Alternative B of the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001) merely refers to provisional 
measures rendered by a court on the basis of accessory jurisdiction, and thus a priori excludes 
recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered on the basis of independent 
jurisdiction for interim relief. Although achieved in a different way, this result corresponds to 
the result achieved via Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.1.9 The Draft Hague Convention’s indirect contribution to the creation of a 
clarifying provision of the effect of an invalidity defence being raised in provisional 
proceedings (applicability of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
 
The Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001) does not imply any specific provision as to the question which are the effects 
on jurisdiction when an invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings. In light of this, 
the Draft Hague Convention cannot be referred to in view of a clarification of the effect of an 
invalidity defence raised in provisional proceedings. In any case, it is to be borne in mind that 
the issue discussed controversially of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
applies also to provisional proceedings based on Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
does not arise under the (potential) regime of the Draft Hague Convention, because the latter 
merely admits accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures.   
 
 
3.3.4.2.2 ALI Principles 
 
The ALI Principles contain, in Chapter 2 on Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter, a special 
provision on provisional and protective measures: § 214 of the ALI Principles. The provision 
reads as follows: 
 
 
 § 214. Provisional and Protective Measures 
 
 (1) A court has jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures consistent with its authority 
 under §§ 201-207 and §§ 221-223 of these Principles. 
 
 (2) The courts in any States in which intellectual property rights are registered or in which tangible 
 property is located have jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective measures with respect to that 
 property. The measure shall be limited to the territory of that State. 
 
 (3) A person having custody or control of goods in transit, even if not an infringer by the law of the 
 State in  which the goods are temporarily located, may be the subject of an action for an order of 
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3.3.4.2.2.1 Codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Similarly to the current system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation pursuant to which jurisdiction 
to grant provisional relief can be based on the jurisdiction accessory to jurisdiction on the 
merits, and on independent jurisdiction for provisional measures, the ALI Principles pursue a 
two-tier approach. According to § 214(1) of the ALI Principles, courts that are competent 
according to §§ 201 to 207 and §§ 221 to 223 of the ALI Principles also have jurisdiction to 
grant provisional or protective measures. If such authority is provided by local law, § 214(1) 
of the ALI Principles gives a court with appropriate jurisdiction over a defendant plenary 
authority to order provisional or protective measure, including ex parte relief and the issuance 
of transborder injunctions.2130 
 
On the other hand, in order to give parties the flexibility to protect their interests in 
jurisdictions other than the one in which the action is pending or will be filed,2131 § 214(2) of 
the ALI Principles creates additional jurisdiction for “the courts in any State in which 
intellectual property rights are registered or in which the tangible property is located”. In 
contrast to the situation pursuant to § 214(1) of the ALI Principles, measures taken under       
§ 214(2) of the ALI Principles are limited to the territory of the State where the deciding court 
is situated, meaning that courts have authority, according to § 214(2) of the ALI Principles, 
only with respect to local property, tangible and intellectual.2132  
 
 
3.3.4.2.2.2 The ALI Principles' response to the stated need for a clarification of the 
requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures  
 
§ 214 of the ALI Principles does not imply any specific definition of requirements of 
jurisdiction for the grant of provisional measures being accessory to the court's jurisdiction on 




3.3.4.2.2.3 Limitation of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures  
 
The case-law of the ECJ being less relevant for the ALI Principles, topoi of European law of 
civil procedure such as the “real connecting link” criterion developed by the ECJ cannot be 
expected to form the guidelines of the ALI Principles.2133 Consequently, the ALI Principles do 
not define the “real connecting link” criterion. In light of this, it is however all the more 
remarkable that § 214 of the ALI Principles comes to similar results.  
 
Similarly to the jurisprudence of the ECJ according to which jurisdiction for provisional 
measures being independent from the jurisdiction for the substance of the case is restricted by 
                                                 
2130
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment a. on § 214(1). 
2131
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment b. on § 214(2). 
2132
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment b. on § 214(2). 
2133
 It is however to be emphasised that the Comments and Reporters' Notes on the ALI Principles also refer to 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the Brussels I Regulation. 
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the requirement of a “real connecting link” between the subject-matter of the interim measure 
and the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State, § 214(2) of the ALI Principles limits such 
independent jurisdiction in several ways. First, it is limited to the courts in States in which 
intellectual property rights are registered or in which tangible property is located (cf.              
§ 214(2)1 of the ALI Principles). Second, § 214(2)1 of the ALI Principles also restricts such 
jurisdiction to that property. Third, § 214(2)2 of the ALI Principles stipulates that “the 
measure shall be limited to the territory of that State”.   
 
 
3.3.4.2.2.4 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Like under the current regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, § 214 of the ALI Principles 
does not provide for a definition of “provisional and protective measures”. Interestingly,        
§ 214(3) of the ALI Principles however contains a specific provision on protective seisures, 
providing that a person having custody or control of goods in transit (i.e. tangible goods 
shipped from one State, across another State, to be sold in a third State where the sale 
infringes intellectual property rights in that third State), be it an infringer or not according to 
the law of the State in which the goods are temporarily located, may be the subject of an 
action for an order of temporary detention of these goods. The goods can thus be seised where 




3.3.4.2.2.5 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another State 
 
Although the ALI Principles do not expressly exclude the recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures which have been granted by way of an ex parte decision, it is to be 
taken into consideration that ex parte provisional measures are subject to application of the 
grounds of non-recognition and enforcement established in § 403(1)(a)-(d) of the ALI 
Principles which provides for certain procedural guarantees.2135 The wording of § 403(1)(a)-
(d) of the ALI Principles is as follows: 
 
 
 § 403. Judgments Not To Be Recognized or Enforced 
 
 (1) The enforcement court shall not recognize or enforce a judgment if it determines that: 
 
  (a) the judgment was rendered under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or 
  procedures compatible with fundamental principles of fairness; 
 
  (b) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and justifiable doubt 
  about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judgment in question; 
 
(c) the judgment was rendered without prior notice reasonable calculated to inform the 
defendant of the pendency of the proceeding in a timely manner; 
 
(d) the judgment was obtained by fraud that had the effect of depriving the defendant of 
adequate opportunity to present its case to the rendering court; 
   
  (...). 
                                                 
2134
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment d. on § 214(3). 
2135
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.N04. 
 455 
These rules intend, for the sake of fundamental fairness, to ensure generally recognised 
procedural guarantees, such as an impartial tribunal, both in general and regarding the rights 
at issue, proper and timely notice, an opportunity to be heard and assurances that the judgment 
was not obtained by fraud.2136 It may be assumed that the decision on the grant of provisional 
measures while depriving the defendant of his right to a hearing will mean to disregard 
procedural guarantees in the sense of § 403(1)(a)-(d) of the ALI Principles. Although not 
explicitly excluding the recognition and enforcement of provisional measures which have 
been granted by way of an ex parte decision, it is therefore probable that the ALI Principles 
will reach this result.  
 
   
3.3.4.2.2.6 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings  
 
In the context of rules on exclusive jurisdiction, the provisions of §§ 222 and 223 of the ALI 
Principles have already been presented. § 214(2) of the ALI Principles can be regarded as an 
exception from the rules requiring courts to suspend proceedings pending adjudication in the 
coordination court or the consolidation court because they provide other tribunals with 
authority over the dispute.2137 With regard to provisional measures to preserve evidence or the 
status quo, time is frequently of the essence. For this reason, the court best situated to achieve 




3.3.4.2.2.7 The ALI Principles' approach of refusal of recognition of provisional 
measures when irreconcilable with other judgments  
 
The ALI Principles contain, in § 403(2)(d), a provision that is similar to Article 45(1)(c) and 
(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and could therefore serve for orientation in view of an 
alternative approach. § 403(2)(d) of the ALI Principles reads: 
 
 
 § 403. Judgments Not To Be Recognized or Enforced 
  
 (...) 
 (2) The enforcement court need not recognize or enforce a judgment if it determines that: 
 
 (...) 
 (d) the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the court designated by § 221, or the actions were 
 coordinated in accordance with § 222 and the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the court of 
 consolidation or of the courts that cooperated in resolving the dispute.  
 
 
The wording of § 403(2)(d) of the ALI Principles however reveals that the provision is closely 
related to the specific principles of coordinating proceedings laid down in §§ 221 et seq. of 
the ALI Principles.2139 For this reason, despite similar results may be reached, § 403(2)(d) of 
the ALI Principles seems less appropriate to serve as an alternative for Article 45(1)(c) and 
(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. After all, in contrast to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) in 
                                                 
2136
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 403, Comment b. on § 403(1). 
2137
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment c. on § 214(2). 
2138
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 214, Comment c. on § 214(3). 
2139
 The American Law Institute 2008 (ALI Principles), § 403, Comment g. on § 403(2). 
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conjunction with Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, § 403(2)(d) of the ALI 
Principles does not explicitly mention provisional measures, and therefore would actually 
mean to “go one step backwards” in times of the Brussels Convention/Brussels I Regulation 
when the applicability of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention/Article 34(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation to the constellation of several decisions on provisional measures 
rendered by different courts was merely determined through the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
(Italian Leather) without this being reflected in the wording of the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation.    
 
 
3.3.4.2.2.8 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
With regard to the issue under which circumstances provisional measures are recognisable 
and enforceable, § 401(4) of the ALI Principles provides: 
 
 
 § 401. Foreign Judgments to Be Recognized or Enforced 
  
 (...) 
 (4) For purposes of this Part IV of the Principles, a provisional or protective order rendered in accord 
 with § 214(1) shall be considered a judgment entitled to recognition and enforcement. 
 
 
Remarkably, § 401(4) of the ALI Principles solely refers to provisional or protective orders 
rendered according to § 214(1) of the ALI Principles, i.e. on the basis of accessory 
jurisdiction for interim relief, while not mentioning provisional or protective orders having 
been rendered pursuant to § 214(2) of the ALI Principles. As a consequence, provisional 
measures granted on the basis of § 214(2) of the ALI Principles, i.e. on the basis of 
independent jurisdiction for interim relief, are not entitled to recognition and enforcement 
abroad. This result reflects the statement in § 214(2) of the ALI Principles according to which 
provisional or protective measures granted on the basis of § 214(2) of the ALI Principles are 
limited to the territory of the rendering State.2140 As recognition and enforcement of 
provisional measures ordered on the basis of independent jurisdiction for interim relief is thus 
a priori excluded according to the ALI Principles, these Principles reach results which are 




3.3.4.2.2.9 The ALI Principles' indirect contribution to the creation of a clarifying 
provision on the effect of an invalidity defence being raised in provisional proceedings 
(applicability of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
 
The ALI Principles do not contain any specific provision as to the question of which are the 
effects on jurisdiction when an invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings. 
Presumably, the general rules as to coordination of proceedings will apply which have been 




                                                 
2140
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.N04. 
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3.3.4.2.3 Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property (CLIP Principles)  
 
As to the addressed problematic issues regarding provisional measures, it is to be noticed that 
the CLIP Principles contain several provisions concerning different aspects. While Article 
2:501 of the CLIP Principles implies jurisdiction rules for provisional measures and provides 
for a definition of provisional measures, Article 2:705 of the CLIP Principles deals with the 
coordination of proceedings for provisional measures. Besides, Article 4:301 of the CLIP 
Principles rules the recognition and enforcement of measures of interim relief.2141 As the 
CLIP Principles merely deal with jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and 
enforcement, other issues such as the question under which conditions provisional measures 
may be granted, who can be the addressee of such provisional measures and further aspects 
are – subject to international and supranational harmonisation (Article 50 TRIPS) – governed 
by the applicable national law.2142   
 
I shall begin my presentation and analysis of relevant provisions of the CLIP Principles as to 
provisional measures with Article 2:501 of the CLIP Principles, analysing step by step in how 
far the CLIP Principles manage to deliver appropriate solutions to the problematic issues 
concerning provisional measures indicated above. 
 
Article 2:501 of the CLIP Principles stipulates: 
 
 
 Article 2:501: Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
 (1) A court having jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 2:101 to 2:401 also has jurisdiction to order 
 any provisional, including protective, measures.  
  
 (2) Provisional, including protective, measures may also be ordered by the courts of a State 
 
  (a) where the measure is to be enforced, or 
 
  (b) for which protection is sought. 
 
 (3) Provisional, including protective, measures are measures which are intended to preserve a factual or 
 legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court 
 having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. Such measures may include 
 
  (a) orders to prevent an (imminent or continuing) infringement of an intellectual property right 
  from occurring; 
 
  (b) orders to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement; 
 
  (c) orders to seise goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right; 
 
  (d) orders to seise, attach or prevent the dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction of assets to 
  safeguard enforcement of the judgment on the merits; and 
 
  (e) orders directing a party to provide information about the location of assets which are 
  subject of an order under lit. (d).   
 
                                                 
2141
 While it is to be underlined that provisional and protective measures adopted by a foreign court can, in 
principle, be recognised and enforced under the CLIP Principles, Article 4:301 of the CLIP Principles admits 
only cross-border enforcement of such provisional measures which were adopted by a court having jurisdiction 
on the merits in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles (i.e. according to Article 
2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles. Cf. De Miguel Asensio 2010, p. 269. 
2142 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C01. 
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3.3.4.2.3.1 Codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Noteworthily, Article 2:501(1) and (2) of the CLIP Principles picks up as a starting point the 
two-tier system of jurisdiction regarding provisional measures that is also acknowledged 
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As has been shown in the foregoing chapter, a court which 
has jurisdiction as to the substance of a case also has accessory jurisdiction to order any 
provisional or protective measures that may prove necessary. While the text of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation is somewhat vague in this respect, the ECJ affirmed such accessory 
jurisdiction in its Van Uden decision: 
 
 “The first point to be made, as regards the jurisdiction of a court hearing an application for interim 
relief, is that it is accepted that a court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case in accordance 
with Articles 2 and 5 to 18 of the [Brussels] Convention also has jurisdiction to order any provisional or 
protective measures which may prove necessary [underscore and content in brackets added].“2143 
 
“Thus, the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a case under one of the heads of jurisdiction 
laid down in the [Brussels] Convention also has jurisdiction to order provisional or protective measures, 
without that jurisdiction being subject to any further conditions (…) [underscore and content in brackets 
added].”2144 
 
On the other hand, courts lacking jurisdiction as to the substance of the case may order 
provisional measures based on Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as an independent 
ground of jurisdiction, under the condition of, inter alia, 
 
“(...) the existence of a real connecting link between the subject-matter of the measures sought and the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting State [of the Brussels Convention, respectively Member State 
with regard to the Brussels Ibis Regulation] of the court before which those measures are sought 
[underscore and content in brackets added].”2145 
 
In accordance with the current system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 2:501(1) and 
(2) of the CLIP Principles distinguishes between jurisdiction that is accessory to jurisdiction 
for the substance of the case (Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles), and jurisdiction being 
independent from the jurisdiction for the substance of the case (Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP 
Principles).2146 However, the CLIP Principles do not merely reformulate, but develop the 
current two-tier system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation by proposing a number of amendments 
and clarifications.2147 So, Article 2:501 of the CLIP Principles goes beyond the current system 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in that the wording of Article 2:501(1) and (2) of the CLIP 
Principles clearly distinguishes between accessory and independent jurisdiction, without the 
need for having recourse to the ECJ's jurisprudence for clarification as under the Brussels 
Convention/Brussels I Regulation, and actually still under the Brussels Ibis Regulation which 
only addresses the side-by-side existence of jurisdiction for provisional measures pursuant to 
Articles 4 and 7 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation on the one hand, and Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation in conjunction with national law on the other hand, in its Recital 33.  
 
 
                                                 
2143
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 19 – Van Uden. 
2144
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 22 – Van Uden. 
2145
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 40 – Van Uden. 
2146
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C02. 
2147
 Heinze 2010, p. 74. 
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3.3.4.2.3.2 Clarification of the requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction for 
provisional measures (Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles) 
 
As to jurisdiction for provisional measures being accessory to jurisdiction for the substance of 
the case, Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles clarifies the conditions under which such 
jurisdiction is existent.  
 
First of all, Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles makes clear that this accessory jurisdiction 
for ordering provisional measures does not depend on any further conditions such as the 
possibility of enforcing the measures in the forum State.2148 This clearly reflects that Article 
2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles intends to take into consideration the above cited 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Van Uden decision.2149 The clarification within the text of 
Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles might prove useful for a better understanding of the 
provision.2150 
 
Provided that the jurisdiction for the substance of the case on which accessory jurisdiction is 
founded allows for provisional measures, it is thus possible to grant orders with 
extraterritorial effect on the basis of Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles. Due to the 
accessory nature of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles, it must be 
considered that such jurisdiction cannot be broader than the jurisdiction for the substance of 
the case.2151 
 
Moreover, the wording “court having jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 2:101 to 2:401” 
provides for further clarification. Besides the rather unproblematic constellation where a court 
has already been seised with an action on the merits (according to Articles 2:101 to 2:401), it 
has been shown in the foregoing chapter that it is discussed controversially in which way the 
constellation is to be treated where no court has been seised yet. As has been mentioned 
earlier, parts of legal doctrine have put forth that accessory jurisdiction regarding provisional 
measures requires that jurisdiction on the merits does not only potentially exist, but that it has 
factually been exerted. By using the formulation “court having jurisdiction in accordance with 
Articles 2:101 to 2:401” instead of “court seised in accordance with Articles 2:101 to 2:401”, 
Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles clarifies that potential/fictitious jurisdiction on the 
merits suffices for jurisdiction regarding provisional measures. In other words, Article 
2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles is available before any proceedings on the merits have been 
started.2152 Another problematic constellation could arise where an action on the merits has 
already been brought before a different court which, as a consequence of the lis pendens rules, 
results in the exclusion of jurisdiction on the substance of the court from which provisional 
relief is requested. The broad wording of Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles however 
ensures that jurisdiction under Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles will persist after an 
action on the merits has been initiated in a different court.2153  
 
This being true, it has been suggested that, in case that proceedings on the merits have already 
been initiated in a specific court, it is reasonable – in order to reduce the risk of conflicting 
provisional measures – to subject provisional measures granted by any other court to the same 
                                                 
2148
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C03. 
2149
 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, paras. 19, 22 – Van Uden. 
2150
 Heinze 2010, p. 75. 
2151
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C03. 
2152
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C05.  
2153
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C05.  
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restrictions that apply for measures based on Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles. 




 Article 4:301: Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
 (1) Provisional, including protective, measures adopted by a foreign court shall not be recognised 
 and enforced if there is no ground of jurisdiction under Part 2 of these Principles, which would 
 have allowed the foreign court to decide on the merits.   
 
  
This scenario shall be illustrated by the following sample case: 
 
 
 Case 1: 
  
P, a Dutch company, holds a European patent for France. X, an English company 
being domiciled in England, allegedly infringes P's patent. X initiates, in the 
Netherlands where P is domiciled, an action on the merits against P, for a declaration 
of non-infringement holding that P's patent in France is not being infringed by X. 
Subsequently, P seeks a preliminary injunction against X from the French courts. 
 
 
French courts have jurisdiction to grant provisional relief according to Article 2:501(1) of the 
CLIP Principles in connection with Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles (place of 
infringement), even before proceedings on the merits have been initiated. In this respect, it is 
not relevant that jurisdiction on the merits of the French courts is excluded pursuant to Article 
2:701 of the CLIP Principles, because the same cause of action is already pending in the 
Netherlands. But, due to Article 4:301(1) of the CLIP Principles2155, any provisional measure 
issued by the French courts may not be subject to recognition and enforcement.2156   
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.3 Definition of the real connecting link-criterion with regard to independent 
jurisdiction for interim relief (Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles) 
 
In contrast to the current situation under the Brussels Ibis Regulation where the issue which 
connection must exist between the subject-matter of the interim measure and the territorial 
jurisdiction of the forum State is merely (if any) clarified by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, it is 
noteworthy that Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles implies a normative answer to this 
crucial question. The CLIP Principles thereby pursue a twofold approach that corresponds to 
the conception advocated in this thesis: Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles provides that, 
besides courts having jurisdiction for the substance of the case, provisional relief may also be 
granted, on the one hand, by the courts of a State where the measure is to be enforced (Article 
2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles), or, on the other hand, by the courts of a State for which 
protection is sought (forum protectionis, Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP Principles). While 
not mentioning explicitly the criterion of a “real connecting link”, Article 2:501(2) of the 
                                                 
2154
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C05; cf. also: Garber 2011, at p. 99 et seq. 
2155
 Article 4:301(1) of the CLIP Principles shall be subject of further more detailed discussion at a later point. 
2156
 This sample case has been inspired by the a similar sample case in the Commentary on the CLIP Principles, 
cf. Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C05, there Illustration 3. 
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3.3.4.2.3.3.1 Jurisdiction of the courts of a State where the measure is to be enforced 
 
Article 2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles confers jurisdiction to courts where the provisional 
measure is to be enforced. This solution is based on the insight that provisional measures, in 
order to be effective, should be available due to the particular need for quick, immediate 
enforcement.2158 It has been rightly put forth that this need can be best met if the court where 
the provisional measure can be enforced has jurisdiction to grant immediate relief, meaning 
that lengthy proceedings to enforce foreign judgments can thus be avoided.2159 As has been 
explicated in the foregoing chapter, it is both required and sufficient that there is a certain 
probability that enforcement in the forum State can be achieved, to be demonstrated at the 
time when the proceedings are commenced.2160 
 
While the enforcement criterion is easy to apply in case that the measures concerned relate to 
specific goods, assets or evidence – then the courts of the State have jurisdiction regarding the 
grant of interim relief where the goods, assets and evidence are located regardless of whether 
this State is the protection State2161 – things are more difficult if in personam orders such as 
interim injunctions are concerned.2162  
 
The following sample case may serve for illustration of this scenario. 
 
 
 Case 2: 
 
 P, a Dutch company, holds a European patent for the Netherlands and Germany. X, an 
 English company being domiciled in England, allegedly infringes the Dutch and the 
 German part of P’s European patent. X disposes of shops and an account in the 
 Netherlands. In order to obtain quick legal protection, P seeks interim relief, namely:
   
 (1) interim injunctions for both the Netherlands and Germany; 
 (2) an order to block X’s account in the Netherlands in order to secure the recovery of 
 damages; 
 (3) an order to inspect evidence located in France where X undertook respective 
 business activities.  
  




For a structured approach, it is necessary to distinguish between the measures sought. 
 
                                                 
2157
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C06. 
2158
 Heinze 2010, p. 75; Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C08 with further references. 
2159
 Heinze 2010, p. 75.  
2160
 Leible 2011 (Rauscher), Art 31 Brüssel I-VO, para. 25a. 
2161
 Cf. with regard to evidence orders: Hof van Cassatie 3 September 2000, (2001)50(1) GRUR Int. 73, at p. 74 
– Sanac/Variantsystemen; Cour de cassation 11 December 2001, (2002)91(2) Rev. crit. DIP 371, at p. 372, with 
case note H. Muir Watt. 
2162
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C08. 
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Ad (1) Interim injunctions for both the Netherlands and Germany 
 
According to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles, English courts have jurisdiction for 
such interim injunctions because they also have jurisdiction on the substance pursuant to 
Article 2:101 of the CLIP Principles (forum defensoris), because X is domiciled in England. 
Besides, Dutch courts and German courts have jurisdiction to order such interim injunctions 
because the respective places of infringement are located in the Netherlands and Germany (cf. 
Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles). However, unlike the jurisdiction of the English courts 
that is not restricted, the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts and German courts is limited to the 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the respective State (cf. Article 
2:203(1) of the CLIP Principles). Dutch courts therefore may not issue an interim injunction 
to stop infringement in Germany; the same applies to German courts vis-à-vis infringement in 
the Netherlands.  
 
Besides, interim injunctions can also be ordered on the basis of Article 2:501(2)(a) of the 
CLIP Principles, i.e. by the courts of the State where these interim injunctions are to be 
enforced. In the sample case, this leads to the jurisdiction of both English and Dutch courts: 
English courts are competent because X is present in England which means that the 
enforcement of an English injunction can be ensured by the court’s power of contempt. Dutch 
courts have jurisdiction because X disposes of assets in the Netherlands which can be subject 
to enforcement.   
 
 
Ad (2) Order to block X’s account in the Netherlands in order to secure the recovery of 
damages 
 
As to jurisdiction according to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles, the same applies as 
explicated with regard to interim injunctions for both the Netherlands and Germany.  
 
Regarding jurisdiction based on Article 2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles, Dutch courts have 
jurisdiction because the place of enforcement of the Dutch bank account is located in the 
Netherlands. Besides, English courts have jurisdiction to order a freezing injunction that, as 
an in personam measure, is enforceable against an English-resident defendant even if the 
assets are located abroad. 
 
 
Ad (3) Order to inspect evidence located in France where X undertook respective business 
activities 
 
As to jurisdiction according to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles, the same applies as 
explicated with regard to interim injunctions for both the Netherlands and Germany.  
 
With regard to jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles, the place of 
enforcement is France only as the place where the evidence is located. Consequently, French 
courts are competent to grant an order to inspect evidence in France.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.3.2 Jurisdiction of the courts of a State for which protection is sought 
 
As has been mentioned above, the CLIP Principles pursue the approach to acknowledge not 
only a “real connecting link” between the State of the court which decides on provisional 
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measures and the State where these provisional measures are to be enforced, but expand 
jurisdiction to order provisional measures to courts of a State for which protection is sought 
(forum protectionis, Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP Principles). In comparison with Article 
2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles, the justification for Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP 
Principles, the additional jurisdiction of courts in the State of protection, is less obvious.2163 
By offering the right holder this further option, the CLIP Principles tempt to facilitate to 
obtain interim relief without having to demonstrate the probability of enforcement in the 
granting State as according to Article 2:501(2)(a) of the CLIP Principles.2164 Although, as has 
been concluded in the foregoing chapter, the forum protectionis will often be available 
already pursuant to the rules of infringement jurisdiction (Article 2:202 in connection with 
Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles),2165 it has been highlighted that constellations are 
conceivable where infringement jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles 
is excluded, for instance if there is exclusive jurisdiction or if a jurisdiction or an arbitration 
agreement has been concluded.2166 
 
In order to illustrate such a situation, the following sample cases shall be presented.2167  
 
 
 Case 3a: 
 
X, an English company being domiciled in England, holds a patent in the United 
States. P, a Dutch company being domiciled in the Netherlands, is one of X’s 
competitors. In order to impair P’s reputation, X writes letters to several U.S. 
customers alleging that P’s products infringe X’s patent (which is actually not true). In 
order to protect his reputation and ensure that X stops writing, P seeks an injunction 
from the Dutch courts against X to stop X from writing such untrue letters. 
 
 
 Case 3b: 
 
 The constellation corresponds to the facts of Case 3a except that X also writes letters 
 to several Dutch customers alleging that P's  products infringe X’s U.S. patent.  
 
 
 Do the Dutch courts have jurisdiction for interim relief? 
 
 
Both regarding Case 3a and Case 3b, English courts have jurisdiction according to Article 
2:101 of the CLIP Principles, since the place of domicile of the defendant (X) is located in 
England. Jurisdiction according to Article 2:202 of the CLIP Principles is vested with the 
courts in the United States because the place of infringement is located there. Dutch courts 
have no jurisdiction for interim relief on the basis of Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles. 
Jurisdiction of the Dutch courts for interim relief cannot be based on Article 2:501(2)(a) of the 
CLIP Principles either because X has no domicile and does not dispose of any assets in the 
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 Heinze 2010, p. 75. 
2164
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C09. 
2165
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C09, with reference to: OGH 16 December 2010, 
17 Ob 13/10a, (2011)60(5) GRUR Int. 450, at p. 452. 
2166
 Heinze 2010, p. 75; Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C09. 
2167
 A similar case was decided by the Austrian Supreme Court in OGH 16 December 2010, 17 Ob 13/10a, 
(2011)60(5) GRUR Int. 450. A part of the constellation discussed here (Case 3a) is also mentioned in the 
Commentary of the CLIP Principles, cf. Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C09. 
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Netherlands; consequently, enforcement of an injunction cannot be realised in the 
Netherlands.         
 
However, Case 3a and Case 3b differ from each other with regard to the question of whether 
the Dutch courts have jurisdiction for interim relief according to Article 2:501(2)(b) of the 
CLIP Principles. In Case 3a, Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP Principles does not assign 
jurisdiction for interim relief to the Dutch courts either because X’s behaviour only relates to 
the U.S. market and has no effects in the Netherlands. As the claim is based on unfair 
competition rather than intellectual property law, Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP Principles is 
applied only mutatis mutandis (cf. Article 1:101(3)(c) of the CLIP Principles). As a 
consequence, it is not decisive that the State of protection is the United States, but rather that 
the behaviour is directed to the U.S. market and has effects only in the United States.2168 In 
contrast, in Case 3b, as X has also written to several Dutch customers alleging that P's 
products infringe X’s U.S. patent, the Netherlands are, in this respect, the State for which 
protection is sought, although no Dutch patent is affected. Accordingly, the Dutch courts have 
jurisdiction for interim relief under Article 2:501(2)(b) of the CLIP Principles. It is to be 
noticed however that this only affects X’s letters to Dutch customers; as to X’s letters 
addressed to U.S. customers, Dutch courts lack jurisdiction, because letters to U.S. customers 
are not directed to and do not have any effects on the Dutch market (cf. Case 3a).    
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.3.3 Conclusion regarding the twofold approach of Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP 
Principles 
 
According to the Commentary on the CLIP Principles2169, the broad twofold (indirect) 
definition of a “real connecting link” in Article 2:501(2)(a) and (b) of the CLIP Principles is 
to avoid legal uncertainty regarding the interpretation of this criterion. Unfortunately, Article 
2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles is silent with regard to the problematic question addressed in 
the foregoing chapter as to the specific meaning of the “real connecting link” criterion with 
regard to different types of provisional measures (interim injunctions, interim performance 
orders, evidence orders). The approach of the CLIP Principles thus tends to circumvent this 
crucial question by constructing jurisdiction pursuant to Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP 
Principles in an extensive way, conferring jurisdiction to a relatively broad range of courts. 
However, this broad, comprehensive conception brings along the advantage that there may be 
a higher chance that this approach is taken into consideration in the framework of legislative 
reforms because it may find more approval since it combines several conceptions. Conferring 
independent jurisdiction for provisional measures to the courts of a State where the measure is 
to be enforced, or for which protection is sought is not contradictory, but rather extends the 
number of (potentially) competent courts and leaves room for a flexible application of the 
provision, i.e. determination whether the courts of a certain State have independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures. As a consequence, this means inter alia that it is 
possible to differentiate, in jurisdictional respect, between the different types of provisional 
measures as proposed in this thesis.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.4 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Given the different national conceptions of provisional measures, the CLIP Principles contain 
a specific definition to clarify the scope of Article 2:501 of the CLIP Principles. In particular, 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C09, there fn. 30. 
2169
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C07. 
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this aims to avoid a possible circumvention of the jurisdiction rules for the substance of the 
case by resorting to interim payment orders being available in certain jurisdictions.2170 
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.4.1 General definition and non-exhaustive list of examples 
 
In determining respectively defining the notion of “provisional, including protective, 
measures”, Article 2:501(3) of the CLIP Principles proceeds in two steps. First of all, Article 
2:501(3)1 of the CLIP Principles generally defines such measures as “measures which are 
intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of 
which is otherwise sought from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case”. 
This definition is clearly inspired by the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Reichert II where the 
court held: 
 
“The expression ‘provisional, including protective, measures’ within the meaning of Article 24 [of the 
Brussels Convention] must therefore be understood as referring to measures which, in matters within 
the scope of the Convention, are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard 
rights the recognition of which is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter [content in brackets added].”2171 
 
As has been shown in the foregoing chapter, the ECJ, referring to its Reichert II decision, 
subsequently confirmed this (attempt of a) definition in Van Uden2172 and St. Paul Dairy2173 
by using the same wording.  
 
In a second step, Article 2:501(3)2 of the CLIP Principles provides for a non-exhaustive list 
of examples which qualify as provisional measures for the purposes of the CLIP Principles, 
whereby the content of this list is inspired by Article 50(1) of the TRIPS Agreement2174 and 
Articles 7 and 9 of the EU Enforcement Directive and attempts to enumerate the most 
significant measures in intellectual property litigation.2175  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.4.2 The measures mentioned in Article 2:501(3)2 of the CLIP Principles 
 
First of all, Article 2:501(3)2(a) of the CLIP Principles mentions orders to prevent an 
(imminent or continuing) infringement of an intellectual property right from occurring. 
Although there should be no doubt that such orders – commonly designated as interim 
injunctions – constitute typical measures of interim relief, the benefit of mentioning those 
measures within the list in Article 2:501(3)2 of the CLIP Principles is to make clear without 
any doubt that such negative injunctions do not fall under the strict regime which governs 
positive interim performance orders.2176  
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 Heinze 2010, p. 76. 
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 ECJ 26 March 1992, C-261/90, Mario Reichert and Others v Dresdner Bank AG, [1992] ECR I-02149, para. 
34 – Reichert II. 
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 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 37 – Van Uden. 
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 ECJ 28 April 2005, C-104/03, St. Paul Dairy Industries NV v Unibel Exser BVBA, [2005] ECR I-03481, 
para. 13 – St. Paul Dairy. 
2174
 Heinze 2010, p. 76; cf. also: De Miguel Asensio 2010, p. 269. 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C12. 
2176
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C13; Kropholler & Von Hein 2011, Art. 31 
EuGVO, para. 7.  
 466 
According to Article 2:501(3)2(b) of the CLIP Principles, orders to preserve relevant evidence 
with regard to the alleged infringement are also considered as provisional measures for the 
purposes of the CLIP Principles. As the Commentary on the CLIP Principles explicitly 
emphasises that the CLIP Principles have adopted the view that courts at the place where 
evidence is located should be allowed to directly secure this evidence by way of provisional 
measures without having to take a lengthy detour via the rules of judicial assistance,2177 it is 
an interesting question of whether this means that provisional measures to obtain evidence are 
a priori excluded from the scope of Article 2:501(3)2(b) of the CLIP Principles. According to 
the interpretation purported in this thesis, the term “preserve” may generally comprise both 
“obtain” and “secure”.   
 
Article 2:501(3)2(c) and (d) of the CLIP Principles mention diverse conservatory measures. 
On the one hand, these are orders to seise goods suspected of infringing an intellectual 
property right (c) covering both in rem orders, such as attachment or arrest, as well as 
personal orders restraining the defendant from dealing in certain assets, such as freezing 
injunctions.2178 These measures are based on the idea that an order to seise or deliver up goods 
which are allegedly infringing an intellectual property right serves the purpose of preventing 
the movement of these goods in the channels of commerce. On the other hand, orders to seise, 
attach or prevent the dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction of assets to safeguard 
enforcement of the judgment on the merits are covered (d). Such orders safeguard the 
enforcement of monetary (damages) judgments.2179 The provisions of Article 2:501(3)2(c) 




Article 9 of Directive 2004/48/EC 
 
(1) Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the applicant: 
 
  (…) 
 
(b) order the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property 
right so as to prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce. 
 
(2) In the case of an infringement committed on a commercial scale, the Member States shall ensure 
that, if the injured party demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of damages, the 
judicial authorities may order the precautionary seizure of the movable and immovable property of the 
alleged infringer, including the blocking of his/her bank accounts and other assets. To that end, the 
competent authorities may order the communication of bank, financial or commercial documents, or 
appropriate access to the relevant information. 
 
 
In addition, Article 2:501(3)2(e) of the CLIP Principles clarifies that orders directing a party 
to provide information about the location of assets which are subject of an order under Article 
2:501(3)2(d) of the CLIP Principles (attachment order or freezing order), i.e. ancillary 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C14. 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C15. 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C15. 
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disclosure orders, are also considered to be provisional measures for the purposes of the CLIP 
Principles.2181 
 
In light of the detailed list of measures contained in Article 2:501(3) of the CLIP Principles, it 
is remarkable that orders for positive interim performance (such as interim payment orders) 
have not been included as examples for provisional measures. According to the Commentary 
on the CLIP Principles, this is essentially due to the fact that – although it has partly been put 
forth that such measures constitute measures of interim relief – orders for positive interim 
performance may effectively pre-empt the decision on the merits and therefore may be used to 
circumvent the jurisdiction rules for actions on the substance of the case. As a consequence, 
such orders are not considered as provisional measures according to Article 2:501 of the CLIP 
Principles, unless the enforcement of the order is subject to the applicant's lodging of an 
adequate security to ensure repayment of the sum awarded, including compensation for a 
prejudice suffered if the applicant is unsuccessful concerning the substance of his claim.2182 
This corresponds to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Van Uden decision where the court 
held: 
 
 “Consequently, interim payment of a contractual consideration does not constitute a provisional 
 measure within the meaning of Article 24 [of the Brussels Convention] unless, first, repayment to the 
 defendant of the sum awarded is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of 
 his claim and, second, the measure sought relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to 
 be located within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of the court to which application is made 
 [underscore and content in brackets added].”2183 
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.5 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
 
Inspired by the Denilauler decision of the ECJ as to the necessity of prior hearing of the 
adverse party for provisional measures to be recognised and enforced in another Member 
State, and at least effecting the same result as Articles 2(a), 42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 4:301(2) of the CLIP Principles provides: 
 
 
 Article 4:301: Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
 (...)   
 (2) Provisional, including protective, measures adopted without prior hearing of the adverse party and 
 enforceable without prior service of process to that party shall not be recognised or enforced. 
 
 
In schematic respect, it is to be noticed that Article 4:301(2) of the CLIP Principles seems to 
be in conformity with the grounds for non-recognition established in Article 4:501(1) of the 
CLIP Principles, which provides: 
 
 
Article 4:501: Other grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments  
  
A judgment shall not be recognised or enforced if: 
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 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C15. 
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 ECJ 17 November 1998, C-391/95, Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line, v 
Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line and Another, [1998] ECR I-07091, para. 47 – Van Uden. 
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(1) the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was not notified to the 
defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable her/him to arrange for her/his defence, unless 
the defendant entered an appearance and presented her/his case without contesting notification in the 
court of origin, provided that the law of the State of origin permitted notification to be contested. 
 
 
In this respect, it is to be noticed that, where the defendant was not granted the right to a 
hearing, the document which instituted the proceedings was not notified to the defendant in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence.2184  
  
By excluding the recognition and enforcement of such foreign provisional measures where the 
defendant was not granted the right to a hearing, the CLIP Principles take into account the 
paramount significance of ensuring adequate protection of rights of the defendant.2185 
However, due to the fact that Article 4:301(2) of the CLIP Principles aims at providing 
adequate protection of the rights of the defendant, it may be considered that recognition and 
enforcement is not excluded in case that the provisional measure concerned is confirmed after 
the defendant has been served with the judgment and given the opportunity to appear and seek 
its discharge in due time.2186   
 
The latter idea corresponds to the last sentence of Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 




3.3.4.2.3.6 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings in order to mitigate the danger of irreconcilable decisions  
 
Section 7 of the CLIP Principles on the coordination of proceedings includes several 
provisions which deal with provisional and protective measures. These provisions shall be 
subject to a closer analysis in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.6.1 Proceedings on the substance and preliminary proceedings 
 
In conjunction with rules concerning congruent proceedings on the merits, Article 2:701(3) of 
the CLIP Principles clarifies that these rules do not apply to provisional and protective 
measures, because main proceedings never involve the same cause of action as provisional 
and protective measures:2187 
 
 
 Article 2:701: Congruent proceedings 
  
 (...) 
 (3) Provisional and protective measures do not involve the same cause of action as main proceedings. 
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 Heinze 2010, p. 75; De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.C11. 
2186
 De Miguel Asensio 2010, pp. 270, 271; De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 
4:301.C11, with reference to a decision of the Dutch Hoge Raad where this court held enforceable under the 
Brussels I Regulation a German decision on the determination of costs based on a provisional measure that had 
been granted ex parte, given that both decisions had been served on the defendant who had the opportunity to 
challenge them after service, cf. HR 7 November 2008, 07/12641, Realchemie Nederland B.V. v Fa. Feinchemie 
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 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:705, para. 2:705.C01. 
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Article 2:701(3) corresponds to the legal situation under the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
according to which the requirement to stay proceedings, in the case of “congruent” actions 
according to Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, does not prevent the court second 
seised from ordering provisional and protective measures.2188 
 
Besides, where the court first seised stays (infringement) proceedings in the case that validity 
proceedings are instigated subsequently before a court in the State of registration (cf. Article 
2:703(1) of the CLIP Principles), Article 2:703(2) of the CLIP Principles makes clear that this 
does not limit the authority of the court first seised to grant provisional and protective 
measures as long as the proceedings first brought are stayed: 
 
 
  Article 2:703: Subsequent validity proceedings 
  
 (...) 
 (2) Where the court first seised stays the proceedings, it may order provisional and protective measures 
 for the duration of the stay according to Article 2:501.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.6.2 Several preliminary proceedings 
 
A provision of unique nature is Article 2:705 of the CLIP Principles, which specifically 
regulates the situation that several preliminary proceedings before different courts have been 
initiated. Article 2:705 of the CLIP Principles provides: 
 
 
 Article 2:705: Congruent and related preliminary proceedings 
 
 (1) Where proceedings having as their object provisional or protective measures according to Article 
 2:501 and involving the same cause of action between the same parties are brought in the courts of 
 different States under these Principles, any court other than the court first seised may stay its 
 proceedings. 
 
 (2) Where related proceedings have as their object provisional or protective measures according to 
 Article 2:501, the courts seised may cooperate according to Article 2:704. 
 
 
It is noteworthy that the creation of a separate provision regarding congruent and related 
preliminary proceedings means a distinct deviation from the rules of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.2189 As such an additional rule serves the goal of legal certainty and clarity, it 
should be integrated in an amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and also become 
part of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.7 The CLIP Principles' approach of refusal of recognition of provisional 
measures when irreconcilable with other judgments 
 
Similarly to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 4:501(3) and (4) 
of the CLIP Principles provides: 
                                                 
2188
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:701, para. 2:701.N12, with reference to High 
Court of Justice (Chancery Division – Patents Court) 17 December 2009, Mölnlycke Health Care AB v BSN 
Medical Ltd, [2009] EWHC 3370 (Pat), para. 39 – Mölnlycke Health Care AB v BSN Medical Ltd. 
2189
 Van Eechoud & Peukert 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:705, para. 2:705.N01. 
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 Article 4:501: Other grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments 
  
 A judgment shall not be recognised or enforced if: 
 
 (...) 
 (3) it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in the requested State between the same parties; 
 
 (4) it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in another State between the same parties and having the 
 same cause of action, provided that this judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in 




While the Commentary on the CLIP Principles mentions the case of several provisional 
measures granted by the courts of different States as one constellation covered by Article 
4:501 of the CLIP Principles,2190 the CLIP Principles do not explicitly address this scenario 
(neither in Article 4:501(2), (3) of the CLIP Principles, nor in any other provision).  
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.8 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
As to the question under which circumstances provisional measures are recognisable and 
enforceable, Article 4:301(1) of the CLIP Principles differentiates between provisional 
measures adopted by a court competent to reach a decision on the merits and those adopted by 
a court lacking such jurisdiction: 
 
 
 Article 4:301: Provisional, including protective, measures 
  
 (1) Provisional, including protective, measures adopted by a foreign court shall not be recognised and 
 enforced if there is no ground of jurisdiction under Part 2 of these Principles, which would have allowed 
 the foreign court to decide on the merits. 
 
 
While Article 4:301(1) of the CLIP Principles is drafted in negative terms, the provision 
establishes that only provisional measures adopted in accordance with Article 2:501(1) of the 
CLIP Principles (i.e. regarding provisional measures ordered by a court having jurisdiction 
over the merits in accordance with the relevant provisions of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles) – 
in contrast to provisional measures granted pursuant to Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP 
Principles – may be recognised and enforced abroad.2191 As a consequence, provisional 
measures ordered by the courts of another State, even if under the specific rule on jurisdiction 
over provisional and protective measures of the CLIP Principles, shall lack enforceability.2192 
By excluding measures based solely on Article 2:502(2) of the CLIP Principles from the 
liberal recognition and enforcement regime of Part 3 of the CLIP Principles, Article 4:301(1) 
of the CLIP Principles tries to balance, on the recognition and enforcement level, the 
plaintiff's advantage of expanded jurisdiction for provisional measures pursuant to Article 
2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles.2193 The effect of measures based on Article 2:501(2) of the 
CLIP Principles is limited to the State in which the measures were granted.2194 
                                                 
2190
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:501, para. 4:501.C22. 
2191
 De Miguel Asensio 2010, p. 269. 
2192
 De Miguel Asensio 2010, pp. 269, 270. 
2193
 Heinze 2010, p. 75. 
2194
 Heinze 2010, p. 75. 
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Due to the accessory character of jurisdiction based on Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP 
Principles, it is limited to the extent of the jurisdiction of the court to rule over the merits.2195 
As a consequence, determining whether provisional measures are recognisable and 
enforceable requires to apply the jurisdiction provisions of Part 2 of the CLIP Principles to 
establish if the court adopting the measures (potentially) has direct jurisdiction over the merits 
of the case.2196 In this respect, it can be taken into consideration that the jurisdiction of the 
court that adopted the provisional measures was excluded as a result of lis pendens (Article 
2:701 of the CLIP Principles) since an action on the merits had already been initiated before a 
competent court.2197 Noteworthily, the fact that provisional measures adopted by a court 
having jurisdiction according to Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles (and not being 
competent according to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles) are not subject to recognition 
and enforcement in another State due to Article 4:301(1) of the CLIP Principles, does not 
impair the possibility that such measures can still have extraterritorial effect so long as the 
court issuing the measure with extraterritorial effect can enforce it domestically. The latter can 
be the case if the defendant is present in this jurisdiction or disposes of assets there.2198 
 
 
3.3.4.2.3.9 The CLIP Principles' indirect contribution to the creation of a clarifying 
provision of the effect of an invalidity defence in provisional proceedings (applicability 
of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation)  
 
While the wording of Article 2:501(1) and (2) of the CLIP Principles does not inevitably 
require a differentiation, the Commentary on the CLIP Principles clearly advocates the 
opinion that the question of which effects the raise of the invalidity defence in provisional 
proceedings has, depends on the manner of jurisdiction which the invoked court has. While, 
according to the Commentary on the CLIP Principles, jurisdiction under Article 2:501(1) of 
the CLIP Principles shall be excluded if the subject-matter of the dispute falls under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of another court2199 – which is the case when an invalidity defence is 
raised in patent infringement proceedings – jurisdiction according to Article 2:501(2) of the 
CLIP Principles shall also apply in case that another court has exclusive jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the case.2200 In order to justify this differentiation, the Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles strongly refers to the character of jurisdiction under Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP 
Principles as jurisdiction which is accessory to jurisdiction on the merits.  
 
However, as has been underlined in the foregoing chapter, this argumentation is not 
mandatory. Although it is to be admitted that excluding jurisdiction under Article 2:501(1) of 
the CLIP Principles if another court has exclusive jurisdiction on the merits, for instance when 
an invalidity defence is raised in patent infringement proceedings, does not mean a denial of 
the right to effective judicial protection, because jurisdiction under Article 2:501(2) of the 
CLIP Principles is not affected by exclusive jurisdiction,2201 the mere fact that jurisdiction for 
provisional measures can still be grounded on Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles cannot 
justify to discard Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles as another ground of jurisdiction. 
For jurisdiction according to Article 2:501(1) of the CLIP Principles exists independently 
from Article 2:501(2) of the CLIP Principles.   
                                                 
2195
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.C04. 
2196
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.C05. 
2197
 De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 4:301.C05. 
2198
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C10.  
2199
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C04. 
2200
 Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C10.  
2201
 Putting forth this argument: Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, para. 2:501.C04. 
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Despite of – or due to – the admittedly distinct position of the Commentary on the CLIP 
Principles with regard to this issue,2202 the crucial question of whether Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable when an invalidity defence is raised in provisional 
proceedings could certainly have been answered in a clearer way than it has been 
accomplished in Article 2:501(1) and (2) of the CLIP Principles. If a differentiation between 
the two types of jurisdiction – accessory and independent jurisdiction for provisional 
measures – was actually intended, this should have been formulated explicitly not only in the 




3.3.4.2.4 The Heidelberg Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I 
 
The Heidelberg Report proposes to maintain Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation (as 
Article 31(1)) and supplement it by two new paragraphs ((2) and (3)). The amended version 
which shall be cited as “Heidelberg Proposal” reads as follows:2203 
 
 
 Article 31 of the Heidelberg Proposal 
 
 (1) Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, 
 measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Regulation, the courts of 
 another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 (2) In the case of an order for interim performance the court shall make the enforcement of the order 
 dependent on the providing of a bank guarantee (on conditions to be specified by the court) for 
 repayment or damages due whenever the applicant should be finally unsuccessful in the proceedings for 
 the substance of the matter. In order to avoid unusual hardship, however, the court may grant the 
 applicant an exception. 
 
 (3) The court vested with jurisdiction for, and seized by either party with the substance of the matter has 
 power to discharge, to modify or to adapt to its own legal system any provisional measure granted by a 
 court of another Member State. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.1 Codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Although in particular Article 31(3) of the Heidelberg Proposal implies a differentiation of 
jurisdiction for provisional measures which is accessory to the jurisdiction for the substance, 
and independent jurisdiction for provisional measures, this differentiation is merely 
formulated indirectly and therefore may not effect the degree of legal certainty which could 
be reached by way of a clear, direct formulation.  
 
                                                 
2202
 Cf.: Heinze 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 2:501, paras. 2:501.C04 and 2:501.C10.  
2203 Besides, the Heidelberg Report proposes to supplement Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation (which 
mostly corresponds to Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) in the following way (text in italics to be 
supplemented to the wording of the Brussels I Regulation): 
“(2) The Regulation shall not apply to: 
... 
(d) arbitration not including provisional measures not affected, under the law of the Member State, by an 
arbitration agreement.” 
Due to the fact that arbitration law is not subject of this thesis, this part of the Heidelberg Proposal shall not be 
treated. 
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3.3.4.2.4.2 Clarification of the requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction 
 
Like Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (and likewise Article 31 of the Brussels I 
Regulation), Article 31 of the Heidelberg Proposal does not define under which circumstances 
jurisdiction being accessory to jurisdiction for the substance of the case is existent. As a 
consequence, recourse must be had to the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.3 Definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
 
Likewise, the Heidelberg Proposal does not contain a definition of the real connecting link-
criterion set up by the ECJ in its Van Uden decision. In this respect, Article 31 of the 
Heidelberg Proposal does not result in an amendment of the situation under the Brussels I(bis) 
Regulation, meaning that uncertainties as to which are the precise circumstances when there is 
a real connecting link are not eliminated by the Heidelberg Proposal. 
 
Instead, the Heidelberg Report suggests, as a substitute for the real connecting link-criterion, 
that the court seised with the substance shall have a coordination authority “to discharge, to 
modify or to adapt to its own legal system any provisional measure granted by a court of 
another Member State”.2204 
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.4 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Furthermore, the Heidelberg Proposal contains no definition of which measures fall within the 
scope of Article 31 of the Heidelberg Proposal. 
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.5 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
 
Although the Heidelberg Report explicitly recognises as “reasonable” the requirement set up 
in Denilauler by the ECJ that “for the purpose of enforcement abroad, the respondent must 
have had a previous opportunity to comment the application for granting the provisional or 
protective order”,2205 the Heidelberg Proposal refrains from codifying this requirement and, 
consequently, misses the chance to procure an enhanced level of legal certainty.  
 
  
3.3.4.2.4.6 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings in order to mitigate the danger of irreconcilable decisions  
 
While the Heidelberg Proposal does not contain specific provisions with regard to the 
coordination of several preliminary proceedings, Article 31(3) of the Heidelberg Proposal 
rules the interaction of the court seised or to be seised for the substance of the matter with the 
court(s) issuing provisional matters. In this respect, Article 31(3) of the Heidelberg Proposal 
provides that the court having jurisdiction for the substance and already being seised, is 
empowered to discharge, to modify or to adapt to its own legal system any provisional 
measure granted by a court of another Member State.  
                                                 
2204
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 654. 
2205
 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser & Weller 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 734. 
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In this regard, the Heidelberg Report focuses on the fact that the trans-border effectiveness of 
protective measures can be viewed in two ways, which are interlinked, but are nonetheless to 
be distinguished:2206 On the one hand, the applicant's interests in avoiding the frustration of 
his rights are to be taken into account and to be balanced against the (opposing) interests of 
the defendant. The applicant's interests are respected if the invoked court grants effective 
provisional measures. This view may occasionally amount to something like a jurisdiction by 
necessity for provisional measures. On the other hand, the cooperation between the two (or 
more) judiciaries must be considered. Given the court addressed by the applicant has the 
primary task of assisting the court seised with the substance of the matter in finding a just and 
effective solution, the court of provisional measures may so “lend remedies” to the court of 
the main proceedings. The latter view implies that the court seised, or to be seised, with the 
substance of the matter, must always have power to lift or to modify the measure ordered by 
the foreign court or to substitute it by a measure available under its own laws.2207       
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.7 The Heidelberg Proposal's missing approach of refusal of recognition of 
provisional measures when irreconcilable with other judgments 
 
The Heidelberg Proposal does not mention provisional measures to be subject to Article 34(3) 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), as the ECJ held 
(with regard to Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention) in Italian Leather (which means that 
a judgment on interim relief shall not be recognised if it is irreconcilable with a judgment 
given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is 
sought). In this respect, the Heidelberg Proposal does not represent an amendment in 
comparison with the status quo under the Brussels I(bis) Regulation and therefore does not 
deliver a solution which could serve as an alternative to the approach pursued in the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation (cf. Articles 2(a) and 45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).  
 
 
3.3.4.2.4.8 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Article 31(2) of the Heidelberg Proposal provides that an order for interim performance shall 
only be enforceable in case of a bank guarantee given by the applicant, on conditions to be 
specified by the deciding court and with the possibility of an exception from this requirement 
if the court finds it an unusual hardship for the applicant, for repayment or damages due 
whenever the applicant should be finally unsuccessful in the principal proceedings.  
 
In contrast to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles which 
limit recognition and enforcement of provisional measures by differentiating between the 
different types of jurisdiction for provisional measures (accessory and independent 
jurisdiction), the Heidelberg Proposal pursues an alternative approach by setting up the 
requirement that the applicant who benefits from the provisional order must – in general – 
provide for a guarantee for the “repayment” of the amount ordered to be paid in the interim. 
The mere existence of a substantive claim for compensation is not considered a sufficient 
guarantee.2208 Given the fact that not only provisional “payment” may be ordered and that 
                                                 
2206
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 628. 
2207
 Schlosser 2008 (Heidelberg Report), paras. 631-633, with reference to Court of Appeal 12 June 2003, 
Motorola Credit Corpn v Uzan And Others (No 2), [2003] EWCA Civ 752, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 113 – Motorola 
Credit. 
2208
 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser & Weller 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 735. 
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bank guarantees are not always available for the applicant, the issuing court is given 
discretion to specify details of guarantee.2209 Under equitable considerations, it must not cover 
all the amounts later probably due under compensation concepts and the duration of the 
guarantee may be limited subject to later prolongation.2210 As it may be too hard or even 
impossible for the applicant to provide a bank guarantee, let alone a guarantee with an 
indefinite duration, Article 31(2)2 of the Heidelberg Proposal provides for the possibility of 
an exception from the general prerequisite of a bank guarantee.2211  
 
  
3.3.4.2.4.9 Creation of a clarifying provision of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is applicable where an invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings  
 
The Heidelberg Proposal does not include any clarification of whether Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation applies in the case that an invalidity defence is raised in provisional 
proceedings. The Heidelberg Proposal thus misses the chance to codify – and clarify – the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ in its Solvay case where the court only decided this question with 
regard to jurisdiction based on Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) and did not make a decision as to the question if the same goes for 
the constellation that jurisdiction for provisional measures is grounded on the jurisdiction for 
the substance of the case (accessory jurisdiction). 
 
 
3.3.4.2.5 The Commission Proposal 2010 for Reform of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
3.3.4.2.5.1 Codification of the existing two-tier system of accessory and independent 
jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
In contrast to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the proposal of the European Commission for a 
reform of the Brussels I Regulation from 2010 (hereinafter Commission Proposal 2010) 
clearly distinguishes between accessory jurisdiction and independent jurisdiction for 
provisional measures, by establishing two separate provisions, Articles 35 and 36 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010, which read as follows: 
 
 
 Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 Where the courts of a Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of a matter, those courts shall 
 have jurisdiction to issue provisional, including protective measures as may be available under the law 
 of that State. 
 
 
 Article 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 Application may be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, 
 measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if the courts of another State or an 
 arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
 
As Article 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010 allows other States than the State in which 
courts have jurisdiction as to the substance of a case to order provisional measures in 
                                                 
2209
 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser & Weller 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 736. 
2210
 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser & Weller 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 736. 
2211
 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser & Weller 2008 (Heidelberg Report), para. 736. 
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accordance with their national law,2212 the Regulation and national law “go side by side”.2213 
Noteworthily, this evaluation is not shared unanimously. For instance, Hess has evaluated the 
structure of Articles 35 and 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010 as a “hierarchisation”, 
meaning that Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 precedes Article 36 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010.2214 However, the latter understanding is not (necessarily) 
supported by the text of Articles 35 and 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010. Besides, as 
Hess himself admits, the court having jurisdiction for provisional measures pursuant to Article 
35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 is not allocated authority to discharge provisional 
measures granted by a court of another Member State,2215 as Article 20(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility (hereinafter Brussels IIbis Regulation), repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1347/2000,2216 provides correspondingly:2217 
 
 
 Article 20 Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
(1) In urgent cases, the provisions of this Regulation shall not prevent the courts of a Member State 
from taking such provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets in that State 
as may be available under the law of that Member State, even if, under this Regulation, the court of 
another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. 
 
(2) The measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall cease to apply when the court of the Member State 




While it has been put forth that a “non-substance” court may not order additional, cross-
border interim relief, for instance a “worldwide freezing injunction” to support foreign 
principal proceedings, this statement is not supported by the text of the Commission Proposal 
2010; “non-substance” courts would indeed have authority to order such a measure. A 
different question is whether such a measure could be recognised and enforced which is 
however to be considered separately, notwithstanding the jurisdiction issue.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.2 Clarification of the requirements regarding accessory jurisdiction  
 
Compared with the wording of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (which corresponds 
to Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation), the Commission Proposal 2010 delivers no further 
clarification regarding the requirements with regard to accessory jurisdiction. As a 
consequence, recourse must be had to the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
                                                 
2212 It has been underlined that, according to the Commission Proposal 2010, national rules of jurisdiction would 
solely be relevant for interim relief (Article 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010), cf.: Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 
508, at p. 521. 
2213
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 289. 
2214
 Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
2215
 Cf. Article 31(3) of the Heidelberg Proposal for such an approach with regard to a reform of Article 31 of the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
2216
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ 2003 L 338/1, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:338:0001:0029:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
2217
 Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
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The Commission Proposal 2010 leaves unclear what is the meaning of “jurisdiction as to the 
substance of a matter” (instead of the wording “proceedings as to the substance [which] are 
pending”).2218 The wording of Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 may suggest that 
jurisdiction under Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 should also be available 
before any proceedings on the merits have been initiated.2219 However, parts of legal doctrine 
have contested this view and proposed to restrict jurisdiction based on Articles 2 to 24 of the 
Brussels I Regulation (Articles 4 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) to cases where the 
court is actually seised of proceedings.2220 Furthermore, the wording of Article 35 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 does not reveal whether jurisdiction under Article 35 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 persists after an action on the merits has been brought before a 
different court. Does “jurisdiction as to the substance” according to Article 35 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 merely require that the respective court has (potential) jurisdiction 
on the merits in accordance with Sections 1 to 7 of Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation2221 
(Brussels Ibis Regulation), or is it necessary that this jurisdiction is not excluded by the lis 
pendens rule (Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation/Article 29 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation respectively Article 29 of the Commission Proposal 2010) given that the action on 
the merits is pending in a different court?2222 On the one hand, a reference to the Van Uden 
decision where the ECJ did not mention the lis pendens rule, and the thought that it would not 
seem reasonable to allow that jurisdiction based on Article 36 of the Commission Proposal 
2010 in conjunction with national law which is available even where proceedings on the 
merits have already been commenced elsewhere, is more robust than jurisdiction according to 
the rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation itself, may militate for the conception that potential 
jurisdiction on the merits suffice for jurisdiction for interim relief. On the other hand, it could 
also be put forward that the respective court must actually be seised with the action on the 
merits, because the price for the more liberal jurisdiction rule in Article 36 of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 is that provisional measures based on this provision can, under the 
Commission Proposal 2010, only be enforced in the Member State granting the measure 
(Article 2(a) and Recital 25 of the Commission Proposal 2010) which reduces the risk of 
conflicting provisional measures and allocates the sole authority to issue cross-border 
provisional relief to the court seised with the substance.2223   
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.3 Definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
 
The Commission Proposal 2010 contains no definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
developed by the ECJ in its Van Uden decision, which may be owed to the admitted difficulty 
to define this criterion,2224 and thus misses the chance to strengthen legal certainty and clarity 
by including (a solution of) this crucial issue into the text of the Regulation.   
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.4 Definition of provisional, including protective, measures 
 
Similarly to Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Recital 22 of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 outlines vaguely the term “provisional, including protective, measures”: 
  
                                                 
2218
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290. 
2219
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 607. 
2220
 Cf. in place of others Dickinson (2010)30(3) IPRax 203, at p. 208. 
2221
 Sections 1 to 8 under the Commission Proposal 2010. 
2222
 Cf. Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 608. 
2223
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 608. 
2224
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 608 et seq. 
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 Recital 22 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The notion of provisional, including protective measures should be clarified. They should include, in 
 particular, protective orders aimed at obtaining information or preserving evidence, thus covering 
 search and seizure orders as referred to in Article 6 and 7 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European 
 Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. They 
 should not include measures which are not of a protective nature, such as measures ordering the hearing 
 of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case.  
 
 
However, in contrast to Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Recital 22 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 explicitly postulates the need for a clarification of “provisional, 
including protective, measures”. Another major difference2225 between the respective recitals 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation and the Commission Proposal 2010 consists in the fact that 
Recital 22 of the Commission Proposal 2010 is not supplemented, like Recital 25 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, by a “rule” with regard to the relationship between the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation and Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation 
between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil and commercial 
matters determining that the latter Regulation remains applicable (Evidence Regulation) (cf. 
Recital 25 3rd sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). 
 
Like the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Commission Proposal 2010 does not introduce a full, 
but merely a partial definition of “provisional, including protective, measures”.2226 In any 
case, Article 2(b) of the Commission Proposal 2010 at least provides that certain evidence 
measures shall be included: 
 
 
 Article 2(b) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
  
 For the purposes of this Regulation: 
 
 (...) 
 (b) 'provisional, including protective measures' shall include protective orders aimed at obtaining 
 information and evidence. 
 
 
With regard to evidence orders, it is noteworthy that Article 2(b) of the Commission Proposal 
2010 thus covers only such measures which – at least partly – have the purpose of preserving 
evidence or information, such as search and seisure orders under Directive 2004/48/EC2227.2228 
This conception brings along several advantages: First of all, it introduces a European concept 
of evidentiary measure into the Brussels Regulation which is in line with EU legislation in 
other fields. Second, this conception shows clearly that the Evidence Regulation can no longer 
be considered as lex specialis for evidentiary measures. Last but not least, the conception 
ensures that the court where the evidence is located has jurisdiction to immediately secure that 
                                                 
2225
 Besides, there are minor formulation differences between the recitals, for instance as to the inclusion of 
protective orders aimed at obtaining information or preserving evidence (Recital 22 of the Commission Proposal 
2010: “in particular”; Recital 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: “for example”): However, these differences 
should not be considered crucial with regard to the content. 
2226
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 603; Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 291; 
Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 43. 
2227
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (revised version), OJ L195 of 2 June 2004, pp. 16-25, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R%2801%29&from=EN> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015). 
2228
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 605. 
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evidence, without the need for taking recourse to the Evidence Regulation.2229 It is remarkable 
that such a clarification concerning protective orders aimed at obtaining information and 
evidence (Article 2(b) of the Commission Proposal 2010) has been codified neither in Article 
2 nor in any other Article of the Brussels Ibis Regulation where this idea is merely mentioned 
in Recital 25 1st sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.5 Grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures as a 
prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
 
In contrast to Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which provides that decisions on 
the grant of provisional measures are recognised and enforced in another Member State only 
if the defendant was given the right to a hearing, respectively if the judgment containing the 
provisional measure is served on the defendant before enforcement is sought, the Commission 
Proposal 2010 considers it sufficient that the defendant disposes of the subsequent 
opportunity of challenging the measure according to national law. In this respect, Article 2(a) 
of the Commission Proposal 2010 provides: 
 
 




 (a) (...) For the purposes of Chapter III, the term 'judgment' includes provisional, including protective 
 measures ordered by a court which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
 the matter. It also includes measures ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear and 
 which are intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant if the defendant has the right to 
 challenge the measure subsequently under the national law of the Member State of origin. 
 
 
Where Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 at least requires that the defendant has 
the right to subsequently challenge the measure under the law of the Member State of origin, 




 Article 42(2)(b)(ii) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 (...) 
 (2) For the purposes of enforcement in another Member State of a judgment ordering a provisional, 
 including protective measure, the applicant shall provide the competent enforcement authorities with: 
 
  (...) 
(b) the certificate in the form set out in Annex I issued by the court of origin, containing a 
description of the measure and certifying 
 
   (...) 
   (ii) where the measure is ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear and is 
   intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant, that the defendant has the right 
   to challenge the measure under the law of the Member State of origin.   
 
 
                                                 
2229
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 605. 
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Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 is in line with Recital 25 4th sentence of the 
Commission Proposal 2010: 
 
 
 Recital 25 4th sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The removal of intermediate measures requires an adaptation of the free circulation of provisional, 
 including protective measures. Where such measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to the 
 substance of a dispute, their free circulation should be ensured. Where, however, such measures are 
 adopted by a court not having jurisdiction as to the substance, the effect of such measures should be 
 confined to the territory of that Member State. Furthermore, the free circulation of measures ordered ex 
 parte should be allowed if accompanied by appropriate safeguards. 
 
 
It is remarkable that the Commission Proposal 2010 thus pursues an approach which – in 
comparison with the approach pursued by the Brussels Ibis Regulation – is more in favour of 
the applicant of provisional measures. For Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
considers it sufficient that the defendant disposes of the opportunity of challenging the 
measure according to national law of the Member State of origin after enforcement has been 
accomplished, while Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation rigorously excludes 
provisional measures from cross-border recognition and enforcement where the defendant has 
not been granted the right to a hearing, unless the judgment containing the measure is served 
on the defendant prior to enforcement.2230  
  
Interestingly, the approach of the Commission Proposal 2010 is consistent with Articles 7(1) 
and 9(4) of Directive 2004/48/EC2231 according to which Member States are explicitly 
required to introduce ex parte relief: 
 
 
Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC 
 
(1) (…) Those measures (to preserve relevant evidence) shall be taken, if necessary without the other 
party having been heard, in particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the 
rightholder or where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed. 
 
Where measures to preserve evidence are adopted without the other party having been heard, the parties 
affected shall be given notice, without delay after the execution of the measures at the latest. A review, 
including a right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the parties affected with a view to 
deciding, within a reasonable period after the notification of the measures, whether the measures shall 
be modified, revoked or confirmed. 
 
 
 Article 9(4) of Directive 2004/48/EC 
 
 (…)  
(4) Member States shall ensure that the provisional measures (…) may, in appropriate cases, be taken 
without the defendant having been heard, in particular where any delay would cause irreparable harm to 
the rightholder. In that event, the parties shall be so informed without delay after the execution of the 
measures at the latest. A review, including a right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the 
defendant with a view to deciding, within a reasonable time after notification of the measures, whether 
those measures shall be modified, revoked or confirmed. 
                                                 
2230 Von Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at p. 107 et seq.; Pohl (2013)33(2) IPRax 109, at p. 114. 
2231
 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (revised version), OJ L195 of 2 June 2004, pp. 16-25, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R%2801%29&from=EN> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015). 
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Additionally, the approach pursued by the Commission Proposal 2010 is in line with the more 
flexible jurisprudence of both the ECJ and the ECHR with regard to the interpretation of the 
right to be heard in the context of provisional measures.2232 So, the ECJ held in its Eurofood 
decision on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
insolvency proceedings: 
 
“Concerning more particularly the right to be notified of procedural documents and, more generally, the 
right to be heard, (…) these rights occupy an eminent position in the organisation and conduct of a fair 
legal process. In the context of insolvency proceedings, the right of creditors or their representatives to 
participate in accordance with the equality of arms principle is of particular importance. Though the 
specific detailed rules concerning the right to be heard may vary according to the urgency for a ruling to 
be given, any restriction on the exercise of that right must be duly justified and surrounded by 
procedural guarantees ensuring that persons concerned by such proceedings actually have the 
opportunity to challenge the measures adopted in urgency [underscore added].”2233 
 
Similarly, the ECHR stated in its Micallef decision that 
 
“(…) the Court accepts that in exceptional cases – where, for example, the effectiveness of the (interim) 
measure sought depends upon a rapid decision-making process – it may not be possible immediately to 
comply with all of the requirements of Article 6. Thus, in such specific cases, while the independence 
and impartiality of the tribunal or the judge concerned is an indispensable and inalienable safeguard in 
such proceedings, other procedural safeguards may apply only to the extent compatible with the nature 
and purpose of the interim proceedings at issue (…) [underscore added].”2234  
 
Noteworthily, the Commission Proposal 2010 limits the eventual cross-border effects of an 
order of provisional measures at the level of enforcement. In this respect, Article 44(3) of the 
Commission Proposal 2010 provides: 
 
 
 Article 44(3) of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 (...) 
 (3) Where a protective measure was ordered without the defendant having been summoned to appear 
 and enforced without prior service of the defendant, the competent authority may, on application by the 
 defendant, suspend the enforcement if the defendant has challenged the measure in the Member State of 
 origin.  
 
 
Noteworthily, according to the Commission Proposal 2010, the suspension of the enforcement 
of an ex parte order of provisional measures depends on the application by the defendant, 
meaning that the grant of the right to a hearing before rendering provisional measures is not 
per se a prerequisite for the recognition and enforcement in another Member State. This idea 
– the requirement of the defendant's application for the suspension – may appear at first 
glance, in a way, similar to Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to 
which the refusal of recognition of a judgment depends on a party's application. However, a 
closer look reveals that there are considerable differences between those provisions: while 
Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation concerns the recognition level, Article 44(3) 
of the Commission Proposal 2010 comes into play at the enforcement level (due to the fact 
that the Commission Proposal 2010 is based on the abolition of the exequatur procedure, cf. 
explications below). Further, while Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation becomes 
                                                 
2232
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 615. 
2233
 ECJ 2 May 2006, C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, [2006] ECR I-03813, para. 66 – Eurofood. 
2234
 ECHR 15 October 2009, Application no. 17056/06, Micaleff v Malta, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{%22appno%22:[%2217056/06%22],%22itemid%22:[%2
2001-95031%22]}, para. 86 – Micaleff. 
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effective on the application of “any interested party”, Article 44(3) of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 explicitly requires an application of the defendant.  
 
A comparison between the Commission Proposal 2010 and the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
reveals that the Brussels Ibis Regulation pursues an approach which is more in favour of the 
defendant in provisional proceedings than the Commission Proposal 2010, by rigorously 
precluding provisional measures from cross-border recognition and enforcement where the 
defendant has not been granted the right to a hearing, unless the judgment containing the 
measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement.2235  
  
 
3.3.4.2.5.6 Creation of clear rules regarding the coordination of several, including 
preliminary, proceedings  
 
Unlike the Brussels Ibis Regulation according to which there is no “hierarchisation”2236 
between the court having jurisdiction for the substance of the case and the court having 
independent jurisdiction for provisional measures, meaning that principal proceedings and 
provisional proceedings, respectively several provisional proceedings before different courts 
may be brought without any coordination,2237 the Commission Proposal 2010 pursues a 
cooperative approach. According to Article 31 of the Commission Proposal 2010, the possible 
conflict over provisional measures when proceedings before the court of substance and a 
“non-substance” court are pending shall be solved by interaction in the form of cooperation 
between the two courts.2238 This is to ensure that all circumstances of the case are taken into 
account when a provisional measure is granted.2239 Article 31 of the Commission Proposal 
2010 reads as follows: 
 
 
 Article 31 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 If proceedings as to the substance are pending before a court of a Member State and the courts of 
 another Member State are seised with an application for provisional, including protective measures, the 
 courts concerned shall cooperate in order to ensure proper coordination between the proceedings as to 
 the substance and the provisional relief. 
 
 In particular, the court seised with an application for provisional, including protective measures shall 
 seek information from the other court on all relevant circumstances of the case, such as the urgency of 
 the measure sought or any refusal of a similar measure by the court seised as to the substance.  
 
 
While the idea of cooperation between the involved courts may seem a desirable solution 
(which would argue for a general duty of cooperation to be introduced), it has rightly been 
doubted that the Commission Proposal 2010 establishes a solution which is manageable in 
practice.2240 First of all, cooperation between courts premises that those courts know of the 
other proceeding.2241 Second, different languages can impede an effective cooperation of the 
courts.2242 In this regard, it has been proposed that a separate standard form for provisional 
                                                 
2235 Von Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at pp. 107-108; Pohl (2013)33(2) IPRax 109, at p. 114. 
2236
 Cf. Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
2237
 Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 548. 
2238
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290; Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
2239
 European Commission 2010 (Commission Proposal 2010), p. 10. 
2240
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290. 
2241
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290. 
2242
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290. 
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measures could be developed or that some further questions are added to the standard form of 
Annex I.2243 Finally, due to the need for quick interim relief, it might be impossible or at least 
impractical to establish contacts between the courts before ordering the provisional 
measure.2244  
 
While not explicitly mentioned in the text of Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010, the 
court of substance should be considered to have the power not only to issue provisional 
measures, but also to discharge such measures which does not comprise the discharge of 
measures issued by “non-substance” courts.2245 As has already been mentioned, the 
Commission Proposal 2010 does not contain a provision according to which the court being 
competent on the basis of Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010 to order provisional 
measures would have authority, comparably to the situation under the Brussels IIbis 
Regulation, to discharge provisional measures granted by a court of another Member State.2246 
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.7 The approach of the Commission Proposal 2010 of refusal of enforcement of 
provisional measures when irreconcilable with other judgments 
 
Under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the recognition of a judgment given in a Member State, in 
another Member State, occurs without any special procedure being required (Article 36(1) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation),2247 and its enforcement in another Member State (merely) 
requires that this judgment is enforceable in the Member State of origin, without any 
declaration of enforceability being required (Article 39 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation).2248  
 
One of the most important and progressive issues addressed by the Commission Proposal 
2010 is the proposed abolition of the exequatur procedure for all judgments covered by the 
scope of the Regulation (with the exception of judgments in defamation and compensatory 
collective redress cases), without any possibility of opposing the recognition of a judgment 
given in a Member State.2249 In this respect, Article 38 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
provides: 
                                                 
2243
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290, proposing, for instance: urgent: yes/no; very 
urgent: yes/no etc. (cf. there fn. 205).  
2244
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290. 
2245
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290; Dickinson (2010)30(3) IPRax 203, at p. 208; 
differently: Article 31(3) of the Heidelberg Proposal. 
2246
 Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
2247 This corresponds to the legal situation under the Brussels I Regulation, cf. Article 33(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation: “A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any 
special procedure being required.” 
2248 This legal status quo under the Brussels Ibis Regulation as to enforcement considerably differs from the 
previous legal situation under the Brussels I Regulation according to which enforcement of a judgment given in a 
Member State, in another Member State, required not only enforceability in the Member State of origin, but also 
a declaration of enforceability on the application of any interested party. Article 38(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation reads: “A judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in 
another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.”  
2249
 As a compensation for the abolition of the exequatur procedure, the Commission Proposal 2010 provides for 
certain remedies in favour of the defendant by which he could prevent in exceptional circumstances that a 
judgment given in one Member State takes effect in another Member State: The defendant would be able to 
contest the judgment in the Member State of origin if he was not properly informed about the proceedings in that 
State (Article 45 of the Commission Proposal 2010). Furthermore, the defendant would dispose of an 
extraordinary remedy in the Member State of enforcement which would enable the defendant to contest any 
other procedural defects which might have arisen during the proceedings before the court of origin and which 
may have infringed his right to a fair trial (Article 46 of the Commission Proposal 2010). Additionally, the 
defendant would be enabled to stop the enforcement of the judgment if it is irreconcilable with another judgment 
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 Article 38 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, a judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in 
 the other Member States without any special procedure being required and without any possibility of 
 opposing its recognition. 
 
 (2) A judgment given in one Member State which is enforceable in that State shall be enforceable in 
 another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability. 
 
 
As has been mentioned above, Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 determines that 
“for the purposes of Chapter III” of the Commission Proposal 2010 which deals with 
recognition, enforceability and enforcement, provisional measures are to be considered 
judgments if they are issued by a Member State court which has jurisdiction for the substance 
of a matter according to the Brussels Regulation:  
 
 




 (a) (...)  
 
 For the purposes of Chapter III, the term 'judgment' includes provisional, including protective 
 measures ordered by a court which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
 the matter. (...) 
 
 
It is remarkable that Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010, in this respect, 
corresponds to Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which reads: 
 
 




 (a) (...) 
 
 For the purposes of Chapter III, ‘judgment’ includes provisional, including protective, measures ordered 
 by a court or tribunal which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the 
 matter. (...)  
 
 
On the basis of the approach of the Commission Proposal 2010 to abolish the exequatur 
procedure, the aspect of a refusal of recognition of an order of provisional measures has 
become obsolete, because then there would be no possibility at all of opposing the recognition 
of the order of provisional measures of the court in another Member State.  
 
However, at the enforcement level, Article 43 of the Commission Proposal 2010 provides that 
the defendant can stop the enforcement of the judgment if it is irreconcilable with another 
judgment which has been issued in the Member State of enforcement or, in certain conditions, 
in another State: 
                                                                                                                                                        
which has been issued in the Member State of enforcement or, in certain conditions, in another country (Article 
43 of the Commission Proposal 2010); cf.: European Commission 2010 (Commission Proposal 2010), p. 6; Von 
Hein (2013)59(3) RIW 97, at p. 108 et seq.; Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 35.   
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 Article 43 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The competent authority in the Member State of enforcement shall, on application by the defendant, 
 refuse, either wholly or in part, the enforcement of the judgment if 
 
  (a) it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the 
  Member State of enforcement; 
 
(b) it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third 
State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties provided that the earlier 




The grounds for refusal of enforcement mentioned in Article 43 of the Commission Proposal 
2010 correspond to the grounds for refusal of recognition pursuant to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively the grounds for non-recognition according to 
Article 34(3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation2250). However, it is to be noticed that non-
enforcement according to Article 43 of the Commission Proposal 2010 depends on the 
defendant's application, while refusal of recognition according to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation is dependent on the application of any interested party.2251  
 
Noteworthily, the Commission Proposal 2010 does not deliver an answer to the question how 
to solve a possible conflict in the constellation where a court which lacks jurisdiction on the 
substance has already issued a provisional measure when a provisional measure of the court 
of substance which is irreconcilable with the first measure shall be enforced in the State of the 
first court.2252 Should the defendant, on the basis of Article 43(a) of the Commission Proposal 
2010, be entitled to apply for refusal of the enforcement of the provisional measure rendered 
by the court of substance? As the court of substance will, in comparison with the “non-
substance” court, likely be in a better position to assess the required kind and necessity of 
provisional measures, one may argue that it would be preferable to concede priority to 
provisional measures ordered by the court of substance given they satisfy the requirements for 
recognition and enforcement.2253 In comparison with the Commission Proposal 2010, the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation provides for extended possibilities for a refusal of enforcement 
(besides the possibility of refusal of recognition) of a judgment rendered in another Member 
State. It may happen that recognition and enforcement of a provisional measure of the court 
having jurisdiction for the substance of a case is denied in another Member State where courts 
(merely) have independent jurisdiction for provisional measures (in conjunction with national 
law), due to the fact that the decision is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment on the grant of 




                                                 
2250
 Cf. Weller (2012)9(1) GPR 34, at p. 35. 
2251
 In contrast to both the Commission Proposal 2010 and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, non-recognition 
pursuant to Article 34(3) and (4) of the Brussels I Regulation occurred ex officio). 
2252
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290; the authors rightly suggest that Article 31 of 
the Commission Proposal 2010 which deals with the duty of cooperation may be useful but presumably remains 
ineffective. 
2253
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290 et seq. 
2254
 Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 548, with reference to the Italian Leather decision of the ECJ (cf. ECJ 6 
June 2002, C-80/00, Italian Leather SpA v WECO Polstermöbel GmbH & Co., [2002] ECR I-04995 – Italian 
Leather). 
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3.3.4.2.5.8 Recognition and enforcement of provisional measures ordered according to 
rules of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures 
 
Almost identically with the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Commission Proposal 2010 provides 
that provisional measures can, according to the rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, only be 
recognised and enforced in other Member States if they were ordered by a court having 
jurisdiction as to the substance of the case according to the Brussels Regulation. If the court 
which ordered the provisional measure had no jurisdiction on the substance of the matter 
pursuant to the Brussels Regulation, recognition and enforcement in another Member State 
shall be excluded, meaning that measures issued by “non-substance” courts remain valid only 
in the territory of the forum State, and cannot be enforced outside.2255 Comparably to Article 
2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 stipulates 
in this regard: 
 
 




 (a) (...) For the purposes of Chapter III, the term 'judgment' includes provisional, including protective 
 measures ordered by a court which by virtue of this Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of 
 the matter. (...). 
 
 
Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010 is consistent with Recital 25 2nd and 3rd 
sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010: 
 
 
 Recital 25 2nd and 3rd sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The removal of intermediate measures requires an adaptation of the free circulation of provisional, 
 including protective measures. Where such measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to the 
 substance of a dispute, their free circulation should be ensured. Where, however, such measures are 
 adopted by a court not having jurisdiction as to the substance, the effect of such measures should be 
 confined to the territory of that Member State. Furthermore, the free circulation of measures ordered ex 
 parte should be allowed if accompanied by appropriate safeguards. 
 
 
Remarkably, Recital 25 2nd and 3rd sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010 is very similar 
to Recital 33 1st and 4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: 
 
 
 Recital 33 1st and 4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 Where provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to the 
 substance of the matter, their free circulation should be ensured under this Regulation. (...) Where 
 provisional, including protective, measures are ordered by a court of a Member State not having 
 jurisdiction as to  the substance of the matter, the effect of such measures should be confined, under this 
 Regulation, to the territory of that Member State. 
 
 
                                                 
2255
 Magnus & Mankowski (2011)110 ZVglRWiss 252, at p. 290; differently, since apparently even denying 
jurisdiction of these courts to order a measure of cross-border interim relief such as a “worldwide freezing 
injunction” in order to support a foreign proceeding on the substance: Hess (2011)31(2) IPRax 125, at p. 130. 
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Comparably to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, this approach pursued in the Commission 
Proposal 2010 may be interpreted as being based on an understanding of the “real connecting 
link” as referring to the place of (prospective) enforcement, while avoiding a definition by 
simply denying enforcement under Chapter III.2256 Alternatively, one might conclude that the 
Commission Proposal 2010 does not start at the question of admissibility of the provisional 
measure but consequently chooses an approach focused on its enforcement notwithstanding if 
there was a “real connecting link” justifying the order of the concerned measure.2257 In any 
event, the exclusion of cross-border enforcement of provisional measures based on Article 36 
of the Commission Proposal 2010 (independent jurisdiction for provisional measures) shifts 
the real connecting link to the enforcement level, which makes it less important to define this 
requirement at the level of jurisdiction.2258 This approach brings along both disadvantages and 
advantages.  
 
On the one hand, it has been underlined that this approach may encourage a transfer of assets 
outside the forum State once provisional relief is applied for on the basis of Article 36 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010, because the eventual measure will not reach beyond the borders 
of this State.2259 With regard to the Brussels I Regulation, it has also been put forth in this 
respect that, in case that provisional measures based on independent jurisdiction were 
excluded from cross-border enforcement according to the rules of the Brussels I Regulation, 
the effectiveness of the regime of the Brussels I Regulation would be impeded in general by 
encouraging evasive action and a multiplicity of legal proceedings, which would go along 
with an increase of costs and a reduction of the prospect of a final judgment being 
successfully enforced.2260 Second, it has been put forward that the Commission Proposal 2010 
effects that a court not having jurisdiction over the substance of the case could no longer 
(effectively) “lend its remedies” to another court,2261 because the measure based on Article 36 
of the Commission Proposal 2010 would not enjoy recognition and enforcement under 
Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation. As a consequence, the applicant would either have to 
seek cross-border provisional relief from the courts having jurisdiction as to the substance of 
the case (Article 35 of the Commission Proposal 2010), or, alternatively, would have to apply 
for local relief in every jurisdiction where enforcement was necessary (Article 36 of the 
Commission Proposal 2010).2262   
 
However, despite these flaws linked with the solution established by the Commission 
Proposal 2010, there are, on the other hand, several arguments which militate in favour of the 
latter approach. First of all, it is consistent with other European instruments, notably the 
Brussels IIbis Regulation and the Community Regulations on unitary IP rights2263 which 
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 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 611. 
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 Cf. Domej (2014)78 RabelsZ 508, at p. 543. 
2258
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 613. 
2259
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 611 et seq. 
2260
 Dickinson (2010)30(3) IPRax 203, at p. 212. 
2261
 Under the Brussels I Regulation, given the existence of a real connecting link, the court which lent its 
remedies could issue provisional measures on the basis of Article 31 of the Brussels I Regulation. This practice 
could be useful if a jurisdiction had developed specific forms of provisional relief which the court having 
jurisdiction for the substance of the case did not possess. Such measures could then be enforced in other Member 
States under Chapter III of the Brussels I Regulation. (cf. Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 612 with further 
references). 
2262
 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 612. 
2263
 Cf. Article 103(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community 
trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015); Article 90(3) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, 
OJ L3 of 5 January 2002, pp. 1-24, available at WWW <http://eur-
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contain the same rule. Second, as to the addressed risk of a transfer of assets, this risk may be 
countered by the fact that ex parte measures can be granted in the enforcement State, and 
parallel provisional measures can be taken by the court which has jurisdiction for the 
substance of the case, these measures enjoying cross-border enforcement pursuant to Article 
2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010.2264 Besides, it has been pointed out that cross-border 
enforcement necessarily leads to a separation of the remedy from its enforcement context; as a 
consequence, specific effects of the measure may be impeded.2265 Moreover, the ECJ has 
taken the position, in its Purrucker decision on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (Brussels IIbis Regulation) that 
 
“(…) to accept the recognition and enforcement of measures within the scope of Article 20 of 
Regulation No 2201/2003 in all other Member States, including the State which has substantive 
jurisdiction, would, in addition, create a risk of circumvention of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by 
that regulation and of forum shopping, which would be contrary to the objectives pursued by that 
regulation (…) [underscore added].”2266 
 
The risk of forum shopping and circumvention of rules of jurisdiction is even more relevant in 
a system where exequatur proceedings are abolished, meaning that several courts may issue 
cross-border measures which circulate freely in all Member States which increases the risk of 
contradictory orders at the enforcement stage.2267 This issue is suggested in Recital 25 1st 
sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010: 
 
 
 Recital 25 1st sentence of the Commission Proposal 2010 
 
 The removal of intermediate measures requires an adaptation of the free circulation of provisional, 
 including protective measures. Where such measures are ordered by a court having jurisdiction as to the 
 substance of a dispute, their free circulation should be ensured. Where, however, such measures are 
 adopted by a court not having jurisdiction as to the substance, the effect of such measures should be 
 confined to the territory of that Member State. Furthermore, the free circulation of measures ordered ex 
 parte should be allowed if accompanied by appropriate safeguards. 
 
 
After all, Article 2(a) of the Commission Proposal 2010, like Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, seems not to prohibit provisional measures, ordered on the basis of independent 
jurisdiction for interim relief, from having extraterritorial effect as long as these measures can 
be enforced domestically, for instance due to the fact that the defendant is present in this 
jurisdiction,2268 although it is to be noticed that Recital 25 of the Commission Proposal 2010 
contains no comparably clear statement as Recital 33 4th sentence of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation according to which the effect of provisional measures ordered by courts on the 
basis of independent jurisdiction for interim relief is confined, under this Regulation, to the 
territory of the forum Member State. In any event, the exclusion of provisional measures 
                                                                                                                                                        
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:003:0001:0024:en:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015), amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006, OJ L386 of 29 December 
2006, pp. 14-16, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1891&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
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 Heinze (2011)75 RabelsZ 581, at p. 612. 
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 ECJ 15 July 2010, C-256/09, Bianca Purrucker v Guillermo Vallés Pérez, [2010] ECR I-07353, para. 91 – 
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based on Article 36 of the Commission Proposal 2010 from cross-border enforcement under 
the rules of the Brussels Regulation seems not to pre-empt the recognition and enforcement 
under more favourable national rules at least as long as recognition and enforcement is not 
fully harmonised by European rules which might be concluded from an analogy from 
Purrucker2269 where the ECJ held:  
 
“The fact that measures falling within the scope of Article 20 of Regulation No 2201/2003 do not 
qualify for the system of recognition and enforcement provided for under that regulation does not, 
however, prevent all recognition or all enforcement of those measures in another Member State (…). 
Other international instruments or other national legislation may be used, in a way that is compatible 
with the regulation [underscore added].”2270 
 
 
3.3.4.2.5.9 Creation of a clarifying provision of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is applicable where an invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings  
 
The Commission Proposal 2010 contains no provision, neither in the context of provisions on 
exclusive jurisdiction nor in the context of provisions of interim relief, that could be referred 
to in order to clarify whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies where an 
invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings. Consequently, recourse must be had to 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, in particular the court's decision in the Solvay case, which did 
not mean any amelioration vis-à-vis the situation under the Brussels I Regulation.   
  
 
3.3.4.3 Final comment and formulation proposal 
 
Compared with Articles 7(2), 8(1) and 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation has already established considerable amendments in comparison 
with the legal situation under the Brussels Convention respectively the Brussels I Regulation, 
by codifying crucial jurisprudence of the ECJ in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As to 
remaining problematic issues, the same as has been stated above in the framework of the 
aforementioned Articles also applies in this context: Any reform proposal must pass the 
“stress test” of whether it delivers adequate solutions for problems existing under present law. 
 
In comparison with the mentioned and analysed reform proposals, the elaborate solutions 
proposed by the CLIP Principles principally seem appropriate to adequately regulate the 
subject of interim relief. In particular, the broad formulation of the CLIP Principles effects 
that this proposal may combine a lot of opinions and thus raises the chances of acceptance and 
realisation. Although, as has been concluded in the foregoing chapter, the criterion of 
enforceability of a provisional measure should be considered the primary, i.e. the essential 
criterion when it comes to the question of whether a court having no jurisdiction as to the 
substance of a matter may order a provisional measure, the approach of the CLIP Principles to 
refer, on the one hand, to enforceability and, on the other hand, to the place of protection 
seems convincing in practical respect, because those criteria do not exclude each other, and 
the number of courts having jurisdiction to order provisional measures is merely enlarged. 
Another advantage of the CLIP Proposal is the adequate definition of provisional measures.  
 
An amendment of the set of rules concerning interim relief in the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
should therefore pick up the solutions contained in the CLIP Proposal. Article 2(a) of the 
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Brussels Ibis Regulation which includes rules similar to Article 4:301(1) and (2) of the CLIP 
Principles should be maintained. While, as to the protection of the defendant's right to a 
hearing, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (“(...) unless the judgment containing the 
measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement”) at first glance seems to be more 
liberal (i.e. more in favour of the applicant) than Article 4:301(2) of the CLIP Principles (“(...) 
shall not be enforced.”), it is to be considered that recognition and enforcement according to 
Article 4:301(2) of the CLIP Principles, since this provision aims at providing adequate (and 
not overly) protection of the rights of the defendant, is not excluded if the provisional measure 
concerned is confirmed after the defendant has been served with the judgment and given the 
opportunity to appear and seek its discharge in due time.2271 As both provisions are thus 
comparable, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which has already entered into force 
should be maintained.  
 
Similarly, since Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should generally lead 
to similar results as reached according to Article 4:501(3) and (4) of the CLIP Principles (with 
the difference that non-recognition and non-enforcement according to Article 4:501 of the 
CLIP Principles applies ex officio, while pursuant to Article 45(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation that consequence depends on the application of any interested party), it seems 
reasonable to adhere to Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which has already entered 
into force.   
 
To conclude, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be reformulated according to 
Article 2:501 of the CLIP Principles as follows: 
 
 
 Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
 Article 35 
 
 (1) A court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a matter also has jurisdiction to order any 
 provisional, including protective, measures.  
  
 (2) Provisional, including protective, measures may also be ordered by the courts of a Member State 
 
  (a) where the measure is to be enforced, or 
 
  (b) for which protection is sought. 
 
 (3) Provisional, including protective, measures are measures which are intended to preserve a factual or 
 legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court 
 having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. Such measures may include 
 
  (a) orders to prevent an (imminent or continuing) infringement of an intellectual property right 
  from occurring; 
 
  (b) orders to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement; 
 
  (c) orders to seise goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right; 
 
  (d) orders to seise, attach or prevent the dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction of assets to 
  safeguard enforcement of the judgment on the merits; and 
 
                                                 
2271
 De Miguel Asensio 2010, pp. 270, 271; De Miguel Asensio 2013 (CLIP Principles), Article 4:301, para. 
4:301.C11. 
 491 
  (e) orders directing a party to provide information about the location of assets which are 
  subject of an order under lit. (d).   
 
 
Article 2(a) and Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should apply. With 
regard to Articles 2:705 and 2:704 of the CLIP Principles which have been discussed above, 
equally clear provisions should be integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, but, since they 
concern the coordination of proceedings in general, should be part of a separate section of 
Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As has already been proposed above in the 
framework of exclusive jurisdiction, a clear solution would be to integrate the content of the 
complete Section 7 of the CLIP Principles in Chapter 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which 
would also ensure the internal balance of these provisions.  
 
As to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, the content of the discussed 
provisions of the CLIP Proposal should be adopted.2272 As to Article 4:301(1) and (2) of the 
CLIP Principles, it is to be stated that in light of the paramount importance of ensuring 
adequate protection to the rights of the defendant, such a restrictive approach as pursued in 
Article 4:301(1) and (2) of the CLIP Principles seems in particular justified in view of a 
scheme intended to be applicable to decisions rendered by States all over the world.2273 Thus, 
the CLIP Principles could in this point serve as an orientation for an eventual Global 
Judgments Convention, while it does not prevent the establishment of a more liberal 
approach, as drafted above, between States belonging to a regional integration organization or 
agreeing on a convention.2274 Despite the so-called favor recognitionis principle according to 
which the most favourable regime applies (cf. Article 4:103 of the CLIP Principles) and the 
fact that Article 50(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that courts shall have the authority to 
adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate, Member States are not 
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4. The creation of a European patent with unitary effect and a Unified Patent Court as 





Having treated, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, international jurisdiction in patent infringement 
proceedings with regard to national patents and European patents, i.e. bundles of national 
patents, I shall turn in this chapter to the issue of international jurisdiction with regard to 
proceedings concerning the infringement of what has initially been named a Community 
Patent or EU Patent and which is today denominated a “European patent with unitary effect”. 
Afterwards, the so-called Unified Patent Court shall be discussed. 
 
Aiming at the creation of a uniform patent regime within the European Union, one of the 
biggest single markets worldwide, the European Parliament and the European Council agreed 
on the so-called “patent package” consisting of three components: a Regulation creating a 
European patent with unitary effect (hereinafter Regulation 1257/2012)2276, a Regulation 
establishing a language regime applicable to the European patent with unitary effect 
(hereinafter Regulation 1260/2012)2277 and an international agreement among Member States 
establishing a single and specialised patent judiciary, named “Unified Patent Court” 
(hereinafter UPC Agreement)2278, which sits outside of the EU institutional framework. 
However, the question remains whether every player on the playing field of patent law in 
Europe will benefit from the new system.  
 
Although the creation of such substantive and procedural instruments are closely linked with 
each other in practice – the future development of a European patent with unitary effect 
depends upon agreeing on a corresponding system for patent litigation that is both compatible 
with EU law and meets the needs of practitioners2279 – I shall discuss both elements separately 
in order to be able to analyse their particularities in more detail. Before that, I shall give a 
brief overview of what has been achieved over the past decades with regard to the creation of 
a sort of uniform patent within Europe. It is noteworthy that attempts to establish such a 
uniform patent have been linked with the idea of creating a single European patent court in 
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4.2 The long march towards a uniform patent in Europe and an adequate litigation 
system 
 
The creation of a sort of uniform patent granting protection in the territories of all EU 
Member States, to be supplemented by a special court dealing with proceedings with regard to 
such a patent, is no idea that has been developed recently. On the contrary, efforts to install 
such an instrument, since the fragmentation of patent protection is costly and considered 
detrimental to the achievement of economic growth through innovation,2280 have been – 
without success – undertaken since the 1960s.2281 In order to embed the most recent 
developments as to this subject into their historical framework, and thus to make 
comprehensible their significance, I shall start my considerations with a summary of what has 
been undertaken and realised so far. Noteworthily, developments in this area, since their 
hesitant beginnings, have enormously accelerated.    
  
In 1975, the plans for a uniform patent for the European Communities were negotiated, but 
finally failed in the phase of ratification by the national parliaments. Another convention on a 
Community patent signed by twelve States of the European Communities in 1989 was merely 
ratified by seven amongst them, thus missing the sufficient number of ratifications to put the 
Convention into effect. One decade later, the European Commission developed a proposal to 
create a Community Patent, by a Regulation, which, remarkably, should not replace national 
patents but rather serve as an additional option for applicants to choose. However, the 
proposal was not successful as no agreement could be found on the language issue, i.e. the 
question in which languages a patent application must be translated.  
 
In procedural respect, a first approach to establish a single European patent court was the 
European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA), under discussion since 1999. This proposal 
was supported by a group of patent judges from different European national jurisdictions, and 
many of its mechanisms have been adopted in later proposals. Nonetheless, the EPLA would 
apply only to European patents as a protocol to the European Patent Convention, thus being 
entirely separate from the Single Community Patent. In January 2007, the legal division of the 
European Parliament gave its opinion that the EPLA would be unlawful as a matter of 
European Community law as it would violate the EU’s exclusive jurisdiction governing such 
matters. 
 
As to the creation of a Community Patent, particularly the lack of an agreement on the 
translation regime was the reason for the failure of a further approach of the Member States in 
2003. Resolutely, the Commission launched a Communication from 3 April 20072282 that 
contained three options in order to create an integrated system for patent litigation within the 
European Union. On 4 December 2009, the Member States unanimously adopted the Council 
conclusions on an “Enhanced patent system for Europe” and a general approach on a draft 
regulation on the EU patent including its main features.2283 Nonetheless, agreement on the 
translation regime again could not be achieved, and the Member States merely affirmed the 
need for a separate regulation as to this matter.  
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On 2 July 2010, the Commission submitted a proposal, dated from 30 June 2010, on the 
translation arrangements for the European Union patent to the Council.2284 As still no 
unanimous agreement on the translation arrangements could be realised – Italy and Spain 
were not prepared to agree to these translation arrangements – initially twelve Member States 
expressed their wish to establish an enhanced cooperation in the area of creation of unitary 
patent protection. “Enhanced cooperation”, established by the Lisbon Treaty which entered 
into force on 1 December 2009, means a legislative procedure available to a minimum of nine 
Member States under the Treaty of European Union (TEU) according to which EU-wide 
systems can be established in certain areas falling outside the exclusive competences of the 
EU, in the case that unanimous agreement between all Member States cannot be reached. The 
agreements made in this way only bind the involved states, other Member States being 
allowed to join at any stage before or after an enhanced cooperation has been launched.2285 
Thirteen of the remaining fifteen Member States – except Spain and Italy – followed this 
example. The European Parliament agreed on this approach on 15 February 2011.2286  
 
On 8 March 2011, the ECJ, acting due to a request of the Council from June 2009, delivered 
its Opinion 1/09 on the compatibility of the draft agreement for setting up a patent court with 
exclusive jurisdiction for both European patents and future EU patents with unitary effect 
(hereinafter Patent Court), concluding that the envisaged system was not compatible with the 
provisions of European Union law.2287 The court held inter alia that the establishment of a 
unified patent litigation system as planned in this draft agreement would be in breach of the 
rules of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). To put it in a nutshell, the ECJ founded its reasoning mainly on 
three arguments.2288 First, the ECJ pointed out that the Patent Court would exist outside the 
institutional and judicial framework of the European Union, because it would not be part of 
the judicial system provided for in Article 19(1) TEU, but would rather have the legal nature 
of an organisation with a distinct personality under international law. Second, the ECJ 
underlined that, according to Article 15 of the draft agreement, the Patent Court would be 
vested with exclusive jurisdiction in respect of a significant number of actions brought by 
individuals in the field of patents. As a consequence, the courts of the contracting States, 
including the courts of the Member States of the European Union, would lose these 
competences and only retain those powers which are not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Patent Court. Besides, the ECJ stressed that, in accordance with Article 14a of the draft 
agreement, the Patent Court would have the duty to interpret and apply European Union law, 
as the draft agreement confers on that court the main part of the jurisdiction ratione materiae 
held, normally, by the national courts. As a consequence, the Patent Court would have 
jurisdiction to determine a pending dispute in the light of fundamental rights and general 
principles of European Union law, or even to examine the validity of an act of the European 
Union. In this respect, the ECJ held that the Member States are not entitled to confer the 
jurisdiction to resolve such disputes on a court created by an international agreement, because 
otherwise they could not fulfil their task to implement European Union law and the obligation 
to refer questions for a preliminary ruling in the field concerned. According to the draft 
agreement the power to refer questions for a preliminary ruling is reserved to the Patent 
Court, meaning national courts are deprived of this competence. The ECJ decided that Article 
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267 TFEU, aiming to ensure that law has the same effect in all Member States, requires a 
direct cooperation between the national courts of the Member States and the ECJ. Based on 
the foregoing, the establishment of the Patent Court would be in breach of the rules of the EU 
Treaty and the FEU Treaty also for this reason. The ECJ explicitly underlined that the 
situation of the Patent Court envisaged by the draft agreement would differ from that of the 
Benelux Court of Justice which was the subject of the Parfums Christian Dior case,2289 
because that court is a court common to a number of Member States, situated within the 
judicial system of the European Union, its decisions being subject to mechanisms capable of 
ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the European Union. Additionally, the ECJ 
stressed that the creation of the Patent Court as planned in the draft agreement, would not 
guarantee (or even prevent) an effective protection of rights of individuals, because it would 
be in contrast to the (effective realisation of the) principle that a Member State is obliged to 
make good damages caused to individuals as a result of breaches of European Union law for 
which it is responsible, and to the objective of the provisions of Articles 258 TFEU to 260 
TFEU, providing the opportunity of bringing a case before the Court to obtain a declaration 
that the Member State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations. If a decision of the Patent 
Court were to be in breach of European Union law, that decision could not be the subject of 
infringement proceedings nor could it give rise to any financial liability on the part of one or 
more Member States.  
 
Despite this Opinion of the ECJ – or eventually just meant as a clear reaction to it – the 
Council authorised the launch of enhanced cooperation with the participation of 25 Member 
States two days later, on 10 March 2011.2290  
 
On 13 April 2011, the Commission presented proposals on how to implement such 
cooperation.2291 On 27 June 2011, the Council agreed a general approach on the Commissions 
proposals: two draft regulations concerning European patents with unitary effect and 
translation arrangements.2292 Subsequently, a provisional agreement on both draft regulations 
was reached by the Council and the Parliament in December 2011. 
 
Already in June 2011, Spain and Italy had made an application to the ECJ to have the decision 
of the Council from 10 March 2011 annulled.2293 The actions were founded on several 
grounds. It was put forth that the decision involved misuse of powers because the pursued 
enhanced cooperation was claimed not to further the objectives of the EU, but rather to 
exclude Member States from negotiations when the objectives could be attained by means of 
a special agreement as provided for in the EPC. Additionally, it was claimed that the 
procedure violates the jurisdictional system of the EU for the reason that it does not provide 
any dispute resolution system. Furthermore, it was criticised that the undertaken approach of 
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enhanced cooperation was contrary to the EU treaties, because the procedure is not a last 
resort, involves areas that should be excluded (for the reason that these areas fall within the 
exclusive competence of the EU), infringes the principle of non-discrimination and 
undermines the internal market.    
 
Nonetheless, on 28 June 2012, the heads of state or government of 25 Member States 
participating by way of enhanced cooperation agreed on the seat of the central division of the 
court of first instance of the unified patent court.2294  
 
The Council approved the agreement together with certain amendments on 10 December 
2012.2295 On 11 December 2012, Advocate General Bot issued his opinion in which he 
proposed to dismiss the cases initiated by Spain and Italy.2296 Remarkably, also on 11 
December 2012, the European Parliament confirmed the institutional agreement.2297 The two 
Regulations were signed on 17 December 20122298 and published on 31 December 2012. They 
entered into force on 20 January 2013,2299 but they shall only apply from 1 January 2014 or 
the date of entry into force of the UPC Agreement, whichever is the later.2300 As the UPC 
Agreement has not entered into force yet, both Regulations are still not applicable. 
 
On 19 February 2013, the UPC Agreement was signed by 24 EU Member States (Bulgaria 
followed on 5 March 2013), except Poland and Spain,2301 but including Italy.2302 According to 
Article 89(1) of the UPC Agreement, it will enter into force on 1 January 2014 or on the first 
day of the fourth month after it is ratified by 13 Member States, including France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom, or on the first day of the fourth month after the date of entry into 
force of the amendments to Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (Brussels Ibis Regulation) 
concerning its relationship with the UPC Agreement, whichever is the latest. As these 
conditions have not been fulfilled yet, the UPC Agreement still has not entered into force. 
         
Noteworthily, the ECJ, on 16 April 2013, dismissed the actions brought by Spain and Italy, 
denying all grounds put forth by the plaintiffs.2303 
 
On 22 March 2013, Spain brought two further actions2304 which, in essence, sought to 
demonstrate the unlawfulness of Regulation 1215/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012. However, 
the ECJ dismissed both actions on 5 May 2015.2305 
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Already on 6 May 2014, Regulation 542/2014 was adopted. By this Regulation which has 
been developed from a proposal of the European Commission launched on 26 July 2013, the 
European legislator intended to adapt the Brussels Ibis Regulation and ensure its coordination 
with the UPC Agreement.2306  
 
 
4.3 European patent with unitary effect 
 
 
4.3.1 Which are the basic features of such a patent? 
 
The so-called European patent with unitary effect as it is named within Regulation 1257/2012 
and Regulation 1260/2012, is being developed as a third option beside national patents and 
classical European patents as illustrated above. Notably, it will be impossible to have the 
same patent granted as a unitary patent and a “classical” European patent.2307 The question of 
whether simultaneous protection via a unitary patent and a national patent is possible will 
have to be clarified in national provisions.2308   
 
The procedure including the grant of the patent will be the same as for “classical” European 
patents. In structural respect, the only, but decisive difference between a classical European 
patent and a European patent with unitary effect (hereinafter unitary patent) is the fact that the 
unitary patent will ensure uniform protection for an invention in the territory of the 26 EU 
Member States that have created the unitary patent by way of enhanced cooperation,2309 as an 
agreement between all Member States could not be found.2310 Noteworthily, the protection 
conferred by a classical European patent as a bundle of national patents – even if national 
patents for each Member State have been obtained – is not coextensive with the protection by 
a European patent with unitary effect. For, due to the unitary character of the territory of 
protection with regard to the unitary patent, acts committed by the same infringer in the EU, 
even if these acts are distributed over the territory of several Member States, can be 
aggregated for the infringement analysis.2311 Moreover, also regarding contributory 
infringement, the same activity can be found indirectly infringing or not depending on the 
unitary or fragmented character of the European patent enforced.2312 
 
According to Article 9(1)(g) of Regulation 1257/2012, a request for unitary effect by a 
proprietor of a European patent is to be submitted no later than one month after the mention of 
the grant is published in the European Patent Bulletin, i.e. the periodical publication provided 
                                                                                                                                                        
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CN0147&qid=1435729039478&from=EN > (lastly accessed on 1 
June 2015). 
2305
 ECJ 5 May 2015, C-146/13, Kingdom of Spain v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0146&rid=6> 
(lastly accessed on 1 June 2015); ECJ 5 May 2015, C-147/13, Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European 
Union, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62013CJ0147&rid=6> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
2306
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 871. 
2307
 Article 4(2) of Regulation 1257/2012. 
2308
 Luginbühl (2013)62(4) GRUR Int. 305, at p. 307. 
2309
 On 30 September 2015, Italy has joined the unitary patent and has become the 26th Member State of the 
enhanced cooperation on unitary patent protection. 
2310
 It is to be noted that Member States which do not participate in enhanced cooperation now can join later 
according to Article 20(1) TEU. This currently concerns Spain and Croatia, while Italy has in the meanwhile 
become a member of the enhanced cooperation on unitary patent protection, cf. fn. 2309.  
2311
 Romandini & Klicznik (2013)44(5) IIC 524, at pp. 534-535. 
2312
 Romandini & Klicznik (2013)44(5) IIC 524, at p. 536. 
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for in Article 129 of the EPC (cf. Article 2(f) of Regulation 1257/2012). Such a request must 
be submitted together with a full translation of the patent specification into English, if the 
EPO prosecution was undertaken in German or French. If the patent specification was in 
English, it must be translated into any other official language of an EU Member State. Despite 
being exclusively meant for information purposes, these translations shall be published by the 
EPO.   
 
Pursuant to Article 4(1) of Regulation 1257/2012, the unitary patent will be effective in all 
participating Member States on the date of publication by the EPO of the mention of the grant 
of the European patent in that European Patent Bulletin, meaning that the patent will thus take 
effect retroactively from the mention of the grant.  
 
 
4.3.2 Evaluation of the unitary patent 
 
Multiple arguments may be put forth for and against the creation of the European patent with 
unitary effect. In the following paragraphs, I shall consider some major lines of argumentation 
under discussion, together with a personal evaluation of this subject.    
 
 
4.3.2.1 Unification of patent protection in the European Union? 
 
First of all, it may be underlined that the European patent with unitary effect will finally 
establish uniform patent protection providing an equal standard of protection within the 
European Union, i.e. within the territory of the participating Member States. So, Article 3(2) 
of Regulation 1257/2012 provides:   
 
 
 Article 3(2) of Regulation 1257/2012 
 
A European patent with unitary effect shall have a unitary character. It shall provide uniform protection 
and shall have equal effect in all the participating Member States. 
 
 
At a political level, one may clearly appreciate the creation of a European patent with unitary 
effect as a means to strengthen the European Union and its idea of common rules and the 
creation of a common economic and social entity by ensuring uniform patent protection in 
this respect.2313 Besides the fact that not political, but economic interests, i.e. the interests of 
industry – which are not necessarily identical with pure political interests – should be 
considered decisive for the question of whether to create a unitary patent,2314 the text of 
Article 3(2) of Regulation 1257/2012 however leads to another major problem of the unitary 
patent: As not all EU Member States participate in the creation of the unitary patent, this 
instrument actually adds to territorial fragmentation of patent law in Europe, rather than 
consolidating it.2315 While it is true that Member States not participating can join later,2316 it is 
a matter of fact that there is fragmentation until they do. At an abstract level, this development 
means an alarming fragmentation of the Internal Market. Additionally, the lack of patent 
                                                 
2313
 Kolle 2006, p. 53. 
2314
 Kolle 2006, p. 53; likewise, the interests of industry should be considered decisive with regard to the 
question of how an adequate European patent judiciary should look like, cf. Jacob 2005, p. 323.  
2315
 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 1; Jaeger (2013)44(4) IIC 389, at p. 390; Zawadzka (2014)45(4) 
IIC 383, at p. 397. 
2316
 Article 20(1) TEU.  
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protection in major European markets such as Spain which (currently) does not participate in 
enhanced cooperation provokes disadvantages for innovation in these territories.2317    
 
The Draft Regulation preceding Regulation 1257/2012 contained detailed provisions as to the 
infringement of unitary patents. Article 6 of the Draft Regulation contained a definition of 
direct infringement and Article 7 of the Draft Regulation defined indirect or contributory 
infringement. Additionally, limitations regarding the effects of the unitary patents were 
defined in Article 8 of the Draft Regulation. These rules had been constructed similar to legal 
provisions on infringement in most Member States based on the original Community Patent 
Convention. Essentially due to the wish of many practitioners who wanted to limit, at all 
costs, the competence of the ECJ to decide on cases regarding the unitary patent because of 
the reproach that the ECJ is not a specialist patent court which is feared to provoke lengthy 
delays into patent litigation trials and decisions of poor quality, Articles 6 to 8 of the Draft 
Regulation were removed from the final version of Regulation 1257/2012.2318 
 
Regulation 1257/2012 thus neither contains unified substantive rules with regard to the 
prerequisites for patentability, nor regarding the scope of protection, nor concerning the 
treatment of patents as an object of property.2319 Rather, Article 5(3) of Regulation 1257/2012 
provides, at the level of private international law: 
 
 
Article 5(3) of Regulation 1257/2012 
 
The acts against which the patent provides protection (…) and the applicable limitations shall be those 
defined by the law applied to European patents with unitary effect in the participating Member State 
whose national law is applicable to the European patent with unitary effect as an object of property in 
accordance with Article 7. 
 
 
Article 7 of Regulation 1257/2012 contains rules concerning the national law applicable to a 
European patent with unitary effect as an object of property, where the major aspect to be 
considered is that the patent shall be treated in its entirety and in all participating Member 
States as a national patent of the participating Member State in which the patent has unitary 
effect, and further prerequisites mainly referring to the residence or principal place of 
business respectively place of business of the applicant or the location of the headquarters of 
the European Patent Organisation (Munich), thus ultimately referring to German law as 
fallback solution. These further prerequisites are arranged in a hierarchy. 
 
National law in this respect is planned to be unified by way of the UPC Agreement. In this 
respect, Articles 25 to 27 of the UPC Agreement actually contain rules which are similar to 
Articles 6 of the Draft Regulation. Article 25 of the UPC Agreement provides, as to direct 
infringement of patents:  
 
 
 Article 25 of the UPC Agreement 
  
A patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent any third party not having the proprietor's  
consent from the following:  
                                                 
2317
 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 1.  
2318 Tilmann (2013)115(2) GRUR 157, at p. 157. 
2319
 Haberl & Schallmoser (2013)5(1) GRUR-Prax 1, at p. 2; in this respect, it has been underlined that, in 
particular, substantive law as to entitlement is needed, cf. Brandi-Dohrn (2012)43(4) IIC 372, at p. 387. 
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(a) making, offering, placing on the market or using a product which is the subject matter of the patent, 
or importing or storing the product for those purposes;  
(b) using a process which is the subject matter of the patent or, where the third party knows, or should 
have known, that the use of the process is prohibited without the consent of the patent proprietor, 
offering the process for use within the territory of the Contracting Member States in which that patent 
has effect;  
(c) offering, placing on the market, using, or importing or storing for those purposes a product obtained 
directly by a process which is the subject matter of the patent.”  
 
 
Correspondingly to Article 7 of the Draft Regulation, Article 26 of the UPC Agreement 
provides as to indirect infringement of patents: 
 
 
 Article 26 of the UPC Agreement 
 
(1) A patent shall confer on its proprietor the right to prevent any third party not having the proprietor's 
consent from supplying or offering to supply, within the territory of the Contracting Member States in 
which that patent has effect, any person other than a party entitled to exploit the patented invention, 
with means, relating to an essential element of that invention, for putting it into effect therein, when the 
third party knows, or should have known, that those means are suitable and intended for putting that 
invention into effect.  
 
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the means are staple commercial products, except where the third 
party induces the person supplied to perform any of the acts prohibited by Article 25. 
 
(3) Persons performing the acts referred to in Article 27(a) to (e) shall not be considered to be parties 
entitled to exploit the invention within the meaning of paragraph 1. 
 
 
Article 27 of the UPC Agreement finally contains a detailed enumeration of specific 
exemptions from infringement.  
 
In light of the fact that Articles 6 to 8 of the Draft Regulation were replaced by provisions in 
Articles 25 to 27 of the UPC Agreement, i.e. by different law than EU law, it has been 
criticised that the unitary patent created by Regulation 1257/2012 actually lacks content and 
shape based on EU law.2320 It is also not clear by what means national laws are to be aligned. 
Although it is to be admitted that substantive patent law in Europe has already been subject to 
certain harmonisation, there are variations, for instance in relation to experimental use (as 
referred to in Article 27(b) of the UPC Agreement). Consequently, different patents may grant 
different protection since national laws vary. Remarkably, Articles 25 to 27 of the UPC 
Agreement also set out rights which a patent confers on its proprietor, whereby these rights do 
not refer to national law. 
 
Moreover, while it is true that, on the basis of the set of rules in Articles 5 and 7 of Regulation 
1257/2012, merely one national law would be applicable in all participating Member States, 
different national laws could be applicable to different unitary patents, which might thwart 
any attempts of unification of patent protection in the European Union.2321 For instance, this 
problem becomes evident regarding non-European companies which eventually have plenty 
of places of business throughout the European Union. Then the question arises whether all 
their unitary patents should be governed by the same national law or not, and whether these 
companies shall be given free choice which law they choose.  
                                                 
2320
 Jaeger (2013)24(1) EuZW 15, at p. 16. 
2321
 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 2.  
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Furthermore, it is to be underlined that the unitary patent would merely form an alternative to 
classical European patents, i.e. patents granted by the EPO (where a further differentiation 
must be undertaken between such national patents granted within the system of the Uniform 
Patent Court Agreement and those for which the Uniform Patent Court has no jurisdiction), 
and national patents granted by national authorities. The envisaged coexistence of all such 
patent systems seems rather contrary to a unifying approach.2322  
 
 
4.3.2.2 Facilitation of patent protection? 
 
Another aspect which has been underlined by those in favour of a unitary patent is that it will 
facilitate patent protection for inventors (comprising individuals, companies and institutions), 
because one single patent application must be filed only with the European Patent Office, 
there being no need to validate it in each participating State. Besides, high-quality machine 
translation systems – available online and free of charge – are being developed for all 
languages of the European Union by the EPO together with Google.2323 Nowadays, the EPO 
already provides a machine translation service regarding 13 languages (Danish, Dutch, 
German, Finnish, French, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish 
and Swedish to English), and has announced to offer that service also with regard to 32 
languages in total, including all EU languages and major non-European languages such as 
Russian, Chinese, Japanese and Korean.2324 However, it is not sure whether such high-quality 
translations (which guarantee an appropriate quality of translations of complex professional 
terminology of patent documents) will be available within the transitional period,2325 although 
the EPO and Google have already entered, into their long-term agreement to collaborate on 
such machine translations of patents, in March 2011. One might however be sceptical 
regarding the quality of such machine translations, which is a severe obstacle for a proper 
understanding of the invention and the determination of the scope of the protection resulting 
from the patent.2326 Problematically, Article 6(2) of Regulation 1260/2012 provides that the 
text of such translations shall have no legal effect, but shall serve for information purposes 
only. In the absence of any legal effect of machine translation, it will not be possible, in patent 
infringement proceedings, to refer to such translation in order to exclude illegality of the 
infringement committed.2327 And, at least in the initial period, machine translations will 
require “support” by human translators.2328   
 
In this respect, one may consider the unitary patent as simpler and less burdensome than 
current patent protection at the European level, which is determined by complex validation 
and expensive translation requirements. Besides, with regard to national patents respectively 
ordinary European patents without unitary effect which constitute in fact a bundle of national 
patents, it has been put forth that there is the need of parallel or successive patent disputes in 
                                                 
2322
 However, the benefit of such a coexistence of several options has also been highlighted, cf. for instance 
Torremans 2009, p. 206 (while Torremans mingles the substantive and the procedural level (highlighted by the 
author of this thesis) when stating: “What is really needed is a Community Patent as a single right than can be 
subject of a single invalidation and a single infringement proceeding in an efficient way. Even EPLA would then 
become a second best solution. (...) Various options should remain open and the appropriate one can then be 
chosen by the parties. Cross-border litigation is then the appropriate approach in a number of scenarios.”)   
2323
 Luginbühl (2013)62(4) GRUR Int. 305, at p. 308. 
2324
 Cf. Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 392. The unburdened access to the latter Asian languages 
realistically takes into consideration the progressive state-of-the-art of technology being developed in Asia.  
2325
 Cf. Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 392. 
2326
 Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 392. 
2327
 Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 392. 
2328
 Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 392. 
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several States which provokes high costs and the eventual creation of diverging decisions.2329 
While the latter aspects reveal benefits for the patent holder arising from the European patent 
with unitary effect, it is true that unitary patents will also provide competitors with a higher 
degree of legal certainty. Alleged infringers will not any longer – as this is the case with 
regard to ordinary European patents – run the risk of being exposed to multiple damage 
claims for an economically unitary activity carried out in the EU for the sole reason that the 
use of the invention was distributed in more than one State.2330    
 
However, it remains to be seen whether patent protection via the unitary patent actually 
effects a simplified patent protection. In contrast to former proposals of an EU patent to be 
considered as an autonomous instrument, the European patent with unitary effect has a hybrid 
structure2331 between international law, EU law, and national law, possibly forming a new sui 
generis right, provoking therefore both doubts on the legal quality of the patent protection 
afforded, and regarding the cross effects between these different layers of law. As to the 
establishment of high-quality machine translation systems, it is to be noted that such a service 
could also be installed as to classical European patents, and therefore does not necessarily 
argue for the creation of a unitary patent.  
 
Besides, it has even been put forth that for economically developing States, granting a 
European patent with unitary effect might effect a so-called patent blockade as a result of 
rapid growth in the number of patent monopolies.2332 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Reduction of costs? 
 
As to the unitary patent as an additional substantive means of patent protection, it has often 
been underlined that the unitary patent shall lead to a cost reduction regarding patent 
protection in the European Union. While patent protection in the territory of the 28 EU 
Member States by means of  a “classical” European patent produces costs of about 36.000 € 
today, costs of a unitary patent are expected to be reduced to an amount of 6.500 € during a 
transitional period of maximum twelve years,2333 and finally even reach a mark of about 5.000 
€.
2334
 The reason for the present high sum of 36.000 € to be calculated for the whole territory 
of the European Union is mainly based on translation costs2335 and further validation costs 
(fees of local patent agents and fees of local patent offices). It has been announced that the 
unitary patent will produce fewer costs, because, in contrast to the situation regarding 
classical European patents, no further translations will be necessary beyond those required by 
the EPO before granting the patent. However, it has been underlined that eventual litigation 
costs must also be taken into consideration.2336 During the transitional period, additional 
translation requirements will produce certain costs, because a request for unitary effect must 
                                                 
2329
 Cf. Trüstedt (2010)59(12) GRUR Int. 1039, at p. 1041. 
2330
 Romandini & Klicznik (2013)44(5) IIC 524, at p. 536. 
2331
 Jaeger compares the European patent with unitary effect with a figure created by Hieronymus Bosch who 
included bizarre figures composed of parts of other creatures into his pictures, cf. Jaeger (2013)24(1) EuZW 15, 
at p. 17. With regard to a comparison between the European patent with unitary effect and the EU's systems for 
trade marks, designs and plant variety protection, Jaeger underlines the “systemic change – or rather, breach? – 
that it brings about in EU IP law”, cf. Jaeger (2013)44(4) IIC 389, at p. 390. 
2332
 Referring to the example of Poland: Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 388. 
2333
 It is noteworthy that the transitional period may be terminated earlier if an independent expert committee 
states that high quality machine translations are available for all official languages of the European Union. 
2334
 EU Focus 2013, 304, 1, at p. 2. 
2335
 Explicitly underlining the aspect of high translations costs: Artelsmair 2005, p. 20. 
2336
 Stjerna (2012)103(2) Mitt. 54, at p. 55. 
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be submitted together with a full translation of the patent specification into English if the 
patent was granted in German or French. If the EPO prosecution was in English, a request for 
unitary effect will have to be translated to another official EU language. After the transitional 
period, such additional costs are expected to be avoided by the establishment of high-quality 
machine translation systems. 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), natural persons, non-profit-organisations, 
universities and public research organisations which have their residence or principal place of 
business within the territory of one of the 28 EU Member States have been considered to 
benefit from the new translation regime being applicable to the unitary patent, because they 
will get a compensation of all translation costs up to a ceiling in case that the application was 
filed in one of the official languages of the European Union being not an official language of 
the EPO (i.e. another language than English, French or German).2337 However, one might still 
fear that the costs of translations could constitute an insurmountable barrier with regard to 
SMEs. Although it is admitted that Article 5 of Regulation 1260/2012 provides for a system 
of partial reimbursement, available for SMEs, for natural persons, non-profit organizations, 
higher schools and public research institutes whose place of residence or headquarters or the 
main place of business is situated in a Member State, neither the sum or reimbursement nor 
the ceiling has yet been determined.2338 As a consequence, a serious comparison of costs 
seems impossible at the moment.  
 
After granting the patent, only a single renewal fee will have to be paid to the EPO each year, 
eliminating the need for separate maintenance fees to be paid to the national patent offices. 
This is considered to lead to further cost reduction. The official renewal fee is expected to 
equal the current renewal costs in five EU Member States but has yet to be determined. 
Renewal fees shall be progressive throughout the term of the unitary patent protection.2339 
 
Besides, it is hoped that protection by means of a unitary patent will indirectly raise the 
effectiveness of patent protection, because, due to the fact that the national validation of 
classical European patents currently produces prohibitive costs, many inventors only obtain 
patent protection in a small number of countries which makes inventions less valuable.    
 
At the international level, it is to be considered that a patent costs about 2000 € in the United 
States of America and about 600 € in China,2340 economic areas which form two major 
competitors of the European Union respectively its Member States.2341  
 
In this regard, it must nonetheless be borne in mind that the comparison between the grant of 
patents for the United States or China, on the one hand, and all the States of the European 
Union via a unitary patent lacks general justification, because it presumes without further 
analysis that European inventors long for EU-wide protection of their inventions. However, 
such a view disregards that, in particular, SMEs might only be active in a small number of 
Member States, and therefore might only be interested in obtaining patent protection for the 
territories of these States rather than attaining pan-EU protection – through classical European 
                                                 
2337
 Article 5(2) of Regulation 1260/2012. Interestingly, such a reduced fee programme has been offered by the 
United States and Canada for years. In this light, it seems indeed reasonable and justified to offer such a 
programme within the European Union as well in order to secure the European market position in global 
competition. 
2338
 Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 391. 
2339
 Article 12(1)(a) of Regulation 1257/2012. 
2340
 EU Focus 2013, 304, 1, at p. 2. 
2341
 These countries provide for the grant of a uniform patent within their respective territories.  
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patents.2342 In these circumstances, a unitary patent, even if it might be cheaper than a 
classical European patent granted for all EU Member States, might ultimately turn out to be 
the more costly alternative where only protection for some States is required,2343 this being 
aggravated by the fact that the cheap translation arrangements will enter into force only after a 
long transitional term.  
 
As another disadvantage of the unitary patent as to the cost issue, it must be emphasised that, 
in contrast to the situation concerning classical European patents, a unitary patentee will not 
have the possibility to choose the jurisdictions in which he wants to obtain protection, and, as 
a consequence, there will be no possibility to reduce the initial costs of the grant of the patent, 
by selecting a subset. Additionally, it will not be possible to (subsequently) opt out protection 
for specific participating Member States in order to reduce the amount of renewal fees.2344 
   
Admittedly, it is to be pointed out that the unitary patent envisaged at present is constructed as 
an alternative to classical European patents, meaning that the latter will still be available, 
giving inventors the opportunity to choose which sort of patent they wish to gain. In light of 
this, one may at least expect that industry will appreciate to have a further option of patent 
protection, regardless whether respectively to which extent this option will be chosen.2345    
     
After all, it has been rightly highlighted that earlier assessments and economic studies were 
necessarily founded on the expectation of the introduction of a real European Union Patent, 
i.e. a patent that would be unitary and harmonised for all of the European Union. In light of 
this, it has been stressed – since the European patent with unitary effect will only be valid 
within the territories of the participating Member States – that there is now “a strong need for 
new appraisals, which will incorporate the agreed-upon conditions of the unitary patent 
package, which does not cover all of the EU and falls short of the objectives set out in the 
beginning.”2346   
 
 
4.3.2.4 Compliance with EU law? 
 
It has already been underlined above that the unitary patent as envisaged by Regulation 
1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012 has a unique structure based on European law as well 
as on international and national law. Apart from the aspects of doubtful effectiveness of such 
an unproved structure, it has been doubted that there is a sufficient legal basis for a unitary 
patent of that kind.  
 
 
4.3.2.4.1 Article 118 TFEU versus Article 114 TFEU 
 
Generally, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for two 
possibilities how patent protection within the European Union could be made more effective: 
Article 114 TFEU provides for a possibility for the approximation (harmonisation) of national 
laws of the Member States, which have as their object the establishment and the functioning 
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 Kolle 2006, p. 54; Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 390. 
2343
 Cf. Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 390. This aspect is not taken into consideration by those who, as a 
matter of principle, advocate a cheap unitary patent which grants identical protection throughout the whole 
European Union, cf. Nooteboom 2003, p. 585. 
2344
 Pagenberg (2012)114(6) GRUR 582, at p. 583. 
2345
 Kolle 2006, p. 54. 
2346
 Kupzok (2014)36(7) E.I.P.R. 418, at p. 427. 
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of the internal market, whereas Article 118 TFEU even provides for the possibility to create 
European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the European Union and for the setting up of Union-wide authorisation, 
coordination and supervision arrangements. The crucial question is: on which of these 
provisions can respectively should the European patent with unitary effect (or being given a 
different name) be founded? 
 
 
4.3.2.4.1.1 Article 114 TFEU 
 
Article 114(1) TFEU provides: 
 
 
 Article 114(1) TFEU 
 
Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement 
of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market. 
 
 
Concerning intellectual property law, the European legislator has created a multitude of 
Directives based on Article 114 TFEU in order to equalise differences between national legal 
systems.2347 However, it is to be underlined that such harmonisation can only effect a 
minimum standard of protection, whereas the major obstacle for a free and unhampered 
internal market consisting in the territorial limitation of the effects of intellectual property 
rights such as patents (principle of territoriality)2348 rather than the difference between the 
existing legal systems, can only be overcome by a right having equal effect throughout the 
whole territory of the European Union.2349 This idea is impressively stated in Recital 2 of the 
Community trade mark Regulation2350 which states inter alia:  
 
 
                                                 
2347
 Cf. for instance the following Directives: Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (Codified 
version), OJ L299 of 8 November 2008, pp. 25-33, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0095&from=GA> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015); Directive 
98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, OJ L213 of 30 July 1998, pp. 13-21, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31998L0044&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015); Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal 
protection of designs, OJ L289 of 28 October 1998, pp. 28-33, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:399f8f58-0b0e-4252-a0a8-
8c8600f55c5e.0008.02/DOC_1&format=PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015); Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(revised version), OJ L195 of 2 June 2004, pp. 16-25, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0048R%2801%29&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
2348
 This consideration does not apply to copyright law. 
2349
 Wichard 2011 (Calliess/Ruffert), Art. 118 AEUV, paras. 6, 8; Stieper 2012 (Grabitz, Hilf & Nettesheim), 
Art. 118 AEUV, para. 8. 
2350
 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 
March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015). 
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 Recital 2 of the Community trade mark Regulation 
 
It is desirable to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities 
and a continuous and balanced expansion by completing an internal market which functions properly 
and offers conditions which are similar to those obtaining in a national market. In order to create a 
market of this kind and make it increasingly a single market, (…) legal conditions must be created 
which enable undertakings to adapt their activities to the scale of the Community (…). For those 
purposes, trade marks enabling the products and services of undertakings to be distinguished by 
identical means throughout the entire Community, regardless of frontiers, should feature amongst the 
legal instruments which undertakings have at their disposal. 
 
 
In light of this, Article 114 TFEU is to be considered an inappropriate legal basis for the 
creation of a unitary patent, because it is a priori insufficient to reach the envisaged goal, i.e. 
an effective patent protection throughout the territory of the European Union.  
 
 
4.3.2.4.1.2 Article 118 TFEU 
 
On the other hand, the European legislator has created, by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 118 
TFEU in order to allocate a legal basis for a real unification of intellectual property rights 
within the EU framework. Community intellectual property rights being established before 
had to be based on the general provision of ex-Article 308 EC (which is now Article 352 
TFEU).2351 In fact, the creation of Article 118 TFEU has been evaluated as a declaration of 




 Article 118(1) TFEU 
 
(1) In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, the European Parliament 
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures 
for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, 
coordination and supervision arrangements. 
 
 
                                                 
2351
 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ L11 of 14 
January 1994, pp. 1-36, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31994R0040&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015), newly codified 
by Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L78 of 24 
March 2009, pp. 1-42, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:078:0001:0042:EN:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015); Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights, OJ L227 of 1 
September 1994, pp. 1-30, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31994R2100&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015), amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 15/2008 of 20 December 2007, OJ L8 of 11 January 2008, p. 2, available at WWW 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008R0015&from=GA> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015); Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, OJ L3 of 5 
January 2002, pp. 1-24, available at WWW <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:003:0001:0024:en:PDF> (lastly accessed on 1 June 
2015), amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006, OJ L386 of 29 December 
2006, pp. 14-16, available at WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1891&from=EN> (lastly accessed on 1 June 2015). 
2352
 Stieper 2012 (Grabitz, Hilf & Nettesheim), Art. 118 AEUV, para. 3; Pernice and Hindelang (2010)21(11) 
EuZW 407, at p. 412. 
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It has however been discussed controversially2353 in legal doctrine whether Regulation 
1257/2012 meets the requirements of Article 118(1) TFEU. Doubts have been based on 
several reasons.2354 First, it has been criticised that the European patent with unitary effect is a 
hybrid construction consisting of European and international law, because the grant and scope 
of protection are determined by the EPC which is no European law, and the design of the 
unitary effect is determined by the UPC Agreement, an international agreement, i.e. no 
European law either.2355 European law determines protection conferred by the European 
patent with unitary effect only to a very limited extent, since such rules which should 
originally be contained in the Regulation (cf. Articles 6 to 8 of the draft Regulation)2356 have 
instead been integrated in the UPC Agreement. Also for this reason, one might doubt that the 
European patent with unitary effect actually constitutes a uniform European intellectual 
property right.2357 In this respect, it has been put forth that “European intellectual property 
rights” within the meaning of Article 118(1) TFEU must be exclusively determined by EU 
law including its features such as primacy and uniformity.2358 On the basis of this conception, 
a European system of protection would be manageable only by way of a Regulation which 
rules all essential aspects to be considered.2359 As to a unitary patent, this would mean that 
such a Regulation would have to contain rules as to the aspects of patentability, exclusivity 
and property.2360 Proponents of this conceptions have put forth that uniform protection meant 
as inherent to the intellectual property right to be created via Article 118(1) TFEU can only be 
guaranteed if both the object and the content of the protection and the conditions for that 
protection are defined by the same authority that creates the right in question.2361 Besides, it 
has been criticised that the European patent with unitary effect will not create uniform 
protection within the European Union, because it will only grant protection for the territory of 
the participating Member States.2362  
 
Although the mentioned arguments put forth by those who are of the opinion that Regulation 
1257/2012 does not meet the requirements of Article 118(1) TFEU cannot be totally 
dismissed, it seems that none of these arguments ultimately proves that the construction 
chosen by the European legislator (combination of Regulation 1257/2012 (supplemented by 
Regulation 1260/2012) and the UPC Agreement) is irreconcilable with Article 118(1) TFEU. 
First of all, it must be underlined that the wording of Article 118(1) TFEU does not expressly 
require that European intellectual property rights such as the European patent with unitary 
effect are solely established by European law.2363 In this respect, it is remarkable that the 
European legislator chose the open wording “European” intellectual property rights and did 
not employ the notion “EU intellectual property rights”.2364 
                                                 
2353
 Götting (2014)22(2) ZEuP 231, at p. 365. 
2354
 Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 431; Lamping (2011)42(8) IIC 879, at pp. 911-913. 
2355
 Cf. Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 431. 
2356
 Götting (2014)22(2) ZEuP 231, at p. 365. 
2357
 Cf. Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 431. 
2358
 De Visscher (2012)61(3) GRUR Int. 214, at p. 220; Wichard 2011 (Calliess/Ruffert), Art. 118 AEUV, para. 
9.  
2359
 Stieper 2012 (Grabitz, Hilf & Nettesheim), Art. 118 AEUV, para. 24; cf. Jaeger (2013)44(4) IIC 389, at p. 
390. 
2360
 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 5. 
2361
 De Visscher (2012)61(3) GRUR Int. 214, at p. 221; disagreeing and suggesting the contrary: Tilmann 
(2013)115(2) GRUR 157, at p. 157. 
2362
 Cf. Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 431. 
2363
 Cf. Eck (2014)63(2) GRUR Int. 114, at p. 116. 
2364
 Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 431; differently: Ullrich 2012, p. 41: “Article 118 para. 1 TFEU, however, 
expressly grants the authority only to create European Union rights of intellectual property, meaning that their 
substance must be determined by Union law.”; cf. also: Jaeger (2013)44(4) IIC 389, at p. 390, who also refers to 
the wording of Article 118(1) TFEU to argue that only such measures to realise the internal market can be based 
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It therefore seems that Article 118(1) TFEU merely allows that the EU act creating an EU 
intellectual property right implies rules of substantive law with regard to the validity and the 
scope of protection, but does not necessarily require it.2365  
  
With regard to the (limited) territorial scope of the European patent with unitary effect 
(limitation to the territory of the participating Member States), it has been rightly stressed 
that, if enhanced cooperation is also possible with regard to the creation of European 
intellectual property rights, this logically means that such rights are not valid for the whole 
territory of the European Union. After all, this issue should preferably be resolved in the 
framework of Article 20 TEU.2366 Furthermore, it is to be underlined that Article 5 of 
Regulation 1257/2012 provides that the effects of the European patent with unitary effect are 
almost completely determined by EU law and the EPC and the UPC Agreement, and that the 
provisions of the UPC Agreement partly even effect more unification than being established 
with regard to Community trade marks through the Community trade mark Regulation.2367 
Article 5 of Regulation 1257/2012 constitutes a compromise in that it leaves open the 
question of the incorporation of the rules of substantive patent law into the EU law, which in 
practice means to leave open the crucial question of competence conferred to the ECJ in such 
matters (depending on the interpretation of Article 5 of Regulation 1257/2012).2368  
 
     
4.3.2.4.2 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, it is to be emphasised that Article 118(1) TFEU should be considered as a 
sufficient legal basis for the construction of the European patent with unitary effect by way of 
a combination of EU law (Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012) and international 
law (EPC and UPC Agreement). 
 
 
4.4 Unified patent court (UPC) 
 
Having dealt with the unitary patent in the foregoing paragraphs, I shall now proceed to have 
a look on its procedural counterpart, the envisaged Unified Patent Court (UPC). In this regard, 
it is to be emphasised that the establishment of the unitary patent and of the UPC are not 
necessarily linked with each other.2369 So, Italy first merely signed the UPC Agreement, but 
initially opted out of the enhanced cooperation procedure leading to the adoption of 
Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012 which institute the unitary patent. However, 
others have considered the creation of a unified patent judiciary that has jurisdiction where the 
unitary patent is affected an essential element of a unified patent system within the European 
                                                                                                                                                        
on Article 118 TFEU which create “European intellectual property rights” in the meaning of an autonomous 
system of protection that provides unified rules for the creation, the scope of protection and limits of the 
respective right and grant EU-wide protection to the holder of this right. It seems however that the references 
made by Jaeger (Stieper 2012 (Grabitz, Hilf & Nettesheim), Art. 118 AEUV, para. 16; Wichard 2011 
(Calliess/Ruffert), Art. 118 AEUV, paras. 9-10; Fischer 2013 (Lenz & Borchardt), Art. 118 AEUV, para. 2) do 
not necessarily confirm Jaeger's opinion.  
2365
 Kraßer 2011, pp. 9-10. 
2366
 Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 432. 
2367
 Ohly (2012)4 ZGE/IPJ 419, at p. 432. 
2368
 Götting (2014)22(2) ZEuP 231, at p. 365. 
2369
 Jaeger, Hilty, Drexl & Ullrich (2009)40(7) IIC 817, at pp. 819, 820, 822. This conception is not undisputed. 
For instance, the former German Federal Minister of Justice Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger postulated in 2010 
that the existence of a (unitary) patent and a (unified) patent judiciary constitute an “inseparable total package” 
(“untrennbares Gesamtpaket”), cited in Trüstedt (2010)59(12) GRUR Int. 1039, at p. 1039; Tilmann (2012)13(1) 
ERA Forum 87, at p. 100. 
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Union.2370 In any event, the substantive benefits effected by the unitary patent may be backed 
up and reinforced by the establishment of a uniform litigation system, where this mutually 
reinforcing beneficial effect of the unitary patent and unitary litigation comes about 
irrespective of whether both are established at the same time or litigation is set up first and 
only later incorporates the unitary patent when created.2371     
 
 
4.4.1 Which are the basic features of the UPC? 
 
The envisaged UPC will form a centralised court for litigation concerning both classical 
European patents and European patents with unitary effect. It is to be emphasised that the 
UPC will have jurisdiction only in respect of designations of European patents for any of the 
signatories of the UPC Agreement. On the other hand, it will not have jurisdiction regarding 
designations of the European patent for any of the other EPC contracting States. The UPC 
will thus be a court common to the participating EU Member States and subject to the same 
obligations under EU law as any of their national courts. Consequently, the UPC must refer, 
where necessary, questions on the interpretation of EU law to the ECJ.2372 
 
Regarding civil litigation related to infringement and validity issues for both classical 
European patents and unitary patents, the UPC will be given exclusive jurisdiction. The UPC 
will also have jurisdiction with regard to a supplementary protection certificate,2373 i.e. a sui 
generis intellectual property right extending the exclusive right after expiration of the patent 
upon which it is based (in order to compensate for the loss of effective patent term caused by 
the delay in obtaining marketing authorisation), regardless if such a right has been issued for a 
product protected by a classical European patent or a unitary patent. The UPC Agreement 
does not comprise any substantive provisions concerning laws ancillary to patent protection, 
such as to confidentiality (for instance with respect to prior disclosures) and licensing. 
Apparently, these matters will continue to be governed by national Member State laws, which 
are not closely harmonised. 
 
In structural respect, it is noteworthy that the envisaged structure of the UPC resembles the 
respective court systems in the United States and Japan with decentralised entry instances and 
a joint appeal court.2374 The UPC will have three tiers: it will comprise a Court of First 
Instance (containing local and regional divisions, and a central division located in Paris2375, 
                                                 
2370
 Nooteboom 2003, p. 569. 
2371
 Jaeger, Hilty, Drexl & Ullrich (2009)40(7) IIC 817, at p. 822. 
2372
 Although numerous stakeholders have sought to ensure that substantive patent validity and infringement 
laws are not the subject of EU law, in order to avoid having the ECJ decide substantive questions of patentability 
and infringement, it remains to be seen if the EU will though assume competence over questions of patent 
infringement. The ECJ will continue to interpret the SPC Regulations and the Biotech Directive. Beyond this, the 
court will also have to interpret Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012.  
2373
 Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products, OJ L152 of 16 June 2009, pp. 1-10, available at 
WWW <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:152:0001:0010:en:PDF> (lastly 
accessed on 1 June 2015), implies a system for the provision of supplementary protection certificates for 
medicinal products in the European Union. At present, the system allows for the grant by national patent offices 
of supplementary protection certificates for national patents and for European patents designated for the 
respective State. The issue of whether respectively in how far it is problematic that Regulation 1257/2012 does 
not imply any provisions as to supplementary protection certificates shall not be discussed in this thesis. 
2374
 Tilmann (2013)115(2) GRUR 157, at p. 158. 
2375
 Paris: cases involving physics, electronics, computer sciences, paper and textiles (IPC classes B, D, E and G 
and H). 
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while specialised sections of this central division will be located in Munich2376 and 
London2377), a Court of Appeal and a Registry located in Luxembourg. All panels of the court 
are planned to be composed of legally qualified judges, also including technically qualified 
judges. The personnel will be characterised by a multinational composition. The divisions of 
the Court of First Instance will be composed of a panel of three judges, while the Court of 
Appeal will consist of a panel of five judges. Besides, a patent mediation and arbitration 
centre will have its seat in Lisbon and Ljubljana. Budapest will host a training facility for 
judges.  
 
Generally, infringement cases regarding classical European patents and European patents with 
unitary effect shall be initiated before the local division hosted by the Member State where the 
alleged infringement has occurred or may occur. If there is no such local division in that State, 
proceedings shall be brought before the regional division in which this Member State 
participates. In case of (alleged) infringement in more than one participating Member State, 
the claimant will have a choice of local (or regional) divisions where proceedings may be 
initiated.  
 
Alternatively, proceedings shall begin at the local division hosted by the Member State where 
the defendant has his residence or place of business, respectively at the regional division in 
which this Member State participates.  
 
With regard to (direct) revocation actions, infringement actions if the Member State does not 
host a local division nor participates in a regional division, actions for declaration of non-
infringement and actions concerning administrative decisions of the EPO, proceedings must 
be initiated before the central division.  
 
In some constellations, proceedings may be brought or referred by a local/regional division to 
the central division. This is possible where the defendant has his residence in a third State, 
where both parties agree, in cases of counterclaims for revocation of patents where an 
infringement action has been initiated before the local (or regional) division, or in cases in 
which a (direct) action for revocation has already been brought before the central division. 
However, it is to be noticed that in these cases, the court initially invoked shall have 
discretion to hear both the infringement and revocation together (according to legal system in 
many EU Member States) or to refer the revocation counterclaim to the central division and 
suspend or proceed with the infringement proceedings (with accordance to the legal situation 
in Germany). 
 
It is noteworthy that actions regarding classical European patents can still be initiated before 
the national courts during a transitional period of seven years, if those patents have been opted 
out before an action has been brought before the UPC. The Administrative Committee, a 
decision-making body within the court system formed by one representative per participating 
Member State, may prolong this transitional period for another seven years. Persons filing 
applications for European patents within the transitional period may decide to opt these 
patents out of the exclusive jurisdiction of the UPC. That means that the UPC will have non-
exclusive competence over classical European patents within the transitional period which 
will become exclusive competence as soon as the transitional period has expired (if no opt-out 
has been declared). It is to be noticed that once an action has been brought in the UPC in 
relation to a given patent, the opt-out is no longer available. Conversely, if an opt-out has 
                                                 
2376
 Munich: cases involving mechanical engineering (IPC section F). 
2377
 London: cases involving chemistry, pharmaceuticals, metallurgy and human necessities (IPC sections A and 
C). 
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been declared and proceedings have been initiated in a national court, it will not any longer be 
possible to revoke the opt-out. 
 
At present, detailed Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court (hereinafter Rules of 
Procedure respectively Draft Rules of Procedure) are being elaborated.2378 They will have to 
be adopted by the Court’s Administrative Committee, made up of one member for each 
participating Member State. Ultimately, they will be the subject of a public consultation, the 
commencement of which is yet to be announced.       
 
 
4.4.2 Evaluation of the UPC 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Creation of legal certainty? 
 
In the first instance, advocates of the UPC have put forth that the creation of such a unified 
and specialised jurisdiction in patent matters will, at least concerning the participating 
Member States, provide a single forum for patent litigation. As a consequence, the risk of an 
unnecessary duplication or even multiplication of parallel proceedings before the various 
courts of the Member States is hoped to be avoided. This shall strengthen legal certainty, as 
the risk of inconsistent (i.e. conflicting) outcomes of parallel proceedings will be prevented 
and consistency of interpretation will be secured.2379 
 
However, also in procedural respect, it is to be stated that not all Member States participate in 
the UPC Agreement, which ultimately leads to fragmentation of jurisprudence between 
participating and non-participating Member States.2380 A decision of the UPC could merely 
have, if any, influencing (but not binding) effect on national courts of EPC Contracting States 
that do not participate in the UPC Agreement. And even concerning the group of participating 
Member States, it is to be noticed that several authorities would have jurisdiction according to 
the matter concerned.2381 So, five constellations can be identified. National courts or 
administrative bodies would be competent in proceedings regarding nationally granted 
patents. The EPO’s Board of Appeal would have jurisdiction concerning administrative 
appeals for European patents. National courts of EU Member States not ratifying the UPC 
Agreement or not participating in enhanced cooperation as well as those of all non-EU EPO 
Contracting States would be competent for cases on infringement and validity of national and 
classical European patents. Finally, as to cases concerning infringement and validity of 
classical European and unitary patents, the UPC would have jurisdiction for those Member 
States which have ratified the UPC Agreement. Besides these rules of competence, the ECJ as 
highest instance interpreting the law of the European Union, would have jurisdiction in 
respect of preliminary references from the UPC as to infringement of unitary patents.2382  
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 The Rules of Procedure will structurally form a hybrid of common law and civil law elements, meaning 
detailed paper-based arguments and witness evidence, court-appointed experts, technical judges and no 
automatic right to cross-examination. As to a summarising overview, cf. Grabinski (2013)62(4) GRUR Int. 310, 
at pp. 310-321; at present, the 17th draft of Rules of Procedure is the most recent version of this set of rules. Cf. 
the 17th draft of Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court from 31 October 2014, available at WWW 
<http://www.unified-patent-court.org/images/documents/UPC_Rules_of_Procedure_17th_Draft.pdf> (lastly 
accessed on 1 June 2015). 
2379
 Brandi-Dohrn (2012)43(4) IIC 372, at p. 388; Kazi (2011)33(8) E.I.P.R. 538, at p. 539; Rodriguez 
(2012)34(6) E.I.P.R. 402, at p. 408. 
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 Cf. Jaeger (2013)44(4) IIC 389, at p. 390. 
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 Cf. also Ullrich (2015)46(1) IIC 1, at pp. 2-3. 
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 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 2 et seq.  
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Problematically, the consequence of this split jurisdiction is a separate jurisdiction applicable 
to related patents, which might be considered as a severe obstacle towards a unification in 
European patent litigation which, as a consequence, might create legal uncertainty.2383 To 
illustrate this situation one may think of the constellation of three identically worded patents 
(Patent A, Patent B and Patent C), Patent A being granted as a unitary patent, Patent B being 
granted as a European patent designating Italy, and Patent C being granted as a national patent 
in Spain. So which courts would then be ultimately competent to deal with infringement 
actions with regard to these patents? With regard to Patent A, the ECJ would have ultimate 
jurisdiction. Concerning Patent B, the Appeal Division of the UPC would ultimately be 
competent. And as to Patent C, the Spanish Supreme Court would be the last court instance to 
decide on the infringement of the Spanish national patent.  
 
As it does not seem probable that all national courts will align their jurisprudence on that of 
the UPC, but will rather find themselves in competition both with the UPC and among 
themselves, problems arising from such judicial competition will have to be faced. These 
might not only concern the efficiency of case management or the technical quality of 
decision-making, but also create divergences with regard to the interpretation, respectively the 
application of substantive law.2384    
 
Besides, it has been criticised that the rules of choice of jurisdiction have become 
considerably complex2385 and complicated which effects intransparency.2386 It has been 
warned against the fact that the UPC Agreement does not contain any method how to 
consolidate different layers of substantive rules which might be developed in the five 
enumerated branches, and simply adds another enforcement layer.2387 This might further 
establish legal uncertainty.2388 
 
Also, the relationship between the UPC Agreement which confers exclusive jurisdiction to the 
UPC, and contractual jurisdiction provisions which allocate exclusive jurisdiction to national 
courts or arbitral panels, might turn out problematic. Although the UPC Agreement would 
principally prevail concerning matters for which the UPC is granted exclusive jurisdiction, the 
question remains to be answered how to deal with constellations where the UPC Agreement 
expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction to the UPC for part of the proceedings, while there are 
other parts which are not affected by the UPC Agreement. Shall the UPC be granted a sort of 
annex competence for these further matters? The UPC Agreement does not answer this issue 
and thus does not provide for legal certainty. In this context, it has also been criticised that, 
due to the strict limitation of the UPC's competence to litigation on infringement and 
revocation of patents (including only counterclaims concerning license defences, cf. Article 
32(1)(a)-(h) of the UPC Agreement) combined with the technical orientation of the 
composition of the UPC, leave this court ill equipped for deciding on other matters such as 
contract law and property law which may arise as incidental points. The same goes for the 
treatment of broader contextual questions which have become more relevant for patent 
protection, such as issues of competition law, European and international trade law, human 
rights law and rules of market regulation.2389 
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However, legal certainty might be strengthened by the role of the ECJ. As has already been 
mentioned, the UPC would be obliged to refer questions to the ECJ on the interpretation of 
Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012. Decisions of the ECJ in this respect would 
have binding effect for the UPC. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Article 5 of Regulation 
1257/2012 (indirectly) refers to Article 25 of the UPC Agreement. While parts of legal 
doctrine have argued that the ECJ is only competent to give a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation of Article 5 of Regulation 1257/2012 as such and not regarding Article 25 of the 
UPC Agreement, because Article 25 of the UPC Agreement is no European law,2390 it is to be 
emphasised that Article 25 of the UPC Agreement in fact reproduces the content of Article 
28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, providing: 
 
 
Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement 
 
(1) A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that 
product; 
   
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s 
consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.  
 
 
Noteworthily, the ECJ made clear in its Merck decision that the TRIPS Agreement forms an 
integral part of the EU legal order.2391 In light of this, one might argue that, as the EU adopted 
Regulation 1257/2012, this legislation should be regarded as sufficient to lead to the 
conclusion that the sphere of patents falls within the scope of EU law.2392 In view of the 
creation of legal certainty, it has been suggested that the UPC will ask the ECJ which 
construction of the rules regulating direct infringement applicable to the European patent with 
unitary effect is consistent with Article 28(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and which is not.2393 It 
has been rightly highlighted that, on the basis of the acquired jurisdiction over the TRIPS 
patent provision, the ECJ will have a position to prevent further fragmentation of the rules 
applicable to European and national patents and the case-law related to them, the national 
courts then having the possibility to refer question to the ECJ when applying domestic rules 
on national patents corresponding to the TRIPS provisions.2394 With regard to the mentioned 
criticism that the European patent with unitary effect and the UPC have not managed to 
provide methods to ensure a consistent construction of patent law in the European Union, the 
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 Romandini & Klicznik (2013)44(5) IIC 524, at p. 538. 
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jurisdiction of the ECJ over TRIPS patent provisions, acquired through the adoption of 
Regulation 1257/2012, may mitigate this deficiency.2395    
 
 
4.4.2.2 Effectiveness of the UPC? 
 
First of all, the effectiveness of the UPC might be impaired by the existence of the transitional 
period addressed above, during which a holder of a European patent (but not a unitary patent) 
may at any time opt out of the exclusive competence of the UPC, then having the possibility 
to opt back into the exclusive competence of the UPC at any time, even after the expiration of 
the transitional period, apparently without penalty. This situation could provoke “regime 
shopping” during the transitional period, deciding whether to go with the new system or opt 
out initially and continue to use national courts for European patents. 
 
Concerning the UPC as such, as pointed out above, local divisions of the UPC can be 
established in each participating Member State regardless of the number of patent proceedings 
negotiated in these States. In this respect, it has been warned against the risk that the quality 
and effectiveness of the UPC could suffer from the existence of inexperienced courts, industry 
eventually being reluctant to consign its patents (in particular the most valuable ones) to a 
judicial system that has not been tested and therefore appears unpredictable.2396 This problem 
could however be avoided if the number of courts were to be restricted to a certain number, 
having the consequence that these courts would then be able to gather considerable expertise 
in the field of patent law.2397 In this respect, it is remarkable that some States indeed 
deliberately provide only for a limited number of courts (respectively only one court) for 
patent disputes in order to benefit from the courts' experience and knowledge.2398 Besides, the 
number of patent cases within the European Union varies a lot among the Member States, 
most patent cases being negotiated in Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands.2399 It is 
therefore doubtful whether it will be possible to actually guarantee a high quality of the 
personnel of the UPC which shall be built up on a broad geographical basis. In practice, it will 
be necessary to have judges be educated by existing experienced infringement judges where 
the problem will have to be faced that such education will be necessary performed primarily 
in a foreign language.        
 
Moreover, the importance of local/regional divisions has more and more been reduced in 
favour of the central division which means a change from the principle of a decentralised 
jurisdiction being determined by local/regional divisions, easily accessible for users and 
negotiating in local procedural language. As a consequence, the relationship between the 
divisions of jurisdiction among the first instance of the UPC as being envisaged at present is 
to be characterised as imbalanced.2400 If the defendant is domiciled outside the territory of a 
participating Member State, the action can be initiated before the central division, where the 
applicable language is not the local language of proceedings, but the language of the patent. In 
the case of a defendant domiciled within a participating EU Member State and an (alleged) 
infringement in the territory of more than three local divisions, the defendant may demand 
that the total proceeding is referred to the central division, effecting that the local division is 
deprived of jurisdiction and the procedural language changes as well. Even if proceedings are 
                                                 
2395
 Romandini & Klicznik (2013)44(5) IIC 524, at p. 538. 
2396
 Franzosi (2004)35(4) IIC 416, at p. 419. 
2397
 Pagenberg (2012)114(6) GRUR 582, at p. 585. 
2398
 Stauder 2006, p. 351. 
2399
 Feldges 2007, pp. 113, 115 and there fn. 24. 
2400
 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 4. 
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negotiated before the local division initially invoked, the language chosen by the claimant 
shall be changed into the language of the patent on demand of the defendant for reasons of 
fairness.2401 It has been put forth that these rules effect a considerable discrimination of 
claimants, in particular SMEs which are eventually deprived of their local jurisdiction and 
forced to negotiate before a foreign central division including translation requirements, 
eventually after having already litigated before another court. In this respect, it is actually to 
question why the defendant should benefit from such an extended protection on expense of 
the claimant, given that an effective defence does not require that it is performed in the 
defendant’s language, translations being available already at present.2402   
 
Due to the complicated system of different branches of competences of the divisions of the 
UPC illustrated above, the constellation is conceivable that a local (or regional) division deals 
with the alleged infringement of a unitary patent and the central division hears revocation (cf. 
Article 32 of the UPC Agreement). This bifurcation may lead to numerous problems and 
obstacles. First, it is conceivable that proceedings before those divisions are led in different 
languages which would pose additional translation requirements. Besides, it has also rightly 
been put forward that such a bifurcated approach could provoke continued forum 
shopping.2403 In light of the multitude of local and regional divisions to be expected, which 
will contain panels of judges drawn from different legal traditions, it is important to note that 
forum shopping might indeed become an important issue. It is probable that there will be 
scope for local variations in procedure and application of the law, depending on the national 
practice to which those judges are accustomed. Some divisions might be more inclined to use 
their discretion to split off invalidity counterclaims from infringement, and procedural speed 
might vary between the divisions. Other aspects which might become crucial in this respect 
are the relative ease of obtaining a preliminary injunction (and any order to seise stock from 
the defendant to preserve it until trial) or an order to preserve evidence of infringement. 
Furthermore, the claimant might be given the undue advantage to benefit from an injunction, 
although the patent might subsequently turn out to be invalid. With regard to bifurcation, it 
has been put forth that bifurcated cases seem to be plagued by invalid patents, and that the 
bifurcated system might allow owners of such patents to extract rents from industry without 
the prospect of having their own patent revoked.2404 
 
Further, it has been put forth that there is the risk that the existence of the system of the 
European patent with unitary effect and the UPC might result in increased activities of “patent 
trolls”.2405 These entities purchase and hide a patent until it appears economically 
indispensable. Then the patent holder either asks high licensing fees or files for 
injunctions.2406 As the costs of fighting a potential infringement may often be higher than the 
costs of paying the licensing fee, many companies will prefer to take a license as the cheaper 
alternative. Where the proprietor holds a predominant position on a certain market, such 
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 Pagenberg (2012)114(6) GRUR 582, at p. 584. 
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 Pagenberg (2012)114(6) GRUR 582, at p. 584. 
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 Hilty, Jaeger, Lamping & Ullrich 2012, p. 4. 
2404
 Rodriguez (2012)34(6) E.I.P.R. 402, at p. 404. The underlying problem is that the patentee may argue for a 
narrow interpretation of his claim when defending it but an expansive interpretation when asserting 
infringement, cf. Kitchin J. in: High Court of Justice (Chancery Division – Patents Court) 26 March 2007, 
European Central Bank v Document Security Systems Incorporated, [2007] EWHC 600 (Pat), para. 88 – 
European Central Bank, referred to in: Kazi (2011)33(8) E.I.P.R. 538, at p. 541. 
2405
 Although the problem of “patent trolls” so far is mostly discussed in the United States, such practice appears 
to be a universal phenomenon, and some EU Member States are actually witnessing increasing “patent troll” 
activities in their territories, cf. Malaga (2014)45(6) IIC 621, at p. 643. 
2406
 Malaga (2014)45(6) IIC 621, at p. 641. 
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behaviour may be considered abusive.2407 A “patent troll” might be even more encouraged to 
abuse the patent in case of a European patent with unitary effect in combination with the 
UPC, because it will be possible in this system to influence, with a single injunction, 
competitors in all participating Member States.2408 Admittedly, this situation is however a 
double-edged sword in that the patent holder will be more exposed to invalidity actions as 
well, because the other market actors will be strongly tempted to challenge the competitor's 
patent with a single hit.2409  
 
    
4.4.2.3 Reduction of costs? 
 
First of all, it is to be taken into consideration that the UPC could make it easier, in 
comparison with the current EPO system, for patent holders to pursue infringers even in small 
countries where litigation would have been overly expensive in proportion with the achieved 
result. Further, it may at present not always be financially viable to file multiple patent 
infringement claims in multiple countries, because the bundle of national patents resulting 
from a European patent – even in cases of EU-wide infringement – can be enforced only on a 
strictly national basis, which effects high litigation costs. As a consequence, infringers may 
eventually never be forced to pay for the intellectual property they misappropriated. In 
contrast, it is more affordable to sue that same infringer in the UPC for infringement in 
several countries.  
 
As parties may be represented, before the UPC, either by authorised lawyers or by European 
Patent Attorneys who dispose of an appropriate litigation certificate, patent holders will have 
the possibility to work with the same attorney both before the EPO and the UPC. As a 
consequence, cost associated with litigation may possibly be reduced.2410  
 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, despite the widespread hope that the creation of the UPC 
shall contribute to a further reduction of costs, the court fees have not been determined yet.2411 
An Administrative Committee is considered to do so once the UPC has been set up. Due to 
these circumstances, a serious evaluation of these costs and their comparison with procedural 
costs currently produced is simply not manageable at this moment. Whereas it is planned to 
establish the UPC as a self-financing court with balanced finances, specific tools being 
envisaged to guarantee proper access to the court (which should be important for SMEs), and 
to eventually grant legal aid to natural persons in the case of need, there are several aspects to 
be considered which entail the risk that the establishment of the UPC as envisaged by the 
UPC Agreement might actually lead to higher costs.  
 
On the one hand, establishing a multitude of local divisions before which both infringement 
and invalidity of a patent may be negotiated, and, on the other hand, strengthening the central 
division of the Court of First Instance which shall also have jurisdiction to decide on the 
infringement and invalidity of patents according to the UPC Agreement, it has been 
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also supported by the fact that, as a consequence of abandoning the patent translations, it will be much easier for 
a potential “patent troll” to “hide” the patent against a major group of competitors. Moreover, the fact that the 
translation of claims has no official status, may establish an incentive to abuse a proprietor's dominant position 
through an abuse of a process, by either submitting an inaccurate version or delaying the submission, cf. Malaga 
(2014)45(6) IIC 621, at p. 642.  
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2409
 Malaga (2014)45(6) IIC 621, at p. 642. 
2410
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underlined that this would bring along a prolongation of proceedings and therefore an increase 
of procedural costs in comparison with a system where infringement and invalidity issues 
cannot be negotiated before the same court (as it is the case in Germany).2412 
 
Concerning the enforcement of a unitary patent, a counterclaim initiated against a unitary 
patent would bring along the (costly) risk of voiding the patent with effect for all 26 Member 
States.2413 In this respect, potential advantages produced by the unitary patent would finally be 
compensated by a considerably increased risk of losing patent protection for the whole 
territory of the participating EU Member States in the course of single-action revocations 
(rather than requiring separate revocations in each European State, as it is presently the case). 
In light of this, organisations/entities with high value patents, in particular pharmaceutical 
companies, could therefore (at least initially) shy away from the system as it presents a 
significant risk, avoid unitary patents in favour of national patents and opt their European 
patents out of the UPC system until they are convinced of the quality of this system. Some of 
these patentees may decide to withdraw their opt-out at a later moment. Industries which rely 
on several rights beside patents (such as trade marks and designs) might benefit from the new 
system as attractive with relatively little risk. For instance, this might be true for household 
consumer products or the automotive industry.    
 
It may be expected that the extent of the required personnel and infrastructure of the UPC – 
qualified judges for the UPC will have to be found and trained, and a completely new court 
system will have to be established including a working administrative body – would be 
greater than for the present system(s), and therefore more expensive. In this respect, it is also 
conceivable that the use of the court once litigation has started produces further costs. Due to 
the fact that there are less courts available than under the current system, additional travel 
costs of parties which have to travel to distant courts might to be added. Moreover, translation 
services necessary during litigation might produce further costs. As the European Union has 
already announced not to finance the UPC, the court will have to be self-funding. This can be 
realised by the creation of funds from patent issue fees and from the cost of issuing 
proceedings. Additionally, Member States will probably contribute to the start-up costs of the 
UPC.2414 However, it is unclear to which extent such financing will be realised, and according 
to which proportion Member States will undertake payments.       
 
Again, as explicated earlier in conjunction with the unitary patent, it is to be pointed out that 
such an increase of costs may be justified in the case of the actual need for patent protection 
for the territory of all participating Member States. In contrast, particularly SMEs which 
realistically do not require patent protection for that complete territory, expectably will not 
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4.4.2.4 Compliance with EU law? 
 
 
4.4.2.4.1 Compliance with primary EU law 
 
It is noteworthy that the UPC Agreement, in contrast to previous proposals, tends to place the 
position of the UPC within the legal system of the European Union. Rather than creating a 
separate court outside the EU system, various States among EU Member States will establish 
the court by an agreement.2415 Neither the EU itself nor countries outside the European Union 
will be signatories. The UPC shall be subject to the same obligations under EU law as any 
national court of the Contracting Member States2416 and shall apply EU law in its entirety, 
respecting its primacy.2417 Additionally, the UPC Agreement specifies that the UPC, as a 
court common to the Contracting Member States and as part of their judicial system, shall 
cooperate with the ECJ to ensure the proper application and uniform interpretation of EU law 
in the same way as the national courts of EU Member States. In particular, the UPC shall 
request preliminary rulings from the ECJ on the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the EU in 
accordance with Article 267 TFEU, in the same manner as national courts.2418 The UPC 
Agreement also explicitly stipulates that the Contracting Member States are jointly and 
severally liable for damage resulting from an infringement of EU law by the Court of Appeal, 
in accordance with EU law concerning non-contractual liability of Member States for damage 
caused by their national courts breaching EU law.2419 These provisions reveal clearly the 
European legislator’s intent to meet the concerns of the ECJ expressed in its Opinion 1/09. 
 
 
4.4.2.4.2 Compliance with the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
Another issue is to ensure that the UPC Agreement is fully compliant with the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.2420 In this respect, it is noteworthy that Article 89(1) of the UPC Agreement 
explicitly refers to amendments to the Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning the relationship 
between the Regulation and the UPC Agreement as a precondition for the entry into force of 
the UPC Agreement: 
 
 
 Article 89 of the UPC Agreement 
 
 (1) This Agreement shall enter into force on 1 January 2014 or on the first day of the fourth month after 
 the deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification or accession in accordance with Article 84, 
 including the three Member States in which the highest number of European patents had effect in the 
 year preceding the year in which the signature of the Agreement takes place or on the first day of the 
 fourth month after the date of entry into force of the amendments to Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 
 concerning its relationship with this Agreement, whichever is the latest. 
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 Given the clear wording of Article 118 TFEU, which makes no reference to the creation of a common court 
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In order to ensure compliance between the UPC Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
and in order to address the particular issue of jurisdiction rules vis-à-vis defendants in non-
European Union States, the Commission issued a proposal for a regulation amending the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (hereinafter Commission Proposal 2013)2421.2422 Since, as has been 
rightly suggested in the Commission Proposal 2013, the Protocol modifying the 1965 Treaty 
of the Benelux Court of Justice raises identical issues as the UPC Agreement,2423 a further 
objective of the Commission Proposal 2013 was to ensure compliance between the modified 
Treaty of 31 March 1965 concerning the establishment and statute of a Benelux Court of 
Justice (hereinafter BC)2424 and the Brussels Ibis Regulation,2425 and also to address the lack 
of common jurisdiction rules vis-à-vis defendants in non-European Union States.2426 In the 
Commission Proposal 2013, the following issues in the Brussels Ibis Regulation were 
addressed in order to guarantee the combined and coherent application of the UPC 
Agreement:2427 
 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal 2013, the 
Commission stresses the need to clarify in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that the 
UPC constitutes a “court” within the meaning of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Second, the 
need is pointed out in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal 2013 to 
clarify the operation of the jurisdiction rules applicable in relation to the UPC concerning 
Member State defendants. Third, the Commission expresses its will in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to establish uniform rules for the international jurisdiction vis-à-vis third State 
defendants in proceedings against such defendants brought in the UPC where national law is 
applicable because the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not itself provide for such rules. Fourth, 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal 2013 underlines that the operation 
of the rules on lis pendens and related actions in relation to the UPC on the one hand and the 
national courts of Member States which are not Contracting Party to the respective 
international agreements on the other hand must be determined. Additionally, it is stressed in 
the Explanatory Memorandum that the operation of these rules during the transitional period 
referred to in Article 83(1) of the UPC Agreement must be defined. Fifth, the Commission 
proposed to clarify the operation of the rules on recognition and enforcement in the relations 
between Member States which are and those which are not Contracting Parties to the 
respective international agreements. According to the Commission, the envisaged 
amendments should be combined in four new provisions: Articles 71a to 71d of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation. 
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By way of Regulation 542/20142428, the European legislator followed the Commission 
Proposal 2013 and added the new provisions of Articles 71a to 71d to the set of rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, but undertook several changes compared with the proposed wording 
of these articles according to the Commission Proposal 2013. In the following paragraphs, 
Articles 71a to 71d of the Brussels Ibis Regulation pursuant to the Commission Proposal 2013 
shall be discussed and compared with the corresponding Articles according to Regulation 
542/2014. The decisive question to be answered is whether respectively to which extent the 
said provisions accomplish to bring in line the UPC Agreement with the rules of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation without any structural breaks. For a better readability and understanding, and 
in order to illustrate existing differences between the Commission Proposal 2013 and 
Regulation 542/2014, the relevant provisions shall be presented by way of a synopsis.       
  
 
4.4.2.4.2.1 Treatment of the UPC as a court of a Member State 
 
Originally, the UPC was constructed as a court outside the EU structure. This provoked fierce 
criticism, because the UPC – while being outside the EU structure – would interpret and apply 
EU law. The ECJ addressed this constellation as a violation of the principles of the EU system 
of judicial review. Although being based on the example of the BC (the latter being 
specifically recognised by the Treaties), there are considerable structural differences between 
the BC and the UPC: The jurisdiction of the UPC is not limited to preliminary references – in 
contrast to the jurisdiction of the BC2429, and the UPC is fully detached from the national legal 
systems.2430  
 
It was in view of this criticism that the Commission elaborated a proposal how to integrate the 
UPC in the existing EU structure. Pursuing this objective, the Commission chose the way to 
clarify in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation that the UPC be considered a “court” within 
the meaning of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this regard, the Commission Proposal 2013 
provides for such a clarification in its Article 71a which has been adopted in Article 71a of 
Regulation 542/2014 by slightly varying the wording which has not effected any change of 
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(1) For the purposes of this Regulation, a court 
common to several Member States (a “common 
court”) shall be a court of a Member State when, 
pursuing to the agreement establishing it, it exercises 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters within the 
meaning of this Regulation. 
 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Regulation, the following 
shall each be a common court: 
 
(a) the Unified Patent Court established by the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court signed on 19 
February 2013 (the “UPC Agreement”); 
 
(b) the Benelux Court of Justice established by the 
Treaty of 31 March 1965 concerning the 
establishment and statute of a Benelux Court of 






(1) For the purposes of this Regulation, a court 
common to several Member States as specified in 
paragraph 2 (a ‘common court’) shall be deemed to be 
a court of a Member State when, pursuant to the 
instrument establishing it, such a common court 
exercises jurisdiction in matters falling within the 
scope of this Regulation. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Regulation, the following 
shall be a common court: 
 
(a) the Unified Patent Court established by the 
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court signed on 19 
February 2013 (the ‘UPC Agreement’); 
 
(b) the Benelux Court of Justice established by the 
Treaty of 31 March 1965 concerning the 
establishment and statute of a Benelux Court of 
Justice (the ‘Benelux Court of Justice Treaty’). 
 
 
As has been mentioned above, the UPC will be divided into divisions situated in several 
States (cf. Article 7 of the UPC Agreement). As a consequence, it may occur that a defendant 
is sued before a division which is not situated in the Member State of the court designated 
according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This shall be illustrated by the following sample 
cases 1 and 2: 
 
 
 Case 1: 
 
 P, a Dutch company having its seat in the Netherlands, holds a European patent with 
 unitary effect on a product in the field of chemistry. X, an Austrian company having 
 its seat in Austria, infringes P's patent by manufacturing and selling an identical 
 product in Austria. P wonders where it can initiate patent infringement proceedings 
 against X.    
  
 
According to the general jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, X would expect to 
be sued at his domicile on the basis of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. However, 
the UPC Agreement provides for deviating, broader rules in Article 33 of the UPC 
Agreement. In Case 1, P can sue X before the local division hosted by Austria as the 
Contracting Member State where the defendant has its “residence” (if there is such a local 
division), respectively before the regional division in which Austria participates (if there is 
such a regional division) (cf. Article 33(1)(b) of the UPC Agreement). Additionally, pursuant 
to Article 33(1)(a) of the UPC Agreement, P can sue X before the local division hosted by the 
Contracting Member State where the infringement has occurred or may occur, or the regional 
division in which that Contracting Member State participates. But what does the term 
“infringement” mean in this context? Is it the act of infringement or the result of such an act? 
In light of the fact that a European patent with unitary effect has unitary effect in all 
participating Member States by virtue of Regulation 1257/2012 (cf. Article 2(c) of Regulation 
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1257/2012), an interpretation according to which the term “infringement” within the meaning 
of Article 33(1)(a) of the UPC Agreement refers to the result of an infringing act would not 
make sense, because then Article 33(a) of the UPC Agreement would a priori confer 
jurisdiction to the local divisions of all Contracting Member States. This provision must 
therefore rather be interpreted to refer to the local division hosted by the Contracting Member 
State where the infringing act has occurred or may occur, respectively the regional division in 
which that Contracting Member State participates. This interpretation also correlates with the 
provision of substantive law of Article 8(2) of the Rome II Regulation2431: 
 
 
 Article 8  




 (2) In the case of a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of a unitary Community 
 intellectual property right, the law applicable shall, for any question that is not governed by the 




In Case 1, Article 33(1)(a) of the UPC Agreement would thus lead to the local division hosted 
by Austria (if there is such a local division), respectively the regional division in which 
Austria participates (if there is such a regional division), because the infringing act 
(manufacture) has been committed in Austria.   
 
Besides, P and X may agree to proceed before the divisions of their choice, including the 
central division which has its seat in Paris, with sections in London and in Munich (Article 
7(2)1 of the UPC Agreement). However, Article 7(2)2 of the UPC Agreement provides that 
the cases before the central division shall be distributed in accordance with Annex II of the 
UPC Agreement. As the concerned patent concerns a product in the field of chemistry, the 




 Case 2: 
 
The situation shall essentially be as illustrated in Case 1, apart from the fact that P's 
 patent is infringed by Y, a Spanish company which has its seat in Spain and 
manufactures an identical product in Spain. P wonders where it can initiate patent 
infringement proceedings against Y.    
  
 
The decisive difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is the fact that Y, in contrast to X, has its 
seat in a State which is no Contracting Member State in the meaning of Article 2(c) of the 
UPC Agreement, because Spain does not take part in the UPC Agreement. According to 
Article 33(1)(b) 4th sentence of the UPC Agreement, actions against defendants having their 
residence, or principal place of business (...) outside the territory of the Contracting Member 
                                                 
2431
 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L199 of 31 July 2007, pp. 40-49, available at WWW 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007R0864&from=EN> (lastly accessed 
on 1 June 2015). 
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States shall be brought before the local or regional division in accordance with Article 
33(1)(a) of the UPC Agreement or before the central division. Consequently, P can sue Y 
before the local division hosted by the Netherlands (if there is such a local division), 
respectively the regional division in which the Netherlands participate (if there is such a 
regional division), or before the central division. As the concerned patent concerns a product 
in the field of chemistry, the London section of the central division of the UPC would be 
competent (cf. Annex II of the UPC Agreement in conjunction with Article 7(2) of the UPC 
Agreement). 
 
It is to be noticed that Article 71(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation allows conventions on 
particular matters which already exist, but does not allow any such new conventions like the 
UPC Agreement.2432 Article 71(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation reads as follows: 
 
 
 Article 71 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
  
 (1) This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which, 




In order to ensure that the Brussels Ibis Regulation is also fully applicable where proceedings 
are brought before the UPC, it was necessary to clarify that the UPC is considered a “court” 
of a Member State in the meaning of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Noteworthily, the 
European legislator defined the term “court” neither in the Brussels I Regulation nor in the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (although Article 2 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains a list of 
definitions); in particular, neither Article 3 nor Article 71a of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
contain a real definition of the notion of “court”.2433 Article 3 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
merely includes certain specific authorities within the concept of “court” for purposes of the 
operation of the Brussels Ibis Regulation,2434 which however should not be relevant with 
regard to patent disputes.2435 At least, Recital 11 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation provides for 
some clarification, stating: 
 
 
 Recital 11 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
 
 For the purposes of this Regulation, courts or tribunals of the Member States should include courts or 
 tribunals common to several Member States, such as the Benelux Court of Justice when it exercises 
 jurisdiction on matters falling within the scope of this Regulation. Therefore, judgments given by such 
 courts should be recognised and enforced in accordance with this Regulation.  
 
 
However, it has been rightly underlined that a recital does not have binding nature and thus 
cannot ensure with a sufficient degree of legal certainty compliance of the UPC Agreement 
with the Brussels Ibis Regulation, particularly Article 71 thereof.2436 By explicitly mentioning 
the UPC in Article 71a as a “common court”, the European legislator makes clear that the 
international jurisdiction of the UPC will be determined by the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This 
clarification serves in particular to ensure legal certainty and predictability for defendants who 
                                                 
2432
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 4. 
2433
 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 331; Luginbühl & Stauder (2014)63(10) GRUR Int. 885, at p. 886. 
2434
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 5.  
2435
 Luginbühl & Stauder (2014)63(10) GRUR Int. 885, at p. 886. 
2436
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 5. 
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eventually would expect to be sued in a specific Member State pursuant to the rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, by making clear that they may be sued before a division of the UPC 
which is located in another Member State than the national courts designated according to the 
“ordinary” rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2437         
 
 
4.4.2.4.2.2 Operation of the jurisdiction rules applicable in relation to the UPC 
concerning Member State defendants 
 
It is noteworthy that Article 71b of Regulation 542/2014, while using the broad notion of 
“jurisdiction”, actually merely affects international jurisdiction,2438 and does not concern local 
jurisdiction. This is due to logical reasons: With regard to a court which is considered to be 
common to several Contracting Member States, local jurisdiction cannot exist.2439 Despite the 
fact that coordination of the rules conferring international jurisdiction to the UPC and the 
provisions on the internal allocation of competence within the UPC may be problematic, the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation cannot provide for respective rules touching the internal allocation of 
competence within the UPC because this subject lies beyond the scope of the Regulation.2440 
 
 
Correspondingly, Recital 5 of Regulation 542/2014 provides: 
 
 
 Recital 5 of Regulation 542/2014 
 
 The amendments to Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 provided for in this Regulation with regard to the 
 Unified Patent Court are intended to establish the international jurisdiction of that Court and do not 
 affect the internal allocation of proceedings among the divisions of that Court nor the arrangements laid 
 down in the UPC Agreement concerning the exercise of jurisdiction, including exclusive jurisdiction, 
 during the transitional period provided for in that Agreement.  
 
 
In regard of the mentioned need to clarify the operation of the jurisdiction rules applicable in 
relation to the UPC concerning Member State defendants, addressed by the Commission, 
Article 71b(1) of the Commission Proposal 2013 contains such a clarifying rule that also 
forms part of Regulation 542/2014. In essence (apart from minor changes regarding the 
wording), Article 71b of the Commission Proposal 2013 has been adopted as Article 71b of 
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 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 334; De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 872. 
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The jurisdiction of a common court shall be 
determined as follows: 
 
(1) The common court shall have jurisdiction where, 
under this Regulation, the courts of a Member State 
party to an agreement establishing a common court 









The jurisdiction of a common court shall be 
determined as follows: 
 
(1) a common court shall have jurisdiction where, 
under this Regulation, the courts of a Member State 
party to the instrument establishing the common court 






Article 71b of the Commission Proposal 2013/ Regulation 542/2014 has been constructed 
corresponding to Article 71 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which provides with regard to 
other international conventions on particular matters:2441 
 
 
 Article 71  
 
 (1) This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which, 
 in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments. 
 
 (2) With a view to its uniform interpretation, paragraph 1 shall be applied in the following manner:  
 
  (a) this Regulation shall not prevent a court of a Member State which is party to a convention 
  on a particular matter from assuming jurisdiction in accordance with that convention, even 
  where the defendant is domiciled in another Member State which is not party to that  
  convention. The court hearing the action shall, in any event, apply Article 28 of this  
  Regulation; 
 
  (b) judgments given in a Member State by a court in the exercise of jurisdiction provided for in 
  a convention on a particular matter shall be recognised and enforced in the other Member 
  States in accordance with this Regulation.  
 
 Where a convention on a particular matter to which both the Member State of origin and the Member 
 State addressed are parties lays down conditions for the recognition or enforcement of judgments, those 
 conditions shall apply. In any event, the provisions of this Regulation on recognition and enforcement 
 of judgments may be applied.  
 
 
Accordingly, Article 71b of the Commission Proposal 2013/ Regulation 542/2014 prescribes 
that the UPC will have jurisdiction any time when a national court of one of the Contracting 
Member States would have jurisdiction according to the rules of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.2442 On the other hand, this statement also implies, a contrario, that the UPC will 
lack jurisdiction when no national court of a Contracting Member State has jurisdiction based 
on the rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. This will be the case if, according to the Brussels 
                                                 
2441
 In the Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission Proposal 2013, it has been rightly suggested that 
similar clarifications have been undertaken, for instance, in Articles 64 and 67 of the 2007 Lugano Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, cf. European 
Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 5. 
2442
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 5. 
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Ibis Regulation, courts of a non-Contracting Member State would have jurisdiction.2443 It is 
noteworthy that international jurisdiction of the common court according to Article 71b(1) of 
the Commission Proposal 2013/ Regulation 542/2014 merely requires that a national court of 
any Contracting State of the UPC Agreement would have international jurisdiction. There is 
no requirement that the national courts of a specific Contracting State must have hypothetical 
international jurisdiction pursuant to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2444 
 




 Case 1: 
 
P, a Dutch company having its seat in the Netherlands, holds a European patent with 
 unitary effect on a product in the field of chemistry. X, an Austrian company having 
 its seat in Austria, infringes P's patent by manufacturing an identical product in Austria 
and selling it in the Netherlands.  
 
  
According to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Austrian courts would have 
jurisdiction because X has its seat in Austria. Besides, pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, Dutch courts would have jurisdiction because the place where the damage 
occurred would be situated in the Netherlands. As a consequence, the courts of at least one 
Member State party to the UPC Agreement (here: both Austria and the Netherlands) would 
have jurisdiction under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Therefore the UPC has jurisdiction in 
this case (cf. Article 71b(1) of Regulation 542/2014.   
  
 
 Case 3: 
 
P, a Dutch company having its seat in the Netherlands, holds a European patent with 
 unitary effect on a product in the field of chemistry. Y, a Spanish company having 
 its seat in Spain, infringes P's patent by manufacturing an identical product in Spain 
and selling it in the Netherlands.  
 
  
Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Spanish courts would have 
jurisdiction because Y's seat is located in Spain. According to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, Dutch courts would have jurisdiction because the place where the damage 
occurred would be situated in the Netherlands. As in Case 1, the courts of at least one 
Member State party to the UPC Agreement (here: the Netherlands) would have jurisdiction 
under the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect it does not matter that Spain is a Member 
State but no Contracting State to the UPC Agreement. As in Case 1, the UPC has jurisdiction 
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 Case 4: 
 
P, a Dutch company having its seat in the Netherlands, holds a European patent with 
 unitary effect on a product in the field of chemistry. Z, a Russian company having 
 its seat in Russia, infringes P's patent by manufacturing an identical product in Russia 
and selling it in the Netherlands.  
 
  
In contrast to Cases 1 and 3, Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not apply in 
Case 4,2445 because Russia where Z has its seat is no Member State. According to Article 6(1) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State would be 
determined by the law of that Member State, because the constellation described does not 
touch upon matters of Articles 18(1), 21(2), 24 or 25 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not apply either2446 because it also requires that the 
defendant is domiciled in a Member State. As a consequence, the UPC does not have 
jurisdiction according to Article 71b(1) of Regulation 542/2014 in Case 4. However, this 
result does not exclude that jurisdiction of the UPC can be grounded on another legal basis. 
This shall be discussed in the following paragraphs.   
 
Article 71b(1) complements Article 71a in that it explicitly stipulates that a “common court” 
shall not only be considered to be a court of a Contracting Member State (cf. Article 71a), but 
that it shall have jurisdiction to the same extent as national courts of Contracting Member 
States in a matter governed by the UPC Agreement. At a closer look, one might argue that 
Article 71b(1) would not be necessary beside Article 71a, because its content is actually 
implied in Article 71a. However, this might be owed to the Commission's severe intent “to 
create full transparency on the combined and coherent application”2447 of the UPC Agreement 
and the Brussels Ibis Regulation. It has been rightly highlighted that, with regard to the UPC, 
many heads of jurisdiction of the Brussels Ibis Regulation do not apply, because they do not 
fall within the scope of application of the UPC Agreement. Beyond Articles 7(5) and 8(3) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 71b(1) of Regulation 542/2014 primarily concerns 
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 At this point, suffice it to state that Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not apply immediately. 
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4.4.2.4.2.3 Creation of uniform jurisdiction rules vis-à-vis third State defendants 
 
Article 71b(2) and (3) of the Commission Proposal 2013 respectively Article 71b(2) and (3) 
of Regulation 542/2014 have been constructed according to the Commission's intent to 
establish uniform rules for the international jurisdiction vis-à-vis third State defendants in 
proceedings against such defendants brought in the UPC where national law is applicable, 
because the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not itself provide for such rules. With regard to 
those legal situations which are not governed by uniform jurisdiction rules (such uniform 
jurisdiction rules already exist, for instance, with regard to exclusive jurisdiction concerning 
proceedings on the registration and validity of patents, in contrast to patent infringement 
proceedings), Article 71b(2) and (3) of the Commission Proposal 2013 respectively Article 
71b(2) and (3) of Regulation 542/2014 aim at providing an adequate solution for the 
addressed issues by completing the jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation for 
matters falling within the competence of the UPC where third State defendants are affected. 
Article 71(b)(2) and Article 71(b)(3) are constructed in such a way that Article 71(b)(3) 
complements Article 71(b)(2). 
 
While the content of Article 71b(2) of the Commission Proposal 2013 has been adopted in 
Article 71b(2) of Regulation 542/2014, by merely slightly amending the wording, Article 
71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 deviates from Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 
2013 in that the requirements for an action relating to an infringement of a European patent 
giving rise to damage within the Union, against a defendant domiciled in a non-Member 
State, before a common court have been altered. Articles 71b(2) and (3) of the Commission 


































The jurisdiction of a common court shall be 




(2) Where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member 
State, and this Regulation does not otherwise confer 
jurisdiction over him, the provisions of Chapter II 
shall apply as if the defendant was domiciled in a 
Member State. Article 35 shall apply even if the courts 
of non-Member States have jurisdiction as to the 




(3) Where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member 
State and no court of a Member State has jurisdiction 
under this Regulation, the defendant may be sued in 
the common court if: 
 
(a) property belonging to the defendant is located in a 
Member State party to the agreement establishing the 
common court; 
 
(b) the value of the property is not insignificant 
compared to the value of the claim; 
 
(c) the dispute has a sufficient connection with any 







The jurisdiction of a common court shall be 




(2) where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member 
State, and this Regulation does not otherwise confer 
jurisdiction over him, Chapter II shall apply as 
appropriate regardless of the defendant's domicile. 
 
Application may be made to a common court for 
provisional, including protective, measures even if the 
courts of a third State have jurisdiction as to the 
substance of the matter;  
 
(3) where a common court has jurisdiction over a 
defendant under point 2 in a dispute relating to an 
infringement of a European patent giving rise to 
damage within the Union, that court may also exercise 
jurisdiction in relation to damage arising outside the 
Union from such an infringement. 
 
Such jurisdiction may only be established if property 
belonging to the defendant is located in any Member 
State party to the instrument establishing the common 
court and the dispute has a sufficient connection with 




Noteworthily, Article 31 of the UPC Agreement declares applicable the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation or the Lugano Convention for determining international jurisdiction of the UPC: 
 
 
 Article 31 of the UPC Agreement 
 
 The international jurisdiction of the Court shall be established in accordance with Regulation (EU) No. 
 1215/2012 or, where applicable, on the basis of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
 enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Lugano Convention’). 
 
 
Insofar as the Brussels Ibis Regulation respectively the Lugano Convention determine 
jurisdiction by reference to provisions implied in these sets of rules, Article 31 of the UPC 
Agreement does not raise a problem. But problems arise in case that the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation or the Lugano Convention determine jurisdiction by reference to the national law 
of the Member State where proceedings are initiated. In this respect, the essential rule 
contained in Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation2449 is to be borne in mind which 
provides: 
 
                                                 
2449
 Article 4 of the Lugano Convention contains a similar set of rules. 
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 Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation  
 
 (1) If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member 
 State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of 
 that Member State.  
 
 (2) As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Member State may, whatever his nationality, 
 avail himself in that Member State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those of 
 which the Member States are to notify the Commission pursuant to point (a) of Article 76(1), in the 
 same way as nationals of that Member State. 
 
 
Referring to the national law of the forum Member State, Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (and the same applies to Article 4 of the Lugano Convention) does not determine 
which rules should apply to determine the jurisdiction of courts that are common to several 
Member States such as the UPC.2450 A further problem to be solved arises from the fact that 
the UPC is divided into several divisions; in this respect, the Commission has rightly 
highlighted that referring to different national laws for the several divisions of the UPC would 




4.4.2.4.2.3.1 Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
According to the clear rule codified in Article 71(b)(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, 
the UPC shall, in proceedings against third State defendants, have jurisdiction as if these 
defendants were domiciled in a Member State, which is effected by stating that Chapter II of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (containing jurisdiction rules) shall be applicable. This implies 
the application of special jurisdiction according to Articles 7 and 8 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. Remarkably, this is not in line with the clear wording of Article 7 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation which refers to “a person domiciled in a Member State”. However, despite 
this structural break, it is to be accepted that the European legislator, when creating Article 
71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, intended to create a special provision – which 
precedes the general rule in Article 7 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2452 It is noteworthy that 
Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 thus picks up the initial idea contained in 
the Commission Proposal 2010 to widely extend jurisdiction rules to third State defendants, 
and even goes beyond it by also referring to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in 
Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, while Article 6(1) of the Commission 
Proposal 2010 did not imply an extension to third State defendants.2453 From the European 
perspective, Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 provides adequate jurisdiction 
rules, also because patent protection does not depend on the fact whether the defendant is 
domiciled in a Member State or in a third State.2454 Others have criticised that the approach 
pursued by the European legislator in Article 71b of Regulation 542/2014 does not go far 
enough, and that the preservation of different rules governing access to justice in the Member 
States with respect to disputes involving third State defendants in matters governed by the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation remains a significant failure in the evolution of the Brussels 
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Regulation, effecting distortions between the jurisdiction rules and the provisions on 
recognition and enforcement of judgments provided for by the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2455   
 
To illustrate the functioning of Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, I shall 
reconsider Case 4. 
 
 
 Case 4: 
 
P, a Dutch company having its seat in the Netherlands, holds a European patent with 
 unitary effect on a product in the field of chemistry. Z, a Russian company having 
 its seat in Russia, infringes P's patent by manufacturing an identical product in Russia 
and selling it in the Netherlands.  
 
  
It has been stated above that the UPC does not have jurisdiction according to Article 71b(1) of 
Regulation 542/2014, because Z's seat is not situated in a Member State. As the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation does not otherwise confer jurisdiction over him either (apart from, eventually, 
Article 71b which is being analysed instantly here), Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 
542/2014 provides that Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (jurisdiction rules) shall 
apply regardless of the defendant's domicile. According to the wording of Article 71b(2) 1st 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014, jurisdiction of the UPC concerning an infringement action 
against Z could eventually be based on Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 in 
conjunction with Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, or on Article 71b(2) 1st sentence 
of Regulation 542/2014 in conjunction with Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Pursuant to Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 in conjunction with Article 
7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Dutch courts would have jurisdiction because the place 
where the damage occurred would be situated in the Netherlands. But what about jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 in conjunction with Article 
4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation? Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation confers 
jurisdiction to “the courts of that Member State” (where the defendant is domiciled). But in 
the case of a defendant domiciled outside the European Union – like Z in Case 4 – this 
prerequisite of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not fulfilled. Case 4 thus 
demonstrates that the reference to Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation contained in 
Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 cannot comprise Article 4(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation for logical reasons.2456 The wording of Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of 
Regulation 542/2014 should therefore be amended by explicitly providing that Article 71b(2) 




4.4.2.4.2.3.2 Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
According to Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014, the UPC shall have 
authority to order provisional, including protective, measures even if the courts of a third 
State have jurisdiction for the substance of the matter. Consequently, access to justice before 
the UPC for defendants domiciled in an EU Member State and third State defendants will be 
equally ensured in this respect, and independently of which instance or division within the 
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UPC is seised of a claim.2457 In contrast to the text of Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence of 
Regulation 542/2014, the wording of Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence of the Commission Proposal 
2013 explicitly refers to the applicability of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
However, these variant formulations should not effect a different evaluation of both 
provisions with regard to their content. Similarly to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
jurisdiction of the common court to order provisional, including protective, measures can, vis-
à-vis third State defendants, be based on two pillars: accessory jurisdiction for interim relief 
where there is jurisdiction on the merits (Article 71b(2) 1st sentence) and independent 
jurisdiction for interim relief according to the rules of procedure of the common court (Article 
71b(2) 2nd sentence).2458 However, in contrast to the situation with regard to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, provisional measures must be provided for by the rules of procedure 
of the common court (and not by the procedural law of the Contracting State where the 
common court has been established). Besides, jurisdiction according to Article 71b(2) 2nd 
sentence is only effective against jurisdiction for principal proceedings of courts of third 
States, but cannot have such effect vis-à-vis Member States courts.2459 However, this effect 
can be reached via Article 71b(2) 1st sentence. In this respect, it has been rightly underlined 
that Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence and Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are parallel 
provisions which complement each other.2460 As with regard to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, Article 71b(2) 2nd sentence does not define “provisional, including protective, 
measures”. As a consequence, identical problems will occur as with regard to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation: legal uncertainty and a lack of sufficient predictability. To resolve 
this problem, the European legislator should, first, implement a definition of the notion of 
“provisional, including protective, measures” into Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
and, second, implement a reference to Article 35 into Article 71b (2) 2nd sentence (as already 
contained in the Commission Proposal 2013).  
 
 
4.4.2.4.2.3.3 Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
It is noteworthy that – contrary to the relationship between Article 71b(2) of the Commission 
Proposal 2013 and Article 71b(2) of Regulation 542/2014 – Article 71b(3) of Regulation 
542/2014 significantly differs from Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 2013 which 
will be carved out in the following paragraphs.2461  
 
Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 complements Article 71b(2) of Regulation 
542/2014 insofar as the authority of the UPC regarding a third State defendant is extended in 
that the court, in case of an infringement of a European patent, may not only exercise 
jurisdiction concerning damage arising within the European Union, but also regarding damage 
that arises outside the European Union from such an infringement. In this respect, Recital 7 1st 
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Recital 7 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
A common court should be able to hear disputes involving defendants from third States on the basis of a 
subsidiary rule of jurisdiction in proceedings relating to an infringement of a European patent giving 
rise to damage both inside and outside the Union. (...) 
 
 
In structural respect, it is noteworthy that Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
seems to constitute no separate head of jurisdiction, but rather seems to determine the scope 
of the court's authority to decide.2462 However, others seem to classify Article 71b(3) 1st 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014 as a ground of jurisdiction.2463 In any event, as this provision 
extends the reach of single enforcement to cover infringements outside the European Union 
by defendants not domiciled in a Member State, and thus offers patentees the possibility to 
claim enforcement without having to litigate in the State of infringement, the rationale behind 
Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 might be to enhance a key advantage that 
the UPC may offer to become an alternative forum to the US for major patent litigation.2464  
 
The significance of Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 becomes obvious in 
conjunction with Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation in the case of (patent) 
infringements in several States. A comprehensive authority to decide regarding infringements 
in all concerned States principally exists only before the courts of the State where the 
defendant is domiciled (Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), and at the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation). Jurisdiction at 
the place where the damage occurred in principle merely confers authority to decide on 
infringements which have occurred in the forum State (mosaic principle).2465 However, in the 
case of third State defendants, Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not apply, and 
the application of 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is only possible via Article 71b(2) 1st 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014. As Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
directly refers to Article 71b(2) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 (“where a common court 
has jurisdiction over a defendant under point 2”), the rules developed by the ECJ2466 in the 
framework of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) with 
regard to the scope of authority to decide, apply in the constellation of Article 71b(3) 1st 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014 where the UPC has jurisdiction over a third State defendant 
in a dispute concerning an infringement of a European patent giving rise to the damage within 
the European Union. On the basis of jurisdiction at the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage (Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), it seems that the UPC could have 
unrestricted jurisdiction over the whole infringement, without the need for a supplementary 
rule, if the place where the event giving rise to an infringement of a European patent, which 
also produces damage outside the Union, is located in a Contracting State of the UPC 
Agreement.2467  
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respectfully disagree with this opinion. 
2464
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 879. 
2465
 Cf. explications in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
2466
 Cf. in particular ECJ 7 March 1995, C-68/93, Fiona Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA, [1995] ECR I-
00415 – Shevill: “mosaic principle”. 
2467
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 880. 
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The true purpose of Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 seems to consist in 
extending the court’s authority to decide, beyond the rules with regard to the authority to 
decide mentioned above, at the place where the damage occurred in respect of damage which 
arises outside the European Union.2468 From the European perspective, this extension of 
jurisdiction of the UPC may provide for an enhanced protection with regard to European 
patents and European patents with unitary effect by ensuring an adequate judiciary also for 
deciding on such extra-Union damage. It should however be borne in mind that this happens 
at the expense of courts of those EPC Contracting States which are no EU Member States.2469 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I have arrived at the conclusion that only the place where the 
patent right has been infringed (“Ort der Rechtsgutverletzung”) is to be considered the place 
where the damage occurred according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As a 
consequence, the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage 
occurred will regularly coincide. This fact may relativise the importance of the extension of 
the authority to decide pursuant to Article 71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 which 
refers to jurisdiction at the place where the damage occurred, where the invoked court has 
also jurisdiction because the forum is situated at the place of the event giving rise to the 
damage, and therefore has corresponding broad authority to decide.   
 
In light of the clear jurisprudence of the ECJ in Roche Nederland that in the case of infringing 
several national parts of an ordinary European patent, there are actually several infringements, 
it is suggested that, while the wording of Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 refers to “an 
infringement”, it can be established that proceedings concerning at the same time the 
infringement of a European patent within the European Union and outside the European 
Union actually cover different infringements. In light of this, the extension of the jurisdiction 
of the UPC to adjudicate a patent infringement outside the European Union according to 
Article 71b(3) of  Regulation 542/2014, where the UPC has no jurisdiction under Chapter II 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, seems controversial.2470   
 
 
4.4.2.4.2.3.4 Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
However, in order to avoid proliferation of jurisdiction according to Article 71b(3) 1st 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014,2471 Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 sets 
up two conditions that must be fulfilled for such jurisdiction: first, property belonging to the 
                                                 
2468
 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at pp. 337-338; Luginbühl & Stauder (2014)63(10) GRUR Int. 885, at p. 
888. 
2469
 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 338. 
2470
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 880. 
2471
 According to the schematic place of Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 behind Article 
71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, and also under (3), one should conclude that it refers only to Article 
71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014 and not to the whole Article 71b of Regulation 542/2014, although a 
purely literal interpretation of Article 71b of Regulation 542/2014 would also justify the latter alternative (the 
notion of “such jurisdiction” in Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence could in theory refer to “the jurisdiction” at the 
beginning of Article 71b or to the term “jurisdiction” in Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence). Likewise: Mankowski, cf. 
Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 338. However, I respectfully disagree with Mankowski's opinion that 
Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 has the effect to establish jurisdiction (“Art. 71b Nr. 3 UA 2 
wirkt im Ergebnis zuständigkeitsbegründend, obwohl er auf den ersten Blick Einschränkungen durch zusätzliche 
Voraussetzungen zu normieren scheint. Ohne diese zusätzlichen Voraussetzungen würde jedoch überhaupt keine 
Erweiterung der Zuständigkeit stattfinden, und Art. 71b Nr. 3 wäre neben Art. 71b Nr. 2 i.V.m. Art. 7 Nr. 2 
überflüssig und ohne eigenen Sinn”, cf. Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 338). In my opinion, Article 
71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 restricts Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 that 
actually extends jurisdiction as already discussed. Extension of jurisdiction is thus only effected by Article 
71b(3) 1st sentence of Regulation 542/2014, but not by Article 71b(3) 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014. 
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defendant must be located in any UPC Contracting Member State and, second, the dispute 
must have a sufficient connection with any such Member State. In contrast to Article 71b(3) 
of Regulation 542/2014, Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 2013, first, does not 
contain a clear differentiation between damage arising within the European Union and 
damage that arises outside the Union. In comparison with Article 71b(3) of Regulation 
542/2014, it is remarkable, second, that Article 71b(3)(a) to (c) of the Commission Proposal 
2013, on the one hand, at first glance seems to be more restrictive as it contains three 
conditions (and not only two as Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014) to be fulfilled for 
jurisdiction, but on the other hand to some extent less restrictive with regard to the exact 
content of the conditions set up. In contrast to Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014, Article 
71b(3)(a) to (c) of the Commission Proposal 2013 not only requires the existence of property 
belonging to the defendant in a UPC Contracting Member State (a), and the existence of a 
sufficient connection between the dispute with a Member State party to the UPC Agreement 
(c), but also sets up the requirement that the value of the property is not insignificant 
compared to the value of the claim (b). This requirement indeed lacks in Article 71b(3) of 
Regulation 542/2014. By way of an isolated consideration, one might therefore arrive at the 
conclusion that Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 2013 is more restrictive than 
Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 in this respect. However, a closer look reveals that the 




 Recital 7 3rd sentence of Regulation 542/2014 
 
 (...) In establishing its jurisdiction, the common court should have regard to the value of the property in 
 question, which should not be insignificant and which should be such as to make it possible to enforce 




Although a recital does not have binding character like a legal provision, it should be assumed 
that Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 and Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 
2013 would arrive at the same results. Nevertheless, for the sake of legal certainty and 
predictability, the value criterion should be integrated in the wording of Article 71b(3) of 
Regulation 542/2014 in the framework of a future reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.   
 
Notwithstanding these differences between Article 71b(3) of the Commission Proposal 2013 
and Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014, it is to be remarked that the European legislator 
intended to create, for disputes involving defendants domiciled outside the European Union, 
an additional forum2472 at the place where assets are located, in order to balance the absence 
of the defendant in the European Union.2473  
 
Arguing in favour of this approach to establish an additional asset-based forum, in order to 
ensure the jurisdiction of the UPC in situations where the extended jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation would not provide for jurisdiction and where such jurisdiction may 
be appropriate, the Commission has put forth that such a rule also exists in a sizeable group of 
Member States,2474 which may suggest that there is already experience in applying such a 
rule. Besides, it has been underlined by the Commission that establishing an asset-based 
                                                 
2472
 Cf. Recital 7 2nd sentence of Regulation 542/2014: “subsidiary jurisdiction”. 
2473
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 6; cf. also Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, 
at p. 338. 
2474
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 6. 
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forum brings along the advantage that a judgment can be enforced in the State where it was 
issued, which may avoid eventual difficulties which might arise with regard to cross-border 
recognition and enforcement.2475 However, while the existence of property belonging to the 
defendant, within the forum, may also be one of the traditional bases of jurisdiction under 
national law, it has not been applied to cases of infringement of foreign intellectual property 
rights.2476 Also by reference to the solutions proposed in the CLIP Principles and the ALI 
Principles, as well as in other model provisions concerning international jurisdiction over 
intellectual property litigation drafted in other regions of the world2477, Article 71b(3) 2nd 
sentence of Regulation 542/2014 has therefore been considered as inappropriate.2478 
Furthermore, in typical situations, there is the risk that a judgment rendered by the UPC on 
the basis of Article 71b(2) in conjunction with Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 will not 
be recognised or enforced in the non-EU State of infringement, in particular because the 
decision would not comply with the standard of review of the jurisdiction of the deciding 
court.2479  
 
Moreover, the argument brought forward by the Commission that creating an additional asset-
based forum “fits better in the general philosophy of the Brussels Ibis Regulation than other 
rules of subsidiary jurisdiction such as those provided in the Community trade mark 
Regulation and the Community designs Regulation (...) which allow proceedings against third 
States defendants to be brought, in particular, before the courts of the Member State where the 
plaintiff is domiciled (forum actoris)”2480, is not convincing. Deviating from Article 25 the 
Commission Proposal 20102481, the European legislator did refrain from establishing a general 
asset-based forum in the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and thus clearly expressed its negative 
attitude towards such a rule. By integrating an asset-based forum into the system of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation “through the back door” via Article 71b(3) of  Regulation 542/2014, 
the European legislator created a structural break in the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2482  
 
As to the Commission's reference to similar rules in the Community trade mark Regulation 
and the Community designs Regulation, one could argue that creating a forum actoris in 
clearly defined constellations in case of third State defendants could bring along the benefit to 
ensure harmony (“Gleichklang”) between the treatment of European patents with unitary 
effect on the one hand, and Community trade marks and Community designs on the other 
hand. Both the Community trade mark Regulation and the Community designs Regulation 
contain a complete set of rules on jurisdiction vis-à-vis third State defendants, comprising the 
rule of a forum actoris applicable under specific circumstances. The respective rules of those 
Regulations are Article 97(2) of the Community trade mark Regulation and Article 82(2) of 
the Community designs Regulation. Article 97(2) of the Community trade mark Regulation 
reads as follows: 
 
  
                                                 
2475
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), p. 6. 
2476
 Fawcett & Torremans 2011, para. 6.89. 
2477
 In this respect, the Waseda Proposal and the Korean KOPILA Principles shall be mentioned, cf. Jurčys 
(2012)3(3) JIPITEC 174, at p. 177.  
2478
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at pp. 881-882. 
2479
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at pp. 882-883; cf. also De Miguel Asensio 2010, p. 274. 
2480
 European Commission 2013 (Commission Proposal 2013), pp. 6-7. 
2481
 Article 25 of the Commission Proposal 2010 provided: 
“Where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 2 to 24, jurisdiction shall lie 
with the courts of the Member State where property belonging to the defendant is located, provided that 
(a) the value of the property is not disproportionate to the value of the claim; and 
(b) the dispute has a sufficient connection with the Member State of the court seised.” 
2482
 Cf. also Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at pp. 338-339. 
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 (2) If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such 
 proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if 
 he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in which he has an establishment. 
 
 








 (2) If the defendant is neither domiciled nor has an establishment in any of the Member States, such 
 proceedings shall be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the plaintiff is domiciled or, if 
 he is not domiciled in any of the Member States, in any Member State in which he has an establishment. 
 
 
However, it has been rightly put forth in legal doctrine that a comparison between jurisdiction 
for the Community trade mark and the Community design on the one hand, and the European 
patent with unitary effect on the other hand seems inappropriate due to the different functions 
that those rules fulfil.2483 While the cited rules of the Trade Mark Regulation and the Design 
Regulation basically confer jurisdiction to the courts of Member States of the Regulation in 
situations that clearly (and on other grounds) should fall within the international jurisdictions 
of the EU Member States, Article 71b(3) of Regulation 542/2014 determines the extent of 
jurisdiction of the UPC in situations where there is no similar connection with the Contracting 
State to the UPC Agreement.2484 As to Article 97(2) of the Community trade mark Regulation 
(and a corresponding reasoning applies to the respective provisions of the Community designs 
Regulation) there is no doubt, since the proceedings refer to the infringement and validity of 
Community trade marks, that the courts of one or several Member States must have 
international jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes. As a consequence, Article 97(2) of the 
Community trade mark Regulation has essentially the function to allocate jurisdiction among 
the Member States.2485     
  
 
4.4.2.4.2.3.5 Creation of additional fragmentation due to jurisdiction of the UPC with 
regard to patent disputes concerning States not participating in the UPC Agreement    
 
According to Article 1 of the UPC Agreement, the UPC has jurisdiction with regard to 
disputes relating to European patents and European patents with unitary effect. But how to 
deal with those situations in which the courts of a Member State have jurisdiction according 
to the Brussels Ibis Regulation to adjudicate not only claims with respect of the infringement 
by the defendant of a European patent but also concerning the infringement by the defendant 
of patents granted in non-European States?2486 As the UPC does not have jurisdiction with 
                                                 
2483
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 877. 
2484
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 877. 
2485
 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 877. 
2486
 This question has also been raised by De Miguel Asensio, cf. De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at pp. 
875-876.  
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regard to such patents granted for non-European States, the national courts of the Contracting 
Member States remain competent in this respect, to the extent that jurisdiction is conferred to 
them under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the Lugano Convention or national law according to 
Article 6 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2487 As a consequence, separate proceedings before 
separate courts will have to be led. Also, according to Article 32 of the UPC Agreement, the 
national courts of the Contracting Member States will remain competent for actions 
concerning patents and supplementary protection certificates which do not fall within the 
exclusive competence of the UPC.2488 The foregoing examples demonstrate that the 
implementation of the UPC Agreement has effected an additional fragmentation with regard 
to cross-border litigation of patent proceedings.2489 Unfortunately, Regulation 542/2014 does 
not address, let alone resolve those issues which are based on the scope of the jurisdiction of 
the UPC with respect to patent disputes regarding States that do not participate in the UPC 
Agreement.2490 In opposition to this situation, an additional forum as envisaged in the 
Commission Proposal 2013 would determine the extent of the international jurisdiction of the 
UPC regarding disputes involving third State defendants with respect to, for instance, the 
infringement of European patents outside the European Union.2491  
 
 
4.4.2.4.2.4 Application of the rules on lis pendens and related actions in relation to the 
UPC and the national courts of Member States which are not Contracting Parties to the 
UPC Agreement (Article 71c(1) of Regulation 542/2014) 
 
With regard to the question of how to treat the situation that proceedings are initiated both 
before the UPC and before a court of a Member State which does not take part in the UPC 
Agreement, Article 71c(1) of the Commission Proposal 2013 declares applicable the rules on 
lis pendens and related actions according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The provision has 
been adopted as Article 71c(1) of Regulation 542/2014, undertaking a minor adaptation of the 
wording.  
 
Article 71c(1) of the Commission Proposal 2013 and Article 71c(1) of  Regulation 542/2014 
read as follows: 
 
 





(1) Articles 29 to 32 shall apply when proceedings are 
brought in a common court and in a court of a 
Member State not party to the agreement establishing 






(1) Articles 29 to 32 shall apply where proceedings 
are brought in a common court and in a court of a 
Member State not party to the instrument establishing 
that common court. 
 
 
Apart from minor changes, Article 71c(1) of the Commission Proposal 2013 and Article 
71c(1) of  Regulation 542/2014 are formulated in the same way. As to their content, there are 
no differences between the provisions. Article 71c(1) of Regulation 542/2014 makes clear that 
the rules on lis pendens and related actions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are applicable with 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 876. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 876. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 875. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 875. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at pp. 877-878. 
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regard to the relationship between the UPC and the courts of non-Contracting Member States. 
The UPC will be treated like a national court for the purpose of lis pendens, notwithstanding 
which of the courts – the UPC or the “normal” national court – has been seised first.2492 
Therefore the provisions of Articles 29 to 32 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation are not reviewed, 
but their application is merely extended to cover proceedings brought in the UPC.2493  
 
But how to treat the constellation of two proceedings, both of them being brought before the 
UPC, whereas different divisions are invoked? Does Article 71c(1) of  Regulation 542/2014 
apply? Referring to the wording of Article 71c(1) of  Regulation 542/2014, this provision 
does not cover that constellation. However, it could be argued that Articles 29 to 32 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation should be applied in the constellation of two actions brought before 
the UPC as well, because there is no adequate alternative solution.2494 I respectfully disagree 
with this opinion, because in my view, the mutual relationship between several actions 
brought before the UPC, which affects the internal allocation of competence within the UPC, 
is a matter to be governed by the UPC Agreement, and not by the Brussels Ibis Regulation. It 
seems that rules such as Article 33(2) of the UPC Agreement provide for adequate solutions 
in this respect.2495 Article 33(2) of the UPC Agreement reads as follows: 
 
 
Article 33(2) of the UPC Agreement 
 
(2) If an action referred to in Article 32(1)(a), (c), (f), (g) or (h) is pending before a division of the Court 
of First Instance, any action referred to in Article 32(1)(a), (c), (f), (g) or (h) between the same parties 
on the same patent may not be brought before any other division.  
 
If an action referred to in Article 32(1)(a) is pending before a regional division and the infringement has 
occurred in the territories of three or more regional divisions, the regional division concerned shall, at 
the request of the defendant, refer the case to the central division. 
 
In case an action between the same parties on the same patent is brought before several different 
divisions, the division first seized shall be competent for the whole case and any division seized later 
shall declare the action inadmissible in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. 
 
 
Noteworthily, Article 71c(1) of  Regulation 542/2014 only refers to Articles 29 to 32 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, and does not mention Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. However, this should be dispensable, because Articles 33 and 34 of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation concern lis pendens conflicts between Member States courts and third States 
courts, whereas both with regard to classical European patents and regarding European 
patents with unitary effect, such conflicts should not arise due to the principle of 
territoriality.2496      
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 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 339. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 872. 
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2496
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4.4.2.4.2.5 Application of the rules on lis pendens and related actions in relation to the 
UPC and the national courts of Member States which are Contracting Parties to the 
UPC Agreement, during the transitional period (Article 71c(2) of Regulation 542/2014) 
 
While the UPC will have exclusive jurisdiction also with regard to classical European patents 
after expiration of the transitional period of seven years from the entry into force of the UPC 
Agreement, Article 83(1) of the UPC Agreement provides that the UPC shall have only non-
exclusive jurisdiction before the transitional period has expired. As a consequence, during the 
transitional period,2497 an action for infringement or for revocation may still be brought before 
national courts of the Member States. Those courts have jurisdiction according to the rules of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In particular, Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is to 
be taken into account according to which national courts of the Member States have exclusive 
jurisdiction for revocation actions concerning European patents registered in that Member 
State. In light of the possibility of such parallel proceedings – before the UPC or before the 
“normal” national court of a Member State party to the UPC Agreement – it becomes obvious 
that an additional rule was required with regard to the relationship between the cited 
jurisdiction rules during the transitional period, in order to allow for the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction provided for in Article 83(1) of the UPC Agreement.2498 Such a rule has been 
established by Article 71c(2). 
 
 







(2) Articles 29 to 32 shall apply where during the 
transitional period referred to in Article 83(1) of the 
UPC Agreement proceedings are brought in the 
Unified Patent Court and in a court of a Member State 








(2) Articles 29 to 32 shall apply where, during the 
transitional period referred to in Article 83 of the UPC 
Agreement, proceedings are brought in the Unified 
Patent Court and in a court of a Member State party to 
the UPC Agreement.  
 
 
The establishment of Article 71c(2) is required because Article 83 of the UPC Agreement 
provides for a seven-year transitional period after the date of entry into force of the UPC 
Agreement during which an action for infringement or for revocation of a European patent 
may still be brought before the national courts or authorities. According to Article 71c(2) of 
Regulation 542/2014, the rules on lis pendens and related actions are applicable in this period 
regarding proceedings brought before the UPC and before a court of a Contracting Member 
State. As to the change of the text from Article 71c(2) of the Commission Proposal 2013 
(“Article 83(1) of the UPC Agreement”) to Article 71c(2) of Regulation 542/2014 (“Article 
83 of the UPC Agreement”), it is to be stated that the latter version is preferable because rules 
on the transitional period addressed in Article 71c(2) are contained in all paragraphs of 
Article 83 of the UPC Agreement.  
 
As to the relationship between actions before the UPC and national courts during the 
transitional period, Article 71c(2) of the Commission Proposal 2013 contains a clarifying rule 
which has also been modified in Article 71c(2) of Regulation 542/2014. The European 
                                                 
2497
 After the transitional period has expired, Article 71c(2) of Regulation 542/2014 will have become obsolete, 
due to Article 32 of the UPC Agreement which will then confer exclusive jurisdiction to the UPC. 
2498
 Peers (2011)7(2) E.C.L. Review 229, at p. 264. 
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legislator amended Article 71c(2) of the Commission Proposal 2013 in that Article 71c(2) of 
Regulation 542/2014 not only refers to Article 83(1) of the UPC Agreement – as does the 
Commission Proposal 2013 – but to all parts of Article 83 of the UPC Agreement. 
 
With regard to actions for a declaration of non-infringement, it is noteworthy that Article 
33(6) of the UPC Agreement provides: 
 
 
 Article 33(6) of the UPC Agreement 
 
(6) An action for declaration of non-infringement as referred to in Article 32(1)(b) pending before the 
central division shall be stayed once an infringement action as referred to in Article 32(1)(a) between 
the same parties or between the holder of an exclusive licence and the party requesting a declaration of 
non-infringement relating to the same patent is brought before a local or regional division within three 
months of the date on which the action was initiated before the central division.  
 
 
Article 33(6) of the UPC Agreement explicitly addresses the constellation that an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement is raised before the central division of the UPC. In this 
constellation, a lis pendens conflict cannot arise. If, on the other hand, an action for a negative 
declaration is raised before a national court of a Contracting State – which is possible during 
the transitional period – a lis pendens conflict can come into existence (cf. Article 71c(2) of 
Regulation 542/2014). In this respect, it has been rightly criticised that the European legislator 
has not solved the well-known torpedo problem.2499  
 
 
4.4.2.4.2.6 Operation of the rules on recognition and enforcement in relation between 
Member States which have ratified the UPC Agreement and the Member States that 
have not ratified the UPC Agreement 
 
In order to determine the regime of recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered, on 
the one hand, by courts of Member States that have ratified the UPC Agreement, and, on the 
other hand, courts of Member States which have not ratified that Agreement, the Commission 
proposed to implement Article 71d into the Brussels Ibis Regulation.2500 The text of Article 
71d of the Commission Proposal 2013 was (with minor changes regarding the wording) 
adopted as Article 71d of Regulation 542/2014. However, a clarifying sentence was added in 
Article 71d of Regulation 542/2014 regarding the recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
rendered by the UPC in another Contracting Member State. Article 71d of the Commission 
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 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 340. 
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 De Miguel Asensio (2014)45(8) IIC 868, at p. 873. 
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In matters of recognition and enforcement, this 
Regulation shall apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of 
 
(a) judgments given by the Unified Patent Court or the 
Benelux Court of Justice which need to be recognised 
and enforced in Member States which are not 
Contracting Parties to the UPC or Benelux 
Agreements; and 
 
(b) judgments given by the courts of Member States 
which are not Contracting Parties to the UPC or 
Benelux Agreements which need to be recognised and 












(a) judgments given by a common court which are to 
be recognised and enforced in a Member State not 




(b) judgments given by the courts of a Member State 
not party to the instrument establishing the common 
court which are to be recognised and enforced in a 
Member State party to that instrument. 
 
 
However, where recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment given by a common court is sought in a 
Member State party to the instrument establishing the 
common court, any rules of that instrument on 
recognition and enforcement shall apply instead of the 
rules of this Regulation. 
 
 
In formal respect, it is to be regretted that the European legislator did not properly subdivide 
the Article. At first glance, Article 71d seems to contain (a) and (b) which consists of two 
sentences. However, the content of the last sentence (“However, where recognition and 
enforcement (..) this Regulation”) obviously concerns not only (b), but Article 71d in total. 
Then it would have been logical – and helpful indeed for reasons of a better readability, to add 
(1) and (2) in front of the first sentence (“This Regulation shall apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of: (...)”) and the last sentence (“However, where recognition and enforcement 
(...) this Regulation”). It is to be hoped that a future reform of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
will take this into consideration. For the sake of structural clarity, I will use this subdivision in 
the following paragraphs. 
 
Article 71d has been constructed similarly to Article 71 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation with 
respect to other international conventions on particular matters, and Articles 64 and 67 of the 
2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters. Article 71(1)d(a) of Regulation 542/2014 ensures that 
judgments of the UPC are recognised and enforced, in non-Contracting Member States (i.e. 
those Member States which have not ratified the UPC Agreement), according to the rules of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect, decisions of the UPC are treated as decisions of 
national courts. This is a logical consequence2501 of the fact that Member States which have 
ratified the UPC Agreement differ from non-Contracting Member States insofar as common 
courts such as the UPC are part of their judicial system. However, this does not impair their 
status as Member States. There would be no justification to recognise decisions of “normal” 
                                                 
2501
 The content of Article 71d(1) of Regulation 542/2014 is already implied in, respectively can already be 
derived from Article 71a of Regulation 542/2014. This has been rightly stated by Mankowski, cf. Mankowski 
(2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 341. 
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national courts, but to deny respectively impede recognition of decisions rendered by such 
common courts as the UPC.2502  
 
Vice versa, Article 71d(1)(b) of Regulation 542/2014 clarifies that the regime of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation applies to the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by the 
courts of a Member State which has not ratified the UPC Agreement, in a Contracting 
Member State. While this provision is not relevant as far as national courts in the Contracting 
Member States have jurisdiction for recognition and enforcement, the rule may gain relevance 
as far as the UPC should have jurisdiction for recognition and enforcement in Contracting 
Member States. 
 
Due to the principle that a more specific provision precedes a general provision (lex specialis-
principle), Article 71d(2) of Regulation 542/2014 stipulates that the UPC Agreement instead 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable for recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
rendered by the UPC, where recognition and enforcement of such a judgment is sought in a 
Member State that has ratified the UPC Agreement. This applies even if the UPC Agreement 
provided less favourable recognition and enforcement rules than the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation.2503 With regard to the recognition and enforcement of decisions of the UPC in 
Member States which have not ratified the UPC Agreement, the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
remains applicable, because then there is no more specific rule to be applied. The scope of 




 Recital 3 of Regulation 542/2014 
 
 It is necessary to regulate the relationship of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 with the UPC Agreement 
 (...) by way of amendments to that Regulation. 
  
 
Article 71d(2) of Regulation 542/2014 ensures the independence of the UPC Agreement 
beside the general rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, while adequately embedding it into 
the existing legal framework. This also means to strengthen the Brussels Ibis Regulation 






On the basis of the foregoing paragraphs, it is to be stated that the European legislator, in 
principle, amended the Brussels Ibis Regulation (by creating Articles 71a to 71d) in such a 
way as to ensure compliance between the UPC Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Minor further amendments concerning the wording and structure of the provisions which have 






                                                 
2502
 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 341: “(...) wäre ein nicht zu rechtfertigender Systembruch.” 
2503
 Mankowski (2014)11(6) GPR 330, at p. 341. 
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4.4.2.5 The UPC's democratic deficit 
 
Moreover, it has been questioned whether the UPC is based on a sufficient democratic 
foundation. It has been underlined that, while the UPC Agreement has been submitted to the 
European Parliament, it has never been deliberated by it, because Member States have 
concluded the UPC Agreement as an international non-EU instrument.2504 National 
parliaments will only have the possibility to ratify the UPC Agreement – or refuse it as a 
whole block, but will neither have the possibility to deliberate on the provisions of the 
Agreement, nor have the possibility to refuse parts of it.2505 In light of this, it has been 
emphasised that the UPC Agreement constitutes “an instrument essentially made by the 
European and international patent communities themselves.”2506 It seems unclear how this 
democratic deficit can be overcome.2507 However, although this view cannot be totally 
dismissed, it is to be underlined that national parliaments at least have to ratify the UPC 
Agreement and thus have considerable influence on whether the UPC Agreement will enter 
into force.  
 
 
4.5 Final considerations  
 
From an overall perspective, the creation of the UPC ultimately means the disempowering of 
national court systems, because patent litigation is entrusted into a new – and untested – court 
system. Its structure and its rules of procedure will constitute a compound of rules from 
various European jurisdictions with different legal traditions and background. It is noteworthy 
that the Rules of Procedure of the UPC will form the first code of civil procedure on a 
European level. It seems too early today to definitely determine whether the “patent package”, 
comprising the European patent with unitary effect and the Unified Patent Court will actually 
keep the promise of all the benefits that are praised by its advocates. In this respect, it seems 
appropriate to adopt a differentiated view. For large companies which need protection in all 
European jurisdictions, a European patent with unitary effect might be preferable, while 
national patents respectively classical European patents might be the cheaper alternative for 
others which only need patent protection for the territory of a limited number of Member 
States. The “patent package” will have to prove that the amount of annual fees to be paid is 
attractive enough in order to make holders of classical European patents change towards 
unitary patents,2508 and that it significantly reduces the costs of protection and enforcement. 








                                                 
2504
 Ullrich (2015)46(1) IIC 1, at p. 4. 
2505
 Ullrich (2015)46(1) IIC 1, at p. 4. 
2506
 Ullrich (2015)46(1) IIC 1, at p. 4. 
2507
 Cf. also Ullrich (2015)46(1) IIC 1, at p. 4: “Overcoming that democratic deficit will be the true challenge for 
the UPC.” 
2508
 Luginbühl (2013)62(4) GRUR Int. 305, at p. 309. 
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As set out in the Introduction to this thesis, patent holders have to face multiple problems 
existing at different levels: international procedural law (in particular international 
jurisdiction), choice of law and substantive law. This thesis restricts itself to primarily treat 
procedural issues, in particular with regard to jurisdiction, when analysing existing problems 
concerning cross-border patent disputes according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. However, 
it does not stop at this point, but, on the basis of the foregoing, considers existing reform 
proposals and finally delivers own formulation proposals which could (and should) be taken 




It is noteworthy that the existence of a patent system is generally recognised in both common 
law and civil law countries. However, there are significant differences. This becomes obvious 
as to the fundamental question of how the existence of patents is to be justified. While the 
most prominent rationale being developed under common law in order to justify a strong, 
effective patent system is the idea that the grant of patent monopolies effects public benefits, 
civil law rather tends to emphasise the protection of private interests.  
 
As to different types of patents, it is noteworthy that, in Europe, a patentee may currently 
choose between a national patent and a European patent (these alternatives will be completed 
by the European patent with unitary effect, which is however not available yet), and both 
common law and civil law systems provide for the possibility to grant a patent on a product or 
on a process. This conception of a differentiation between product patents and process patents 
has also been adopted at the European level. 
 
While there are differences concerning underlying conceptions, it is to be stressed that the 
principle of territoriality applies both in civil law and common law legal systems. In the 
framework of this thesis, the question arises which role is to be attributed to this principle 
with regard to the issue of international jurisdiction, i.e. whether courts should have 
jurisdiction to decide on the infringement of a foreign patent. While, for instance, English, 
French, Dutch and German courts initially held that they are not competent to decide on the 
infringement of a foreign patent, this attitude has significantly changed during the last 
decades. Even English courts have given up their negative attitude towards a decision in 
proceedings on the infringement of a foreign patent at least in relation to proceedings within 
the scope of the Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation). Due to the fact that exclusive 
jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its 
predecessors) merely affects validity actions, it can be concluded a contrario that 
infringement actions do not fall within the scope of exclusive jurisdiction. As a consequence, 
Member States courts may not deny international jurisdiction for infringement actions in case 
of the infringement of a foreign patent as far as the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable. The 
principle of territoriality, as a principle of substantive law, does not lead to another result, 
because it merely affects the substantive limitation of the patent, but does not determine in 







The Brussels Ibis Regulation applies regardless of which type of patent (national patent, 
European patent or (future) European patent with unitary effect) is concerned. Within the 
system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, jurisdiction for patent infringement proceedings can 
always be based on Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Other eventual heads of 
jurisdiction for cross-border patent infringement proceedings are (on the assumption that the 
respective prerequisites are fulfilled) Articles 7(2) and 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In 
case that the defendant raises the defence of invalidity of the concerned patent, Article 24(4) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation determines that the courts of the protection State have 
exclusive jurisdiction with regard to a decision on the validity of the patent. Finally, 
concerning cross-border interim relief, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation contains a 




As the domicile of the defendant constitutes the decisive factor in the jurisdiction system of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation also applies to 
infringement actions concerning patents which are granted by and for non-Member States. 
Courts of the State where the domicile of the defendant is situated thus having international 
jurisdiction for patent infringement proceedings according to Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, and it is to be underlined that this competence is comprehensive, meaning that the 




The infringement of a patent constitutes a tort according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. With regard to an action for a negative declaration, it was discussed 
controversially by courts and legal commentators whether this type of action falls within the 
scope of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors), before the 
ECJ, in its Folien Fischer decision, ultimately decided it does. This result is convincing, 
because neither the wording nor the purpose of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
justify a different treatment of an action for damages against the alleged infringer of a patent 
by the presumed victim on the one hand and an action for a declaration of non-infringement 
against the presumed victim by the alleged infringer on the other hand. Rather, the decisive 
factor for jurisdiction according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is whether 
there is a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and the deciding court. The 
previous question of whether Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention is applicable to a 
preventive action for an injunction, was clarified by the European legislator, by extending the 
wording of the provision (“… or may occur”) which is also contained in Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is however not 
applicable to competing contractual actions.  
  
It has been discussed controversially whether courts outside the protection State can have 
jurisdiction with accordance to Article 7(2) in the case of patent infringement, i.e. whether 
Article 7(2) can serve as the legal basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in patent infringement 
proceedings. According to the prevailing opinion in legal doctrine and case-law of the 
Member States, the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur is always situated in 
the State where the patent has been granted, having the effect that a choice according to the 
Mines de Potasse decision of the ECJ does not exist concerning patent infringement 
proceedings. Other legal scholars advocate the possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
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basis of Article 7(2) also with regard to patent infringement proceedings. As to the question of 
whether an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage is conceivable, it is to 
be borne in mind that the principle of territoriality is a principle of substantive law. However, 
one might wonder whether this principle has also (indirect) effect on jurisdiction. The 
jurisprudence of the ECJ is not clear in this respect. In particular, the Shevill jurisprudence of 
the ECJ cannot be transfered in toto to the constellation of cross-border patent infringement 
cases. However, this result does not mean that certain findings of this jurisprudence – in 
particular with regard to the issue of the scope of cognition of the courts at the place of the 
event giving rise to the damage and at the place where the damage occurred may be relevant 
with regard to cross-border patent infringement cases. In the absence of a clear attitude of the 
ECJ regarding the question of whether the place of the event giving rise to the damage is to be 
determined independently from the lex causae, it is necessary to revert to general 
considerations and principles. On the basis of such an analysis, it is however to be stated that 
the principle of territoriality has neither a direct nor an indirect effect on the determination of 
the place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. Consequently, the substantive principle of territoriality constitutes no obstacle 
against the existence of an extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage 
pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The existence of an extraterritorial 
place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation requires that the conditions of accountability and a particularly close connection 
between the infringing acting and the invoked court are fulfilled. As to the possibility of an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage at the place of manufacture with 
regard to a European patent, a differentiation between product patents and process patents 
seems reasonable and justified. For, concerning product patents, the infringing acts of 
bringing into circulation, using, offering, importing and possessing of such products for the 
enumerated purposes constitute acts of patent infringement which are independent from the 
manufacture of the concerned object. The mere fact of manufacture of a product as such does 
not establish a particularly close connection that would be necessary for establishing 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7(2). In opposition, regarding process patents, an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage can exist at the place of 
manufacture if the concerned product is directly (immediately) manufactured through the 
protected process (cf. Article 64(2) of the EPC). This conception also takes into account the 
importance of the basic rule of Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which implies that 
Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as an exception of this rule must be interpreted 
restrictively. 
 
In a number of recent decisions, the ECJ made clear that the mere fact that a tort – for 
instance the infringement of a patent – has been committed by several perpetrators, does not 
justify to ground international jurisdiction of a court in the State where one of the infringers 
acted according to Article 7(2), with regard to all infringers, but solely concerning the very 
infringer who actually acted in this State.  
 
With regard to the question of whether an extraterritorial place where the damage occurred or 
may occur according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is conceivable and where 
it could be situated, diverse conceptions have been developed. Due to the fact that the ECJ 
decided that only initial damage constitutes “damage” within the meaning of Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is most convincing that only the place where the patent right 
has been infringed (“Ort der Rechtsgutverletzung”) is to be considered the place where the 
damage occurred according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Otherwise the 
clear differentiation between initial and consequential damage which has been purported by 
the ECJ would be disregarded. 
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Concerning the territorial scope of the authority to decide of a court pursuant to Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is to be underlined that, although the Shevill decision of the 
ECJ is not applicable as such to the constellation of cross-border patent infringement 
proceedings, considerations made by the ECJ in this decision as to the territorial scope of 
authority to decide of the courts at the place of the event giving rise to the damage and at the 
place where the damage occurred can be transferred to that constellation. With regard to the 
place of the event giving rise to the damage, those in favour of a wide interpretation of the 
term “place of the event giving rise to the damage” according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, who are of the opinion that the place of manufacture generally suffices to 
establish such a place of the event giving rise to the damage have – consistently – argued that 
a court at the place of manufacture can also decide on parallel infringements, i.e. also on 
infringements concerning patents granted for another State than the forum State, because all 
these infringements originate at the place of manufacture. According to this view, the acts of 
manufacture and bringing into circulation of the concerned products are actually part of the 
same uniform act. However, as already mentioned, a differentiation between product patents 
and process patents seems preferable. Only in the case of process patents, a court at the place 
of manufacture should also be authorised to decide on the infringement of parallel patents 
granted in respectively for the territory of another State than the forum State. Such authority 
to decide serves procedural economy, and – in case of a European patent – the common issue 
of the uniform determination of the extent of protection of the patent (Article 69 of the EPC) 
can be decided by one court. As to the place where the damage occurred, i.e. the place where 
the patent right is being infringed, the invoked court has only authority to decide on this very 
infringement whereas it does not have authority to decide on parallel infringements, i.e. 




With regard to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the ECJ clarified, in Ellen Mirjam 
Sapir, the controversial issue of whether this provision is applicable vis-à-vis third State 
defendants by denying this question. 
 
In Roche Nederland, the ECJ set up strict prerequisites for the existence of a “close 
connection”. In its Solvay decision, the ECJ however attenuated its restrictive jurisprudence 
developed in Roche Nederland. As a consequence, constellations are still conceivable in 
which consolidation according to Article 8(1) is possible. Despite certain deficiencies and 
uncertainties with regard to the reasoning of the ECJ in its Solvay decision, it can be assumed 
that regarding the infringement of European patents through the same product in the same 
States by several companies having their seat in different States, there is the same situation of 
fact and of law, which may lead to irreconcilable judgments if several courts render a 
decision. As a consequence, Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation principally applies in 
this constellation. Beyond the constellation considered by the ECJ in Solvay, certain further 
constellations are and remain conceivable where consolidation of actions against several 
infringers with regard to cross-border patent infringements can be based on Article 8(1) of the 




As to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors), the 
question of what effect the raise of the defence of invalidity of a patent in infringement 
proceedings has was answered differently. In its GAT decision, the ECJ made clear that 
Article 16(4) of the Brussels Convention (Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation) is to 
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be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exclusive jurisdiction laid down therein concerns all 
proceedings relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue 
is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.  
 
Regarding the question of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable 
in case of patents granted by respectively for a third State, parts of legal doctrine have 
advocated a reflexive application. As there are good reasons not to follow this approach, and 
also in light of the fact that the European legislator when recasting the Brussels I Regulation 
did not allocate reflexive effect to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 
conception of such a reflexive effect is to be rejected. 
 
With regard to requirements concerning a defence of invalidity, it is to be underlined that 
Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable regardless of the defence of 
invalidity of a patent raised in infringement proceedings is admissible. Further, Article 24(4) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable regardless of the fact of whether, in the course of 
patent infringement proceedings, the defence of invalidity of the concerned patent is raised 
before the courts having jurisdiction for such infringement proceedings. However, the defence 
must then be raised in a sufficiently substantiated way before the courts having jurisdiction 
according to Article 24(4). While there are no immediate temporal restrictions within the 
provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, provisions of national procedural law, constituting 
the lex fori, determine whether such a defence is precluded. As to the question of whether the 
defence of invalidity of the patent is precluded if the defendant acts in bad faith, it is generally 
doubtful if subjective criteria should be taken into account. Therefore, in principle, only 
objective criteria should be taken into consideration. A defence of invalidity of a patent is to 
be taken into consideration once it has been raised, regardless of the question if it is obviously 
unfounded.  
 
Once an invalidity defence has been raised in infringement proceedings, the question arises 
which are the concrete effects on the infringement proceedings. On the basis of a deepened 
analysis, it is to be stated that the infringement court does not have to completely transfer the 
case to a court having jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Where the validity issue is raised by the defendant, the infringement court may not, without 
any exceptions, simply assume that the concerned patent exists and is valid either. The 
infringement court rather has to stay infringement proceedings until the validity issue has 
been decided by a competent court. As the Brussels Ibis Regulation does not contain a 
provision which can serve as legal basis for such a stay, a stay of infringement proceedings in 
this constellation is to be based on provisions of national procedural law of the Member 
States.  
 
Comparably to the situation with regard to the Community trade mark, the determination of 
the length of the term until counter-proceedings should be open to the discretion of the court 
where infringement proceedings have been instituted. Additionally, the defendant, instead of 
instituting invalidity/nullity proceedings, may also institute, given the period for objection is 
still running, revocation proceedings before the competent national authorities or opposition 
proceedings. With regard to a European patent, initiating opposition proceedings before the 
European patent office will also effect that infringement proceedings are stayed.   
 
In case of several defendants, each defendant must, in principle, institute counter-proceedings 
in persona, due to the procedural autonomy of each defendant. Nonetheless, the court before 
which infringement proceedings have been initiated is not prevented from staying the 
infringement proceedings also with regard to another defendant if one defendant has instituted 
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counter-proceedings, if this complies with the national procedural rules of the lex fori. 
However, the court is not forced to stay infringement proceedings as to the other defendant in 
this situation. 
 
When a nullity/invalidity defence has been raised, the infringement court must stay 
proceedings. However, upon the claimant’s request, proceedings are to be completely 
transferred to the courts being competent pursuant Article 24(4), while the defendant cannot 




As quick relief is essential, provisional measures are of utmost importance in particular with 
regard to intellectual property litigation. IP rights holders are in general primarily interested in 
stopping the allegedly infringing activities and only then considering what other remedies 
should be sought. 
 
According to the system of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, interim relief can be based on two 
different bases. On the one hand, courts which have jurisdiction on the merits also have 
accessory jurisdiction to order provisional measures. Besides, Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation provides for an autonomous head of jurisdiction for provisional measures. The 
plaintiff may freely choose between those jurisdiction. Courts having jurisdiction according to 
Articles 4 or 7 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation remain competent to decide on 
provisional measures regardless of whether principal proceedings have been initiated before 
another court according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation.  
 
In the meanwhile, the European legislator codified, in Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Denilauler, according to which a provisional 
measure rendered in favour of a patent holder could only be recognised and enforced in 
another Member State if the alleged infringer had been granted the right to a hearing. By 
creating Article 45(1)(c) and (d) and Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the 
European legislator further codified (and restrictively modified) the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
in Italian Leather, clarifying that Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is 
(only) applicable to such provisional measures ordered by a court having accessory 
jurisdiction for provisional measures. In contrast, provisional measures ordered by a court on 
the basis of independent jurisdiction for provisional measures do not constitute a “judgment” 
within the meaning of Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (cf. Article 2(a) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation), meaning that Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not 
applicable in the latter constellation.  
 
The Brussels Ibis Regulation does not establish a general positive definition of “provisional, 
including protective, measures”. Case-law, especially jurisprudence produced by the ECJ, is 
therefore important to determine which measures are to be considered as provisional measures 
within the meaning of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As to evidence orders, such 
interim measures to obtain or secure evidence may constitute measures according to Article 
35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation if their purpose is to preserve evidence to be employed in 
principal proceedings, i.e. if they shall prevent the loss of that evidence in order to enforce a 
claim in principal proceedings respectively enforce such claim without considerable delay. 
 
As Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessors) is formulated in a 
broad way, the ECJ suggested, in its Denilauler decision, the necessity of a geographical link 
between the deciding court and the assets affected provisional measures. The problem 
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however consists in determining the specific meaning of such a “real connecting link”. In this 
respect, it is proposed to differentiate between different types of provisional measures.  
Regarding interim injunctions, the courts of the State should be considered competent 
according to Article 35 where the defendant disposes of sufficient assets that the interim 
injunction to omit can be enforced. Besides, courts of the State where the patent has been 
granted are also competent pursuant to Article 35. With regard to interim performance orders 
concerning the restitution, the recall or the destruction of concrete objects infringing the 
concerned patent, it would seem most effective in matters of enforcement to refer to the State 
where these objects are situated. Also concerning evidence orders, the decisive question is 
whether the concerned measure is enforceable in the forum State. A court outside the 
protection State may not order provisional measures to obtain or secure evidence to be 
enforced in another State than the forum State, be it the protection State or any other State. 
 
Structurally, the question of whether rejecting an application for a cross-border provisional 
measure for the reason that the court is of the opinion that there is no sufficient claim or 
ground to grant the measure, constitutes a matter of foundedness rather than a question of 
admissibility. As a consequence, legal or factual complexity of cases has no effect on the 
question of whether courts have jurisdiction to order provisional measures pursuant to Article 
35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation.    
 
Comprehensive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation under the 
condition that the provisional measure it is actually possible that the provisional measure is 
enforceable in the forum State is not contradictory to the more restricted scope of jurisdiction 
according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation to order provisional measures, which 
is limited to the State where the patent was granted. A different treatment of these grounds of 
jurisdiction is justified, because the fact that courts which are competent according to Articles 
7 to 26 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation can also order provisional measures, is based on the 
circumstance that Articles 7 to 26 per se imply a sufficient factual proximity between the 
measure and the deciding court. In the case of jurisdiction according to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation of courts of a State where the provisional measure shall be enforced, 
such a factual proximity is only established by the fact that the provisional measure can be 
respectively is to be enforced in the forum State. On the basis of the emphasis of the factual 
proximity, it is then logical to refer to that criterion also with regard to the scope of 
jurisdiction. Due to the principle of territoriality, jurisdiction based on Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation is restricted to the courts of the State where respectively for which 
territory a patent has been granted, meaning that multiple infringing actings in different States 
must be treated independently. In this respect, there is no inner link between patent 
infringements in different States. In contrast to this situation, jurisdiction according to Article 
35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation with regard to courts of a State where the provisional 
measure shall be enforced, is not limited by the principle of territoriality, but by the different 
conditions of enforceability of the provisional measure. Courts of States where provisional 
measures can be enforced fulfil the requirement of such a link, i.e. a “real connecting link” as 
demanded by the ECJ. Besides, the broader scope of jurisdiction with regard to Article 35 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation is also justified by the fact that not all provisional measures may 
be ordered on the basis of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
Where the defence of invalidity of a patent is raised in provisional proceedings, the question 
arises of whether Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies, with the consequence 
that the court before which provisional proceedings have been initiated must stay proceedings. 
While the ECJ expressly clarified in its Solvay case that Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation (respectively its predecessor) does not apply to provisional proceedings based on 
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Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively its predecessor), the court has not 
decided if the same applies in case of accessory jurisdiction for provisional measures. On the 
basis of an analysis of the different conceptions, it is submitted that the better reasons militate 




When considering a reform of the problematic issues in the framework of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation analysed in this thesis, it is worthwhile to take into account existing reform 
projects. In particular, the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles deliver a valuable incitation 
and source of inspiration in which way problems within the Brussels Ibis Regulation might be 
solved.  
 
On the basis of a deepened analysis, it is to be stressed that neither considerations concerning 
the “Gleichlauf” between jurisdiction and the applicable substantive law, sovereignty of the 
granting State, court or party interests, judicial economy, the attempt to find a mediate 
solution for the torpedo problem, nor any other aspects are apt to justify to confer exclusive 
jurisdiction to the courts of the protection State for patent infringement proceedings. Patent 
infringement proceedings should rather be and remain subject to the general rules of 
jurisdiction. Besides rejecting any attempts to extend exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of 
the granting State to infringement proceedings, this also means that approaches according to 
which the courts of the granting State should be given exclusive jurisdiction for validity and 
non-exclusive jurisdiction for infringement, or, conversely, pursuant to which the courts with 
jurisdiction over infringement should be conferred an additional jurisdiction over validity, 
should not be pursued, because they vary from those general rules of jurisdiction laid down in 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. With regard to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, 




As to jurisdiction regarding torts, the crucial question arising in cross-border (patent 
infringement) disputes is whether respectively under which circumstances extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is conceivable. On the basis of an analysis of relevant proposals contained in the 
Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (2001), the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, the Heidelberg Report on the 
Application of Regulation Brussels I (Heidelberg Report) and the Commission Proposal 2010 
for Reform of the Brussels I Regulation (Commission Proposal 2010), I propose the following 
amendment of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which also takes into consideration 
the particular problem of tortious jurisdiction regarding multistate delicts and contains explicit 





 A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 
 
 (...) 
 (2) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event 
 occurred or may occur. As to the infringement of a patent, the harmful event solely occurs or may occur 
 in the State where the patent is protected. A court shall have jurisdiction in respect of infringements that 
 occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is situated. In disputes concerned 
 with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, the court shall also have 
 jurisdiction in respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, 
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 provided that the activities giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any 
 of the States, where the infringer is domiciled and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 
relation to the infringement in its entirety. 
 
 
An eventual future Global Judgments Convention should be considerably oriented towards 
Articles 2:202 (also supplemented by another sentence, written in italics) and 2:203 of the 
CLIP Principles. It would remain to be decided whether the wording “habitually resident” (cf. 
CLIP Principles) or “domiciled” (cf. Brussels Ibis Regulation) would be chosen. The 
provisions could be formulated as follows: 
 
 
Article 2:202: Infringement  
 
In disputes concerned with infringement of an intellectual property right, a person may be sued in the 
courts of the State where the alleged infringement occurs or may occur, unless the alleged infringer has 
not acted in that State to initiate or further the infringement and her/his activity cannot reasonably be 
seen as having been directed to that State. As to the infringement of a patent, the infringement solely 
occurs or may occur in the State where the patent is protected. 
 
 
Article 2:203: Extent of jurisdiction over infringement claims 
 
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, a court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall have jurisdiction in 
respect of infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of the State in which that court is 
situated. 
 
(2) In disputes concerned with infringement carried out through ubiquitous media such as the Internet, 
the court whose jurisdiction is based on Article 2:202 shall also have jurisdiction in respect of 
infringements that occur or may occur within the territory of any other State, provided that the activities 
giving rise to the infringement have no substantial effect in the State, or any of the States, where the 
infringer is habitually resident [domiciled] and 
 
(a) substantial activities in furtherance of the infringement in its entirety have been carried out 
within the territory of the State in which the court is situated, or 
 
(b) the harm caused by the infringement in the State where the court is situated is substantial in 





An amendment of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should, in particular, clarify 
without any doubt in which circumstances infringement actions concerning the alleged 
infringement of different parts of a European patent (i.e. parallel European patents) are 
sufficiently closely connected so that the courts at the place of domicile of one infringer also 
have jurisdiction with regard to the other action(s) which concern patents granted within 
respectively for the territory of other States, where the patents are being infringed by different 
infringers. To put it in a nutshell, the criterion of the risk of irreconcilable judgments which is 
addressed in Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be rendered more precisely, 
since the fact that this criterion can currently be interpreted in various ways produces legal 
uncertainty. Likewise, an eventual future Global Judgments Convention should contain a 
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similar provision which clearly covers parallel patent infringement actions. On the basis of an 
analysis of relevant proposals contained in the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), the ALI Principles, the CLIP 
Principles, the Heidelberg Report and the Commission Proposal 2010, I propose to amend the 
content of Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation as follows, creating a new Article 
(hereinafter Article 8bis) for convenience, in order not to overburden Article 8(1) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation: 
 
 
 Article 8bis 
 
 (1) A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued, where he is one of a number of 
 defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so 
 closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
 irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
 
 (2) For the purposes of paragraph 1, a risk of irreconcilable judgments requires a risk of divergence in 
 the outcome of the actions against the different defendants which arises in the context of essentially the 
 same situation of law and fact. In particular in infringement disputes and subject to the individual 
 circumstances of the case, 
 
 (a) disputes involve essentially the same factual situation if the defendants have, even if in different 
 States, acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a common policy; 
 
 (b) disputes may involve essentially the same legal situation even if different national laws are 
 applicable to the claims against the different defendants, provided that the relevant national laws 
 are harmonised to a significant degree by rules of a regional economic integration organisation or 
 by international conventions which are applicable to the disputes in question. 
 
 (3) If it is manifest from the facts that one defendant has coordinated the relevant activities or is 
 otherwise most closely connected with the dispute in its entirety, jurisdiction according to paragraph 1 
 is only conferred on the courts in the State where that defendant is domiciled. In other cases, 
 jurisdiction is conferred on the courts in the State or States of domicile of any of the defendants, unless 
 
 (a) the contribution of the defendant who is domiciled in the State where the court is 
 located is insubstantial in relation to the dispute in its entirety or 
 
 (b) the claim against the domiciled defendant is manifestly inadmissible. 
 
 (c) the claim against the domiciled defendant is manifestly unfounded.  
 
 
With regard to an eventual future Global Judgments Convention, the content of § 206 of the 




With regard to an amendment of exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, it is to be stated that the extraterritorial infringement court should 
have authority to render an incidental decision on the validity of a patent concerned in patent 
infringement proceedings brought before that court.  
 
For the sake of legal certainty, it seems indispensable to integrate a definition of the 
constellation in which circumstances the validity issue is raised as an incidental matter, i.e. by 
way of a preliminary question. Thus, in order to avoid the risk of inconsistent interpretations 
in the EU Member States (respectively third States), the term “preliminary question” should 
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be expressly defined in the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively an eventual future Global 
Judgments Convention). On the basis of an analysis of conceivable possibilities regarding the 
effect of an incidental decision of an extraterritorial infringement court on the validity of a 
patent, solely a conception according to which such an incidental decision on the validity of a 
patent has inter partes effect, and not erga omnes effect, seems to be justified and feasible in 
practice, and should therefore be envisaged and pursued.  
 
The extraterritorial infringement court should not be given the possibility to stay the 
infringement proceeding, as an alternative for rendering an incidental decision, for the sole 
reason that a defence of invalidity of the concerned patent has been raised. However, a stay of 
the infringement proceeding should be possible according to and in the framework of the 
general rules of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. With accordance to 
the national procedural rules as to the stay of proceedings applicable in EU Member States, it 
would be necessary that a proceeding on the validity of the patent has already been initiated, 
and that there is a sufficient chance that that proceeding will be successful which must be 
evaluated by the infringement court which stays the infringement proceeding. However, while 
national procedural laws may imply, as a prerequisite of a stay of proceedings, formal 
requirements such as “serious doubts” as to the validity of the patent, such formal restrictions 
should not be integrated in an amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, respectively 
an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. For it is conceivable that an extraterritorial, 
unspecialised infringement court does not have any “serious doubts” regarding the validity of 
the patent, but wants to stay the infringement proceeding because of the complexity and 
difficulty of the matter. The criteria for a stay thus cannot be defined a priori but should be in 
the discretion of the infringement court. Besides, although such “serious doubts” can be the 
reason for staying the infringement proceeding, the infringement court, in this situation, is 
convinced of the invalidity of the patent and should therefore render a decision, because it is 
highly probable that the patent will be declared void in a subsequent invalidity proceeding 
with effect ex tunc.  
 
Article 30 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which may become relevant in case that validity 
proceedings have been initiated before infringement proceedings, should be complemented by 
an additional rule which clarifies which factors should be taken into consideration by the 
court which has to determine whether to stay proceedings, in order to ensure legal certainty 
and conformity of legal practice within the EU Member States. 
 
Moreover, a provision should be integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation which provides 
that the infringement court may stay infringement proceedings in case that an invalidity action 
is brought subsequently, i.e. at a point in time when infringement proceedings have already 
been initiated.  
 
In the case of patent infringement proceedings pending before an extraterritorial infringement 
court, and invalidity proceedings, concerning the same patent, before the courts of the 
granting State, be it that those validity proceedings have been brought before or after the 
infringement action has been initiated, it appears that the sole existence of rules as to a stay of 
proceedings does not suffice in order to take into adequate consideration the parties' interests 
and also the general aspect of judicial economy. Rather, rules are required as to establish in 
which way involved courts shall cooperate with each other in such simultaneously pending 
multistate proceedings. An amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation – and also an 
eventual future Global Judgments Convention – should therefore imply such rules. 
 
 558 
Regarding the exclusion of recognition of infringement decisions respectively non-
infringement decisions, if, in the meanwhile, a court or an authority in the granting State 
declared the patent to be void, this decision having erga omnes and ex tunc effect, Article 
45(1)(c) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is applicable. 
 
Conferring jurisdiction to an extraterritorial infringement court to decide, by way of an 
incidental decision with inter partes effect, on the validity of a patent, bears the risk that, after 
the infringement court has made such a decision on the validity of the patent, a court of the 
granting State subsequently renders a contrary decision, which is in principle possible due to 
the inter partes effect of the infringement decision. This problem can occur in two 
constellations. First, it is conceivable that the infringement court convicts an alleged infringer 
for patent infringement, but this patent is declared void in a later proceeding by a court of the 
granting State. On the other hand, it is possible that the infringement court dismisses the 
infringement action because it holds the patent to be void, while a court of the granting State 
subsequently decides that the concerned patent is valid. In both constellations, res iudicata of 
the incidental decision of the infringement court seised first would not be opposed to a later 
decision on the validity of the patent, with erga omnes effect, rendered by the courts of the 
granting State. Noteworthily, the risk of contradictory decisions does not only exist with 
regard to cross-border patent infringement proceedings, aroused by the possibility of 
incidental decisions on the validity of a patent rendered by an extraterritorial infringement 
court, but also exists at the national level both in States which have established  a 
“Trennungssystem” (where the validity and the infringement of a patent are principally 
examined by different courts), and those which employ a “Verbundsystem” (where the courts 
having jurisdiction to decide on the infringement of a patent may also decide on its validity). 
In light of the fact that national law also admits the risk of irreconcilable judgments, it is to be 
underlined that it is not the specific task of international procedural law (as according to the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation) to avoid such dissonant decisions, but that this problem is to be 
solved according to the applicable provisions of national law. Consequently, a potential 
provision on the possibility of bringing an action for restitution respectively damages in case 
that the decision of the extraterritorial infringement court on the validity of the patent (with 
inter partes effect) is overruled as to the validity issue by a later decision on the validity of the 
patent, rendered by the courts of the granting State (with erga omnes effect), should not be 
integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Similarly, such a provision should not become part 
of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. However, the jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation can at least contribute to avoid opposing judgments in the sense of a 
general goal. In this respect, the infringement court should have the possibility to stay the 
infringement proceeding in case that a proceeding on the validity of the concerned patent has 
already been initiated before a court of the granting State. Besides, international procedural 
law is affected if an infringement decision shall be recognised and enforced in another State, 
while the patent has been declared void in the meanwhile with erga omnes and ex tunc effect. 
It is at least a general goal of international procedural law to avoid the circulation of such 
opposing decisions in the protection State, and also in other States, because the underlying 
reason is not the protection of the sovereignty of the granting State, but the consideration of 
the defendant’s interests who has been wrongly convicted. While the defendant's interests are 
adequately taken into consideration and protected by the possibility that the infringement 
court may stay the infringement proceeding if a invalidity proceeding has been initiated 
before the courts of the protection State, it would go too far to confer to the defendant the 
possibility to wait for the result of the infringement proceeding and, if he was convicted by 
the infringement court, to initiate an invalidity proceeding in the protection State. As far as the 
infringement court does not stay the infringement proceeding and, after enforcement has 
already been undertaken, the patent is declared void by the courts of the protecting State, this 
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situation does not differ from comparable situations occurring in pure national cases without 
any cross-border context. Accordingly, the Brussels Ibis Recognition does not and should not 
contain respective rules, but eventual chances of restitution are and should be governed by 
provisions of national law. The same should apply with regard to the creation of an eventual 
future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
Exclusive jurisdiction regarding the issue of validity of a patent should thus be constructed in 
a way which does not exclude extraterritorial courts invoked in patent infringement 
proceedings from examining the validity of the concerned patent by way of an incidental 
decision which has inter partes effect. The mere fact that a defence of invalidity has been 
raised should not establish the possibility for the infringement court to stay the infringement 
proceeding, whereas a stay according to general rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should 
be possible in case that a validity proceeding has already been initiated in the granting State.  
 
Both the possibility to defend against the enforcement of a decision on the infringement of a 
patent which is subsequently declared void with erga omnes and ex tunc effect, and the 
possibility to gain restitution after enforcement, are governed by the rules of national 
procedural law, if only one State is affected. The Brussels Ibis Regulation is not applicable to 
solve this issue. In contrast, the Brussels Ibis Regulation applies to the avoidance of cross-
border recognition and enforcement of (non-)infringement decisions which subsequently 
become unjustified because the concerned patent is held valid/void with erga omnes and ex 
tunc effect by a court of the granting State.  
 
On the basis of an analysis of relevant proposals contained in the Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements (2005), Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), the ALI Principles, the CLIP Principles, 
the Heidelberg Report and the Commission Proposal 2010, I propose the following 
amendment of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: 
 
      
 Exclusive jurisdiction 
 
 Article 24 
 
 The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of 
 the parties: 
 
 (...) 
 (4) in proceedings having as their object a judgment on the grant, registration, validity, abandonment or 
 revocation of a patent, a mark, an industrial design or any other intellectual property right protected on 
 the basis of deposit or registration, the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration 
 has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an 
 international convention deemed to have taken place.  
 
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Office under the Convention on the Grant 
of European Patents, signed at Munich on 5 October 1973, the courts of each Member State shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings having as their object a judgment on the grant, registration, 
validity, abandonment or revocation of any European patent granted for that Member State.  
 
Sentences 1 and 2 do not apply where validity or registration arises in a context other than by principal 
claim or counterclaim. The decisions resulting from such proceedings do not affect the validity or 
registration of those rights as against third parties.  
 
Where a court of a Member State is seised of a claim which has as its object a matter over which the 
 courts of another Member State have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of sentences 1 and 2, it shall 
 declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction. 
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The content of Article 2:702(2) of the CLIP Principles should be integrated in Article 30 of 
the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Moreover, the content of Articles 2:703 and 2:704 of the CLIP 
Principles should be integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In this respect, one should 
preferably integrate the content of the complete Section 7 of the CLIP Principles in Chapter II 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which would also ensure the internal balance of these 
provisions. As Article 4:501(3) of the CLIP Principles corresponds to Article 45(1)(c) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation, the latter provision should be left untouched. With regard to an 
eventual future Global Judgments Convention, the content of all provisions of the CLIP 




With regard to an amendment of the provisions of the Brussels Ibis Regulation concerning 
interim relief, a conception according to which jurisdiction to grant interim relief should be 
reserved to the courts of the State where the concerned patent has been granted is to be 
rejected. On the contrary, like regarding provisional proceedings in other fields of law, 
provisional proceedings in patent matters should be subject to the jurisdiction rules 
concerning interim relief of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (respectively a future Global 
Judgments Convention), and there should be no specific rule with regard to interim relief in 
patent matters which determines that only the courts of the protection State have jurisdiction 
for provisional measures in patent disputes.  
 
For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, the current system under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation providing for both accessory and independent jurisdiction for provisional 
measures should be expressly codified within the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
Similarly, an eventual future Global Judgments Convention should contain such a clarifying 
provision. 
 
Under the current regime of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, the requirements for accessory 
jurisdiction for the grant of provisional measures have partly been defined by the ECJ in 
several decisions. In order to strengthen legal certainty and clarity, it seems desirable to 
integrate these judicial findings in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, and also in the text 
of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention. 
 
For reasons of clarity and thus legal certainty, a definition of the real connecting link-criterion 
should be included in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. The same goes for an eventual 
future Global Judgments Convention. 
 
Moreover, it seems preferable to codify within the Articles of the Brussels Ibis Regulation 
(for instance in Article 35), which measures are to be considered “provisional, including 
protective, measures” according to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Likewise, an eventual future 
Global Judgments Convention should explicitly define provisional measures. 
 
Comparably to the codification (and modification), in Articles 2(a) and 42(2)(c) and 45(1)(b) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, of the jurisprudence of the ECJ in Denilauler, a comparable 
set of rules (i.e. rules excluding ex parte-decisions from being recognised and enforced, 
                                                 
2510
 The exact wording and choice of provisions of such an eventual future Global Judgments Convention would 
depend on its envisaged scope. If required, the whole complex of provisions of the CLIP Principles could be 
adopted to establish a complete set of rules. In any case, the provisions proposed in this thesis, corresponding to 
those provisions proposed for an amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, should be considered as a 
minimum set of rules. 
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unless the judgment containing the measure is served on the defendant prior to enforcement) 
should also form part of an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
In order to mitigate the danger of irreconcilable decisions in preliminary proceedings, an 
amended version of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should further imply definite rules with 
regard to the coordination of several, including preliminary, proceedings. The same goes for 
an eventual future Global Judgments Convention.  
 
An eventual future Global Judgments Convention should contain provisions which are 
comparable to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) and Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, where 
the European legislator codified (and restrictively modified) the jurisprudence of the ECJ in 
Italian Leather, clarifying that Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is 
(only) applicable to such provisional measures ordered by a court having accessory 
jurisdiction for provisional measures. As a consequence, provisional measures ordered by a 
court on the basis of independent, i.e. non-accessory, jurisdiction do not constitute a 
“judgment” within the meaning of Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (cf. Article 2(a) 
of the Brussels Ibis Regulation), meaning that Article 45 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is not 
applicable in the latter constellation. 
 
In particular with regard to provisional measures, the laws of the Member States differ to a 
considerable extent. This fact seems to be the actual reason why only orders of provisional 
measures based on accessory jurisdiction, i.e. excluding provisional measures based on 
independent jurisdiction, are considered as judgments within the meaning of the Regulation's 
provisions of recognition and enforcement, and are consequently conferred effect also in other 
Member States. In light of this, a conception which is merely based on the enforcement 
criterion with the consequence that provisional measures should have a priori effect in 
another Member State given that such measures are enforceable in that State is not 
convincing. Therefore, Article 2(a) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should be maintained.  
 
With regard to the issue of which effect should be allocated to an invalidity defence in 
provisional proceedings, i.e. in which way, if any, Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is considered applicable, I have inter alia explicated in the framework of a 
proposal for a reformulation of Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation:  
 
Sentences 1 and 2 do not apply where validity or registration arises in a context other than by principal 
claim or counterclaim. The decisions resulting from such disputes do not affect the validity or 
registration of those rights as against third parties.  
 
This formulation also comprises the situation where an invalidity defence is raised in 
provisional proceedings, having the equal effect that the rules of exclusive jurisdiction do no 
apply. Therefore, a further mentioning in the framework of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation is not required. 
 
Compared with Articles 7(2), 8(1) and 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation has already established considerable amendments in comparison 
with the legal situation under the Brussels Convention respectively the Brussels I Regulation, 
by codifying crucial jurisprudence of the ECJ in the text of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
On the basis of an analysis of relevant proposals contained in the Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), the ALI 
Principles, the CLIP Principles, the Heidelberg Report and the Commission Proposal 2010, I 
propose the following amendment of Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation: 
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 Provisional, including protective, measures 
 
 Article 35 
 
 (1) A court having jurisdiction as to the substance of a matter also has jurisdiction to order any 
 provisional, including protective, measures.  
  
 (2) Provisional, including protective, measures may also be ordered by the courts of a Member State 
 
  (a) where the measure is to be enforced, or 
 
  (b) for which protection is sought. 
 
 (3) Provisional, including protective, measures are measures which are intended to preserve a factual or 
 legal situation so as to safeguard rights the recognition of which is otherwise sought from the court 
 having jurisdiction as to the substance of the case. Such measures may include 
 
  (a) orders to prevent an (imminent or continuing) infringement of an intellectual property right 
  from occurring; 
 
  (b) orders to preserve relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement; 
 
  (c) orders to seise goods suspected of infringing an intellectual property right; 
 
  (d) orders to seise, attach or prevent the dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction of assets to 
  safeguard enforcement of the judgment on the merits;  
  and 
 
  (e) orders directing a party to provide information about the location of assets which are 
  subject of an order under lit. (d).   
 
 
Article 2(a) and Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation should apply. With 
regard to Articles 2:705 and 2:704 of the CLIP Principles, equally clear provisions should be 
integrated in the Brussels Ibis Regulation. As has already been proposed above in the 
framework of exclusive jurisdiction, a clear solution would be to integrate the content of the 
complete Section 7 of the CLIP Principles in Chapter II of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which 
would also ensure the internal balance of these provisions. As to an eventual future Global 
Judgments Convention, the content of the discussed provisions of the CLIP Proposal should 
be adopted.2511 The CLIP Principles could in this point serve as an orientation for an eventual 





Regarding the envisaged creation of a European patent with unitary effect and a Unified 
Patent Court, the European Parliament and the European Council agreed, by way of enhanced 
cooperation, on the so-called “patent package” consisting of three components: a Regulation 
creating a European patent with unitary effect (Regulation 1257/2012), a Regulation 
establishing a language regime applicable to the European patent with unitary effect 
(Regulation 1260/2012) and, in order to establish a single and specialised patent judiciary, 
named “Unified Patent Court” (UPC), sitting outside of the EU institutional framework, an 
international agreement among Member States (UPC Agreement). Previous efforts to 
                                                 
2511
 The exact wording and choice of provisions of such an eventual future Global Judgments Convention would 
depend on its envisaged scope. If required, the whole complex of provisions of the CLIP Principles could be 
adopted to establish a complete set of rules. 
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establish a “Community patent” had constantly failed, in particular due to the fact that no 
consent could be reached with regard to the question into which languages a patent 




The European patent with unitary effect has been developed as a third option beside national 
patents and classical European patents as illustrated above. Notably, it will be impossible to 
have the same patent granted as a unitary patent and a classical European patent.2512 The 
question of whether simultaneous protection via a unitary patent and a national patent is 
possible will have to be clarified in national provisions.  
 
On the basis of an evaluation of the European patent with unitary effect which takes into 
consideration the aspect of whether this patent effects a unification of patent protection in the 
European Union, facilitates patent protection, reduces costs and is in line with EU law, it is to 
be concluded that doubts remain whether the European patent with unitary effect will cope 
with the high expectations that have been expressed in particular by European Union 
institutions. For instance, it needs to be taken into consideration that, as not all EU Member 
States participate in the creation of the unitary patent, this instrument actually adds to 
territorial fragmentation of patent law in Europe, rather than consolidating it. Moreover, it 
remains to be seen whether patent protection via the unitary patent actually effects a 
simplified patent protection, because the European patent with unitary effect has a 
complicated hybrid structure between international law, EU law, and national law. In respect 
of an eventual reduction of costs, it is to be underlined that, in particular, SMEs might only be 
active in a small number of Member States, and therefore might only be interested in 
obtaining patent protection for the territories of these States rather than attaining pan-EU 
protection – through classical European patents which might be cheaper at the end of the day.  
In these circumstances, a unitary patent, even if it might be cheaper than a classical European 
patent granted for all EU Member States, might ultimately turn out to be the more costly 
alternative where only protection for some States is required,2513 this being aggravated by the 
fact that the cheap translation arrangements will enter into force only after a long transitional 
term.  
 
With regard to the crucial question of whether the European patent with unitary effect is 
founded on a sufficient legal basis, it has been discussed controversially in legal doctrine 
whether Regulation 1257/2012 meets the requirements of Article 118(1) TFEU. Doubts have 
been based on several reasons. First, it has been criticised that the European patent with 
unitary effect is a hybrid construction consisting of European and international law, because 
the grant and scope of protection are determined by the EPC which is no European law, and 
the design of the unitary effect is determined by the UPC Agreement, an international 
agreement, i.e. no European law either. European law determines protection conferred by the 
European patent with unitary effect only to a very limited extent, since such rules which 
should originally be contained in the Regulation (cf. Articles 6 to 8 of the draft Regulation) 
have instead been integrated in the UPC Agreement. Also for this reason, one might doubt 
that the European patent with unitary effect actually constitutes a uniform European 
intellectual property right. In this respect, it has been put forth that “European intellectual 
property rights” within the meaning of Article 118(1) TFEU must be exclusively determined 
                                                 
2512
 Article 4(2) of Regulation 1257/2012. 
2513
 Cf. Zawadzka (2014)45(4) IIC 383, at p. 390. This aspect is not taken into consideration by those who, as a 
matter of principle, advocate a cheap unitary patent which grants identical protection throughout the whole 
European Union, cf. Nooteboom 2003, p. 585. 
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by EU law including its features such as primacy and uniformity. On the basis of this 
conception, a European system of protection would be manageable only by way of a 
Regulation which rules all essential aspects to be considered. As to a unitary patent, this 
would mean that such a Regulation would have to contain rules as to the aspects of 
patentability, exclusivity and property. Proponents of this conception have put forth that 
uniform protection meant as inherent to the intellectual property right to be created via Article 
118(1) TFEU can only be guaranteed if both the object and the content of the protection and 
the conditions for that protection are defined by the same authority that creates the right in 
question. Besides, it has been criticised that the European patent with unitary effect will not 
create uniform protection within the European Union, because it will only grant protection for 
the territory of the participating Member States. Although the mentioned arguments put forth 
by those who are of the opinion that Regulation 1257/2012 does not meet the requirements of 
Article 118(1) TFEU cannot be totally dismissed, it seems that none of these arguments 
ultimately proves that the construction chosen by the European legislator (combination of 
Regulation 1257/2012 (supplemented by Regulation 1260/2012) and the UPC Agreement) is 
irreconcilable with Article 118(1) TFEU. First of all, it must be underlined that the wording of 
Article 118(1) TFEU does not expressly require that European intellectual property rights 
such as the European patent with unitary effect are solely established by European law. In this 
respect, it is remarkable that the European legislator chose the open wording “European” 
intellectual property rights and did not employ the notion “EU intellectual property rights”. In 
light of this, I arrive at the conclusion that Article 118(1) TFEU should be considered as a 
sufficient legal basis for the construction of the European patent with unitary effect by way of 
a combination of EU law (Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012) and international 




The UPC will form a centralised court for litigation concerning both classical European 
patents and European patents with unitary effect. The UPC will have jurisdiction only in 
respect of designations of European patents for any of the signatories of the UPC Agreement. 
On the other hand, it will not have jurisdiction regarding designations of the European patent 
for any of the other EPC contracting States. The UPC will thus be a court common to the 
participating EU Member States and subject to the same obligations under EU law as any of 
their national courts. Consequently, the UPC must refer, where necessary, questions on the 
interpretation of EU law to the ECJ. 
 
An evaluation of the UPC, taking into account the aspect of whether the creation of the UPC 
will foster legal certainty, establish an effective judiciary, reduce costs, and be in line with EU 
law, also reveals (as with regard to the European patent with unitary effect) that a 
differentiated view is required.  
 
As to the aspect of legal certainty, it is to be borne in mind that not all Member States 
participate in the UPC Agreement, which ultimately leads to fragmentation of jurisprudence 
between participating and non-participating Member States. The consequence of this split 
jurisdiction is a separate jurisdiction applicable to related patents, which might be considered 
as a severe obstacle towards a unification in European patent litigation which, in the end, 
might even create legal uncertainty. However, legal certainty might be strengthened by the 
role of the ECJ. As the UPC would be obliged to refer questions to the ECJ on the 
interpretation of Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012, decisions of the ECJ in 
this respect would have binding effect for the UPC.  
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Regarding the effectiveness of the UPC, it is possible that the latter might be impaired by the 
existence of the transitional period, during which a holder of a European patent (but not a 
unitary patent) may at any time opt out of the exclusive competence of the UPC, and would 
then have the possibility to opt back into the exclusive competence of the UPC at any time, 
even after the expiration of the transitional period, apparently without penalty.  
 
While it may at present not always be financially viable to file multiple patent infringement 
claims in multiple countries, because the bundle of national patents resulting from a European 
patent – even in cases of EU-wide infringement – can be enforced only on a strictly national 
basis, which effects high litigation costs, it might be more affordable to sue that same 
infringer in the UPC for infringement in several countries. However, as the court fees of the 
UPC have not been determined yet, this question cannot be answered at this point in time.  
 
With regard to the question of whether the creation of the UPC is in line with EU law, one 
should differentiate between compliance with primary EU law and compliance with the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
 
Regarding the requirement of compliance with primary EU law, it is noteworthy that the UPC 
Agreement, in contrast to previous proposals, tends to place the position of the UPC within 
the legal system of the European Union. Rather than creating a separate court outside the EU 
system, various States among EU Member States will establish the court by an agreement. 
Neither the EU itself nor countries outside the European Union will be signatories. The UPC 
shall be subject to the same obligations under EU law as any national court of the Contracting 
Member States and shall apply EU law in its entirety, respecting its primacy. Additionally, the 
UPC Agreement specifies that the UPC, as a court common to the Contracting Member States 
and as part of their judicial systems, shall cooperate with the ECJ to ensure the proper 
application and uniform interpretation of EU law in the same way as the national courts of EU 
Member States. In particular, the UPC shall request preliminary rulings from the ECJ on the 
interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, 
bodies, offices, or agencies of the EU in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, in the same 
manner as national courts. The UPC Agreement also explicitly stipulates that the Contracting 
Member States are jointly and severally liable for damage resulting from an infringement of 
EU law by the Court of Appeal, in accordance with EU law concerning non-contractual 
liability of Member States for damage caused by their national courts breaching EU law.  
 
In order to ensure compliance between the UPC Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
and in order to address the particular issue of jurisdiction rules vis-à-vis defendants in non-
European Union States, the European legislator, based on a proposal submitted by the 
Commission (Commission Proposal 2013), added the new provisions of Articles 71a to 71d to 
the set of rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, by way of Regulation 542/2014. On the basis 
of a deepened analysis, it is to be concluded that the European legislator, in principle, 
amended the Brussels Ibis Regulation in such a way as to ensure compliance between the 
UPC Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Minor further amendments concerning the 
wording and structure of the provisions which have been indicated in this thesis should 
however be undertaken.  
 
Although the view that the UPC lacks a sufficient democratic foundation, because the UPC 
Agreement has only been submitted to the European Parliament, but has never been 
deliberated by the European Parliament, cannot be totally dismissed, it is to be underlined that 
national parliaments at least have to ratify the UPC Agreement.   
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From an overall perspective, the creation of the UPC ultimately means the disempowering of 
national court systems, because patent litigation is entrusted into a new – and untested – court 
system. Its structure and its rules of procedure will constitute a compound of rules from 
various European jurisdictions with different legal traditions and background. It is noteworthy 
that the Rules of Procedure of the UPC will form the first code of civil procedure on a 
European level.  
 
It is noteworthy that the creation of the European patent with unitary effect does not mean that 
the discussed problems concerning cross-border patent disputes with regard to ordinary 
European patents (and national patents) will disappear, because, at least during the transitional 
period, the problem must be solved that there are still ordinary European patents without 
unitary effect, besides national patents which remain available. Even when the transitional 
period  will have expired after seven years, other patents which are still in existence then will 

























































Cross-border patent infringement litigation within the European Union 
 
In our modern industrial society, intellectual property (“IP”) rights, and in particular patents, 
constitute for many companies and individuals the core assets they own, and which form the 
basis for any business activity. In light of this, adequate protection of IP rights is of crucial 
importance for such entities. In the international arena, patent holders have to face diverse 
problems. Due to the territorially restricted character of (national) patents, the latter are only 
valid in and for the State where they have been granted. Where another entity infringes 
several of such patents, there is not only one infringement, but each patent infringement is 
considered separately. Further, it might well happen that a patent holder suffers from 
infringement of his patent(s) by several infringers. Regularly, he will then be interested in 
consolidating proceedings against the concerned infringers.  
 
Within the European legal framework, the Brussels Ibis Regulation, being also applicable to 
cross-border patent infringement proceedings, provides for specific rules with regard to the 
addressed situations (which are merely to be understood as examples). Although being 
constantly shaped by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, and being developed from the Brussels 
Convention via the Brussels I Regulation to the Brussels Ibis Regulation, a deeper analysis of 
the matter reveals that the respective rules of the Brussels Ibis Regulation still contain 
considerable deficiencies when it comes to the question to what extent adequate patent 
protection and enforcement is ensured.  
 
This thesis primarily aims to propose in which way such deficiencies within the system of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation can be healed.  
 
However, this requires, first, to outline the (legal) framework in order to be able to evaluate 
whether there actually is a deficiency. Besides, it is essential to clearly demonstrate which 
deficiencies exist. On this basis, one should never ignore present (legal) developments which 
potentially offer alternative solutions.   
 
Following these principles, this thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 briefly deals 
with certain fundamental aspects which are relevant for cross-border patent infringement 
proceedings. Different concepts of a patent – from the common law and the civil law 
perspective – are mentioned and embedded in their historical environment, followed by a 
presentation of different ways of justification for the existence of patents. Further, the 
different types of patents – national patents, classical (ordinary) European patents, and 
European patents with unitary effect (which are to be established) are outlined, as well as the 
existing patent categories of product patents and process patents (which will play a role in the 
further course of the thesis). Last but not least, Chapter 1 also treats the crucial question of 
whether the principle of territoriality, a principle of substantive law, is also relevant for 
international jurisdiction in cross-border patent infringement disputes. In this respect, 
approaches of several European States (United Kingdom, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) are considered. While the courts of all these States originally held that they are 
not competent to decide on the infringement of a foreign patent, this attitude has significantly 
changed during the last decades. Even English courts have given up their negative attitude 
towards a decision in proceedings on the infringement of a foreign patent at least in relation to 
proceedings within the scope of the Brussels Convention (Brussels Ibis Regulation).  
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Chapter 2 analyses in detail which deficiencies with regard to jurisdiction rules of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation being relevant for cross-border patent infringement proceedings, 
exist at present. After shortly addressing Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation which 
contains the fundamental principle of actor sequitur forum rei, Chapter 2 undertakes a 
deepened analysis of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. In essence, Chapter 2 first 
states that Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is also applicable to an action for a 
declaration of non-infringement. One focus of Chapter 2 lies on the question of the 
determination of the place of the infringing event in terms of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation. On the basis of an extended analysis, Chapter 2 concludes that the existence of an 
extraterritorial place of the event giving rise to the damage according to Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation requires that the conditions of accountability and a particularly close 
connection between the infringing acting and the invoked court are fulfilled, whereas, as to 
European patents, a differentiation between product patents and process patents should be 
made. With regard to the question of whether an extraterritorial place where the damage 
occurred according to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is conceivable and where it 
is to be located, Chapter 2 concludes that only the place where the patent right has been 
infringed (“Ort der Rechtsgutverletzung”) is to be considered such a place. Regarding the 
territorial scope of authority to decide of a court pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, Chapter 2 underlines that only in the case of process patents, a court at the place 
of manufacture should also be authorised to decide on the infringement of parallel patents 
granted in respectively for the territory of another State than the forum State. As to the place 
where the damage occurred, i.e. the place where the patent right is being infringed, the 
invoked court has only authority to decide on this very infringement, but not concerning 
parallel infringements.  
 
Having treated Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, Chapter 2 points out that the 
criterion of a “close connection” according to Article 8(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation may 
also constitute a crucial problem regarding cross-border patent infringement proceedings. 
Despite specific jurisprudence of the ECJ, it has not been fully clarified yet under which 
circumstances there is such a “close connection”. 
 
Chapter 2 then turns to a detailed discussion of relevant problems in the framework of 
exclusive jurisdiction according to Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation. After treating 
the controversial question of whether Article 24(4) should be applied by way of a reflexive 
application vis-à-vis third State defendants (which is denied in this thesis), Chapter 2 analyses 
the consequences of the GAT decision of the ECJ. Further issues addressed in detail are which 
requirements exist as to the defence of invalidity and which consequences an invalidity 
defence effects in concreto.  
 
The last Article of the Brussels Ibis Regulation treated in Chapter 2 is Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (cross-border interim relief). Chapter 2 makes clear that Article 35 is 
not the only possible legal basis for provisional measures contained in the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, but that also courts which have jurisdiction on the merits have (accessory) 
jurisdiction to order provisional measures. Chapter 2 then treats in details both accessory 
jurisdiction to order provisional measures and jurisdiction according to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation (in conjunction with national law), and analyses which problems are 
existing  (or have – partly – been solved by the ECJ). One aspect of particular importance 
which affects both accessory jurisdiction and jurisdiction according to Article 35 of the 
Brussels Ibis Regulation is the question if Article 24(4) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation is 
applicable when the invalidity defence is raised in provisional proceedings. While the ECJ has 
denied this question, in its Solvay decision, as to Article 35 of the Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
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the question has remained unanswered as to accessory jurisdiction. On the basis of an analysis 
which also takes into consideration national case law of Member States, this thesis arrives at 
the conclusion that both types of provisional proceedings should be treated equally in this 
respect. 
 
On the basis of the insight that general rules of jurisdiction (according to the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation) should apply also with regard to cross-border patent infringement proceedings, 
and in light of the analysis of the current deficiencies within the system of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation undertaken in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 develops proposals as to an amendment of the 
respective provisions. This approach is undertaken also by reference to existing reform 
proposals which are compared with each other in order to find out – if the content of the 
reform proposals differs – which way to solve a problem seems most appropriate. In 
particular, this thesis treats relevant solutions of the ALI Principles and the CLIP Principles, 
but also takes into consideration the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2001), the Heidelberg Report on the Application 
of Regulation Brussels I (Heidelberg Report) and the Commission Proposal 2010 for Reform 
of the Brussels I Regulation (Commission Proposal 2010). However, Chapter 3 does not stop 
at a mere comparison of existing reform proposals, but develops own formulation proposals. 
 
Chapter 4 finally considers the creation of the European patent with unitary effect and the 
Unified Patent Court (UPC) as an alternative to the present system of national patents and 
ordinary European patents without a special “European” patent judiciary. After briefly 
presenting the history of the creation of a uniform patent in Europe, Chapter 4 discusses the 
main features of the European patent with unitary effect and of the UPC, and undertakes an 
evaluation of several aspects. While concluding that Article 118(1) TFEU should be 
considered as a sufficient legal basis for the construction of the European patent with unitary 
effect by way of a combination of EU law (Regulation 1257/2012 and Regulation 1260/2012) 
and international law (EPC and UPC Agreement), it is at least doubtful whether a unitary 
patent will actually be an attractive alternative to an ordinary European patent, primarily due 
to the fact that it is still unclear which costs will be produced. Regarding the UPC, Chapter 4 
in particular underlines that the European legislator has successfully amended the Brussels 
Ibis Regulation, by Regulation 542/2014, in order to ensure compliance between the UPC 
Agreement and the Brussels Ibis Regulation. Only minor further amendments concerning the 
wording and structure of the provisions should be undertaken. However, doubts remain as to 
the questions of whether the creation of the UPC effects legal certainty, whether it will work 























































Grensoverschrijdende octrooi-inbreukprocedures binnen de Europese Unie 
 
In onze moderne geïndustrialiseerde samenleving vormen intellectuele eigendomsrechten 
(“ie-rechten”), en in het bijzonder octrooien, voor veel bedrijven en particulieren de meest 
essentiële bezittingen en zijn zij de basis voor veel bedrijfsactiviteiten. In het licht hiervan is 
adequate bescherming van ie-rechten voor deze bedrijven van eminent belang. In de 
internationale arena worden octrooihouders met diverse problemen geconfronteerd. Als 
gevolg van het territoriaal beperkte karakter van (nationale) octrooien zijn deze slechts geldig 
in en voor het grondgebied van het land waar zij zijn verleend. Als een andere partij inbreuk 
maakt op meerdere van dergelijke octrooien, dan betreft dit niet één enkele inbreuk, maar 
moet de inbreuk op elk van deze octrooien afzonderlijk worden bezien. Bovendien is het goed 
denkbaar dat de octrooihouder te maken krijgt met een inbreuk op zijn octrooi(en) door 
meerdere partijen. Doorgaans zal hij dan de procedures tegen de betrokken inbreuk makende 
partijen willen samenvoegen. 
 
Binnen de Europese juridische kaders voorziet de Brussel Ibis-Verordening, die ook van 
toepassing is op grensoverschrijdende octrooi-inbreukprocedures, in specifieke regels voor de 
aangeduide situaties (die louter als voorbeelden moeten worden begrepen). Hoewel zij 
voortdurend worden aangescherpt door de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie van de EU 
(“HvJ EU”), en zij zich ontwikkelden van het EEX-Verdrag via de Brussel I-Verordening 
naar de Brussel Ibis-Verordening, laat een grondigere analyse van deze kwestie zien dat de 
betreffende regels uit de Brussel Ibis-Verordening nog altijd aanzienlijke tekortkomingen 
vertonen als het gaat om de vraag in welke mate een adequate octrooibescherming en -
handhaving worden gewaarborgd. 
 
Dit proefschrift is er hoofdzakelijk op gericht voorstellen te doen voor de manier waarop deze 
tekortkomingen binnen het systeem van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening kunnen worden 
opgelost. 
 
Hiervoor is het echter noodzakelijk eerst de (juridische) kaders uiteen te zetten om te kunnen 
beoordelen of er daadwerkelijk tekortkomingen zijn. Daarnaast is het essentieel om duidelijk 
te laten zien welke tekortkomingen er bestaan. Bovendien mag men nooit de ogen sluiten voor 
de huidige (juridische) ontwikkelingen die mogelijk alternatieve oplossingen bieden. 
 
Ter uitvoering van het voorgaande is dit proefschrift in vier hoofdstukken onderverdeeld. In 
hoofdstuk 1 wordt kort aandacht geschonken aan enkele fundamentele aspecten van 
grensoverschrijdende octrooi-inbreukprocedures. Verschillende visies op een octrooi – vanuit 
common law- en civil law-perspectief – komen aan de orde en worden ingebed in hun 
historische context, waarna verschillende rechtvaardigingen voor het bestaan van octrooien 
worden uiteengezet. Vervolgens worden de verschillende soorten octrooien – nationale 
octrooien, klassieke (reguliere) Europese octrooien en Europese octrooien met eenvormige 
werking (die nog moeten worden ingevoerd) – besproken, alsmede de bestaande 
octrooicategorieën van productoctrooien en werkwijze-octrooien (die in het verdere verloop 
van het proefschrift een rol zullen spelen). En last but not least is er in hoofdstuk 1 aandacht 
voor de cruciale vraag of het territorialiteitsbeginsel, een beginsel uit het materiële recht, ook 
relevant is voor de internationale rechtsmacht in grensoverschrijdende octrooi-
inbreukgeschillen. In dit verband worden benaderingen van verschillende Europese landen 
(Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk, Duitsland en Nederland) bezien. Terwijl de rechters zich in 
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al deze landen oorspronkelijk onbevoegd achtten te oordelen over de inbreuk op een 
buitenlands octrooi, is deze houding de laatste decennia aanzienlijk veranderd. Zelfs de 
Engelse rechter heeft zijn negatieve houding ten aanzien van een beslissing in een procedure 
over de inbreuk op een buitenlands octrooi opgegeven, tenminste voor zover de procedure 
valt binnen het toepassingsgebied van het EEX-Verdrag (de Brussel Ibis-Verordening). 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een gedetailleerde analyse van de vraag welke tekortkomingen er op dit 
moment bestaan met betrekking tot de rechtsmachtregels uit de Brussel Ibis-Verordening die 
gelden voor octrooi-inbreukprocedures. Na een korte behandeling van artikel 4 lid 1 van de 
Brussel Ibis-Verordening, waarin het fundamentele uitgangspunt actor sequitur forum rei is 
neergelegd, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een diepgravende analyse gegeven van artikel 7 sub 2 van 
de Brussel Ibis-Verordening. In essentie stelt hoofdstuk 2 in de eerste plaats dat artikel 7 sub 2 
van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening ook van toepassing is indien om een verklaring voor recht 
wordt gevraagd dat er van een inbreuk geen sprake is. Een belangrijk aandachtspunt in 
hoofdstuk 2 is de vraag naar de bepaling van de plaats van het inbreukmakende feit in de zin 
van artikel 7 sub 2 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening. Op basis van een uitgebreide analyse 
wordt de conclusie getrokken dat indien de plaats van het schadebrengende feit volgens 
artikel 7 sub 2 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening buiten het grondgebied is gelegen, er wordt 
verlangd dat aan de voorwaarden van toerekenbaarheid en een bijzonder nauwe band tussen 
het inbreukmakende handelen en de aangezochte rechter is voldaan, terwijl, als het gaat om 
Europese octrooien, onderscheid zou moeten worden gemaakt tussen productoctrooien en 
werkwijze-octrooien. Met betrekking tot de vraag of het denkbaar is dat de plaats waar de 
schade intreedt volgens artikel 7 sub 2 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening buiten het 
grondgebied kan zijn gelegen en hoe deze dient te worden bepaald, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de 
conclusie getrokken dat alleen de plaats waar inbreuk wordt gemaakt op het octrooirecht (“Ort 
der Rechtsgutverletzung”) als zodanig kan worden beschouwd. Op het vlak van de territoriale 
reikwijdte van de rechtsmacht van de rechter krachtens artikel 7 sub 2 van de Brussel Ibis-
Verordening wordt in hoofdstuk 2 onderstreept dat alleen in geval van werkwijze-octrooien 
de rechter van de plaats van productie ook rechtsmacht zou moeten hebben om te oordelen 
over de inbreuk op parallelle octrooien, toegekend in respectievelijk voor het grondgebied van 
een ander land dan dat van de rechter. De aangezochte rechter in het land waar de schade 
intreedt, te weten het land waar inbreuk op het octrooirecht wordt gemaakt, is enkel bevoegd 
te oordelen over die betreffende inbreuk, maar niet ten aanzien van parallelle inbreuken. 
 
Nadat artikel 7 sub 2 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening is behandeld, maakt hoofdstuk 2 
duidelijk dat het criterium van de “nauwe band” uit artikel 8 sub 1 van de Brussel Ibis-
Verordening ook een lastig probleem zou kunnen vormen in grensoverschrijdende octrooi-
inbreukzaken. In weerwil van specifieke jurisprudentie van het HvJ EU, is nog altijd niet 
volledig opgehelderd onder welke omstandigheden er sprake is van een dergelijke “nauwe 
band”. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt vervolgens uitvoerig aandacht besteed aan de problemen die met 
betrekking tot de exclusieve bevoegdheid volgens artikel 24 sub 4 van de Brussel Ibis-
Verordening bestaan. Na bespreking van de controversiële vraag of artikel 24 sub 4 van de 
Brussel Ibis-Verordening in het kader van de reflexwerking ook jegens verweerders uit derde 
landen zou moeten worden toegepast (welke vraag in dit proefschrift ontkennend wordt 
beantwoord), volgt in hoofdstuk 2 een analyse van de gevolgen van de GAT-uitspraak van het 
HvJ EU. Verder komt uitvoerig aan de orde welke vereisten er bestaan voor een 




Het laatste artikel van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening dat in hoofdstuk 2 wordt behandeld is 
artikel 35 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening (grensoverschrijdende voorlopige en bewarende 
maatregelen). Hoofdstuk 2 maakt duidelijk dat artikel 35 niet de enige mogelijke juridische 
grondslag vormt voor voorlopige maatregelen onder de Brussel Ibis-Verordening, maar dat 
ook de rechter die bevoegd is om van het bodemgeschil kennis te nemen (aanvullende) 
rechtsmacht bezit om voorlopige maatregelen uit te vaardigen. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt 
vervolgens uitvoerig aandacht besteed aan zowel de aanvullende rechtsmacht tot het 
uitvaardigen van voorlopige maatregelen als de rechtsmacht krachtens artikel 35 van de 
Brussel Ibis-Verordening (in samenhang met nationaal recht), en wordt geanalyseerd welke 
problemen er bestaan (of – gedeeltelijk – zijn opgelost door het HvJ EU). Een aspect dat in 
het bijzonder van belang is en dat raakt aan zowel de aanvullende rechtsmacht als de 
rechtsmacht krachtens artikel 35 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening, is de vraag of artikel 24 
sub 4 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening van toepassing is indien in de procedure tot een 
voorlopige voorziening een (on)geldigheidsverweer wordt gevoerd. Terwijl deze vraag met 
betrekking tot artikel 35 van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening ontkennend is beantwoord door het 
HvJ EU in zijn Solvay-beslissing, is deze vraag onbeantwoord gebleven ten aanzien van de 
aanvullende rechtsmacht. Op grond van een analyse waarbij ook nationale jurisprudentie uit 
de lidstaten in ogenschouw is genomen, wordt in dit proefschrift de conclusie getrokken dat 
beide typen procedures tot voorlopige maatregelen in dit opzicht gelijk zouden moeten 
worden behandeld. 
 
Op basis van de overtuiging dat de algemene rechtsmachtbepalingen (volgens de Brussel Ibis-
Verordening) ook van toepassing zouden moeten zijn op grensoverschrijdende octrooi-
inbreukzaken en in het licht van de analyse uit hoofdstuk 2 ten aanzien van de huidige 
tekortkomingen in het systeem van de Brussel Ibis-Verordening, worden in hoofdstuk 3 
voorstellen gedaan tot aanpassing van de desbetreffende bepalingen. Dit gebeurt onder meer 
door verwijzing naar bestaande voorstellen tot herziening, die met elkaar worden vergeleken 
om erachter te komen – wanneer de inhoud van de herzieningsvoorstellen verschilt – wat de 
meest geschikte manier lijkt te zijn om een probleem op te lossen. In het bijzonder worden in 
dit proefschrift de betreffende oplossingen uit de ALI Principles en de CLIP Principles 
behandeld, maar ook wordt aandacht besteed aan het ontwerp Haags Bevoegdheids- en 
Executieverdrag betreffende burgerlijke en handelszaken (2001), het Heidelberg Report on 
the Application of Regulation Brussels I (Heidelberg Rapport) en het Commissievoorstel uit 
2010 voor een herziening van de Brussel I-Verordening (Commissievoorstel 2010). 
Hoofdstuk 3 is echter niet beperkt tot het enkel vergelijken van bestaande 
herzieningsvoorstellen, maar daarin worden ook nieuw ontwikkelde voorstellen geformuleerd. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden ten slotte de instelling van het Europese octrooi met eenvormige 
werking en het Eengemaakt Octrooigerecht (EOG) beschouwd als alternatief voor het huidige 
systeem van nationale octrooien en reguliere Europese octrooien zonder een speciale 
Europese octrooirechter. Na een korte uiteenzetting van de geschiedenis van de instelling van 
een eenvormig octrooi in Europa, komen in hoofdstuk 4 de belangrijkste kenmerken van het 
Europese octrooi met eenvormige werking en van het EOG aan de orde, en worden deze aan 
een evaluatie onderworpen. Hoewel wordt geconcludeerd dat moet worden aangenomen dat 
artikel 118 lid 1 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie (VWEU) een 
toereikende juridische grondslag biedt voor de instelling van het Europese octrooi met 
eenvormige werking door een combinatie van EU-recht (Verordening 1257/2012 en 
Verordening 1260/2012) en internationaal recht (Europees Octrooiverdrag en Overeenkomst 
betreffende een eengemaakt octrooigerecht), moet op zijn minst worden betwijfeld of een 
eenvormig octrooi daadwerkelijk een aantrekkelijk alternatief voor een regulier Europees 
octrooi zal zijn, voornamelijk vanwege het feit dat het nog altijd onduidelijk is welke kosten 
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hiermee gepaard zullen gaan. Met betrekking tot het EOG wordt in hoofdstuk 4 in het 
bijzonder onderstreept dat de Europese wetgever erin is geslaagd door middel van 
Verordening 542/2014 de Brussel Ibis-Verordening aan te passen, om de onderlinge 
afstemming tussen de Overeenkomst betreffende een eengemaakt octrooigerecht en de 
Brussel Ibis-Verordening te waarborgen. Slechts op ondergeschikte punten zouden de 
formulering en structuur van de bepalingen nog verder moeten worden aangepast. Er blijven 
echter twijfels bestaan ten aanzien van de vragen of de instelling van het EOG de 
rechtszekerheid zal vergroten, of het effectief zal kunnen functioneren en of het een reductie 
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